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මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතියේ ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය සහ එම ව්‍යාපෘතිය සඳහා වන ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු පිළිබඳ විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාව

1. විධායක සාරාංශය

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- (i) 2014 දෙසැම්බර් 31 දින වන විට ස්මෙක් ආයතනයට (SMEC) රු.මිලියන 1,759 ක් ද එම ආයතනයේ වාර්තා පිළිගත හැකි තත්වයක නොපවතින නිසා මේ සම්බන්ධව විවිධ අධ්‍යයන සඳහා බාහිර ආයතන වලට රු.මිලියන 65 ක්ද ගෙවා තිබුණද අවසාන ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන වාර්තාවක් සකස් කර නොතිබුණි.
- (ii) විගණන දිනය වන විටත් අධිවේගී මාර්ගපථය පැහැදිලිව හඳුනාගෙන ඇස්තමේන්තු සංශෝධනය කර නොමැති තත්වයක් යටතේ ලංසු ලේඛණ පිළියෙල කිරීම සහ ලංසු ඇගයීමේ නිරවද්‍යතාවය විගණනයට ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වේ.
- (iii) ව්‍යාපෘතිය සඳහා වන ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුවලට ලැබුණු අනුමැතිය, එය අනමත කළ දිනය, සහ එම ඇස්තමේන්තුව පිළියෙල කළ නිලධාරීන්ගේ නිල මුද්‍රා නොවීය.
- (iv) මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග අංක 01, 02 සහ 03 වන කොටස් වලට අදාළව උපදේශක සමාගමක් සහ කොන්ත්‍රාත් සමාගමක් තෝරාගැනීමේ පටිපාටිය 2006 රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයේ 1.1 වගන්තියට පටහැනිව ක්‍රියාත්මකවී තිබුණි.

- (v) තරභකාරී මිල ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය නොකිරීම හේතුවෙන් 2006 රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයේ අංක 1.2.1 වගන්තියට පටහැනිව තිබුණි.
- (vi) කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරු තෝරාගැනීමේදී අනුගමනය කර ඇති පටිපාටියට අනුව එය රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයේ අංක 1.4.2 සහ 1.4.3 හි දැක්වෙන ප්‍රසම්පාදන සාරධර්මවලට පටහැනි වී තිබුණි.
- (vii) ජපන් තානාපති විසින් නම් කරන ලද ආයතනවලින් ලංසු කැඳවීම සඳහා තාක්ෂණික ඇගයීම් කමිටු නිර්දේශය නොතිබුණි.
- (viii) ජපාන තානාපති කාර්යාලය විසින් මෙම අවිධිමත් ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියට අකමැත්ත පලකර තිබියදීත් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් විසින් ලංසුකරුවන් නම් කරන ලෙස ජපන් තානාපති වෙත ලිපි ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශයන්ට අනුකූල වී නොතිබුණි.
- (ix) මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයාද විරෝධය පළ කර තිබියදීත් අනුගමනය කර තිබූ තරභකාරී ලංසු ක්‍රියාවලිය නවතා ඊට පරිබාහිරව අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ කැබිනට් සංදේශයේ සඳහන් පරිදි Fujita සමාගම විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ලංසුව පිළිබඳව එම ආයතනය (Fujita) සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමට උත්සහ කිරීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයට පටහැනිවේ.
- (x) ධාරිතාවය නොමැති හෙයින් Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව ප්‍රතික්ෂේපවී තිබියදීත් එකී ලංසුව නැවත වතාවක් ඇගයීමට ලක්කරන ලෙස ජපාන විශේෂ උපදේශකගේ ඉල්ලීම පිළිගෙන ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශවලට පටහැනි වේ.
- (xi) Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම නිවැරදි බවට නැවතත් ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව නිර්දේශ කර තිබියදීත් ඊට පටහැනිව එකී සමාගමට, ප්‍රසම්පාදනය ප්‍රදානය සඳහා හිමිකමක් ඇති Taisei සමාගම සමඟ බද්ධවීමට අනුමැතිය ලබාගැනීම සහ ඊට බලපෑම් කිරීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මූලධර්මවලට පටහැනිවේ.

ඉහත කරුණු හේතුවෙන් රාජ්‍ය මුදල් සහ අනෙකුත් සම්පත් අපතේයාම සිදු වන අතර වැය වන මුදල සහ ඊට ලැබෙන අගය අතර විශාල වෙනසක් පවතින බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. එසේම ව්‍යාපෘතිය සඳහා යොදා ගනු ලබන රාජ්‍ය ණය කාර්යක්ෂමව, ආර්ථිකභාවයෙන් යුතුව හා ඵලදායී ලෙස භාවිතා කළ යුතු අතර, එසේ භාවිතා කරන බව සහතික කිරීම සඳහා සුදුසු අභ්‍යන්තර පාලන ක්‍රම සැලසුම් කිරීම, ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම හා යාවත්කාලීනව පවත්වාගෙන යාම කළමනාකරණයේ වගකීමක් වේ. තවද, විදේශ ආධාර යටතේ ක්‍රියාත්මක වන මෙවැනි මහාපරිමාන ව්‍යාපෘති සැලසුම් කිරීමේදී සහ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමේදී ඊට සම්බන්ධිත නිලධාරීන් නිසි වෘත්තීය පරීක්ෂාවෙන් කටයුතු කළ යුතු වන අතර යහ පාලන ආකෘතිය තුළ මීට සම්බන්ධ ආයතන ක්‍රියා කිරීමද අත්‍යවශ්‍ය වේ.

2. උක්ත වාර්තාව නිකුත් කිරීමේ පසුබිම සහ වාර්තාවේ ස්වභාවය

2017 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 19 දින පැය 1430 ට පැවති පොදු ව්‍යාපාර පිළිබඳ කාරක සභා සාකච්ඡාවේදී මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතියේ ප්‍රගතිය පිළිබඳව සහ ඒ සම්බන්ධව වර්තමානයේ උද්ගතව ඇති ගැටලු සම්බන්ධව කරන ලද සාකච්ඡාවට අනුව සහ ඊට උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය, මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සහ ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද කරුණු දැක්වීම් වලට අනුව, විශේෂ විගණන වාර්තාවක් පිළියෙල කරන ලෙස විගණකාධිපතිවරයාගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කල අතර ඒ එකඟතාවය පරිදි මෙම වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබේ.

3. මෙම වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීමේදී පහත සඳහන් ලේඛන පරීක්ෂා කරන ලදී.

- 3.1 2006 වර්ෂයේ නිකුත් කල අංක NPA/CEO/18 දරන ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහය සහ අත්පොත
- 3.2 ප්‍රසම්පාදන අත්පොතට අමතරව මේ දක්වා නිකුත් කර ඇති ප්‍රසම්පාදන ව්‍යාතිරේඛ
- 3.3 ව්‍යාපෘති කටයුතුවලට අදාලව නිකුත් කර ඇති අමාත්‍යමණ්ඩල සංදේශ සහ අමාත්‍යමණ්ඩල තීරණ
- 3.4 උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය. මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය, ව්‍යාපෘති කාර්යාලය, ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුකමිටුව අතර හුවමාරු වූ ලිපිලේඛන
- 3.5 ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුවාර්තා සහ අමාත්‍යමණ්ඩල සාකච්ඡා කමිටු (Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee) වාර්තා
- 3.6 ජපාන තානාපති කාර්යාලය, ව්‍යාපෘති කාර්යාලය, අමාත්‍යතුමා, අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා, මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපතිතුමා අතර හුවමාරු වූ ලිපිලේඛන
- 3.7 පූර්ව ලංසු රැස්වීම් වාර්තා, ලංසු ලේඛන, අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ මූලික සැලසුම්, ඇස්තමේන්තු, ලංසු ලේඛනවලට සංශෝධන ආදී ලේඛන
- 3.8 පුවත්පත්වල පළවූ වාර්තා
- 3.9 විවිධ වෙබ් අඩවිවල පලවූ ලිපි සහ වාර්තා
- 3.10 විවිධ පාර්ශවයන් සමඟ පැවැත්වූ සම්මුඛ සාකච්ඡා වල සටහන්

4. විගණන විෂය පථය

යටිතල පහසුකම් සංවර්ධන කාර්යයේදී 2007 වර්ෂයේදී මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් පිළියෙල කළ මහා මාර්ග මහ සැලැස්මට අනුව හඳුනාගත් ප්‍රධාන මාර්ග සංවර්ධන ව්‍යාපෘති අතර කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගය සහ කොළඹ - යාපනය අධිවේගී මාර්ගය හඳුනාගෙන ඇති අතර ඊට පෙර අධිවේගී මාර්ග පිළිබඳ කිසිදු සැලැස්මක් නොතිබූ තත්වයක් තුළ 1990 වර්ෂයේ සිට 2012 ජූලි මස වන තෙක් කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ඉදිකිරීමේ අරමුණින් ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකයක් පිහිටුවා, ක්‍රියාත්මක වී ඇති අතර 2012 වර්ෂය අවසානයේ සිට 2015 ජූලි දක්වා කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගය සහ කොළඹ - යාපනය අධිවේගී මාර්ගය සැලකිල්ලට ගනිමින් උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ලෙස නම්කර එඬේරමුල්ල සිට කුරුණෑගල දක්වා කොටස් දෙකකින් සහ නුවරට සම්බන්ධිත මාර්ගයක් ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන, ඉදිකිරීම් සහ උපදේශක සේවා සඳහා කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් තෝරා ගැනීම සඳහා කටයුතු සිදුකර ඇත. පසුව 2015 ජූලි මස සිට මෙම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ලෙස නම්කර කඩවත සිට දඹුල්ල දක්වා කොටස් තුනකින් සහ නුවරට සම්බන්ධිත මාර්ගය ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන සිදුකිරීමට සහ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු වෙනුවෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරමින් සිටියි. මෙම කටයුතු වෙනුවෙන් විටින් විට අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා හා ඊට සබැඳි තීරණ නිරන්තරයෙන් ඉදිරිපත් වී ඇති අතර අදාළ ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වය සඳහා ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකක පිහිටුවා විශාල වශයෙන් වියදම් සිදුකර තිබුණි. මෙම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයට අදාළ ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන සහ ඉදිකිරීමට අදාළව ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු පරීක්ෂාවට විගණන විෂය පථය සීමාවේ.

5. විෂය පථයේ සීමාකම්

- 5.1 සක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනයක් සඳහා ස්ථාන රජය සහ ස්ථාන ජාත්‍යන්තර සංවර්ධන ආයතනය විසින් ලබාදුන් රු. මි. 119 ක ප්‍රදානයෙන් රු.මි. 85.1ක් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් වියදම් දැරූ ආකාරය පිළිබඳ කරුණු විගණනයට හෙළිදරව් නොවීය.
- 5.2 අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන අවසන් කර ඇති මැලේසියාවේ පෞද්ගලික සමාගම සමඟ පැවති ගිවිසුම සහ ඔවුහු සමඟ කරන ලද ක්‍රියාවලිය සහ ගනුදෙනු වලට අදාළ තොරතුරු විගණනයට හෙළිදරව් නොවීය.

6. ක්‍රියාවලිය හැඳින්වීම

- 1990 සිට මේ දක්වා කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගය, උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය, මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය වශයෙන් මෙහි විකාශනය.
- කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගය, උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය සහ මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයට අදාළ ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනයන්, ගිවිසුම්වලට එළඹීම, TOR පිළියෙල කිරීම, ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තු පිළියෙල කිරීම, කාලය දීර්ඝ කිරීම් ලබාදීම, විවලන නියෝග ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම හා ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන වාර්තා වල ප්‍රගතිය
- ව්‍යාපෘතියට අදාළ උපදේශකයින් තෝරාගැනීම කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් තෝරාගැනීම ආශ්‍රිත ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු.

7. ක්‍රියාවලිය

7.1 මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ විකාශනය

7.1.1 කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගය

7.1.1.1 කොළඹ - නුවර මාර්ගය සැලකිල්ලට ගනිමින් මධ්‍යම පළාතට අධිවේගී මාර්ගයක් ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 1990 ඔක්තෝබර් 04 දින ලබා දී තිබූ අතර එම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා, ඉදිකිරීම, ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සහ පැවරීම (BOT) යන පදනම යොදා ගැනීම සඳහා අනුමැතිය 2002 සැප්තැම්බර් මස 18 දින ලබාදී තිබුණි . මෙම ව්‍යාපෘතියේ කටයුතු වෙනුවෙන් ආරම්භ කරන ලද ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකය ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන කටයුතු වෙනුවෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක වී ඇති අතර 2012 වර්ෂය අවසානය තෙක් ගිණුම් පිළියෙල කර තිබුණි.

7.1.2 උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය

7.1.2.1 වරාය හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් 2012 ජූලි 09 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශයක් ඉදිරිපත් කරමින් 2007 - 2017 වර්ෂ සඳහා මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් සකස් කරන ලද මහා මාර්ග මහා සැලැස්ම යටතේ හඳුනාගනු ලැබූ අධිවේගී මාර්ග 06 න් 01 ක් උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය වන බවත් කොළඹ - යාපනය අධිවේගී මාර්ගය උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ලෙස කොළඹ සිට කුරුණෑගල දක්වා කොටස් 02 කින් සහ කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගයට ද සම්බන්ධතාවයක් ලබාදෙමින් හැදෙණිය අන්තර්නුවමාරුව දක්වා ද ඉදිකිරීමට යෝජනා කර තිබුණි.

- පළමු කොටස - එඬේරමුල්ල - හොරපෙ - රාගම - වල්පොල - බටුවත්ත - බුළුගොඩ - ගණේමුල්ල - යාගොඩ - ගම්පහ - දාරඵව - බෙම්මුල්ල - මගලෙගොඩ - හීන්දෙණිය - වේයන්ගොඩ - වදුරව - කීනවල - පල්ලෙවෙල - මීරිගම අන්තර් නුවමාරුව (42 Km)

- දෙවන කොටස - මීරිගම අන්තර් හුවමාරුව - බෝයවලාන - පොතුපිටිය අන්තර් හුවමාරුව - දම්පැලැස්ස -ගනේගොඩ, දෙහිකුඹුර,පල්ලන්දෙණිය අන්තර් හුවමාරුව (35 Km)
- තුන්වන කොටස(Link Expressway) - පොතුපිටිය අන්තර් හුවමාරුව - නුගවෙල - පොරමඩල - පොල්ගහවෙල - රඹුක්කන - හතරලියද්ද - හැදෙණිය අන්තර් හුවමාරුව (44 Km)

7.1.2.2 මූලික වශයෙන් මෙම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය මංතීරු 04 කින් ඉදිකිරීමටත් I සහ II කොටස් අනාගතයේදී මංතීරු 06 ක් වශයෙන් පුළුල් කිරීමටත් යෝජනා වී තිබුණි. මෙම අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශයට අනුමැතිය 2012 ජූලි 18 දින අනුමැතිය ලබාදී තිබුණි.

7.1.2.3 මේ අතර ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකය 2012 ජූලි 18 දිනැති කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල අනුමැතියට අනුව උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය , ඉදිකිරීම් සහ උපදේශක සේවා සඳහා කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් තෝරාගැනීමේ කටයුතු සඳහා ක්‍රියාත්මකවී ඇත.

7.1.3 මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය

7.1.3.1 2015 ජූලි 06 දිනැති උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහා මාර්ග අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කල අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශය මගින් මෙතෙක් උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ලෙස හඳුනාගත් මාර්ගය මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ලෙස නම් කර, ජාතික ප්‍රමුඛත්වය ලබාදිය යුතු ව්‍යාපෘතියක් ලෙස කඩිනමින් ආරම්භ කිරීම සඳහා 2015 ජූලි 08 දින අනුමැතිය ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි.

7.1.3.2 තවද ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකය මෙතැන් සිට 2015 ජූලි 08 දිනැති කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල අනුමැතියට අනුව මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය සහ පොතුහැර සිට ගලගෙදර දක්වා සම්බන්ධිත මාර්ගයේ (තෙවන කොටස) ඉදිකිරීම් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය යටිතල පහසුකම් කටයුතු සිදුකරමින් පවතින අතර මාර්ගයේ පළමු කොටස වන කඩවත සිට මීරිගම දක්වා ද, දෙවන කොටස මීරිගම සිට කුරුණෑගල දක්වාද, හතරවන කොටස කුරුණෑගල සිට දඹුල්ල දක්වා ද කොටස් වෙනුවෙන් වෙන වෙනම ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකක පිහිටුවා ඇත.

7.2 කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගයට, උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගයට සහ මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයට අදාළ ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනයන්

7.2.1 ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන ආයතනය තෝරා ගැනීම හා අරමුදල් සම්පාදනය

7.2.1.1 2003 ජූනි 25 දිනැති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණය ප්‍රකාර කොළඹ -නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය මැලේසියානු රජය මගින් ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීමට අනුමැතිය ලබා දී තිබුණු අතර ඒ අනුව 2003 සැප්තැම්බර් 10 දින මැලේසියානු රජය සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය විසින් අවබෝධතා ගිවිසුමකට අත්සන් තබා තිබුණි.

7.2.1.2 මෙම අවබෝධතා ගිවිසුම ප්‍රකාරව සිදුකළ යුතු විස්තරාත්මක ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය සඳහා ස්වීඩන් රජය සහ ස්වීඩන් ජාත්‍යන්තර සංවර්ධන ආයතනය විසින් රු.මි.119 ක ප්‍රදානයක් ලබා දී තිබූ අතර ස්වීඩන් උපදේශක සමාගමක් වන යුරෝ ඉන්ෆා ගෘප් (Euro Infra Group) ආයතනය විසින් අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ දිග කිලෝමීටර් 98 ක් සඳහා ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදුකර තිබුණි.

7.2.1.3 මෙම ස්වීඩන් ප්‍රදානයෙන් රු. මිලියන 85.1ක් ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකය පිහිටුවීමට පෙර මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් වියදම් දරා තිබුණු අතර ගිණුම්ගත කර නොතිබුණි.

7.2.1.4 2005 මැයි 30 වන විටත් මාර්ග පටය හඳුනාගෙන අත්පත්කරගත යුතු ඉඩම් ප්‍රමාණයද හඳුනාගෙන නොමැති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

7.2.1.5 ඒ අතර කාලයේදී මෙම ව්‍යාපෘතිය පෞද්ගලික ආයෝජන මත සිදුකිරීමට 2007 ජූනි 06 දින කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබා දී තිබුණි.

7.2.1.6 කෙසේවුවද, මැලේසියානු රජය සමග අත්සන් කළ අවබෝධතා ගිවිසුමේ කාලය 2007 සැප්තැම්බර් 10 දක්වා ද පසුව 2008 ජූනි 30 දක්වා ද අවස්ථා දෙකකදී දීර්ඝ කර තිබුණි.

7.2.1.7 2008 ජූනි 30 දිනද ඉක්මවා ගිවිසුමේ කාලය අවසන් වී තිබුණු අතර ව්‍යාපෘතියේ I වන අදියරේ කටයුතු මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් ආසියානු සංවර්ධන බැංකු අරමුදල් යටතේ සිදුකිරීමටත්, මැලේසියාවේ පෞද්ගලික සමාගම සමඟ පවතින ක්‍රියාවලිය අවසන් කිරීමටත් 2010 ජූනි 23 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන තිබුණි. මෙහි අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන අවසන් කර ඇති මැලේසියාවේ පෞද්ගලික සමාගම සමඟ පැවති ක්‍රියාවලිය කුමක්ද යන්න විගණනයට අනාවරණය නොවීය.

7.2.1.8 මෙම කටයුතු සිදුකිරීම සඳහා ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකයක් පිහිටුවා තිබූ අතර එහි කාර්යය මණ්ඩලය සඳහා අනුමැතිය 2003 සැප්තැම්බර් 25 දින කළමනාකරණ සේවා දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් ලබාදී තිබුණි. 2012 වර්ෂය අවසාන වන විට එම එම ඒකකය වෙනුවෙන් දරා තිබූ මුළු වියදම රු. මිලියන 284 කි. කොළඹ - නුවර අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ කටයුතු

මෙපමණකින් අවසන් වී ඇති අතර ඒ වෙනුවෙන් ගිණුම්ගත වූ රු. මි.284 ක් සහ මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් ගිණුම්ගත නොකළ රු.මි. 85.1 ක එකතුව වූ රු. මි. 369.1ක් වූ මුළු වියදම ගිණුම්වල ඉදිරියට ගෙන ගොස් නොමැති අතර එය අනාර්ථික සහ ගිණුම් වලින් වසන් කරන ලද වියදමක් වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

7.2.1.9 වරාය හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් 2012 ජූලි 09 දින ඉදිරිපත් කළ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශයට අනුව උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා සවිස්තරාත්මක අධ්‍යයන සහ සැලසුම් සැකසීමට පෙර ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන සහ පාරිසරික බලපෑම් තක්සේරු කිරීම අවශ්‍ය බවත්, ඒ සඳහා මෙවැනි ව්‍යාපෘති පිළිබඳ සමීප අත්දැකීම් ඇති කොළඹ - කටුනායක අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතියේ ඉදිකිරීම් අධීක්ෂණය සහ සැලසුම් සඳහා උපදේශකවරයා වන ඕස්ට්‍රේලියාවේ SMEC International Pvt Ltd ආයතනයට ප්‍රමාණවත් පලපුරුද්දක් සහිත වන බවත්, දක්වා තිබුණි.

7.2.1.10 මෙම ව්‍යාපෘතිය හැකි ඉක්මනින් ආරම්භ කිරීමට අපේක්ෂා කරන බැවින්, ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය සිදුකිරීම, පාරිසරික බලපෑම් තක්සේරුකිරීම සහ කැමැත්ත ඇති සියළු ආයෝජකයින්ගෙන් අභිලාෂ කැඳවීම (EOI) සහ කෙටි ලැයිස්තුගත කරන ලද ආයෝජකයින්ගෙන් යෝජනා සඳහා ඉල්ලීම් කැඳවීම (RFP) යන කාර්යයන් සඳහා ලිපි ලේඛන පිළියෙල කිරීම සෘජු කොන්ත්‍රාත් ක්‍රමය මගින් SMEC International Pvt Ltd යොදවා සිදුකිරීමටත් එම අධ්‍යයනයන් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් ඒකාබද්ධ අරමුදලින් ලබාගැනීමත් දක්වා තිබුණි. මේ සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 2012 ජූලි 18 දින ලැබී තිබුණි.

7.2.1.11 මේ අතර 2012 සැප්තැම්බර් 10 දින, උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ වැදගත්කම සහ හදිසිය නිසා කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව අත්සන් කිරීමට පෙර සේවාවන් ආරම්භ කරන ලෙස දන්වමින් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් SMEC International Pvt Ltd සමඟ අවබෝධතා ගිවිසුමක් අත්සන් කර තිබුණි.

7.2.1.12 තවදුරටත්, එදිනම මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපතිතුමා එම ආයතනය අමතන ලද ලිපියකින් ඔවුන් විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලබන තාක්ෂණික සහ මූල්‍ය යෝජනා ඇගයීමෙන් සහ කතිකා කරගැනීමෙන් පසුව කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව අත්සන් කරනු ලබන බවත්, රජය මෙම ව්‍යාපෘතියට ඉහළ ප්‍රමුඛතාවයක් දී ඇති නිසා සහ ඉක්මනින් ඉදිකිරීම් ආරම්භ කිරීමට අවශ්‍ය බැවින් ගිවිසුම් අත්සන් කරන තුරු හැකි ඉක්මනින් වැඩ ආරම්භ කරන (mobilize)ලෙසත් ඉල්ලා ඇත.

7.2.2 TOR (Terms of Reference) පිළියෙල කිරීම

7.2.2.1 මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්ගේ 2012 සැප්තැම්බර් 17 දිනැති SMEC ආයතනය අමතන ලද ලිපියකින් වැඩි විස්තර යෝජනා කැඳවීමේ ලිපියට (RFP) අමතරව වෙනම TOR එක මගින් ලබාදෙන බව දන්වා තිබූ අතර, එදිනම අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලය පත්කල උපදේශකයන්ගේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව (CACPC) රැස්වී ව්‍යාපෘති කළමනාකරණ ඒකකය විසින් සකස් කරන ලද (PMU) යෝජනා කැඳවීමේ ඉල්ලීම (RFP) සහ Terms Of Reference (TOR) අනුමත කර තිබුණි.

7.2.2.2 AUD 4,504,896 සහ LKR 499,503,825 ක් වටිනා SMEC ආයතනයේ මූල්‍ය සහ තාක්ෂණික යෝජනා 2012 සැප්තැම්බර් 24 දින ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණි.

7.2.2.3 අවබෝධතා ගිවිසුමක් අත්සන් කර හැකි ඉක්මනින් වැඩ ආරම්භ කරන ලෙස SMEC ආයතනයට දන්වා තිබුණද ඒ වන විට පිළියෙල කළ TOR, ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තු හා අදාල ආයතනය විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කළ මූල්‍ය සහ තාක්ෂණික යෝජනා නොතිබුණි.

7.2.2.4 මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් විසින් 2012 නොවැම්බර් 20 දිනැති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව(Standing Cabinet Appointed Review Committee-SCARC) අමතන ලද ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර SMEC ගේ යෝජනාව අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව (CAPC) විසින් ඇගයූ බවත් වට 3 ක් සාකච්ඡා කල බවත්, ඔවුන් විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කල රේටයන් ඉහළ අගයක් ගන්නා බවත් තවදුරටත් අඩුකරගත හැකි යැයි අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුවට (SCARC) හැඟේ නම් එය නිර්දේශ කරන බවත් දක්වා ඇත. ඒ අනුව, අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලය පත්කල උපදේශකයන්ගේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව (CACPC) විසින් පිරිවැය රු. 499,503,825 සිට 422,164,626 සහ AUD 4,504,897 සිට 4,375,839 දක්වා අඩුකර තිබුණි.

7.2.2.5 අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව විසින් තවදුරටත් සාකච්ඡා කිරීමෙන් පසු ඕස්ට්‍රේලියානු ඩොලර් (AUD) 3,998,671 ක් සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රු.414,233,734 කට කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව ප්‍රදානය කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර ඇත. මේ සඳහා 2012 දෙසැම්බර් 19 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන තිබේ.

7.2.3 විචලන නියෝග ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම

7.2.3.1 2013 මැයි 31 දිනැති වැඩ බලන ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයා විසින් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර SMEC ආයතනය විසින් විචලන නියෝග 01 ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණු අතර මේ පිළිබඳව හුවමාරු වූ ලිපි, අදහස් දැක්වීම් සහ කමිටු නිර්දේශ පිළිබඳ තොරතුරු ඇමුණුම -01 (i), (ii), (iii), iv), (v), (vi), (vii) හි දැක්වේ.

7.2.3.2 කෙසේ වුවද අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී කරන ලද සංශෝධන වලින් පසු අවසන් වරට සංශෝධිත විචලන නියෝග අංක 01 , 2013 ජුනි 23 දින ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණි. SMEC වෙතට ඔවුන්ගේ විෂය පථය පුලුල්කිරීම පිළිබඳව දැනුම්දුන්නේ කවුරුන්ද, එසේ දැනුම්දීමට පෙර විෂයපථය පුලුල් කිරීම සම්බන්ධයෙන් අනුගමනය කල ක්‍රියාවලිය කුමක්ද යන ප්‍රශ්න විගණනයේදී මතු වූවද ඒවාට පිළිතුරු ලබාදීමට ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ අපොහොසත් විය. කෙසේ වුවද, පිරිවැය ඇස්තමේන්තු පරීක්ෂණ කමිටුව (CEEC) විසින් විචලන නියෝගය නිර්දේශ කර තිබුණි.

7.2.3.3 මෙම විචලනය - 01 සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 2014 ජනවාරි 03 දින ලැබී ඇති අතර ඒ අනුව මුළු කොන්ත්‍රාත් වටිනාකම ශ්‍රී ලංකා රු.583,070,286ක් සහ ඕස්ට්‍රේලියානු ඩොලර් 3,998,671ක් දක්වා වැඩි වී තිබුණු අතර කොන්ත්‍රාත් කාලය 2014 මාර්තු 31 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කර තිබුණි. එසේ වුවද කැබිනට් අනුමැතිය ඉක්මවා ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් විටින් විට කාලය දීර්ඝ කිරීම් කර ඇති අතර ඒ අනුව අවසානයේ 2014 දෙසැම්බර් 31 දක්වා කාලය දීර්ඝ කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 02(i), (ii), (iii))

7.2.3.4 2014 අගෝස්තු 22 දින විචලන නියෝග - 02 ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණි.

7.2.3.5 ව්‍යාපෘතියේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් TOR එක ඉක්මවා SMEC ආයතනය වෙත විටින් විට කරන ලද කාර්ය පැවරුම් සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන එම ආයතනය විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද විචලන නියෝග 02 විටින් විට සංශෝධනය කර අවසානයේ 07 වන වරට 2015 මාර්තු 03 දින විචලන නියෝග 02 ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත.

7.2.3.6 මෙම නියෝගය පිළිබඳ 2017 මැයි 26 දින SMEC ආයතනයේ නීතිඥයාගෙන් ලිපියක් ලැබී ඇති අතර මෙය ඇගයීම සඳහා 2017 ජුනි 02 දින අමාත්‍යාංශයේ සැලසුම් අධ්‍යක්ෂකගේ ප්‍රධානත්වයෙන් කමිටුවක් පත්කර ඇත. නැවතත් 2017 ජුනි 22 සහ 2017 අගෝස්තු 09 දින SMEC ආයතනය විසින් එවන ලද ලිපි මගින් අදාළ ගෙවීම් දින 30 ක් ඇතුළත පියවා නොමැති නම් ගිවිසුමේ සාමාන්‍ය කොන්දේසි 8.2 ප්‍රකාරව කටයුතු කිරීමට සහ පමා පොළී අයකිරීමට සිදුවන බවත්, නීත්‍යානුකූලව කටයුතු කරන බවත් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියට දන්වා ඇත.

7.2.3.7 2017 ඔක්තෝබර් 04 දිනැති නීතිපති දෙපාර්තමේන්තුවේ ජ්‍යෙෂ්ඨ නියෝජ්‍ය සොලිසිටර් ජනරල් විසින් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ අධ්‍යක්ෂ (නීති) අමතන ලද ලිපියකට අනුව මෙම ආරවුල බේරුම්කාර මණ්ඩලයක් වෙත යොමු කර ඇති බව දන්වා තිබේ.

7.2.4 ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන වාර්තා ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම

7.2.4.1 2013 ජනවාරි 09 දින මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සහ SMEC ආයතනය අතර ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය වෙනුවෙන් අත්සන් කරන ලද ගිවිසුමට අදාළ TOR අනුව කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව පිටපත් 06 ක් සහ ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික පිටපතක් සමඟ වැඩ ආරම්භ කර මාස 06 ක් තුළ SMEC විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුවේ.

7.2.4.2 අවසන් කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියට ලැබී මාසයක් ඇතුළත ඒ පිළිබඳ අදහස් දැක්වීම් ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුය. තවද SMEC ආයතනයට අදහස් දැක්වීම් ලැබී මසක් ඇතුළත අවසන් වාර්තාව පිටපත් 20 ක් සහ ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික පිටපතක් සහිතව ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතුවේ.

7.2.4.3 කෙසේවුවද, 2013 නොවැම්බර් 22 දින පිටපත් 06 ක් සහ ඉලෙක්ට්‍රොනික පිටපතක් සමඟ අවසන් කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාව ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ අතර මෙම වාර්තාවට මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් අදහස් දැක්වීම් යවා නොතිබුණි. එසේ වුවද 2014 දෙසැම්බර් 30 වන විට SMEC International Pvt Ltd වෙත ගෙවා ඇති මුළු මුදල රු.1,759,123,766 ක් වන බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. (ඇමුණුම - 03)

7.2.4.4 SMEC International Pvt Ltd ආයතනය සමඟ ගිවිසුම් ගතව තිබියදී සහ එකී ගිවිසුම යටතේ අවසන් කෙටුම්පත් වාර්තාවට අදහස් දැක්වීම් ඉදිරිපත් කර අවසන් වර්තාව ගෙන්වා ගෙන නොමැති තත්වයක් තුළ එකී ගිවිසුම යටතේ කළ යුතු වැඩ සඳහා ඇමුණුම -04 (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) හි දැක්වෙන පරිදි වෙනත් ආයතන සමඟ රු. 97,255,497 කට ගිවිසුම් ගතව තිබුණි.

7.3 මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය සඳහා අනුගමනය කරන ලද ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලිය පළමුව මධ්‍යම පළාතට අධිවේගී මාර්ගයක් සහ පසුව නුවරට සම්බන්ධිත මාර්ගයක් සමඟ උතුරු පළාතට අධිවේගී මාර්ගයක් ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා වූ අවිධිමත් තීරණ සහ අධිවේගී මාර්ග ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා වූ නිශ්චිත ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්තියක් නොමැතිවීම හේතුවෙන් විශාල වියදමක් සහ කාලයක් වැයකර තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය වූ අතර ඒ පිළිබඳ විස්තර ඉහත 7.1 සහ 7.2 පරිච්ඡේදවල සඳහන් වේ. මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු පොතුහැර සිට ගලගෙදර දක්වා වූ මාර්ගයේ තුන්වන කොටස සඳහා මූලික වශයෙන් ක්‍රියාත්මක වී ඇති අතර පළමු සහ දෙවන කොටස් වල ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු ඊට අනුරූපීව ක්‍රියාත්මක කර ඇති බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය. ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලිය ප්‍රධාන වශයෙන් විෂය ක්ෂේත්‍ර 02 යටතේ සලකා බැලිය හැක.

7.3.1 මාර්ගයේ 03 කොටස සඳහා උපදේශන සමාගමක් තෝරාගැනීම

7.3.1.1 උපදේශන සමාගම්වලින් කැමැත්ත ප්‍රකාශ කිරීමේ ලියවිලි (Expression of Interest) කැඳවීම සඳහා 2015 දෙසැම්බර් 09 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලැබී තිබුණි. උපදේශක සමාගමක් තෝරාගැනීමේ ක්‍රමවේදය, ගුණත්ව උපදේශන පාදක ක්‍රමය (Quality Consultants Based Selection -QCBS) විය යුතු බවටත් 2015 දෙසැම්බර් 29 දින රැස්වූ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුවේදී තීරණය විය.

7.3.1.2 කැමැත්ත ප්‍රකාශ කිරීමේ ලිපි (EOI) කැඳවීම සඳහා 2015 දෙසැම්බර් 16 දින පල කළ පුවත්පත් දැන්වීමක් අනුව යෝජනා 04 ක් ලැබී තිබුණු අතර එම ආයතන සඳහා යෝජනා ඉල්ලීමේ ලිපි භාරදීම සඳහා මෙන්ම ඇගයීම් නිර්ණායක, යෝජනා ඉල්ලීමේ ලිපි මෙන්ම තාක්ෂණික හා මූල්‍ය යෝජනා කැඳවීම සඳහාද අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුවේ අනුමැතිය 2016 පෙබරවාරි 16 සහ 29 දිනවල ලැබී තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම -05)

7.3.1.3 2016 මැයි 06 වන දින උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහා මාර්ග අමාත්‍යවරයාගේ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශයට අනුව මෙම කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුවේ සංකීර්ණතාවය හේතුවෙන් මෙම ප්‍රසම්පාදනය අත්දැකීම් හා පළපුරුද්ද සහිත අන්තර්ජාතික උපදේශන ආයතනයකට පැවරීමට යෝජනා කළ අතර 2016 මැයි 10 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලැබී තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 06)

7.3.1.4 තවද 2016 මැයි 18 දින පැවති ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ අමාත්‍ය කමිටු (CCEM) වාර්තාව අනුව මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග III කොටසේ ඇති භූමියේ ස්වභාවය අනුව ඇතිවන ඉදිකිරීම් දුෂ්කරතාවය, ගුවන් පාලම්, උමං මාර්ග ආදිය සලකා බලා ඒ සඳහා විදේශ විශේෂඥ දැනුම සහ පළපුරුද්ද අවශ්‍ය බවත්, තවද අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමාගේ ජපාන සංචාරයේදී මෙම ඉදිකිරීම් මිටිප්‍රබන්ධි බැංකුවේ සහනදායී මූල්‍ය ආධාර යටතේ ජපාන කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් මගින් ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා යෝජනා කැඳවීම පිණිස තාක්ෂණික හා ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටු පත්කිරීම සඳහාත් යෝජනා සම්මත විය.

7.3.1.5 ඉන්පසු 2016 මැයි 20 දින ජපාන තානාපතිතුමා, විෂය භාර අමාත්‍යතුමා, අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්තුමා, මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සහාපතිතුමා ඇතුළු ඉහළ නිලධාරීන් පිරිසක් විසින් පාර්ලිමේන්තු සංකීර්ණයේදී පැවැත්වූ සාකච්ඡාවක ප්‍රතිඵලයක් ලෙස ජපාන ඉදිකිරීම් හා උපදේශන සමාගම් 03 ක් බැගින් නම් කරන ලෙස ජපාන තානාපතිගෙන් ඉල්ලීමක් කර තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව 2016 මැයි 25 හා 2016 මැයි 31 දිනයන් සහිත ලිපි මගින් ඊට ප්‍රතිචාරව පහත දැක්වෙන පරිදි ජපාන වාණිජ මණ්ඩලයේ ලියාපදිංචි, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව තුළ අදාළ ක්ෂේත්‍රයේ නියුතු හා ශ්‍රී ලංකාව තුළ කාර්යාල පිහිටි උපදේශන සමාගම් 03 ක් නම් කර එවන ලදී. (ඇමුණුම -07, ඇමුණුම - 08)

- (i) නිපොන් කොයි කම්පනි ලිමිටඩ් (Nippon Koei Company Ltd)
- (ii) ඔරියන්ටල් කන්සල්ටන්ට් කම්පනි ලිමිටඩ් (Oriental Consultants Company Ltd)
- (iii) කටහිරා සහ ඉන්ජිනියරින් ඉන්ටර්නැෂනල් ප්‍රයිවට් ලිමිටඩ්.(Katahira and Engineering international (Pvt) Ltd)

7.3.1.6 ඉහත 7.3.1.5 උපදේශන සමාගම් වලින් යෝජනා කැඳවා ඇගයීම් කර ඔවුන්ගේ රේචයන් සාධාරණද යන්න තීරණය කිරීම සඳහා රාජ්‍ය මුදල් දෙපාර්තමේන්තුව විසින් 05 දෙනෙකුගෙන් සමන්විත අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුවක් 2016 මැයි 30 දින පත් කර තිබුණි. මෙම තීරණ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා මාස 3කට ආසන්න කාලයකින් පසු 2016 අගෝස්තු 23 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාදී තිබුණි. ඒ වන විටත් යෝජනා කැඳවීමේ ලිපි 2016 ජූනි 24 දින උපදේශන සමාගම් වෙත භාරදී තිබූ අතර, 2016 ජූලි 29 දිනට උපදේශන සමාගම් 02 ක් වන ඔරියන්ටල් කන්සල්ටන්ට් කම්පනි ලිමිටඩ් සහ කටහිරා සහ ඉන්ජිනියරින් ඉන්ටර්නැෂනල් ප්‍රයිවට් ලිමිටඩ් පමණක් යෝජනා ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබුණි. මෙම සමාගම් 02 විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කල තාක්ෂණික යෝජනා පළමුව ඇගයීමට ලක්කල අතර ඔරියන්ටල් කන්සල්ටන්ට් කම්පනි ලිමිටඩ් අවම ලකුණු ප්‍රමාණය ලබා නොමැති බැවින් කටහිරා සහ ඉන්ජිනියරින් ඉන්ටර්නැෂනල් ප්‍රයිවට් ලිමිටඩ් සමාගමේ මූල්‍ය යෝජනාව ඇගයීම සඳහා 2017 මාර්තු 09 දින රැස්වූ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව විසින් තීරණය කරන ලදී . මෙම මූල්‍ය යෝජනාව මාස 2ක් ඇගයීම් කර 2017 මැයි 09 දින අවසන් කර තිබූ අතර ඔවුන් සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමෙන් පසුව එකඟවූ වැට් බදු රහිත රු.1,159,192,476 (ජපාන යෙන් 1,199,148,000) මුදලකට Katahira and Engineering international සමාගම සමඟ Green Tech Consultants (Pvt) Ltd සහ Project Management Associate International (Pvt) Ltd වෙත ප්‍රදානය කිරීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණි.

7.3.2 ඉදිකිරීම් සමාගමක් තෝරාගැනීම

7.3.2.1 2013 මැයි 28 දින මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සහ චීන සමාගම් අතර චීනයේදී අත්සන් කරන ලද ගිවිසුම් රාමුවකට අනුව උතුරු අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ තුන්වන කොටසේ අඹේපුස්ස සිට නුවර දක්වා උපරිම දුර කි. මී.46 ක් සැලසුම් කිරීම,අරමුදල් සම්පාදනය, ඉදිකිරීම සහ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සහ ආශ්‍රිත දේපල සංවර්ධනය සඳහා CHINA METALLURDICAL GROUP CORPERATION (MCC) ආයතනය සමඟ මහා මාර්ග, වරාය හා නාවික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් විසින් 2013 ඔක්තෝබර් 17 දින MOU අත්සන් කර තිබුණි. මෙය රහස්‍ය ලියවිල්ලක් ලෙස තබා ගැනීමට දෙපාර්ශ්වය එකඟ වී ඇති අතර එම ලියවිල්ලට අනුව ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු සඳහා අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින් ඉඩම් ලබා දිය යුතු අතර ලංකාවේ පවතින නීති රෙගුලාසි වලට අනුකූලව ආශ්‍රිත දේපල සංවර්ධනය සඳහා අවශ්‍ය ඉඩම් අත්පත් කර ගැනීමට සහ MCC

ආයතනයට බදු පදනම මත ලබාදීම ඇතුළුව තවත් කොන්දේසි වලට එකඟ වී තිබුණි. මෙහි වලංගු කාලය මාස 18ක්විය.(ඇමුණුම - 09 (i))

7.3.2.2 2014 ඔක්තෝබර් 30 දින අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ පොතුහැර සිට රඹුක්කන දක්වා සහ පොතුහැර සහ රඹුක්කන අන්තර් හුවමාරු ඇතුළුව හතරවන කොටසෙන් කි.මී.3.5 ක් ඉදිකිරීම සඳහා කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව රු.මි.48,200 කට MCC ආයතනයට ලබාදීමට කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල කෙටුම්පත් අනුමැතිය ලබා දී තිබුණු අතර ඒ අනුව 2014 නොවැම්බර් 17 දින මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සහ MCC ආයතනය අතර ගිවිසුම් අත්සන්කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම-09(ii))

7.3.2.3 එම ගිවිසුමට අනුව ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු සඳහා ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය විසින් චීනයේ EXIM බැංකුවෙන් ණය මුදලක් ලබා ගැනීමට අදහස් කළ අතර, යම් හෙයකින් ඉහත ගිවිසුම අත්සන් කර කැලැන්ඩර් දින 180 ක් තුළ EXIM බැංකුව සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය අතර ණය ගිවිසුම අත්සන් නොකළහොත් ඉහත ගිවිසුම ඉබේම අවසන් වන අතර සේවා යෝජකයා විසින් දින 10ක් තුළ කාර්යසාධන ඇපකරය නිදහස් කළ යුතු අතර කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරු විසින් දරන ලද සියළුම වියදම් ගෙවිය යුතු වේ.

7.3.2.4 එසේම ගිවිසුමට අනුව, ගිවිසුම් අත්සන් කළ දින සිට වැඩ බිමට ඇතුළු වී පරීක්ෂාවන් කිරීමට, විස්තරාත්මක ඉංජිනේරු සැලසුම් සැකසීමට සහ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු කරගෙන යාමට එකඟ වී තිබුණි.

7.3.2.5 නියමිත පරිදි EXIM බැංකුව සමඟ ණය ගිවිසුම අත්සන් නොකිරීම නිසා MCC ආයතනය සමඟ පැවති ගිවිසුම අවසන් වී ඇති අතර ඔවුන් විසින් දරන ලද වියදම් ආපසු නොගෙවන ලද තත්වයක් යටතේ ව්‍යාපෘතියේ පළමු කොටස වන කඩවත සිට මීරිගම දක්වා ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු ප්‍රසම්පාදන මූලධර්ම වලට පටහැනිව රු.මිලියන 158,386 කට MCC ආයතනය වෙත ලබා දීමට 2015 ජූලි 06 දින අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද අංක 15/1021/602/040 දරන අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශයට 2015 ජූලි 16 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබා දී තිබුණි.

7.3.2.6 2016 ජූනි 20 දින මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සහ MCC ආයතනය අතර ගිවිසුම අත්සන් කර ඇති අතර ගිවිසුමට අනුව කැලැන්ඩර් දින 365 ක් තුළ චීනයේ EXIM බැංකුව සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය අතර ණය ගිවිසුම අත්සන් නොකළහොත් ඉහත ගිවිසුම ඉබේම අවසන් වන අතර සේවා යෝජකයා විසින් දින 10ක් තුළ කාර්යසාධන ඇපකරය නිදහස් කළ යුතු අතර කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරු විසින් දරන ලද සියළුම වියදම් ගෙවිය යුතු වේ.

- 7.3.2.7 ඉහත පරිදි ගිවිසුමට අනුව, ගිවිසුම් අත්සන් කළ දින සිට වැඩ බිමට ඇතුළු වී පරීක්ෂාවන් කිරීමට, විස්තරාත්මක ඉංජිනේරු සැලසුම් සැකසීමට සහ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු කරගෙන යාමට එකඟ වී තිබුණි.
- 7.3.2.8 ණය ගිවිසුම අත්සන් නොකරන ලද තත්වයක් තුළ ඉහත ගිවිසුමේ කාලය අවසන් වී ඇති අතර ගිවිසුමට සංශෝධන 07 ක් සිදුකරමින් 2018 නොවැම්බර් 15 දින දක්වා කාලය දීර්ඝ කිරීම් ලබා ගෙන තිබුණි. වාර්ථාවේ දිනය වන විට දීර්ඝ කරන ලද කාලයද ඉක්මවා තිබූ අතර මෙතෙක් ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු වෙනුවෙන් කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරු (MCC) විසින් දරන ලද වියදම් වෙනුවෙන් එම ආයතනයට ගෙවීම් කරනු ලබන්නේ කෙසේද යන්න විගණනයට පැහැදිලි නොවුණි.
- 7.3.2.9 ඉහත 7.3.2.5 ඡේදය පරිදි මාර්ගයේ පළමු කොටසේ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු MCC ආයතනය වෙත ලබා දී මාර්ගයේ තුන්වන කොටස කොටස් පහකට බෙදා දේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් සහ උපදේශකයන් මගින් ඉදිකිරීම ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා කටයුතු සිදුකර තිබුණු අතර ඒ සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 2015 දෙසැම්බර් 09 දින ලබාගෙන තිබුණි. පසුව මාර්ගයේ III කොටසේ ඇති භූමියේ ස්වභාවය අනුව ඇතිවන ඉදිකිරීම් දුෂ්කරතාවය, ගුවන් පාලම්, උමං මාර්ග ආදිය සලකා බලා ඒ සඳහා විදේශ විශේෂඥ දැනුම සහ පලපුරුද්ද අවශ්‍ය බැවින් ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු සඳහා විදේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවකු තෝරාගැනීමේ අවශ්‍යතාවය පෙන්වා දෙමින් එම ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලිය අවසන් කිරීම සඳහා 2016 අප්‍රේල් 26 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලැබී තිබුණි.
- 7.3.2.10 මේ දක්වා සිදුවූ ක්‍රියාවලියේදී පූර්ව සුදුසුකම් පරීක්ෂා කරන ලද දේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත් සමාගම් 12 ක් සහ උපදේශක සමාගම් 4 ක් වූ අතර ඔවුන් විසින් පිහිටුවා ගනු ලැබූ හවුල් ව්‍යාපාර/බද්ද ව්‍යාපාර කොන්ත්‍රාත් සමාගම් 4 ක් සහ උපදේශක සමාගමක් වෙත ව්‍යාපෘතියේ දෙවන කොටස වන මීරිගම සිට කුරුණෑගල දක්වා ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු කොටස් 4කට බෙදා පිරිනැමීමට තීරණය කරන ලද අතර ඒ සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 2016 නොවැම්බර් 08 දින ලැබී තිබුණි. අවශ්‍ය අරමුදල් දේශීය බැංකු ණය මගින් සපයා ගැනීමට අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 2016.06.28 දින ලැබී තිබුණි. මෙහි ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු ප්‍රසම්පාදන මූලධර්ම වලට පටහැනිව සිදු වූ අතර වාර්ථාවේ දිනය වන විට මෙම කොටසේ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු සිදුවෙමින් පවතී.
- 7.3.2.11 ඉහත 7.3.2.9 ඡේදය පරිදි දේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් සමඟ පැවති ක්‍රියාවලිය අවසන් වීමෙන් පසු ඉහත 7.3.1.5 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් පරිදි පාර්ලිමේන්තුවේ පැවති සාකච්ඡාවේ ප්‍රතිඵලයක් ලෙස ඉදිකිරීම් සමාගමක් තෝරාගැනීම සඳහා වැඩිදුර සාකච්ඡාවක් සඳහා සුදානම් බව ජපන් තානාපති කාර්යාල නියෝජ්‍ය දූත මණ්ඩල ප්‍රධානියාගේ 2016 මැයි 25 දිනැති ලිපිය මගින් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපති වෙත දන්වා එවා තිබුණි. තවද, ජපන් තානාපති කාර්යාලයේ

නියෝජ්‍ය දූත මණ්ඩල ප්‍රධානියාගේ මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපති අමතන ලද 2016 මැයි 31 දිනැති ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර පහත දැක්වෙන ඉදිකිරීම් කොන්ත්‍රාත් සමාගම් 03 නම්කර තිබුණි.

- (i) එම්/එස් තයිසේ(Taisei) කෝපරේෂන්
- (ii) පෙන්ටා ඕෂන් (Penta ocean) කන්ස්ට්‍රක්ෂන් කම්පනි ලිමිටඩ්
- (iii) වකචිකු (Wakachiku)කන්ස්ට්‍රක්ෂන් කම්පනි ලිමිටඩ්

7.3.2.12 මෙම සමාගම්වලින් ටෙන්ඩර් කැඳවීම සඳහා 2016 ජූනි 01 වන දින ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල කමිටුව විසින් අනුමත කර තිබූ අතර, අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් විසින් 2016 ජූනි 06 සහ 2016 ජූනි 08 යන දිනයන්හි දී උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහා මාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් ඇමතු ලිපි මගින්ද මෙකී සමාගම්වලින් ටෙන්ඩර් කැඳවීම සඳහා උපදෙස් දී තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 10 (i),(ii))

7.3.2.13 ව්‍යාපෘතිය විසින් පිළියෙල කරන ලද ලංසු ලේඛණ සහ ලංසු යෝජනා 2016 ජූනි 17 දින අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව (Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee) විසින් අනුමත කර ඇති අතර, 2016 ජූනි 22 දින Taisei, Wakachiku, Penta ocean යන සමාගම් වෙත ලංසු කැඳවීම (invitation for bids) යවා ඇති අතර 2016 අගෝස්තු 02 ටෙන්ඩර් භාර ගන්නා අවසන් දිනය ලෙස දන්වා තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 11)

7.3.2.14 ලංසු සහ යෝජනා ලබාගැනීම පිණිස ජපාන කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් ඇතුළත් ලැයිස්තු සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබාගැනීමට 2016 අගෝස්තු 15 දිනැතිව උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහා මාර්ග අමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශයට 2016 අගෝස්තු 23 වන දින අනුමැතිය ලබාදී තිබුණි.

7.3.2.15 ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් 2016 ජූලි 29 දිනැති Taisei සමාගම වෙත යැවූ සංශෝධන -03(addendum – 3) අනුව ලංසු භාරගන්නා අවසන් දිනය 2016 අගෝස්තු 31 ලෙස දක්වා තිබුණි. තවද, යවා ඇති ලංසු ලේඛනයේ සහ යෝජිත ඉදිකිරීම් කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව පිළිබඳව පැහැදිලි කරවා ගැනීමේ ලිපි Taisei සමාගම විසින් එවා තිබූ අතර කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරවා ගැනීමේ රැස්වීම් සඳහාද එම සමාගම විසින් පමණක් ඉල්ලීම් කර තිබූ බව නිරීක්ෂණය විය.

7.3.2.16 2016 අගෝස්තු 29 දිනැති සංශෝධන -06 (addendum -6) මඟින්, කරුණු පැහැදිලි කරගැනීමට අවශ්‍ය ගැටළු සහ ව්‍යාපෘතිය විසින් අවසන් කළ යුතුව තිබූ එහෙත් අවසන් කර පැහැදිලි උපදෙස් සහ සංඛ්‍යා ලේඛන ලබානොදුන් කරුණු පවත්නා හෙයින්, ලංසු භාරගන්නා අවසාන දිනය 2016 සැප්තැම්බර් 30 ලෙස නැවතත් මාසයකින් දීර්ඝ කිරීමට ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් තීරණය කර දන්වා යවා තිබුණි.

- 7.3.2.17 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 10 දිනැති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටු (CANC) සටහන් වලට අනුව, ලංසු භාරගැනීමේ අවසාන දිනය සැප්තැම්බර් 30 වූ අතර Penta ocean සහ Wakachiku විසින් ඔවුන් bids ඉදිරිපත්කිරීමේ පසුබිමක නොසිටින බව ලිඛිතව දන්වා තිබේ. මෙහිදී Taisei සමාගම පමණක් ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ අතර එම ලංසුව සඳහා ලංසු ආරක්ෂිත ඉදිරිපත් කර නොතිබූ බැවින් එම සමාගම සාරානුකූල ප්‍රතිචාරාත්මක නොවන ලංසුකරුවෙකු ලෙස ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුව විසින් සලකා, ලංසුව අවලංගු කිරීමට නිර්දේශ කර ඇති බවත් ඒ අනුව Taisei සමාගම සාරානුකූල ප්‍රතිචාරාත්මක ලංසුකරුවකු නොවන බවට තීරණය කර ඇති බවත් දැක්වේ. (ඇමුණුම - 12)
- 7.3.2.18 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 28 දිනැති අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම්ගේ ජපන් තානාපති අමතන ලද ලිපියේ සඳහන් පරිදි ජපන් තානාපති කාර්යාලය අනුමත කල පරිදි ජපන් ඉදිකිරීම් සමාගම්වලින් ලංසු නැවත කැඳවීමටත්, ඒ සඳහා දැන්වීමක් දැනටමත් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ වෙබ් අඩවියේ ප්‍රසිද්ධ කර ඇති බවත් සහ තවදුරටත් හැකියාව ඇති ජපන් ඉදිකිරීම් සමාගම් නම් කිරීමට සහ ඔවුන් ගෙන් ලංසු ගෙන්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතු බවත් 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 10 දින රැස්වූ ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ තීරණය දක්වා තිබුණි. තවද වෙබ් අඩවියේ පලවූ දැන්වීම අනුව ලංසු විවෘත කරන දිනය 2016 නොවැම්බර් 15 දින විය.
- 7.3.2.19 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 31 දිනැති අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය කාර්යාලයෙන් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් අමතන ලද ලිපියකට අනුව 2016 ඔක්තෝබර් 26 දින රැස්වූ CCEM ජපාන රජයෙන් ටෙන්ඩර්කරුවන් තිදෙනෙකුගෙන් අළුත් ලංසු සති 02 ක් ඇතුළත විධිමත් ලංසු ඇපකර සමඟ ගෙන්වා ගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතු බව දක්වා තිබුණි .
- 7.3.2.20 2016 නොවැම්බර් 02 දිනැති ජපාන තානාපති කාර්යාලයේ කවුන්සලර් විසින් අමාත්‍යාංශ වැඩබලන ලේකම් වෙත එවන ලද ලිපියකින් ජපාන තානාපති කාර්යාලය ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියට මැදිහත්වීමේ තත්ත්වයක නොසිටින බවත්, ලිපියේ සඳහන් තොරතුරු ලංසු කරුවන්ට ලබාදෙන බවත්, ලංසු ඇපකර සමඟ නව ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමට ඔවුන්ට හැකිවන පරිදි අමාත්‍යාංශය කටයුතු කරනු ඇතැයි ඔවුන් බලාපොරොත්තු වන බවත් දන්වා ඇත. (ඇමුණුම - 13)
- 7.3.2.21 ඒ අනුව 2016 නොවැම්බර් 03 දින Taisei, Wakachiku, Penta ocean වෙත ලංසු කැඳවීම යවා ඇත. 2016 නොවැම්බර් 15 ලංසු කැඳවන අවසන් දිනය වේ. 2016 නොවැම්බර් 03 දිනැතිව පූජ්ටා (Fujita) සමාගම ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂක වෙත ලියන ලිපියකින් මෙම ව්‍යාපෘතියට අදාළව ලංසු ලේඛන මිලදීගැනීමට ඉල්ලුම් කර ඇත. එදිනම පූජ්ටා සමාගමට ලංසු ලේඛන ලබාදෙන ලෙස ජපන් තානාපති කාර්යාලය වෙතින් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් වෙත

එවන ලද ලිපියක් මගින් ඉල්ලා ඇත. 2016 නොවැම්බර් 11 දිනැති ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් අමතන ලද ලිපියකට අනුව ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල කමිටුව විසින් ඉහත සඳහන් කල කැබිනට් අනුමැතිය ලත් සමාගම් 03 ට පමණක් ලංසු ලේඛන ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලෙසට අනුමැතිය ලබාදී තිබෙන බැවින් Fujita සමාගමට ලංසු ලේඛන ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා CCEM එකේ උපදෙස් ලබාදෙන ලෙස ඉල්ලා තිබුණි.

7.3.2.22 තවද අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් විසින් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් ඇමතු 2016 නොවැම්බර් 13 දිනැති ලිපිය ප්‍රකාරව Fujita සමාගමට ලංසු ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සඳහා 2016 නොවැම්බර් 09 දින රැස්වූ ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල කමිටුව වෙතින් අනුමැතිය ලැබුණු බවත් එය තරඟකාරීත්වය වැඩි වීමක් ලෙස එම කමිටුවට දැනෙන බවත් ලංසු විවෘත කරන දිනය තවත් සතියකින් කල් දමන ලෙසත් ඉල්ලා ඇත. (ඇමුණුම - 14)

7.3.2.23 2016 නොවැම්බර් 18 දිනැති ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂකගේ ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුවේ (PC) සභාපති අමතන ලද ලිපියකට අනුව; ජපන් තානාපතීගේ ඉල්ලීම මත තරඟකාරීත්වය වැඩිකිරීමට හතරවන ලංසුකරුවෙකු ඇතුළත්කිරීමට ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණ කමිටුව විසින් තීරණය කර ඇති බවත්, ඒ අනුව, ලංසුකරුවන් හතරදෙනෙකුගෙන් ලංසු කැඳවීමට සහ ලංසු කැඳවීමේ අවසන් දිනය 2016 නොවැම්බර් 23 වන බවත් දන්වා තිබේ.

7.3.2.24 තවද, මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපති විසින් 2016 නොවැම්බර් 15 දින Fujita සමාගමට ලංසු කැඳවීම් යවා ඇති අතර ලංසු භාරගන්නා අවසාන දිනය 2016 නොවැම්බර් 23 ලෙස දක්වා තිබුණි.(ඇමුණුම - 15)

7.3.2.25 2016 නොවැම්බර් 24 දින ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයා විසින් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපති ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර පහත පරිදි ආයතන 02 කින් පමණක් ලංසු ලැබුණු බවත් ඒවා ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුව ඉක්මවන බවත් දන්වා ඇති අතර විස්තර පහත දැක්වේ. (ඇමුණුම - 16)

	ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුව (රු.බිලියන)	ලංසු මිල (රු.බිලියන)	වෙනස (රු.බිලියන)
Taisei	123.5	159.6	36.1
Fujita	123.5	147.7	24.2

- 7.3.2.26 උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යතුමා විසින් 2016 දෙසැම්බර් 02 දිනැති කැබිනට් සංදේශයට අනුව මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් දැනට පවතින ලංසු ක්‍රියාවලිය අවලංගු කිරීමට යෝජනා කර ඇති බවත්, Daiwa House Group/Fujita Corporation විසින් 2016 ජූනි 02 දින රු.144,749,920,000 සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කළ යෝජනාවක් ඇති බවත්, එවකට තරඟකාරී මිල ක්‍රමයට අනුව ප්‍රසම්පාදනය සිදුකළ නිසා එය සැලකිල්ලට නොගත් බවත්, මේ වනවිට එකී යෝජනාව සලකා බැලිය හැකි බවත් සඳහන් කරමින් කැබිනට් අනුමැතිය අපේක්ෂා කර ඇත.
- 7.3.2.27 මේ සඳහා මුදල් ඇමතිගේ නිරීක්ෂණය වූයේ ලංසු කැඳවූයේ තරඟකාරී ක්‍රමය යටතේ CCEM අනුමත කළ ජපන් සමාගම් 04 ක් මගින් වූ බැවින් තරඟකාරී ලංසු ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ පිළිගත හැකි ලංසුවක් ඉදිරිපත් නොකළ ලංසු කරුවකු සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමට එකඟ විය නොහැකි බවත්, එය ප්‍රසම්පාදන ප්‍රතිපත්තිවලට පටහැනි බවත්ය. කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයේ තීරණය වූයේ මුදල් ඇමති නිරීක්ෂණ සටහන් කරගන්නා ලෙසට වේ.
- 7.3.2.28 2016 දෙසැම්බර් 06 දින ව්‍යාපෘතියට අදාළව කැබිනට් ඇමතිවරුන්ගේ තීරණය සහ ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටු වාර්තාව 2016 දෙසැම්බර් 15 දින රැස්වූ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව (CANC) විසින් සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන තිබුණි. ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටු නිර්දේශ සහ කැබිනට් ඇමතිවරුන්ගේ තීරණ සැලකිල්ලට ගත් අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව (CANC) විසින් අවම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කළ ලංසුව (පුජ්ටා සමාගම) ඇගයීමට ලක්කර 2016 දෙසැම්බර් 17 දිනට අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුවට (CANC) නිර්දේශ ලබාදෙන ලෙස ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුවට දන්වා ඇත.
- 7.3.2.29 2016 දෙසැම්බර් 22 දින රැස්වූ CANC විසින් තරඟකාරී ලංසු ක්‍රියාවලිය තුළ අවම මිල ඉදිරිපත් කළ පුජ්ටා ආයතනයේ ලංසුව ඇගයීමට ලක්කළ ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටු වාර්තාව සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන ඇත. ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුව (Project Committee) විසින් පුජ්ටා සමාගම ඇගයීමට ලක් කර විශාල නිරීක්ෂණ ගණනාවක් මතුකර තිබුණි. එම නිරීක්ෂණ සැලකිල්ලට ගත් CANC තීරණය වූයේ; පුජ්ටා සමාගම ලංසු ලේඛණවල ප්‍රධාන මිනුම් දඩු සැපයීමට අපොහොසත්වී ඇති බවත්, ඒ බව කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයට දැනුම් දීමට සහ ඊළඟ ලංසු කරු ඇගයීම සුදුසු බවත් තීරණය කර තිබුණි.
- 7.3.2.30 2017 ජනවාරි 11 දින පැවති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව විසින් 2017 ජනවාරි 04 දින පැවති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල ආර්ථික කළමනාකරන කමිටු වාර්තාව (CCEM) සහ 2017 ජනවාරි 11 දින පැවති ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටු වාර්තා සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන සිය නිර්දේශ ලබාදී තිබුණි. ඒ අනුව, ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුව විසින් Taisei සමාගම සම්පූර්ණ ලංසුවක් ලෙස පිළිගැනීමට තීරණය කර තිබුණු අතර, අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව ව්‍යාපෘති වාර්තාව සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන තවදුරටත් අවශ්‍ය ලිඛිත සාක්ෂි නම් කර ඒවා සති 02 ක් ඇතුළත ලබාදෙන ලෙස ඉල්ලා සිටීමට ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂකට දැන්වීමට තීරණය කර තිබේ. එසේම 2017 පෙබරවාරි 13 දින පැවති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක

කමිටුව (CANC) කමිටු රැස්වීමේදී 2017 පෙබරවාරි 06 දින පැවති ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටු වාර්තාව සැලකිල්ලට ගෙන ඇති අතර එහිදී කොන්ත්‍රාත් මිල තවදුරටත් අඩුකර ගැනීමට සාකච්ඡා කිරීම සඳහා ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුවට (PC) අධිකාරී බලය දී ලබාගත හැකි මිල අඩුකිරීම් ලබාගැනීමට සහ පසුව CANC විසින් අවසාන මිල අඩුකරගැනීමේ සාකච්ඡාව කිරීමටත් තීරණය කර තිබේ. මෙහිදී පෙන්වා දී ඇත්තේ Taisei විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කල ලංසු මිල ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුව සමඟ සැසඳීමේදී 29.24% ක විචලනයක් පෙන්නුම්කරන බවයි.

7.3.2.31 තවද, 2017 ජනවාරි 04 දිනැති CCEM තීරණයට 2017 ජනවාරි 17 දිනැති කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල කෙටුම්පත් තීරණය ලැබී තිබුණි.

7.3.2.32 2017 අප්‍රේල් 03 දිනැති උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශ අතිරේක ලේකම් (ඉංජිනේරු) විසින් Fujita සමාගමේ සභාපති වෙත යැවෙන ලිපියකින් අවශ්‍ය සුදුසුකම් සපුරාලීමට ඔවුන් අසමත්වී ඇති බව තීරණය කල බවත්, දෙවන ලංසුකරුවන Taisei සමාගමට රු. 134,905,155,000 කට කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව පිරිනැමීම සඳහා කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලය වෙත අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුව විසින් නිර්දේශ කිරීමට තීරණය කල බවත්, මෙම දැන්වීම ජනාධිපති ලේකම් විසින් නිකුත් කරන ලද 2014 ඔක්තෝම්බර් 07 දිනැති CSA/4/PAB/01-III දරන චක්‍රලේඛය සහ 2012 පෙබරවාරි 27 දිනැති CSA/4/PAB/01-1 දරන චක්‍රලේඛය අනුව නිකුත් කරන බවත් Fujita සමාගමට දන්වා තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 17)

7.3.2.33 අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් විසින් 2017 මැයි 05 දින උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර 2017 මැයි 03 දින පැවති ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණ කමිටුවේ සටහන්වලට අනුව; Fujita සමාගම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ඉදිකිරීමේ තාක්ෂණික හා මූල්‍ය හැකියාව ඇති සිවිල් වැඩ කොන්ත්‍රාත් සම්බන්ධයෙන් ප්‍රමුඛ කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවෙකු වන බව ජපන් රජය දන්වා ඇති බව දැනුම් දී ඇත. තවද, ජපන් රජයේ දැඩි නිර්දේශ නිසා Fujita සමාගමට අසාධාරණයක් වූයේද යන්න පරීක්ෂා කිරීමට ඇගයීම් නිර්නායක නැවත පරීක්ෂා කිරීමෙන් Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව නැවත සලකා බැලීම සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරක කමිටුවේ සභාපති විසින් 2017 මැයි 08 දිනැති ලිපිය මගින් ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුවට නියෝග කර තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 18 , ඇමුණුම - 19)

7.3.2.34 මේ අතර 2017 අප්‍රේල් 12 දින ටෝකියෝ සිට ජපානයේ කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල විශේෂ උපදේශකයෙකු විසින් ලක්ෂ්මන් කිරිඇල්ල ඇමතිතුමාගේ නමට එවන ලද ලිපියකින් Fujita සමාගම සඳහා විශේෂ අවධානයක් ලබාදෙන ලෙස ඉල්ලා තිබුණි.(ඇමුණුම - 20)

- 7.3.2.35 2017 මැයි 03 දින පැවති CCEM කමිටු රැස්වීමේදී නැවත Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව සලකා බලන ලෙස ගත් තීරණය අග්‍රාමාත්‍යවරයා විසින් 2017 මැයි 05 දින කැබිනට් මණ්ඩලයට ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇත. මෙහිදී ජනාධිපතිවරයාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ ලෙස සඳහන් වන්නේ; යෝජිත ක්‍රියාමාර්ගය රජයේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියේ මූලධර්මවලට පටහැනි බැවින් තීරණයකට එළැඹීමට ප්‍රථම මෙම කරුණ CCEM සහ අමාත්‍යාංශය සලකා බැලීම යෝග්‍ය බවයි. කැබිනට් තීරණය වූයේ එම කරුණ CCEM අවධානයට යොමුකරවීමයි.
- 7.3.2.36 ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයා විසින් 2017 මැයි 22 දින Fujita සමාගම ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර එම සමාගමේ ලංසු වලංගු කාලය 2017 අගෝස්තු 23 දක්වා දීර්ඝ කරන බව දක්වා ඇති අතර එම සමාගම සාරානුකූල ප්‍රතිචාරාත්මක ලංසුකරුවෙකු නොවන බව තාක්ෂණික ඇගයීම් කමිටුව විසින් තහවුරු කර තිබියදීත් දීර්ඝකිරීමක් සිදුකිරීම කිරීම විගණනයට ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වේ.
- 7.3.2.37 2017 මැයි 03 දින ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ ආර්ථික කමිටුවේ නියෝගය පරිදි ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුව (PC) විසින් Fujita ලංසුව නැවත සලකා බැලීමෙන් පසු 2017 මැයි 16 දින ඉදිරිපත් කරන ලද වාර්තාව අනුව Fujita ලංසුව ඇගයීමේදී කිසිදු ආකාරයක අසාධාරණයක් සිදුවී නොමැති බව පැහැදිලිව තහවුරු කර ඇත. 2017 මැයි 16 දින රැස්වූ CANC කමිටු වාර්තාව මගින්ද Fujita සමාගමට ලංසු ඇගයීමේදී කිසිදු අසාධාරණයක් සිදුවී නොමැති බවට ව්‍යාපෘති කමිටුව (Project Committee) දෙනු ලැබූ නිගමනය එම කමිටුව මගින්ද තහවුරු කර තිබුණි.
- 7.3.2.38 2017 මැයි 29 දින අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් විසින් උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර 2017 මැයි 24 දින රැස්වූ CCEM තීරණයට අනුව; Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව ඇගයීමේදී කිසිදු අසාධාරණයක් සිදුවී නොමැති බවත් මෙම තත්ත්වය ජපන් රජයට වාර්තා කරන ලෙස ජපන් තානාපතිගෙන් ඉල්ලා සිටිනු ලබන බවත් ඉදිරි පියවර ජපන් රජයේ ප්‍රතිචාරය මත ගනු ලබන බවත් දන්වා ඇත. (ඇමුණුම - 21)
- 7.3.2.39 අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් විසින් 2017 ජූනි 23 දිනැතිව උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල තීරණයට පසුව බද්ද ව්‍යාපාරයක් (Consortium of joined venture) සාදාගැනීම පිළිබඳ සාකච්ඡා කල හැකි බවත්, කැබිනට් පත්‍රිකාවක් මගින් කැබිනට් මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාගත හැකි බවත් දන්වා ඇත.(ඇමුණුම - 22)
- 7.3.2.40 2017 ජූනි 30 දින අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් විසින් නැවත උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම් ඇමතු ලිපිය ප්‍රකාර, 2017 ජූනි 28 දින CCEM කමිටුවේ සටහන්වලට අනුව; ජපන් රජයේ Fujita සමාගම සම්බන්ධයෙන් දැඩි නිර්දේශ කිරීම (strong recommendation) සලකා බලා Fujita සමාගම සහ Taisei සමාගම ඒකාබද්ධවීමට තීරණය ගැනීමට හැකි බවත් ඒ සඳහා

කැබිනට් අනුමැතිය කැබිනට් පත්‍රිකාවක් ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමෙන් පසුව ලබාගත යුතු බවත්, දන්වා තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම -23)

2017 ජූලි 11 දින පැවැත්වූ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී පහත දැ සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබාදී තිබුණි.

- (i) සංග්‍රහයේ 3.0 ඡේදය 3.1 අනුඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් (i) සහ (ii) නිර්දේශ සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම සහ
- (ii) යෝජිත සමාගම් සමූහය ස්ථාපනය කිරීමට අදාළ නියමයන් හා කොන්දේසි, ජපානයේ M/S Taisei Corporation සහ M/S Fujita Corporation යන සමාගම් 02 සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජයට එකඟ විය හැකි ඒවා විය යුතුය.

7.3.2.41 මෙම සමාගම් දෙක අතර එකඟතාවයන් ඇතිවීම සඳහා විවිධ සාකච්ඡා සහ ලිපි හුවමාරුවී ඇති අතර 2018 දෙසැම්බර් 10 දිනය වන විටත් අවසන් තීරණයකට එළඹ නොතිබුණි. කෙසේ වුවද, Taisei Corporation සහ M/S Fujita Corporation යන සමාගම් 02 අතර සමූහය ස්ථාපනය කිරීමට අදාළ ගිවිසුමක් අත්සන්කර තිබුණද එය වලංගු වීම සඳහා මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ එකඟතාවය විගණන දින වන විටත් ලබා දී නොතිබුණි. තවද Taisei Corporation එකට කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව පිරිනැමීම සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය 2018 පෙබරවාරි 20 දින ලබා දී තිබුණි. (ඇමුණුම - 24)

7.3.2.42 2018 දෙසැම්බර් 10 දින වන විටත් ව්‍යාපෘතියේ ඉදිකිරීම් ආරම්භ කිරීම් සඳහා අවශ්‍ය ණය මුදල Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd බැංකුවෙන් ලබා ගැනීම සඳහා ඉදිරිපත් කළ යුතු සමාජයීය සහ පාරිසරික වශයෙන් ඇතිවන බලපෑම පිළිබඳ වාර්තාව පිළියෙල කිරීම සඳහා වන අධ්‍යයන කටයුතු සිදුවෙමින් පවතින අතර ඒ සඳහා ගෙවිය යුතු මුදල වන ජපන් යෙන් මිලියන 30 ක් සඳහා අනුමැතිය 2017 ඔක්තෝබර් 10 දින ලබා දී තිබුණි.

7.3.2.43 නිසි පරිදි සම්පූර්ණ කරන ලද ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන වාර්තාවක් නොතිබුණ ද මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ පළමු සහ දෙවන කොටස්වල ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු මේ වන විට සිදුවෙමින් පවතී. පළමු කොටස වන කඩවන සිට මීරිගම දක්වා කි.මී. 37.09 ක ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු චීනයේ EXIM බැංකු ණය මුදල් යටතේ සිදුකිරීමට සැලසුම් කළ ද මෙතෙක් ණය මුදල ලැබී නොමැති වුවද කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුගේ වියදමින් ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු කරමින් පවත්න අතර මෙම කොටසේ ඉඩම් අත්පත් කරගැනීම සඳහා 2018 අගෝස්තු 31 දිනට රු. මි.5,635 ක වියදමක් දරා තිබුණි.

මේ අතර දෙවන කොටස වන මීරිගම සිට කුරුණෑගල දක්වා කි.මී. 39.9 ක් කොටස් හතරකට බෙදා දේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් සහ දේශීය උපදේශකයන් විසින් දේශීය බැංකු ණය මුදල් යටතේ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු කරගෙන යනු ලැබේ. මෙම කොටසේ ඉඩම් අත්පත් කරගැනීම සඳහා

2018 අගෝස්තු 31 දිනට රු.මි. 5,842 ක් දරා තිබුණු අතර එදිනට දේශීය බැංකු මගින් ලබා ගෙන ඇති ණය ප්‍රමාණය රු. මි. 30,855 ක් වේ.

ඉදිකිරීම් ආරම්භ කර නොමැති පොතුහැර සිට ගලගෙදර දක්වා තුන්වෙනි කොටසේ ඉඩම් අත්පත් කරගැනීම සඳහා 2018 අගෝස්තු 31 දිනට දරා ඇති වියදම රු.මි. 1,971 ක් විය. හතරවන කොටසේ ඉඩම් අත්පත් කරගැනීමේ කටයුතු මේ වන විට සිදුකරමින් පවතින අතර ගෙවීම් කටයුතු සිදුකර නොමැත.

8. නිරීක්ෂණයන්

- 8.1 මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග අංක 01, 02 සහ 03 කොටස් වලට අදාළව උපදේශක සමාගමක් සහ කොන්ත්‍රාත් සමාගමක් තෝරාගැනීමේ පටිපාටිය 2006 රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයේ 1.1 වගන්තිය ප්‍රකාර එකී අරමුණුවලට පටහැනිව ක්‍රියාත්මකවී තිබුණි.
- 8.2 තරඟකාරී මිල ක්‍රමය අනුගමනය නොකිරීම හේතුවෙන් 2006 රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයේ අංක 1.2.1 වගන්තියට පටහැනිව තිබුණි.
- 8.3 කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරු තෝරාගැනීමේදී අනුගමනය කර ඇති පටිපාටියට අනුව එය රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයේ අංක 1.4.2 සහ 1.4.3 හි දැක්වෙන ප්‍රසම්පාදන සාරධර්මවලට පටහැනි වී තිබුණි.
- 8.4 ජපන් තානාපති විසින් නම් කරන ලද ආයතනවලින් ලංසු කැඳවීම සඳහා තාක්ෂණික ඇගයීම් කමිටු නිර්දේශය නොතිබුණි.
- 8.5 ජපාන තානාපති කාර්යාලය විසින් මෙම අවිධිමත් ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියට අකමැත්ත පලකර තිබියදීත් අමාත්‍යාංශ ලේකම් විසින් ලංසුකරුවන් නම් කරන ලෙස ජපන් තානාපති වෙත ලිපි ඉදිරිපත් කිරීමේ හැකියාව ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශයන්ට අනුකූල වී නොතිබුණි.
- 8.6 ලංසු ලේඛන ඉදිරිපත් කිරීම මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියේ සභාපති විසින් සිදුකල බව සඳහන් වන අතර එසේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන අස්ථිත්වයෙන් බාහිර පුද්ගලයෙකු මෙම ක්‍රියාවලිය සඳහා සහභාගිවීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන සංග්‍රහයේ පවත්නා ප්‍රතිපාදන වලට පටහැනි වේ.
- 8.7 ලංසු විවෘත කිරීමේ දිනය අවස්ථා කිහිපයකදී කල්දමා තිබුණු අතර විවෘත කරන දිනය නිශ්චිතව සඳහන් කර නොතිබුණි. මෙම තත්ත්වය විනිවිදභාවය නැමැති ප්‍රසම්පාදන මූලධර්මයට පටහැනි වේ.
- 8.8 මුදල් අමාත්‍යවරයාද විරෝධය පළ කර තිබියදීත් අනුගමනය කර තිබූ තරඟකාරී ලංසු ක්‍රියාවලිය නවතා ඊට පරිබාහිරව අමාත්‍යතුමාගේ කැබිනට් සංදේශයේ සඳහන් පරිදි Fujita සමාගම විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කර තිබූ ලංසුව පිළිබඳව එම ආයතනය (Fujita) සමඟ සාකච්ඡා කිරීමට උත්සහ කිරීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශ සංග්‍රහයට පටහැනිවේ.

- 8.9 ඉහත 7.3.2.26 හි සඳහන් යෝජිත ක්‍රියාමාර්ගය රජයේ ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියේ මූලධර්මවලට පටහැනි බැවින් තීරණයකට එළැඹීමට ප්‍රථම මෙම කරුණ CCEM සහ අමාත්‍යාංශය සලකා බැලීම යෝග්‍ය බවට ජනාධිපතිතුමා විසින් කරුණු දක්වා තිබුණ ද ඒ පිළිබඳව සැලකිල්ලට නොගෙන ඉදිරි ක්‍රියාමාර්ග ගෙන තිබුණි.
- 8.10 ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂවරයා විසින්, Fujita සමාගම සාරානුකූල ප්‍රතිචාරාත්මක ලංසුකරුවෙකු නොවන බව තාක්ෂණික ඇගයීම් කමිටුව විසින් තහවුරු කර තිබියදීත් එම සමාගමේ ලංසු වලංගු කාලය දීර්ඝ කරන බව දන්වා ලිපි යැවීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මූලධර්මයට පටහැනි වේ.
- 8.11 ධාරිතාවය නොමැති හෙයින් Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව ප්‍රතික්ෂේප වී තිබියදීත් සහ රු.බිලියන 24.2 කින් ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුව ඉක්මවා තිබියදීත් එකී ලංසුව නැවත වතාවක් ඇගයීමට ලක්කිරීමට ජපාන විශේෂ උපදේශකගේ ඉල්ලීම පිළිගෙන ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශවලට පටහැනි විය.
- 8.12 Fujita සමාගමේ ලංසුව ප්‍රතික්ෂේප කිරීම නිවැරදි බවට නැවතත් ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව නිර්දේශ කර තිබියදීත් ඊට පටහැනිව එකී සමාගමට, ප්‍රසම්පාදනය ප්‍රදානය සඳහා හිමිකමක් ඇති Taisei සමාගම සමඟ බද්ධවීමට අනුමැතිය ලබාගැනීම සහ ඊට බලපෑම් කිරීම ප්‍රසම්පාදන මූලධර්මවලට පටහැනිවේ.
- 8.13 ව්‍යාපෘතිය සඳහා වන ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුවලට ලැබුණු අනුමැතිය, එය අනුමත කළ දිනය, සහ එම ඇස්තමේන්තුව පිලියෙල කල නිලධාරීන්ගේ නම් අත්සන් සහ නිල මුද්‍රා නොවීය.
- 8.14 විගණක දිනය වන විටත් අධිවේගී මාර්ගපටය පැහැදිලිව හඳුනාගෙන ඇස්තමේන්තු සංශෝධනය කර නොමැති තත්වයක් යටතේ ලංසු ලේඛණ පිලියෙල කිරීම සිදුකර නොමැති අතර සහ ලංසු ඇගයීමේ නිරවද්‍යතාවය විගණනයට ප්‍රශ්නකාරී වේ.
- 8.15 SMEC සමඟ අවබෝධතා ගිවිසුම අත්සන් කරන අවස්ථාව වන විට තාක්ෂණික හා මූල්‍ය යෝජනා ලැබී නොතිබුණු අතර ඉංජිනේරු ඇස්තමේන්තුව සහ TOR පිලියෙල කර නොතිබුණි.
- 8.16 SMEC ආයතනය විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කල කෙටුම්පත් අවසාන වාර්තාව සඳහා ව්‍යාපෘතිය විසින් අදහස් දැක්වීම් ඉදිරිපත් කර නොතිබුණි.
- 8.17 SMEC ආයතනය සඳහා පිලියෙල කරන ලද TOR පිලියෙල කිරීමට අදාල වන නිලධාරීන් හෝ ඊට අදාල ලිපිගොනු ව්‍යාපෘතිය සතුව නොතිබුණි.
- 8.18 ව්‍යාපෘති අධ්‍යක්ෂ විසින් මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සතු මානව සම්පත් SMEC ආයතනය වෙත ලබාදීමට අදාල පැහැදිලි සහ නිශ්චිත අනුමැතියක් නොතිබුණි.
- 8.19 2014 දෙසැම්බර් 31 දින වන විට SMEC ආයතනයට රු.මිලියන 1,759 ක් ගෙවා තිබුණද එම ආයතනයේ වාර්තා පිළිගත හැකි තත්වයක නොපවතින නිසා මේ සම්බන්ධව විවිධ අධ්‍යයන සඳහා 2017 දෙසැම්බර් 31 දින වන විට බාහිර ආයතන වලට රු.මිලියන 65 ක් ගෙවා තිබුණද අවසාන වාර්තාවක් සකස් කර නොතිබුණි.

- 8.20 SMEC International Pvt Ltd මගින් ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනය විශාල වියදමක් සහ කාලයක් වැයකරමින් සිදුකර තිබුණද අදාල වාර්තාව පිළිබඳ විශ්වාසයක් ව්‍යාපෘතියට හෝ මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරියට නොමැති බවද, නිවැරදි සහ පිළිගත හැකි ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන වාර්තාවක් වසර 17 ක් ගතව තිබියදීත් සකස් කර ගැනීමට ඊට වගකිවයුතු පාර්ශ්වයන් අසමත් වී තිබුණද, ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන වෙනුවෙන් රු. මිලියන 2,193.8 ක් මේ වන විට ගෙවා තිබුණි.
- 8.21 ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයන සඳහා ලැබුණු රු.මිලියන 119 ක ආධාර මුදලින් රු.මිලියන 85.1 ක් වූ මුදල මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය විසින් වියදම් දරා තිබුණද ගිණුම්ගත කර නොතිබුණි.
- 8.22 ආර්ථික කළමනාකරණය පිළිබඳ පාර්ලිමේන්තු කමිටුව (CCEM) විසින් ගෙන ඇති සමහර තීරණ ක්‍රියාත්මක කිරීම සඳහා අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල අනුමැතිය ලබාගෙන නොතිබුණි.
- 8.23 අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ පලමු සහ දෙවන කොටස් සඳහා වන කොන්ත්‍රාත් කටයුතු පිළිවෙලින් ඒතයේ MCC අයතනයට සහ දේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන්ට පිරිනමා තිබුණද එකී MCC අයතනය සමඟ තෙවන කොටසේ ඉදිකිරීම් සඳහා ගිවිසුම් ගතව සිටි අදාල ණය මුදල නොලැබීම නිසා ගිවිසුමට අනුව එකඟ වන ලද කොන්දේසි වලට අදාලව ගෙවිය යුතු මුදල් හිලවී කිරීම සඳහා එම කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව MCC අයතනය වෙත පිරිනමා තිබුණි. තවද, තෙවන කොටසේ මාර්ග පටය පිළිබඳව නිසි අවබෝධයක් නොමැතිව එහි ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු දේශීය කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් වෙත පිරිනැමීමට අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු සිදුකර තිබුණද පසුව එහිදී තෝරාගත් කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් වෙත මාර්ගයේ දෙවන කොටසේ කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව පිරිනමා තිබුණි. මෙම කටයුතු ප්‍රසම්පාදන මාර්ගෝපදේශයන්ට පටහැනිව සිදුකර තිබුණි.
- 8.24 2012 දෙසැම්බර් 31 දක්වා දරන ලද වියදම වන රු.මිලියන 369.1 ක මුදල මූල්‍ය ප්‍රකාශණ වලින් වසන් කර තිබුණි.

9. නිර්දේශ

- 9.1 ප්‍රසම්පාදනයන්ට අදාල ලිපිගොනු ක්‍රමවත්ව පවත්වා ගැනීම සඳහා නිලධාරීන්ට නිශ්චිත උපදෙස් ලබාදී ඒ සම්බන්ධ වගකීම් පැවරිය යුතුය.
- 9.2 ලංසු ලියවිලි ලබාගත් ලංසුකරුවන් සම්බන්ධයෙන් දත්ත ගොනුවක් පවත්වාගෙන යාම සහ ලංසු ලියවිලි සහ අනෙකුත් සංශෝධනයන් සියලු අදාල පාර්ශ්වයන්ට යවන ලද බවට සහ යැවූ බවට සනාථන කිරීම් ලබාගැනීම කළ යුතුය.
- 9.3 අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයට නිවැරදි තීරණවලට එළඹීම සඳහා අවශ්‍ය සියලුම අදාල සත්‍ය සහ නිත්‍යානුකූල තොරතුරු අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සංදේශ මගින් අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලය වෙත සන්නිවේදනය කිරීමට වගකිව යුතු නිලධාරීන් ක්‍රියාකළ යුතුය.

- 9.4 ප්‍රසම්පාදනයේදී ආරක්ෂා විය යුතු මුදලට අගය යන සංකල්පය ආරක්ෂා වන පරිදි ආර්ථිකමයභාවය, කාර්යක්ෂමතාවය සහ ඵලදායිතාවය යන ගුණාංග රැකෙන පරිදි ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු මෙහෙයවිය යුතුය.
- 9.5 පූර්ව ලංසු රැස්වීම් පැවැත්වීමට අදාළ පාර්ශවයන් වග බලා ගත යුතු අතර එමඟින් ඉදිරියේදී ඇතිවිය හැකි ගැටළු අවම කරගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතුය.
- 9.6 අමාත්‍යාංශය, මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය සහ මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය අතර මනා සම්බන්ධීකරණයක් සහ වගකීමක් ගොඩනැගෙන පරිදි රැස්වීම් පැවැත්වීම සහ එකී රැස්වීම්වල වාර්තා අදාළ පාර්ශවයන් අතර විධිමත්ව හුවමාරු කර ගත යුතුය.
- 9.7 ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියේදී අනුකූල විය යුතු වලංගු නීතිරීති සහ පොදුවේ සම්මත නියමයන්ට සැමවිටම අනුගත විය යුතුය.
- 9.8 ඉදිකිරීම් සම්බන්ධයෙන් මිළ උච්ඡාවචනයන්හි වාසිය රජයට ලැබෙන පරිදි ඒ පිළිබඳව අවධානය යොමුකරමින් මාර්ග සැලසුම්කිරීම, ලංසු කැඳවීම සහ ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රමය තීරණය කිරීම කළ යුතුය.
- 9.9 ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියේදී සහ ගිවිසුම්වලට එළඹීමේදී ඒවායේ නෛතික පසුබිම පිළිබඳ තහවුරු කරගැනීම සඳහා නීතිපති නිශ්කාශණය ලබාගත යුතුය.
- 9.10 තාක්ෂණික ඇගයීම් කමිටු නිර්දේශ සහ ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටු තීරණ අනුව ඉදිරි කටයුතු සිදුවන බව තහවුරු කරගැනීම සඳහා විධිමත් යාන්ත්‍රණයක් සකස් කළ යුතුය.
- 9.11 තරඟකාරී මිල ක්‍රමයෙන් බැහැරව උපදේශකයින් සහ කොන්ත්‍රාත්කරුවන් සෘජුව තෝරාගැනීමේ හැකියාව සහ විනිවිදභාවය සලකා බැලිය යුතුයි.
- 9.12 ලංසු ඇගයීමේදී තාක්ෂණික ඇගයීම් කමිටුව සහ ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටුව විසින් ගන්නා ලද තීරණවල අඩුපාඩු, ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලිය සඳහා අසාමාන්‍ය කාලයක් ගතකිරීම, ලංසු ලේඛනවල විනිවිදභාවය වැඩිදියුණු කරගැනීම වැනි අඩුපාඩු මඟහැර ගැනීම සඳහා ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියෙහි පැවතිය යුතු තරඟකාරීත්වය ඉහළ නංවාගැනීමට කටයුතු කළ යුතුය.
- 9.13 සැලසුම්කිරීමේ සහ ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියේ පවත්නා දුර්වලතාවය නිසා සිදුවන අනවශ්‍ය කාල පමාවන් අවම වන පරිදි කටයුතු කිරීම ඊට වගකිව යුතු නිලධාරීන් වග බලා ගත යුතුය.
- 9.14 ලෝකයේ බොහෝ රටවල අධිවේගී මාර්ග සැලසුම් කිරීමේදී, ඉදිකිරීමේදී අනුගමනය කරන පාරිසරික මෙන්ම ආර්ථික වශයෙන් වඩාත් ඵලදායී ක්‍රම හැකිතාක් දුරට අනුගමනය කිරීමට වග බලා ගත යුතුය.

10. නිගමන

- 10.1 නිසි ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනයක් සිදුකර නොතිබීමත්, සැලසුම් සකස් කිරීම සඳහා ප්‍රමාණවත් කාලයක් ලබා නොදීමත් හේතුවෙන් මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතියේ ඉදිකිරීම් කටයුතු අසාමාන්‍ය ලෙස ප්‍රමාද වී ඇති බව නිගමනය කරමි.
- 10.2 වගකිව යුතු පාර්ශව විසින් අවිධිමත් ලෙස තීරණ ගැනීම නිසාත්, ගන්නා ලද තීරණ හා විෂය පථය නිරන්තරයෙන් වෙනස් කිරීමට ලක් කිරීමත් හේතුවෙන් ව්‍යාපෘති පිරිවැය කෙරෙහි අහිතකර ලෙස බලපා ඇති බව නිගමනය කරමි.
- 10.3 ප්‍රසම්පාදන කටයුතු වලදී උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය, මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය, මුදල් හා ජනමාධ්‍ය අමාත්‍යාංශය, ව්‍යාපෘති කාර්යාලය යන ආයතන ද මේ සඳහා පත්කරන ලද තාක්ෂණ ඇගයීම් කමිටුව සහ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලය මගින් පත්කෙරෙනු ස්ථාවර ප්‍රසම්පාදන කමිටු සහ අනෙකුත් සම්බන්ධිත කමිටු විසින් සිය කටයුතු ඉටුකිරීමේදී නිසි වෘත්තීය සැලකිල්ලකින් (Professional due care) කටයුතු කර නොමැති බවත්, ප්‍රසම්පාදන ක්‍රියාවලියෙන් අපේක්ෂිත මූලික අරමුණු ඉටුවන පරිදි එය ක්‍රියාත්මක කර නොමැති බවත් නිගමනය කරනු ලැබේ.
- 10.4 රු.මිලියන 2,193 ක වියදමක් දරා සිදුකරන ලද ශක්‍යතා අධ්‍යයනයට අදාළ වාර්තාව භාවිතා නොකිරීම හේතුවෙන් අහිමි වන මෙම මුදල සම්බන්ධයෙන් අදාළ තීරණ ගත් හා තීරණ ක්‍රියාත්මක කරන ලද පාර්ශවයන් වගකිව යුතු බව නිගමනය කරමි.



එච්. එම්. ගාමිණී විජේසිංහ
විගණකාධිපති
2018 දෙසැම්බර් 28-දින

மத்திய அதிவேக வீதி செயற்திட்டத்தின் சாத்தியவள ஆய்வு மற்றும் அச்செயற்திட்டத்திற்கான பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகள் தொடர்பான விசேட கணக்காய்வு அறிக்கை

1. நிறைவேற்றுப் பொழிப்பு

அப்போதைய உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சாகிய தற்போதைய பெருந்தெருக்கள் மற்றும் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அமைச்சின் கீழ் அமுல்படுத்தப்படுகின்ற வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையால் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட 2007 - 2017 பெருந்தெருக்கள் பாரிய திட்டத்தின் பிரகாரம் வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணித்தல் இனங்காணப்பட்டிருந்தது. மேலும் விடயங்களைப் பரீட்சித்த போது 1990 ஆம் ஆண்டிலிருந்தே மத்திய மாகாணத்திற்கு அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக திட்டங்கள் அமுல்படுத்தியிருந்தமை உறுதிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அதன்போது இந்த நிர்மாணங்களுக்குரிய தேசிய கொள்கையை அமுல்படுத்தாமையின் காரணமாக நாட்டுக்கு ஏற்பட்டுள்ள நட்டம் எவ்வளவு என்பதனை மதிப்பீடு செய்யமுடியாதிருந்ததுடன் அவதானிக்கப்பட்ட சில விடயங்களை இந்த அறிக்கை உள்ளடக்கியுள்ளது. எவ்வாறாயினும், இந்த அறிக்கை 2017 செப்டெம்பர் 19 ஆந்திகதி 1430 மணிக்கு நடைபெற்ற பொது முயற்சிகள் தொடர்பான பாராளுமன்ற தெரிவுக்குழு கலந்துரையாடலின் போது மத்திய அதிவேக வீதி செயற்திட்டத்தின் செயல்முன்னேற்றம் தொடர்பாகவும் அது தொடர்பாக நிகழ்காலத்தில் உருவாகியுள்ள பிரச்சினைகள் பற்றி மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட கலந்துரையாடலின் போது ஏற்பட்ட சிக்கல்களின் பின்னர் அதற்காக உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு, வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபை, மற்றும் செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட தகவல்களின் பிரகாரம் ஒரு விசேட கணக்காய்வு அறிக்கையைத் தயாரிக்குமாறு கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதிக்கு வழங்கப்பட்ட ஆலோசனைகளுக்கான இணக்கப்பாட்டின் பேரில் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படுகின்றது.

(i) 2014 திசெம்பர் 31 ஆந்திகதி வரை ஸ்மெக் (SMEC) நிறுவனத்திற்கு ரூபா 1,759 மில்லியனும் அந்த நிறுவனத்தின் அறிக்கை ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளக் கூடிய நிலையில் இல்லாததன் காரணமாக இது சம்பந்தமாக பல்வேறு ஆய்வுகளுக்காக வெளி நிறுவனங்களுக்கு ரூபா 65 மில்லியன் செலுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தும் இறுதி சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு அறிக்கை தயாரிக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.

(ii) கணக்காய்வுத் திகதி வரையும் அதிவேக வீதிகளை தெளிவாக இனங்கண்டு மதிப்பீட்டை திருத்தம் செய்ய முடியாத நிலைமையின் கீழ் கேள்வி ஆவணங்கள் தயாரித்தல் இடம் பெற்றிருக்காததுடன் கேள்வி மதிப்பீட்டின் சரியான தன்மை கணக்காய்வில் கேள்விக்குரியதாக உள்ளன.

- (iii) III ஆம் கட்டத்திற்காக பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு கிடைத்த அங்கீகாரம் அது அங்கீகரிக்கப்பட்ட திகதி மற்றும் அந்த மதிப்பீட்டைத் தயாரித்த உத்தியோகத்தர்களின் உத்தியோகபூர்வ முத்திரைகள் இருக்கவில்லை.
- (iv) மத்திய அதிவேக விடுதியின் இலக்கம் 01, 02 மற்றும் 03 ஆம் பகுதிகள் தொடர்பாக ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனி மற்றும் ஒப்பந்தக் கம்பனியைத் தெரிவு செய்யும் நடைமுறையானது 2006 அரசாங்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையின் 1.1 ஆம் பிரிவிற்கு முரணாக அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- (v) போட்டி விலை முறைமையை கடைப்பிடிக்காததன் காரணமாக 2006 அரசாங்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையின் 1.2.1 ஆம் பிரிவிற்கு முரணானதாக இருந்தது.
- (vi) ஒப்பந்தக்காரரைத் தெரிவு செய்யும் போது அங்கீகரிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள நடைமுறைகளின் பிரகாரம் அது அரசாங்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையின் 1.4.2 மற்றும் 1.4.3 ஆம் பிரிவுகளில் காட்டப்பட்டுள்ள பெறுகை ஒழுக்க நெறிகளுக்கு முரணானதாக இருந்தது.
- (vii) ஜப்பான் தூதுவரால் பெயர் குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட நிறுவனங்களிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளைக் கோருவதற்கு தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக் குழு சிபார்சு செய்திருக்கவில்லை.
- (viii) ஜப்பான் தூதுவராலயத்தால் இந்த முறையற்ற பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளுக்கு விருப்பமின்மையை வெளியிட்டிருந்ததும் அமைச்சு செயலாளரால் கேள்விதாரர்களின் பெயர்களைக் குறிப்பிடுமாறு ஜப்பான் தூதுவருக்கு கடிதம் சமர்ப்பிக்கும் இயலுமை பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவைக்கு இணங்கியிருக்கவில்லை.
- (ix) நிதி அமைச்சர் எதிர்ப்பை வெளியிட்டிருந்தும் கடைப்பிடிக்கப்பட்டிருந்த போட்டி கேள்வி நடைமுறை நிறுத்தப்பட்டு அதற்கு புறம்பாக அமைச்சரின் அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞானத்தில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டவாறு Fujita கம்பனியால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட கேட்பு மனு தொடர்பாக அந்த நிறுவனத்துடன் (Fujita) கலந்தாலோசிப்பதற்கு முயற்சி எடுத்தல் பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவைக்கு முரணானதாகும்.

(x) இயலுமை இல்லாததனால் Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வி நிராகரிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தும் அக்கேள்வியை மீண்டும் ஒரு தடைவ மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு உட்படுத்துமாறு ஐப்பான் விசேட ஆலோசகரின் வேண்டுகலை ஏற்றுக்கொண்டு நடைமுறைப்படுத்துதல் பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிகளுக்கு முரணானதாகும்.

(xi) Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வியை நிராகரித்தல் சரியானது என மீண்டும் பெறுகைக் குழு சிபார்சு செய்திருந்தும் அதற்கு முரணாக அக்கம்பனிக்கு பெறுகையை வழங்குவதற்காக தகமை பெற்ற Taisei கம்பனியுடன் இணைந்து கொள்வதற்கு அங்கீகாரத்தைப் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளுதல் மற்றும் அதற்கு பலவந்தப்படுத்துதல் பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணானதாகும்.

மேற்கூறப்பட்ட விடயங்களின் காரணமாக அரசாங்க நிதி மற்றும் ஏனைய வளங்கள் வீண்விரயமாகுதல் இடம்பெற்றிருந்ததுடன் செலவு செய்யப்பட்ட பணத்திற்கும் அவற்றிற்கு கிடைத்த பெறுமதிக்குமிடையே பாரிய வித்தியாசம் இடம் பெற்றுள்ளமை அவதானிக்கப்பட்டது. அவ்வாறே செயற்திட்டத்திற்காக ஈடுபடுத்தப்படுகின்ற அரசாங்க கடன் ஆக்கபூர்வமாகவும் சிக்கனத்தன்மையுடனும் வினைத்திறனாகவும் பயன்படுத்த வேண்டியதுடன் அவ்வாறு பயன்படுத்துவதனை உறுதிப்படுத்துவதற்காக பொருத்தமான உள்ளகக் கட்டுப்பாடு முறைமையைத் திட்டமிடுதல், அமுல்படுத்துதல் மற்றும் நாளது வரையாகப் பேணுதல் முகாமைத்தவத்தின் பொறுப்பாகும். மேலும், வெளிநாட்டு உதவியின் கீழ் அமுல்படுத்தப்படுகின்ற அவ்வாறான பாரிய அளவான செயற்திட்டங்களை திட்டமிடும் போதும் அமுல்படுத்தும் போதும் அதனுடன் தொடர்புபட்ட உத்தியோகத்தர்கள் உரிய தொழில்சார் திறனுடன் செயற்பட வேண்டியதுடன் நல்லாட்சி கட்டமைப்பிற்குள் அதனுடன் தொடர்புபட்ட நிறுவனங்கள் செயற்பட வேண்டியதும் அத்தியாவசியமானதாகும்.

2. மேற்கூறிய அறிக்கையை வழங்குவதின் பின்னணியும் அறிக்கையின் தன்மையும்

2017 செப்டெம்பர் 19 ஆந் திகதி 1430 மணிக்கு இடம் பெற்ற பொது முயற்சிகள் தொடர்பான பாரளுமன்ற தெரிவுக்குழு கலந்துரையாடலின் போது மத்திய அதிவேக வீதிச் செயற்திட்டத்தின் செயல் முன்னேற்றம் தொடர்பாக மற்றும் அது சம்பந்தமாக நிகழ்காலத்தில் உருவாகியுள்ள சிக்கல்கள் சம்பந்தமாக மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட கலந்துரையாடலின் பிரகாரம் மற்றும் அதற்கு உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு, வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபை, செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளர் ஆகியோரால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட விளக்கங்களின் பிரகாரம் விசேட கணக்காய்வு அறிக்கையை தயாரிக்குமாறு கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதியிடம் வேண்டிக்கொள்ளப்பட்டதுடன் அந்த இணக்கப்பாட்டின் பிரகாரம் இந்த அறிக்கை சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படுகின்றது.

3 இந்த அறிக்கையைத் தயாரிக்கும் போது கீழே குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட ஆவணங்கள் பரீட்சிக்கப்பட்டன.

- 3.1 2006 ஆம் ஆண்டில் வழங்கப்பட்ட NPA/CEO/18 ஆம் இலக்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவை மற்றும் கையேடு
- 3.2 பெறுகை கையேட்டிற்கு மேலதிகமாக இது வரை வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ள பெறுகை
- 3.3 செயற்திட்ட நடவடிக்கைகள் தொடர்பாக வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ள அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞானமும் அமைச்சரவைத் தீர்மானமும்.
- 3.4 உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு, வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபை செயற்திட்ட அலுவலகம், பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான அமைச்சரவை உப குழு என்பவற்றுக்கிடையே கைமாற்றப்பட்ட கடிதங்கள்.
- 3.5 செயற்திட்ட குழு அறிக்கை மற்றும் அமைச்சரவை கலந்துரையாடல் குழு (Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee) அறிக்கை.
- 3.6 ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலயம், செயற்திட்ட அலுவலகம், அமைச்சர், அமைச்சு செயலாளர் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையின் தலைவர் ஆகியோருக்கிடையே கைமாற்றப்பட்ட கடிதங்கள்.
- 3.7 விலை மனு கோரலுக்கு முன்னைய கூட்ட அறிக்கை, கேள்வி ஆவணங்கள் அதிவேக வீதியின் தொடக்க திட்டங்கள், மதிப்பீடு கேள்வி ஆவணங்களுக்கான திருத்தங்கள் ஆகிய ஆவணங்கள்.
- 3.8 பத்திரிகைகளில் பிரசுரிக்கப்பட்ட அறிக்கைகள்
- 3.9 பல்வேறு இணைய தளங்களில் வெளியிடப்பட்ட கடிதங்களும் அறிக்கைகளும்

3.10 பல்வேறு தரப்பினர்களுடன் நேர் காணல்களை நடாத்துதல்.

4. கணக்காய்வின் நோக்கெல்லை.

உட்கட்டமைப்பு வசதிகள் அபிவிருத்திச் செயற்பாட்டின் போது 2007 ஆம் ஆண்டில் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட பெருந்தெருக்கள் பாரிய திட்டத்தின் பிரகாரம் இனங்காணப்பட்ட பிரதான வீதி அபிவிருத்தி செயற்திட்டங்களுக்கு மத்தியில் கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி, கொழும்பு – யாழ்ப்பாணம் அதிவேக வீதி என்பன இனங்காணப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன் இதற்கு முன்னர் அதிவேக வீதி தொடர்பாக எதுவித திட்டமும் இல்லாத நிலையில் 1990 ஆம் ஆண்டிலிருந்து 2012 யூலை மாதம் வரை கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணிக்கும் குறிக்கோள்களுடன் செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவு தோற்றுவிக்கப்பட்டு அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன் 2012 ஆம் ஆண்டு இறுதியிலிருந்து 2015 யூலை வரை கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதியையும் கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதியையும் கொழும்பு – யாழ்ப்பாணம் அதிவேக வீதியையும் கவனத்தில் கொண்டு வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியாகப் பெயரிடப்பட்டு எந்தர முல்லையிலிருந்து குருநாகல் வரை இரண்டு பகுதிகளையும் கண்டியை இணைக்கும் வீதியையும் நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக சாத்தியவள ஆய்வு, நிர்மாணங்கள், ஆலோசனை சேவை என்பவற்றிற்காக ஒப்பந்தக்காரர்களை தெரிவு செய்வதற்கு நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. பின்னர் 2015 யூலை மாதத்திலிருந்து இந்த அதிவேக வீதியானது மத்திய அதிவேக வதியாக பெயரிடப்பட்டு கடவத்தையிலிருந்து தம்புள்ள வரை மூன்று பகுதிகளாக கண்டியை இணைக்கும் வீதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக சாத்திய வள ஆய்வினை மேற்கொள்வதற்கும் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காகவும் அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டு வருக்கின்றது. இந்த நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக அடிக்கடி அமைச்சரவை பத்திரமும் அது தொடர்பான தீர்மானமும் நிரந்தரமாகச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன் உரிய செயற்பாட்டிற்காக செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவு தோற்றுவிக்கப்பட்டு பாரிய அளவில் செலவுகள் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. இந்த அதிவேக வீதிக்குரிய சாத்திய வள ஆய்வினையும் நிர்மாணிப்பதற்குரிய பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகளையும் பரீட்சிப்பதற்கு கணக்காய்வு நோக்கெல்லை மட்டுப்படுத்தப்படுகின்றது.

5. நோக்கெல்லையின் வரையறை

5.1 சாத்திய வள ஆய்விற்காக சுவீடன் அரசாங்கம் மற்றும் சுவீடன் சர்வதேச அபிவிருத்தி நிறுவனத்தால் வழங்கப்பட்ட ரூபா 119 மில்லியன் மானியத்தில் ரூபா 85.1 மில்லியன் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் செலவு செய்யப்பட்ட முறைமை தொடர்பான விடயம் கணக்காய்விற்கு விளக்கமளிக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.

5.2 அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தைப் பெற்று முடிவுறுத்தப்பட்டுள்ள மலேசியாவின் தனியார் கம்பனியுடன் மேற்கொண்ட உடன்படிக்கை மற்றும் அதனுடன் மேற்கொண்ட நடவடிக்கைகளுக்கும் கொடுக்கல்வாங்கல்களுக்குரிய தகவல்கள் கணக்காய்வில் வெளிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.

6. செயற்பாட்டை அறிமுகப்படுத்தல்

- 1990 ஆம் ஆண்டிலிருந்து இன்று வரை கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி, வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதி, மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியாக விஸ்தரிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.
- கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி, வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதி, மத்திய அதிவேக வீதி என்பவற்றிற்குரிய சாத்தியவள ஆய்வுகள், உடன்படிக்கைகளை மேற்கொள்ளல், TOR தயாரித்தல், பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீட்டைத் தயாரித்தல், கால நீடிப்பை வழங்குதல், முரண் கட்டளைகளைச் சமர்ப்பித்தல் சாத்தியவள ஆய்வுகளின் அறிக்கை என்பவற்றின் செயல் முன்னேற்றம்.
- செயற்திட்டங்கள் தொடர்பாக ஆலோசகர்களைத் தெரிவு செய்தல், ஒப்பந்தக்காரர்களைத் தெரிவு செய்தல் என்பவை சார்ந்த பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகள்.

7. செயற்பாடு

7.1 மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியின் விஸ்தரிப்பு

7.1.1 கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி

கொழும்பு கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி கவனத்தில் கொண்டு மத்திய அதிவேக வீதி நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கான அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் 1990 ஒக்தோபர் 04 ஆந் திகதி வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அந்த அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக நிர்மாணித்தல், செயற்படுத்துதல், ஒப்படைத்தல் (BOT) என்ற அடிப்படையை ஈடுபடுத்துவதற்கான அங்கீகாரம் 2002 செப்டெம்பர் 18 ஆந் திகதி வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இச் செயற்திட்டத்தின் நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக ஆரம்பிக்கப்பட்ட செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவு சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் 2012 ஆம் ஆண்டு வரை கணக்குகள் தயாரிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.1.2 வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதி

7.1.2.1 துறைமுகங்கள் மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சால் 2012 யூலை 19 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனம் சமர்ப்பித்து 2007 – 2017 ஆண்டுகளுக்காக வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட பெருந்தெருக்கள் பாரிய திட்டத்தின் கீழ் இனங்காணப்பட்டுள்ள 06 அதிவேக வீதிகளில் ஒன்றான வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியாகிய கொழும்பு – யாழ்ப்பாணம் அதிவேக வீதியை வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியாக கொழும்பிலிருந்து குருநாகல் வரை 02 பகுதிகளாகவும் கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதிக்கும் இணைப்பை வழங்கி ஹேதெனிய உள்ளக இடமாறல் வரை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கு உத்தேசிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

- **முதலாம் பகுதி** – என்டேரமுல்ல – ஹொரண – ராகம – வல்பொல – படுவத்த – புளுகஹகொட – கனமுல்ல – யாகொட – கம்பஹா – தாரளுவ – பெம்முல்ல – மகலகொட – ஹீன்தெனிய – வெயங்கொட – வந்துரவ – கீனவல – பள்ளவெல – மீரிகம – உள்ளக இடமாறல்கள் (42Km)
- **இரண்டாம் பகுதி** – மீரிகம உள்ளக இடமாறல் – போயவலான – பொதுபிடய – தம்பெலஸ்ஸ – கனேகொட – தெஹிகும்புர – பல்லன்தெனிய – உள்ளக இடமாறல்கள் (35Km)
- **மூன்றாம் பகுதி** (Link Expressway) – பொதுபிடய உள்ளக இடமாறல் – நுகவெல – பொரமடல – பொல்கஹவல – ரம்புக்கன – ஹதரலியத்த – ஹேதெனிய உள்ளக இடமாறல்கள் (44 Km)

7.1.2.2 தொடக்கத்தில் இந்த அதிவேக வீதியை 04 வழிப்பாதையாக நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கும் I ஆம் மற்றும் II ஆம் பகுதிகளை எதிர்காலத்தில் 06 வழிப்பாதைகளாக விஸ்தரிப்பதற்கும் உத்தேசிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இந்த அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்திற்கான அங்கீகாரம் 2012 யூலை 18 ஆந் திகதி அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.1.2.3 இதற்கு மத்தியில் செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவு 2012 யூலை 18 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தின் பிரகாரம் வடக்கு அதிவேகப் பாதையின் சாத்தியவள ஆய்வு, நிர்மாணித்தல், ஆலோசனை சேவை என்பவற்றிற்காக ஒப்பந்தக்காரர்களை தெரிவு செய்யும் நடவடிக்கைக்காக அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளன.

7.1.3 மத்திய அதிவேக வீதி

7.1.3.1 2015 யூலை 06 ஆந் திகதி உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சினால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்தின் மூலம் இதுவரை வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியாக இனங்காணப்படாத வீதி மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியாகப் பெயரிடப்பட்டு தேசிய முன்னுரிமை வழங்கப்பட வேண்டிய செயற்திட்டமாக விரைவாக ஆரம்பிப்பதற்காக 2015 யூலை 08 ஆந் திகதி அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.1.3.2 மேலும், செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவப் பிரிவு இதிலிருந்து 2015 யூலை 08 ஆந் திகதிய அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தின் பிரகாரம் மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியின் சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு மற்றும் பொதுஹெரவிலிருந்து கலகெதர வரையான இணைப்பு வீதியின் நிர்மாணத்திற்குத் தேவையான உட்கட்டமைப்பு வசதி நடவடிக்கைகள் இடம்பெற்றுவருவதுடன் வீதியின் முதலாவது பகுதியாக கடவத்தையிலிருந்து மீரிகம வரையும் இரண்டாவது பகுதி மீரிகமவிலிருந்து குருநாகல் வரையும் மூன்றாவது பகுதி குருநாகலிலிருந்து தம்புள்ள வரையும் பகுதி பகுதியாக தனித்தனி முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவு தோற்றுவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.

7.2 கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி, வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதி, மத்திய அதிவேக வீதி என்பன தொடர்பான சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு

7.2.1 சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு நிறுவனங்களைத் தெரிவு செய்தலும் நிதி வழங்குதலும்

7.2.1.1 2003 யூன் 25 ஆந் திகதிய அமைச்சரவைத் தீர்மானத்தின் பிரகாரம் கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக வீதி செயற்திட்டத்தை மலேசியா அரசாங்கத்தின் மூலம் அமுல்படுத்துவதற்கு அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அதற்கிணங்க 2003 செப்டெம்பர் 10 ஆந் திகதி மலேசிய அரசாங்கம் மற்றும் இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தால் புரிந்துணர்வு உடன்படிக்கையில் கையொப்பமிடப்பட்டிருந்தன.

7.2.1.2 இந்த புரிந்துணர்வு உடன்படிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட வேண்டிய விபரமான சாத்தியவள ஆய்விற்காக சுவீடன் அரசாங்கம் மற்றும் சுவீடன் சர்வதேச அபிவிருத்தி நிறுவனத்தால் ரூபா 119 மில்லியன் மானியம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் சுவீடன் மதியுரைக் கம்பனியாகிய யூரோ இன்ப்ரா குரூப் (Euro Infra Group) நிறுவனத்தால் அதிவேக வீதியின் நீளம் 98 கிலோ மீற்றருக்கு சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது.

- 7.2.1.3 இந்த சுவீடன் மானியத்திலிருந்து ரூபா 85.1 மில்லியன் செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவைத் தோற்றுவிப்பதற்கு முன்னர் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் செலவு செய்யப்பட்டதுடன் கணக்கீடு செய்யப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 7.2.1.4 2005 மே 30 ஆந் திகதி வரை வீதியை இனங்கண்டு சுவீகரிக்கப்பட வேண்டிய காணிகளின் அளவும் இனங்காணப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை. என்பது அவதானிக்கப்பட்டது.
- 7.2.1.5 அதற்கு இடைப்பட்ட காலத்தின் போது இச் செயற்திட்டத்தை தனியார் முதலீட்டின் அடிப்படையில் மேற்கொள்வதற்கு 2007 யூன் 06 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.1.6 எவ்வாறாயினும், மலேசிய அரசாங்கத்துடன் கையெழுத்திட்ட புரிந்துணர்வு உடன்படிக்கையின் காலம் 2007 செப்டெம்பர் 10 ஆந் திகதி வரையும் பின்னர் 2008 யூன் 30 ஆந் திகதி வரையும் இரண்டு சந்தர்ப்பங்களில் நீடிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.1.7 2008 யூன் 30 ஆந் திகதியையும் மிகைத்து உடன்படிக்கை காலம் முடிவடைந்திருந்ததுடன் செயற்திட்டத்தின் I ஆவது கட்டத்தின் நடவடிக்கைகளை பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சால் ஆசிய அபிவிருத்தி வங்கியின் நிதியின் கீழ் மேற்கொள்வதற்கும் மலேசியாவின் தனியார் கம்பனியுடன் காணப்படுகின்ற நடவடிக்கைகளை முடிவுறுத்துவதற்கும் 2010 யூன் 23 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தினைப் பெற்றுக்கொண்டு முடிவுறுத்தப்பட்டுள்ள மலேசியாவின் தனியார் கம்பனியுடன் இடம்பெற்ற நடவடிக்கை எவ்வாறானவை என்பது கணக்காய்விற்கு வெளிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 7.2.1.8 இந்த நடவடிக்கைகளை மேற்கொள்வதற்கு செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவப் பிரிவு தோற்றுவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அதன் பதவியணியினருக்கான அங்கீகாரம் 2003 செப்டெம்பர் 25 ஆந் திகதி முகாமைத்துவ சேவைகள் திணைக்களத்தால் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. 2012 ஆம் ஆண்டின் இறுதி வரை அப்பிரிவிற்காக மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட மொத்த செலவு ரூபா 284 மில்லியனாகும். கொழும்பு – கண்டி அதிவேக நடவடிக்கைகள் தற்பொழுது பூர்த்தி செய்யப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அதற்காக கணக்கீடு செய்யப்பட்ட ரூபா 284 மில்லியன் மற்றும் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் கணக்கீடு செய்யப்படாத ரூபா 85.1 மில்லியனும் மொத்த தொகையான ரூபா 369.1 மில்லியன் மொத்த செலவுகள் கணக்குகளில் முன்கொண்டு வரப்படாதிருந்ததுடன் அது சிக்கனமற்ற மற்றும் கணக்குகளில் மறைக்கப்பட்ட ஒரு செலவு என்பது அவதானிக்கப்பட்டது.

- 7.2.1.9 துறைமுகங்கள் மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சால் 2012 யூலை 09 ஆந் திகதி சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்தின் பிரகாரம் வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக விபரமான ஆய்வும் திட்டமும் தயாரிப்பதற்கு முன்னர் சாத்திய வள ஆய்வினையும் சுற்றாடல் தாக்கத்தையும் மதிப்பீடு செய்தல் அவசியமானது எனவும் அதற்காக இவ்வாறான செயற்திட்டம் தொடர்பாக அண்மித்த அனுபவம் உள்ள கொழும்பு - கட்டுநாயக்கா அதிவேக வீதி செயற்திட்டத்தின் நிர்மாண மேற்பார்வை மற்றும் திட்டங்களுக்கான ஆலோசகரான SMEC International Pvt. Ltd நிறுவனத்திற்கு போதிய அனுபவம் உள்ளது எனவும் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.1.10 இச் செயற்திட்டத்தை மிக விரைவில் ஆரம்பிப்பதற்கு எதிர்பார்க்கப்பட்டுள்ளதனால் சாத்திய வள ஆய்வினை மேற்கொள்ளல், சுற்றாடல் தாக்கத்தை மதிப்பீடு செய்தல், விருப்பமுள்ள அனைத்து முதலீட்டாளர்களின் கருத்துக்களைக் கோருதல், (EOI) குறுகிய பட்டியல்படுத்தப்பட்ட முதலீட்டாளர்களிடமிருந்து பிரேரணைக்காக விண்ணப்பங்களைக் கோருதல் (RFP) ஆகிய செயற்பாடுகளுக்கான ஆவணங்களைத் தயாரிக்கும் நேரடி ஒப்பந்த முறைமையின் மூலம் SMEC International Pvt. Ltd யினை ஈடுபடுத்தி மேற்கொள்வதற்கும் அந்த ஆய்வுகளுக்கு தேவையான நிதிகளை திரட்டு நிதியிலிருந்து பெற்றுக் கொள்வதாகவும் காட்டப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதற்காக அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் 2012 யூலை 18 ஆந் திகதி பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.1.11 இதற்கு மத்தியில் 2012 செப்டெம்பர் 10 ஆந் திகதி வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியின் முக்கியத்துவம் மற்றும் அவசரத்தின் காரணமாக ஒப்பந்தம் கையெழுத்திட்டப்படுவதற்கு முன்னர் சேவைகளை ஆரம்பிக்குமாறு காட்டி வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் SMEC International Pvt. Ltd நிறுவனத்துடன் புரிந்துணர்வு உடன்படிக்கை கைச்சாத்திடப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.1.12 மேலும் அத்திகதியே வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையின் தலைவர் அந்த நிறுவனத்திற்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தில் அவர்களால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட தொழில்நுட்ப மற்றும் நிதிப் பிரேரணைகளை மதிப்பீடு செய்ததன் மற்றும் உடன்பட்டதன் பின்னர் ஒப்பந்தம் கைச்சாத்திடப்பட்டதாகவும் அரசாங்கம் இச் செயற்திட்டத்திற்கு அதிக முக்கியத்துவம் வழங்கியதன் காரணமாக விரைவாக நிர்மாணத்தை ஆரம்பிக்க வேண்டியிருப்பதனால் உடன்படிக்கையில் கையொப்பமிட்டதும் மிக விரைவாக வேலையை ஆரம்பிக்குமாறும் (mobilize) வேண்டப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.2.2 Terms of Reference (TOR) தயாரித்தல்

- 7.2.2.1 பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு செயலாளரின் 2012 செப்டெம்பர் 17 ஆந் திகதி SMEC நிறுவனத்திற்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தில் வேலை விபரத்தைக் கோரும் கடிதத்திற்கு (REP) மேலதிகமாக தனியான TOR ஒன்றின் மூலம் வழங்குமாறு தெரியப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அத் திகதியே அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த ஆலோசகரின் பெறுகைக் குழு (CACPC) கூட்டப்பட்டு செயற்திட்ட முகாமைத்துவ பிரிவினால் (PMU) தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட பிரேரணையைக் கோரும் வேண்டுகல் (RFP) மற்றும் Terms of Reference (TOR) என்பன அங்கீகரிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தன.
- 7.2.2.2 AUD 4,504,896 மற்றும் LKR 499,503,825 பெறுமதியான SMEC நிறுவனத்தின் நிதி மற்றும் தொழில்நுட்ப பிரேரணை 2012 செப்டெம்பர் 24 ஆந் திகதி சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.2.3 புரிந்துணர்வு உடன்படிக்கையில் கையொப்பமிடும் வகையில் விரைவாக வேலையை ஆரம்பிக்குமாறு SMEC நிறுவனத்திற்கு தெரியப்படுத்தியிருந்தும் அதுவரை தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட TOR, பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீடு, உரிய நிறுவனத்தினால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட நிதி, தொழில் நுட்ப பிரேரணைகள் என்பன இருக்கவில்லை.
- 7.2.2.4 பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சின் செயலாளரால் 2012 நவம்பர் 20 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த மீளாய்வுக் குழு (Standing Cabinet Appointed Review Committee – SCARC) விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் SMEC இன் பிரேரணையானது அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பெறுகைக் குழுவினால் (CAPC) மதிப்பீடு செய்யப்பட்டதாகவும் 3 தடவைகள் கலந்துரையாடப்பட்டதாகவும் அவர்களால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட விலைகளில் உயர்ந்த பெறுமதி எடுக்கப்பட்டதாகவும் மேலும் குறைக்கக் கூடியது என அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த மீளாய்வுக்குழு கருதுமாயிருந்தால் அது சிபார்சு செய்யப்படுவதாகவும் காட்டப்பட்டிருந்தது. அதற்கிணங்க அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த ஆலோசகரின் பெறுகைக் குழுவால் (CACPC) கிரயம் ரூபா 499,503,825 இலிருந்து ரூபா 422,164,626 வரை மற்றும் AUD 4,504,897 இலிருந்து AUD 4,375,839 வரை குறைக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.2.5 அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த மீளாய்வுக் குழுவால் மேலும், கலந்துரையாடியதன் பின்னர் அவுஸ்திரேலிய டொலர் (AUD) 3,998,671 மற்றும் இலங்கை ரூபா 412,233,734 இற்கு ஒப்பந்தத்தை வழங்குவதற்கு சிபார்சு செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தது.

இதற்காக 2012 திசம்பர் 19 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.2.3 முரண் கட்டளை சமர்ப்பித்தல்

- 7.2.3.1 2013 மே 31 ஆந் திகதி பதில் கடமையாற்றும் செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் அமைச்சு செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் SMEC நிறுவனத்தினால் 01 முரண் கட்டளை சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் இது தொடர்பாக பரிமாறப்பட்ட கடிதங்கள், கருத்துரைகள் குழு தீர்மானம் என்பன தொடர்பான தகவல்கள் பின்னிணைப்பு - 01(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii) இல் தரப்படுகின்றது.
- 7.2.3.2 எவ்வாறாயினும், பல சந்தர்ப்பங்களில் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட திருத்தங்களின் பின்னர் கடைசியாகத் திருத்திய 01 ஆம் இலக்க முரண் கட்டளை 2013 யூன் 23 ஆந் திகதி சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. SMEC இற்கு அவர்களின் நோக்கெல்லையை விரிவுபடுத்துவது தொடர்பாக யாரால் தெரியப்படுத்தப்பட்டது அவ்வாறு தெரிப்படுத்துவதற்கு முன்னர் நோக்கெல்லையை விரிவுபடுத்துவது சம்பந்தமாக கடைப்பிடிக்கப்பட்ட நடைமுறை எது ஆகிய பிரச்சினை கணக்காய்வின் போது உருவாகியிருந்தும் அவற்றிற்கு பதில் வழங்குவதற்கு செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளர் தவறியிருந்தார். எவ்வாறாயினும் கிரய மதிப்பீட்டு பரிசோதனை குழுவால் பின்வருமாறு முரண் கட்டளை சிபார்சு செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.3.3 இந்த முரண் - 01 இற்கான அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் 2014 சனவரி 03 ஆந் திகதி கிடைத்திருந்ததுடன் அதற்கிணங்க முழுமையான ஒப்பந்த பெறுமதியான இலங்கை ரூபா 583,070,286 மற்றும் அவுஸ்திரேலிய டொலர் 3,998,671 வரை அதிகரித்திருந்ததுடன் ஒப்பந்த காலம் 2014 மார்ச் 31 வரை நீடிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. எவ்வாறாயினும், அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தை மிகைத்து செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் அடிக்கடி காலம் நீடிக்கப்பட்டதுடன் அதற்கிணங்க இறுதியாக 2014 திசம்பர் 31 வரை காலம் நீடிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு II) 2014 ஆகஸ்ட் 22 ஆந் திகதி முரண் கட்டளை - 02(i),(ii),(iii) சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.3.4 செயற்திட்டத்தின் பணிப்பாளரால் TOR யினை மிகைத்து SMEC நிறுவனத்திற்கு அடிக்கடி மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட பணி ஒப்படைப்புக்களை கவனத்தில் கொண்டு அந்த நிறுவனத்தால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட முரண் கட்டளை 02 அடிக்கடி திருத்தம் செய்யப்பட்டு இறுதியில் 07 ஆவது தடவையாக 2015 மார்ச் 03 ஆந் திகதி முரண் கட்டளை 02 சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.2.3.5 இக் கட்டளை தொடர்பாக 2017 மே 26 ஆந் திகதி SMEC நிறுவனத்தின் சட்டத்தரணியிடமிருந்து ஒரு கடிதம் கிடைத்திருந்ததுடன் இதனை மதிப்பீடு

செய்வதற்காக 2017 யூன் 02 ஆந் திகதி திட்ட பணிப்பாளரின் தலைமையில் ஒரு குழு நியமிக்கப்பட்டது. மீண்டும் 2017 யூன் 22 மற்றும் 2017 ஆகஸ்ட் 09 ஆந் திகதிகளில் SMEC நிறுவனத்தினால் அனுப்பப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் மூலம் உரிய கொடுப்பனவுகள் 30 நாட்களுக்குள் தீர்த்து வைக்கப்படவில்லையாயின் உடன்படிக்கையின் சாதாரண நிபந்தனை 8.2 இன் பிரகாரம் நடவடிக்கை எடுப்பதற்கும் தாமத வட்டி அறவிட வேண்டி ஏற்படுமெனவும் சட்டரீதியான நடவடிக்கை எடுப்பதாகவும் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபைக்குத் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.2.3.6 2017 ஒக்டோபர் 04 ஆந் திகதி சட்ட மா அதிபர் திணைக்களத்தின் சிரேஷ்ட பிரதி சொலிசிடர் ஜெனரால், வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையின் பணிப்பாளருக்கு (சட்டம்) விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் இது இணக்க சபைக்கு அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்டதாகத் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.2.4 சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு அறிக்கையைக் சமர்ப்பித்தல்

7.2.4.1 2013 சனவரி 09 ஆந் திகதி வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபை மற்றும் SMEC க்கு இடையே சாத்திய வள ஆய்வுக்கான கையொப்பமிடப்பட்ட உடன்படிக்கைக்குரிய TOR இன் பிரகாரம் வரைபு அறிக்கையின் 06 பிரதிகள் மற்றும் இலத்திரனியல் பிரதிகளுடன் வேலை ஆரம்பித்து 06 மாதங்களுக்குள் SMEC இனால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.

7.2.4.2 இறுதி வரைபு அறிக்கையானது வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபைக்கு கிடைத்து ஒரு மாதத்திற்குள் அது தொடரான கருத்துரைகள் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படுதல் வேண்டும். மேலும், SMEC நிறுவனத்துக்கு கருத்துரைகள் கிடைத்து ஒரு மாதத்திற்குள் இறுதி அறிக்கையின் 20 பிரதிகள் மற்றும் இலத்திரனியல் பிரதியுடன் சமர்ப்பித்தல் வேண்டும்.

7.2.4.3 எவ்வாறாயினும், 2013 நவம்பர் 22 ஆந் திகதி 06 பிரதிகள் மற்றும் soft copy உடன் இறுதி வரைபு அறிக்கை சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் இந்த அறிக்கைக்கு வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையால் கருத்துரைகள் அனுப்பிவைக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை. எவ்வாறாயினும், 2013 திசம்பர் 30 ஆந் திகதி வரை SMEC Internation Pvt. Ltd இற்கு செலுத்தப்பட்டுள்ள மொத்த பணம் ரூபா 1,759,123,766 என்பது அவதானிக்கப்பட்டது. (பின்னிணைப்பு - 03)

7.2.4.4 SMEC Internation Pvt. Ltd நிறுவனத்துடன் உடன்படிக்கை செய்து கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தும் அந்த உடன்படிக்கையின் கீழ் இறுதி வரைபு அறிக்கைக்கு கருத்துரைகள் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டு இறுதி அறிக்கை பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்படாத நிலைமையில் அந்த உடன்படிக்கையின் கீழ் செய்யப்பட வேண்டிய வேலைகளுக்காக பின்னினைப்பு - 04 (i),(ii),(iii),(iv),(v), இல் காட்டப்பட்டுள்ளவாறு ஏனைய நிறுவனங்களுடன் ரூபா 97,255,497 தொகைக்கு உடன்படிக்கை செய்து கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3 மத்திய அதிவேக வீதிச் செயற்திட்டத்திற்காக அங்கீகரிக்கப்பட்ட பெறுகை நடைமுறைகள்

மத்திய மாகாணத்திற்கு முதலாவது அதிவேக வீதி மற்றும் பின்னர் கண்டிக்கான இணைப்பு வீதியுடன் வட மாகாணத்திற்கு அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கான முறையற்ற தீர்மானம் மற்றும் அதிவேக வீதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக உறுதியான தேசிய கொள்கை இல்லாததன் காரணமாக கூடுதலான செலவும் காலமும் செலவிடப்பட்டிருந்தமை அவதானிக்கப்பட்டதுடன் அது தொடர்பான விபரம் மேலே 6.2 ஆம் அத்தியாயத்தில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டுள்ளது. மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியின் பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகள் பொதுஹெரவிலிருந்து கலகெதர வரையான வீதியின் மூன்றாம் பகுதிக்கான அடிப்படையாக அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன் முதலாம் மற்றும் இரண்டாம் பகுதிகளின் பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகள் அதற்கு இணைந்ததாக அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளது. என்பது அவதானிக்கப்பட்டது. பெறுகை நடைமுறைகள் பிரதானமாக 02 விடய அம்சங்களின் கீழ் கவனத்தில் கொள்ளப்பட வேண்டும்.

7.3.1 வீதியின் 03 ஆம் பகுதிக்காக ஒரு ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனியைத் தெரிவு செய்தல்

7.3.1.1 ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகளிடமிருந்து விருப்பத்தை வெளிப்படுத்தும் (Exprestion of Interest) ஆவணங்களைக் கோருவதற்காக 2015 திசம்பர் 09 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனியைத் தெரிவு செய்யும் நடைமுறையானது தரமான ஆலோசகரை அடிப்படையாகக் கொண்ட தெரிவாக (Quality Consultants Based Selection – QCBS) இருக்க வேண்டுமென 2015 திசம்பர் 29 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய அமைச்சரவை பெறுகைகள் குழு கூட்டத்தின் போது தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டது.

7.3.1.2 விருப்பத்தை வெளிப்படுத்தும் கடிதத்தை (EOI) கோருவதற்காக 2015 திசம்பர் 16 ஆந் திகதி வெளியிடப்பட்ட பத்திரிகை அறிவித்தலின் பிரகாரம் 04 பிரேரணைகள் கிடைத்துள்ளதுடன் அந்த நிறுவனத்திற்கான பிரேரணை வேண்டுகல் கடிதத்தை ஒப்படைப்பதற்காக அதே போல் மதிப்பீட்டு வரையறைகள் பிரேரணை வேண்டுகல் கடிதங்களுக்கும் தொழில்நுட்ப மற்றும் நிதிப் பிரேரணைக் கடிதங்களுக்காகவும்

அமைச்சரவைப் பெறுகைக் குழுவின் அங்கீகாரம் 2016 பெப்ரவரி 16 மற்றும் 29 ஆந் திகதிகளில் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தன. (பின்னிணைப்பு – 05)

7.3.1.3 2016 மே 06 ஆந் திகதி உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சின் அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்தின் பிரகாரம் இந்த ஒப்பந்தத்தின் சிக்கலானதன்மை காரணமாக இப்பெறுகை அனுபவத்துடனான சர்வதேச நிறுவனத்திற்கு ஒப்படைப்பதற்கு உத்தேசிக்கப்பட்டதுடன் 2016 மே 10 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 06)

7.3.1.4 மேலும் 2016 மே 18 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான அமைச்சரவை குழு (CCEM) அறிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியின் III ஆம் பகுதியிலுள்ள காணியின் தன்மையின் பிரகாரம் உருவாகும் நிர்மாணச் சிக்கல், மேம்பாலம், சுரங்கப் பாதை ஆகியவற்றை கவனத்தில் கொண்டு அதற்காக வெளிநாட்டு விசேடத்துவ அறிவு மற்றும் அனுபவம் தேவையானது எனவும், மேலும் பிரதம மந்திரியின் ஐப்பான் பயணத்தின் போது இந்த நிர்மாணத்தை மிட்சுபிசி வங்கியின் சலுகை நிதி உதவியின் கீழ் ஐப்பான் ஒப்பந்தக்காரர்களின் மூலம் நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கான பிரேரணையைக் கோரும் வகையில் தொழில்நுட்ப மற்றும் பெறுகைக் குழுவை நியமிப்பதற்காகவும் பிரேரணை ஏற்றக்கொள்ளப்பட்டது.

7.3.1.5 இதன் பின்னர், 2006 மே 20 ஆந் திகதி ஐப்பான் தூதுவர், விடயத்திற்குப் பொறுப்பான அமைச்சர், அமைச்சு செயலாளர், வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையின் தலைவர் உள்ளடங்கலாக மேல்மட்ட உத்தியோகத்தார்களால் பாரளுமன்றக் கட்டிடத் தொகுதியில் இடம் பெற்ற கலந்துரையாடலின் விளைவாக ஐப்பான் நிர்மாண மற்றும் ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகள் 03 வீதம் பெயர் குறிப்பிடுமாறு ஐப்பான் தூதுவரிடம் வேண்டுகோள் விடுவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. அதற்கிணங்க 2016 மே 25 மற்றும் 2016 மே 31 ஆந் திகதிகளுடனான கடிதங்களின் மூலம் இதற்குப் பரிசீலனாக கீழே குறிப்பிடப்பட்டவாறு ஐப்பான் வர்த்தகச் சபையில் பதிவு செய்துள்ள, இலங்கையில் உரிய துறையில் ஈடுபட்டுள்ள மற்றும் இலங்கையில் அலுவலகத்தை அமைத்துள்ள 03 ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகள் பெயர் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டு அனுப்பிவைக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 07 மற்றும் 08)

- (i) நிப்பான் கொய் கம்பனி லிமிடட் (Nippon Koei company Ltd)
- (ii) ஓரியன்டல் கொன்சல்டன்ட் கம்பனி லிமிடட் (Oriental Consultants Company Ltd)
- (iii) கடஹிரா மற்றும் இன்ஜினியரிங் இன்டென்சனல் பிறைவேட் லிமிடட் (Katahira and Engineering International Pvt . Ltd)

7.3.1.6 மேலே 7.3.1.5 ஆம் பந்தியில் ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகளிடமிருந்து பிரேரணைகளைக் கோரி அவர்களின் விலைகள் நியாயமானது என்பதனைத் தீர்மானிப்பதற்காக அரசாங்க நிதித் திணைக்களத்தால் 05 நபர்களை உள்ளடக்கிய அமைச்சரவை பெறுகைக் குழு 2016 மே 30 ஆந் திகதி நியமிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இத் தீர்மானத்தை அமுல்படுத்துவதற்காக 03 மாதங்களை அண்மித்த காலத்தின் பின்னர் 2016 ஆகஸ்ட் 23 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. அது வரையும் பிரேரணைகளைக் கோரும் கடிதங்கள் 2016 யூன் 24 ஆந் திகதி ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகளுக்கு ஒப்படைக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் 2016 யூலை 29 ஆந் திகதியில் 02 ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகளான ஓரியன்டல் கன்சல்டன்ட் கம்பனி லிமிடட் ஆகக் குறைந்த புள்ளிகளைப் பெற்றிருக்காததால் கடஹிரா மற்றும் இன்ஜினியரிங் இண்டென்சனல் பிறைவட் லிமிடட் கம்பனியின் நிதிப் பிரேரணையை மதிப்பீடு செய்வதற்காக 2017 மார்ச் 09 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய அமைச்சரவை பெறுகை குழுவினால் தீர்மானம் எடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இந்த நிதிப் பிரேரணை 02 மாதங்கள் மதிப்பீடு செய்யப்பட்டு 2017 மே 09 ஆந் திகதி முடிவுறுத்தப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அவர்களுடன் கலந்தாலோசித்ததன் பின்னர் இணங்கிய வெட், வரியற்ற ரூபா 1,159,192,476 (ஐப்பான் யென் 1,199,148,000) தொகைக்கு (Katahira and Engineering International) கம்பனியுடன் Green Tech Consultants (Pvt) Ltd Project Mangement Associate International (Pvt) Ltd இற்கு வழங்குவதற்கு தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2 நிர்மாணக் கம்பனியைத் தெரிவு செய்தல்

7.3.2.1 வீதியை ஒன்பது பகுதிகளாகப் பிரித்து உள்நாட்டு ஒப்பந்தகாரர்கள் மற்றும் ஆலோசகர்களின் மூலம் நிர்மாணங்களை அமுல்படுத்துவதற்கு நடவடிக்கை மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அதற்காக அமைச்சரவையின் அங்கீகாரம் ஆந் திகதி பெற்றுக் கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. பின்னர் III ஆம் பகுதியிலுள்ள காணியின் தன்மைக்கு இணங்க உருவாகியுள்ள நிர்மாணச் சிக்கல், மேம்பாலம், சுரங்கப் பாதை முதலியவற்றை கவனத்தில் கொண்டு அதற்கு வெளிநாட்டு விசேடத்துவ அறிவு மற்றும் அனுபவம் தேவைப்பட்டிருந்தனால் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக வெளிநாட்டு ஒப்பந்தக்காரர் ஒருவரைத் தெரிவு செய்யும் தேவையைச் சுட்டிக்காட்டி அப்பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளைப் பூர்த்தி செய்வதற்காக ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு – 09 (i))

7.3.2.2 இதுவரை இடம் பெற்ற நடைமுறைகளின் போது முன் அனுபவம் பரீட்சிக்கப்பட்ட 12 உள்நாட்டு ஒப்பந்த கம்பனிகளும் 4 ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிகளும் உள்ளதுடன் அவர்களால் தோற்றுவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள 4 consortium / Joint.venture ஒப்பந்த கம்பனிகளுக்கும் ஒரு ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனிக்கும் செயற்திட்டத்தின் இரண்டாவது பகுதியாகிய மீரிகமவிலிருந்து குருநாகல் வரையான நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகள்

வழங்கப்பட்டதுடன் அந்த வீதிப் பகுதியை 4 பகுதிகளாகப் பிரித்து நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கு தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டதுடன் தேவையான நிதியை உள்நாட்டு வங்கி கடன் மூலம் வழங்குவதற்கும் அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் --- ஆந் திகதி கிடைத்திருந்தது. இதில் பெறுகை நடவடிக்கையானது பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணாக இடம்பெற்றிருந்ததுடன் அறிக்கைத் திகதி வரை இப்பகுதியின் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகள் நடைபெற்றுக் கொண்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு - 09 (ii))

7.3.2.3 2013 மே 28 ஆந் திகதி வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபைக்கும் சீன கம்பனிக்குமிடையே சீனாவில் கையெழுத்திடப்பட்ட உடன்படிக்கை கட்டமைப்பின் பிரகாரம் வடக்கு அதிவேக வீதியின் மூன்றாவது பகுதியை அம்பேபுஸ்ஸவிலிருந்து கண்டி வரை உச்சளவு தூரம் 46 கி.மீற்றரை திட்டமிடுதல், நிதிகளை வழங்குதல், நிர்மாணித்தல், அமுல்படுத்துதல் மற்றும் தொடர்புபட்ட ஆதனங்களை அபிவிருத்தி செய்வதற்காக China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) நிறுவனத்துடன் பெருந்தெருக்கள், துறைமுகங்கள் அமைச்சு செயலாளரால் 2013 ஒக்தோபர் 17 ஆந் திகதி MOU கையொப்பமிடப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதனை இரகசிய ஆவணமாக வைத்துக் கொள்வதற்கு இரண்டு தரப்பினர்களும் இணங்கி கொண்டிருந்ததுடன் அந்த ஆவணத்தின் பிரகாரம் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக அமைச்சினால் காணிகள் வழங்க வேண்டியிருந்ததுடன் இலங்கையில் காணப்பட்ட சட்ட ஒழுங்கு விதிகளுக்கு இணங்க தொடர்புபட்ட ஆதனங்களை அபிவிருத்தி செய்வதற்குத் தேவையான காணிகளைச் சுவீகரிப்பதற்கு மற்றும் MCC நிறுவனத்திற்கு குத்தகை அடிப்படையில் வழங்குவதனை உள்ளடக்கி மேலும் நிபந்தனைகளுக்கு இணக்கம் செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதன் செல்லுபடியாகும் காலம் 18 மாதங்களாகும்.

7.2.4 2014 ஒக்தோபர் 30 ஆந் திகதி அதிவேக வீதியினை பொதுஹெரவிலிருந்து ரம்புக்கன வரை மற்றும் பொதுஹெர, ரம்புக்கன உள்ளக இடமாறல்களை உள்ளடக்கி நான்காவது பகுதியின் 3.5 கிலோ மீற்றர்களை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்கான ஒப்பந்தம் ரூபா 48,200 மில்லியனுக்கு MCC நிறுவனத்திற்கு வழங்குவதற்கு அமைச்சரவை வரைபு அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அதற்கிணங்க 2014 நவம்பர் 17 ஆந் திகதி வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபைக்கும் MCC நிறுவனத்திற்குமிடையே உடன்படிக்கை கைச்சாத்திடப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.5 அந்த உடன்படிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தால் சீனாவின் EXIM வங்கியிடமிருந்து கடனை பெற்றுக் கொள்வது கருத்தில் கொள்ளப்பட்டதுடன் ஏதாவது காரணத்தால் மேற்கூறிய உடன்படிக்கை 180 கலண்டர் நாட்களுக்குள் EXIM வங்கி மற்றும் இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்திற்கிடையே கடன் உடன்படிக்கை கையெழுத்திட முடியாது போனால்

உடன்படிக்கை சுயமாக முடிவுறுத்தப்படுவதுடன் சேவை பிரேரணையாளரால் 10 நாட்களுக்குள் செயலாற்றல் பிணை முறியை விடுவிக்க வேண்டியிருந்ததுடன் ஒப்பந்தக்காரரால் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட அனைத்து செலவுகளும் செலுத்தப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.

7.3.2.6 அவ்வாறே உடன்படிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் உடன்படிக்கை கையெழுத்திட்ட திகதியிலிருந்து வேலைத் தளத்திற்குள் நுழைந்து பரீட்சிப்பதற்கு விபரமான பொறியியலாளர் திட்டங்களைத் தயாரிப்பதற்கும் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கை மேற்கொள்வதற்கும் இணக்கம் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.7 நிர்மாணிக்கப்பட்டவாறு EXIM வங்கியுடன் கடன் உடன்படிக்கையில் கைச்சாத்திடாமையின் காரணமாக MCC நிறுவனத்துடன் முன்னர் காணப்பட்ட உடன்படிக்கை முடிவுறுத்தப்பட்டதுடன் அவர்களால் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட செலவுகளை மீளச் செலுத்தப்படாத நிலைமையின் கீழ் செயற்திட்டத்தின் முதலாவது பகுதியாகிய கடவத்தையிலிருந்து மீரிகம வரையான நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகள் பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணாக ரூபா 158,386 மில்லியனுக்கு MCC நிறுவனத்துக்கு வழங்குவதற்கு 2015 யூலை 06 ஆந் திகதி பிரதம மந்திரரால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட 15/1021/602/040 ஆம் இலக்க அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்திற்கு 2015 யூலை 16 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.8 2016 யூன் 20 ஆந் திகதி வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபைக்கும் MCC நிறுவனத்திற்கும் இடையே உடன்படிக்கை கையெழுத்திட்டப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் உடன்படிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் 365 கலன்டர் நாட்களுக்குள் சீனாவின் EXIM வங்கிக்கும் இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்திற்குமிடையே கடன் உடன்படிக்கை கையெழுத்திட முடியாமையால் மேற்கூறிய உடன்படிக்கை சுயமாக முடிவுறுத்தப்படுவதுடன் சேவைப் பிரேரணையாளரால் 10 நாட்களுக்குள் செயலாற்றல் பிணை முறி விடுவிக்கப்பட வேண்டியிருந்ததுடன் ஒப்பந்தக்காரரால் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட அனைத்து செலவுகளும் செலுத்தப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.

7.3.2.9 மேற்கூறியவாறு உடன்படிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் உடன்படிக்கை கையெழுத்திட்ட திகதியிலிருந்து வேலைத்தளத்திற்குள் நுழைந்து பரீட்சிப்பதற்கு விபரமான பொறியியல் திட்டத்தை தயாரிப்பதற்கு மற்றும் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகளை மேற்கொள்வதற்கு இணக்கம் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.10 கடன் உடன்படிக்கை கையொப்பமிடப்படாத நிலைமையில் மேற்கூறிய உடன்படிக்கையின் காலம் முடிவடைந்துள்ளதுடன் உடன்படிக்கைக்கு 07 திருத்தங்கள் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டு 2018 நவம்பர் 15 ஆந் திகதி வரை கால நீடிப்பு

பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. அறிக்கைத் திகதி வரை நீடிப்புச் செய்யப்பட்ட காலத்தையும் மிகைத்திருந்ததுடன் இதுவரை நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகளுக்காக ஒப்பந்தக்காரால் (MCC) மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட செலவுகளுக்காக இந்த நிறுவனத்திற்கு கொடுப்பனவு செய்யப்பட்டது. எவ்வாறு என்பது கணக்காய்விற்கு விளக்கமளிக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.

7.3.2.11 2015 மே மாதம் இறுதி வரை வீதியின் மூன்றாவது பகுதியை நிர்மாணிப்பதற்காக MCC நிறுவனத்துடன் காணப்பட்ட உடன்படிக்கை முடிவுறுத்தப்பட்டதன் பின்னர் மேலே 7.3.1.5 ஆம் பந்தியில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டவாறு பாராளுமன்றத்தில் இடம் பெற்ற கலந்துரையாடலின் விளைவாக ஒரு நிர்மாணக் கம்பனியைத் தெரிவு செய்வதற்காக மேலதிக கலந்துரையாடலுக்கு ஆயத்தம் என ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலயத்தின் பிரதி தூதுவரின் 2016 மே 25 ஆந் திகதிய கடிதத்தின் மூலம் அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையின் தலைவருக்கு தெரிவித்து அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. மேலும், ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலயத்தின் பிரதித் தூதுவரின் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையின் தலைவருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட 2016 மே 31 ஆந் திகதிய கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் பின்வரும் 03 நிர்மாண ஒப்பந்தக் கம்பனிகள் பெயரிடப்பட்டிருந்தன.

- (i) எம்/எஸ் தாய்சே (Taisei) கோப்பரசன்
- (ii) பென்டா ஓசன் (Penta Ocean) கன்ஸ்ட்ரக்சன் கம்பனி லிமிட்டட்
- (iii) வகசிகு (wakachiku) கன்ஸ்ட்ரக்சன் கம்பனி லிமிட்டட்

7.3.2.12 இக்கம்பனிகளிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளைக் கோருவதற்காக 2016 யூன் 01 ஆந் திகதி பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான அமைச்சரவைக் குழுவால் அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் பிரதம மந்திரியின் செயலாளரால் 2016 யூன் 06 மற்றும் 2016 யூன் 08 ஆந் திகதிகளில் உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்ச செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதங்களின் மூலமும் மேற்கூறிய கம்பனிகளிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளைக் கோருவதற்காக ஆலோசனை வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 06) (பின்னிணைப்பு – (i),(ii))

7.3.2.13 செயற்திட்டத்தால் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட கேள்வி ஆவணங்களும் கேள்வி பிரேரணைகளும் 2016 யூன் 17 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை சமரச குழுவால் (Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee) அங்கீகரிக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் 2016 யூன் 22 ஆந் திகதி Taisei, wakachiku, Penta Ocean ஆகிய கம்பனிகளுக்கு கேள்வி மனுக்களுக்கான அழைப்புக்கள் (invitation for bids) அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் 2016 ஆகஸ்ட் 02 ஆந் திகதி கேள்விகளைப் பொறுப்பேற்கும் இறுதித் திகதியாக தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 11)

- 7.3.2.14 கேள்விகளையும் பிரேரணைகளையும் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளும் வகையில் ஜப்பான் ஒப்பந்தகாரர்களை உள்ளடக்கிய பட்டியலுக்காக அங்கீகாரத்தைப் பெற்றுக்கொள்வதற்கு 2016 ஆகஸ்ட் 15 ஆந் திகதிய உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சினால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்திற்கு 2016 ஆகஸ்ட் 23 ஆந் திகதி அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.3.2.15 செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் 2016 யூலை 29 ஆந் திகதி Taisei கம்பனிக்கு அனுப்பப்பட்ட addendum - 3 இன் பிரகாரம் கேள்விகளைப் பொறுப்பேற்கும் இறுதித் திகதி 2016 ஆகஸ்ட் 31 ஆகக் காட்டப்பட்டிருந்தது. மேலும், அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்ட கேள்வி ஆவணங்கள் மற்றும் உத்தேச நிர்மாண ஒப்பந்தம் தொடர்பாக விளக்கமளிக்கும் கடிதங்கள் Taisei கம்பனியால் அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் விடயங்களைத் தெளிவுபடுத்தும் கூட்டத்திற்காகவும் அக்கம்பனியால் மாத்திரம் வேண்டுகல் விடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தமை அவதானிக்கப்பட்டது.
- 7.3.2.16 2016 ஆகஸ்ட் 29 ஆந் திகதி addendum - 6 இன் மூலம் காரணங்களைத் தெளிவுபடுத்துவதற்குத் தேவையான பிரச்சினைகள் மற்றும் செயற்திட்டத்தால் முடிவுறுத்த வேண்டி இருந்தது. எனினும் முடிவுறுத்துவதற்கான தெளிவுபடுத்தல் ஆலோசனை மற்றும் புள்ளிவிபர பதிவேடு வழங்கிய விடயங்கள் என்பன பேணப்பட்டதனால் கேள்விகளைப் பொறுப்பேற்கும் இறுதித் திகதியை 2016 செப்டெம்பர் 30 ஆக மீண்டும் ஒரு மாதத்தால் நீடிப்பதற்குத் தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.3.2.17 2016 ஒக்தோபர் 10 ஆந் திகதிய CANC குறிப்புக்களின் பிரகாரம் கேள்விகளைப் பொறுப்பேற்கும் இறுதித்திகதி செப்டெம்பர் 30 ஆந் திகதியாக இருந்ததுடன் Penta Ocean மற்றும் Wakachiku ஆல் அவர்கள் கேள்விகளைச் சமர்ப்பிக்கும் பின்னணி காணப்படவில்லை என எழுத்து மூலம் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதில் Taisei கம்பனி மாத்திரம் கேள்விகளைச் சமர்ப்பித்திருந்ததுடன் அக்கேள்விகளுக்காக கேள்வி பாதுகாப்பு பிணை சமர்ப்பிக்கப்படாதிருக்காததால் அக்கம்பனி கணிசமாக பதிலளிப்புச் செய்யாத கேள்விதாரராக செயற்திட்டக் குழுவால் கருதி கேள்வியை இரத்துச் செய்வதற்கு சிபாரிசு செய்யப்பட்டுள்ளதாகவும் அதற்கிணங்க CANC ஆனது Taisei கம்பனி கணிசமாக பதிலளிப்புச் செய்யாத கம்பனி எனத் தீர்மானித்துள்ளதாகவும் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு - 12)
- 7.3.2.18 2016 ஒக்தோபர் 28 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சு செயலாளரின் ஜப்பான் தூதுவருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டவாறு ஜப்பான் தூதுவராலயம் அங்கீகரித்தவாறு ஜப்பான் நிர்மாணக் கம்பனிகளிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளை மீண்டும் கோருவதற்கும் அதற்கான அறிவித்தல் தற்பொழுது வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையின் இணையத்தளத்தில் பிரசுரிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதாகவும் மேலும் இயலுமையுள்ள ஜப்பான் நிர்மாணக் கம்பனிகளின் பெயர்களைக் குறிப்பிடுவதற்கும் அவர்களிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளைப் பெற்றுக் கொள்ளுவதற்கும் நடவடிக்கை எடுக்க வேண்டுமெனவும் 2016 ஒக்தோபர் 10 ஆந் திகதி

கூட்டப்பட்ட பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவ குழுக் கூட்டத்தில் தீர்மானம் எடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. மேலும் இணையத்தளத்தின் முதலாவது அறிவித்தலின் பிரகாரம் கேள்விகளைத் திறக்கும் திகதி 2016 நவம்பர் 15 ஆந் திகதியாக இருந்தது.

7.3.2.19 2016 ஒக்தோபர் 31 ஆந் திகதி பிரதம மந்திரியின் அலுவலகத்திலிருந்து அமைச்சு செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் 2016 ஒக்தோபர் 26 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய CCEM ஆனது ஐப்பான் அரசாங்கத்திடமிருந்து பின்வருமாறு வேண்டிக் கொள்வதற்கு தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டதாகத் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. அமைச்சின் மூலம் கொழும்பு ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலாயத்தால் மூன்று கேள்வி தாரர்களிடமிருந்து புதிதாக கேள்விகளைப் (02 வாரத்திற்குள் முறையான கேள்வி முறிகளுடன்) பெற்றுக் கொள்வதற்கு நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கப்பட வேண்டுமெனத் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.20 2016 நவம்பர் 02 ஆந் திகதி ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலயத்தில் கவுன்சலரால் அமைச்சின் பதில் கடமையாற்றும் செயலாளருக்கு அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்ட கடிதத்தில் ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலயம் இலங்கையின் பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளில் ஈடுபடும் நிலையில் இல்லை எனவும் கடிதத்தில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட தகவல்களை கேள்விதாரர்களுக்கு வழங்குமாறும் கேள்வி முறிகளுடன் புதிய கேள்விகளைச் சமர்ப்பிப்பதற்கு அவர்களுக்குள்ள இயலுமையின் படி அமைச்சு நடவடிக்கை எடுக்குமென அவர்கள் எதிர்பார்ப்பதாகவும் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 10)

7.3.2.21 அதற்கிணங்க 2016 நவம்பர் 03 ஆந் திகதி Taisei, Wakachika, Penta Ocean என்பவற்றிற்கு கேள்வி கோரல்கள் அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்டிருந்தன. 2016 நவம்பர் 15 ஆந் திகதி கேள்வி இறுதித் திகதியாகும். 2016 நவம்பர் 03 ஆந் திகதி புஜிடா (Fujita) கம்பனி செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளருக்கு எழுதிய கடிதத்தில் இச்செயற்திட்டத்திற்குரிய கேள்வி ஆவணங்களைக் கொள்வனவு செய்வதற்கு வேண்டுதல் விடுத்துள்ளது. அத்திகதியே புஜிடா கம்பனிக்கு கேள்வி ஆவணங்களை வழங்கமாறு ஐப்பான் தூதுவராலயத்தால் ஒரு கடிதத்தின் மூலம் வேண்டியிருந்தது. 2016 நவம்பர் 11 ஆந் திகதி செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் அமைச்சு செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான அமைச்சரவை குழுவால் மேலே குறிப்பிட்ட அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தைப் பெற்றுக்கொண்ட 03 கம்பனிகளுக்கு மாத்திரம் கேள்வி ஆவணங்களைச் சமர்ப்பிக்குமாறு அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்ததனால் Fujita கம்பனிக்கு கேள்வி ஆவணங்களைச் சமர்ப்பிப்பதற்காக CCEM இற்கு ஆலோசனை வழங்குமாறு வேண்டப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.22 மேலும் பிரதம மந்திரியின் செயலாளரால் அமைச்சு செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட 2016 நவம்பர் 13 ஆந் திகதிய கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் Fujita கம்பனிக்கு கேள்விகளைச் சமர்ப்பிப்பதற்காக 2016 நவம்பர் 09 ஆந் திகதி கூட்டப்பட்ட பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான அமைச்சரவை குழுவிடமிருந்து அங்கீகாரம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டதாகவும் அது போட்டித் தன்மையை அதிகரிக்கும் என அக்குழு அறிந்து கொள்வதாகவும் கேள்வி

திறக்கும் திகதியை மேலும் ஒரு வாரத்திற்கு காலநீடிப்புச் செய்யுமாறும் வேண்டப்பட்டுள்ளது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 14)

7.3.2.23 2016 நவம்பர் 18 ஆந் திகதி செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரின் செயற்திட்ட குழுவின் தலைவருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் ஐப்பான் தூதுவரின் வேண்டுகலின் அடிப்படையில் போட்டித் தன்மையை அதிகரிப்பதற்கு நான்காவது கேள்விதாரரைச் சேர்த்துக் கொள்வதற்கு பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவ குழுவினால் தீர்மானம் எடுக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதாகவும் அதற்கிணங்க நான்கு கேள்விதாரர்களிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளைக் கோருவதற்கும் கேள்விகளைக் கோரும் இறுதித் திகதி 2016 நவம்பர் 23 எனவும் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.24 மேலும் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகார சபையால் 2016 நவம்பர் 15 ஆந் திகதி Fujita கம்பனிக்கு கேள்வி அழைப்புக்கள் அனுப்பிவைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதுடன் கேள்விகளைப் பொறுப்பேற்கும் இறுதித் திகதி 2016 நவம்பர் 23 என தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 15)

7.3.2.25 2016 நவம்பர் 24 ஆந் திகதி செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையின் தலைவருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் பின்வருமாறு 02 நிறுவனங்களிடமிருந்து மாத்திரம் கேட்பு மனுக்கள் கிடைந்திருந்ததாகவும் அவை பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீட்டை மிகைத்திருந்ததாகவும் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் விபரம் கீழே தரப்படுகின்றது (பின்னிணைப்பு 16)

	பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீடு (ரூபா பில்லியன்)	கேள்வி விலை (ரூபா பில்லியன்)	வித்தியாசம் (ரூபா பில்லியன்)
Taisei	123.5	159.6	36.1
Fujita	123.5	147.7	24.2

7.3.2.26 உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சினால் 2016 திசம்பர் 02 ஆந் திகதிய அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்தின் பிரகாரம் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையால் தற்பொழுது காணப்படுகின்ற கேள்வி நடைமுறைகளை இரத்துச் செய்வதற்கு உத்தேசிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதாகவும் Daiva House Group / Fujita Corporation ஆல் 2016 யூன் 02 ஆந் திகதி ரூபா 144,749,920,000 இற்குச் சமர்ப்பித்த பிரேரணை உள்ளதாகவும் அப்போதைய போட்டி விலை முறைமையின் பிரகாரம் பெறுகை மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டதன் காரணமாக அதனை கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக்கொள்வதில்லை எனவும் குறிப்பிட்டு அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் எதிர்பார்க்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

- 7.3.2.27 இதற்கு நிதி அமைச்சரின் அவதானிப்பானது கேள்விகளை அழைத்திருந்தமை போட்டி முறைமையின் கீழ் CCEM அங்கீகரித்த 04 ஜப்பான் கம்பனிகளின் மூலமாக இருந்ததனால் போட்டியான கேள்வி நடைமுறைகளுக்குள் ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளக்கூடிய கேள்வியைச் சமர்ப்பிக்காத கேள்விதாரருடன் கலந்தாலோசிப்பதற்கு இனங்கியிருக்க முடியவில்லை எனவும் அது பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணானது என்பதுமாகும். அமைச்சரவையின் தீர்மானமானது நிதி அமைச்சரின் அவதானிப்புக்கள் கவனத்தில் எடுத்துக்கொள்ளப்படும் என்பதாகும்.
- 7.3.2.28 2016 திசெம்பர் 06 ஆந் திகதிய செயற்திட்டத்திற்குரிய அமைச்சரவை அமைச்சரின் தீர்மானம் மற்றும் செயற்திட்ட குழு அறிக்கை என்பன 2016 திசெம்பர் 15 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம்பேசுதல் குழுவினால் கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. செயற்திட்ட குழுவின் சிபாரிசு மற்றும் அமைச்சரவை அமைச்சரின் தீர்மானம் கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக் கொண்ட அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம்பேசுதல் குழுவினால் (CANC) ஆகக் குறைந்த விலையைச் சமர்ப்பித்த கேள்விதாரரை (பூஜிடா கம்பனி) மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு உட்படுத்தி 2016 திசெம்பர் 17 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம்பேசுதல் குழுவிற்கு (CANC) சிபாரிசினை வழங்குமாறு செயற்திட்ட குழுவிற்கு தெரியப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.3.2.29 2016 திசெம்பர் 22 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய CANC ஆல் போட்டியான கேள்வி நடைமுறையில் ஆகக் குறைந்த விலையைச் சமர்ப்பித்த பூஜிடா நிறுவனத்தின் கேள்வியை மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு உட்படுத்தி செயற்திட்ட குழு அறிக்கை கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக் கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. செயற்திட்ட குழுவால் (Project Committee) பூஜிடா கம்பனியை மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு உட்படுத்தி முக்கிய அவதானிப்புகள் பல உருவாகியிருந்தன. அந்த அவதானிப்புகளை கவனத்தில் கொண்ட CANC இன் தீர்மானமானது பூஜிடா கம்பனி கேள்வி ஆவணங்களில் பிரதான நில அளவை வரைபடங்களை வழங்குவதற்கு முடியாதிருந்ததனால் அது பற்றி அமைச்சரவைக்குத் தெரியப்படுத்துவதும் அதற்கு அடுத்த கேள்விதாரரை மதிப்பீடு செய்வது பொருத்தமானது எனவும் தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 7.3.2.30 2017 சனவரி 11 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம்பேசுதல் குழுவினால் 2017 சனவரி 04 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவ குழு அறிக்கை (CCEM) மற்றும் 2017 சனவரி 11 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற செயற்திட்ட குழுவின் அறிக்கையை கவனத்தில் எடுத்துக்கொண்டு தனது சிபாரிசினை வழங்கியிருந்தது. அதற்கிணங்க செயற்திட்ட குழுவால் Taisei கம்பனியை முழுமையான கேள்விதாரராக ஏற்றுக்கொள்வதற்குத் தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம்பேசுதல் குழுவின்

அறிக்கையை கவனத்தில் எடுத்துக் கொண்டு மேலும் தேவையான ஆவணச் சான்றுகளைப் பெயரிட்டு அவற்றை 02 வாரங்களுக்குள் வழங்குமாறு வேண்டிக்கொள்வதற்கு செயற்திட்ட பனிப்பாளருக்கு தெரிவிப்பதற்கு தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. அவ்வாறே 2017 பெப்ரவரி 06 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம் பேசுதல் குழுவின் (CANC) குழு கூட்டத்தின் போது 2017 பெப்ரவரி 06 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற செயற்திட்ட குழுவின் அறிக்கை கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக்கொள்ளப்பட்டதுடன் அதில் ஒப்பந்த விலையை மேலும் குறைப்பதற்காக கலந்துரையாடுவதற்கு செயற்திட்ட குழுவிற்கு (PC) அதிகாரப் பொறுப்பை பெற்றுக்கொள்ளக்கூடிய விலைக் குறைப்பை பெற்றுக்கொள்வதற்கும் தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதன் போது Taisei இனால் சமர்ப்பித்த கேள்வி விலையை பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீட்டுடன் ஒப்பீடு செய்த போது 29.24 சதவீத முரணை காட்டியிருந்தமை சுட்டிக்காட்டப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.31 மேலும் 2017 சனவரி 04 ஆந் திகதி CCEM தீர்மானத்திற்கு 2017 சனவரி 17 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவை வரைபுத் தீர்மானம் பெற்றுக் கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.32 2017 ஏப்ரல் 03 ஆந் திகதி உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சின் மேலதிக செயலாளரால் (பொறியியல்) Fujita கம்பனியின் தலைவருக்கு அனுப்பிய கடிதத்தில் தேவையான தகைமைகளைப் பூர்த்தி செய்து கொள்வதற்கு அவர்கள் தோல்வியுற்றிருந்தார்கள் என்பது தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டதாகவும் இரண்டாவது கேள்விதாரரான Taisei கம்பனிக்கு ரூபா 134,905,155,000 தொகைக்கு ஒப்பந்தத்தை வழங்குவதற்காக அமைச்சரவைக்கு அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம் பேசுதல் குழுவினால் சிபாரிசு செய்வதற்கு தீர்மானிக்கப்பட்டதாகவும் இந்த அறிவித்தல் சனாதிபதி செயலாளரால் வழங்கப்பட்ட 2014 ஒக்தோபர் 07 ஆந் திகதிய CSA/4/PAB/01-III ஆம் இலக்க சுற்றறிக்கை மற்றும் 2012 பெப்ரவரி 27 ஆந் திகதிய CSA/4/PAB/01-1 ஆம் இலக்க சுற்றறிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டதாகவும் Fujita கம்பனிக்கு தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 17)

7.3.2.33 பிரதம மந்திரியின் செயலாளரால் 2017 மே 05 ஆந் திகதி உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் 2017 மே 03 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவ குழுவின் குறிப்புக்களின் பிரகாரம் Fujita கம்பனி அதிவேக வீதிகளை நிர்மாணிக்கும் தொழில்நுட்ப மற்றும் நிதி இயலளவுள்ள சிவில் வேலை ஒப்பந்தங்கள் சம்பந்தமான முன்னணி ஒப்பந்தக்காரராகும் என ஐப்பான் அரசாங்கம் தெரிவித்துள்ளது என தெரியப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது. மேலும் ஐப்பான் அரசாங்கத்தின் ஆழமான சிபாரிசின் காரணமாக Fujita கம்பனிக்கு நியாயமின்மை ஏற்பட்டுள்ளதா என்பதனைப் பரிசீலிப்பதற்கு மதிப்பீட்டு வரையறைகளை மீளப் பரிசீலிப்பதனால்

Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வியை மீண்டும் கவனத்தில் எடுத்துக்கொள்வதற்காக அமைச்சரவை நியமித்த பேரம்பேசுதல் குழுவின் தலைவரினால் 2017 மே 08 ஆந் திகதிய கடிதத்தின் மூலம் செயற்திட்ட குழுவிற்கு கட்டளையிடப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு - 18) (பின்னிணைப்பு - 19)

7.3.2.34 இதற்கு மத்தியில் 2017 ஏப்ரல் 12 ஆந் திகதி டோக்கியோவிலிருந்து அமைச்சரவை விசேட ஆலோசகரினால் லக்ஸ்மன் கிரிஎல்ல அமைச்சரின் பெயருக்கு அனுப்பப்பட்ட கடிதத்தில் Fujita கம்பனிக்காக விசேட கவனம் செலுத்துமாறு வேண்டிக் கொள்ளப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு - 20)

7.3.2.35 2017 மே 30 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற CCEM குழுக் கூட்டத்தின் போது மீண்டும் Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வியை கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக்கொள்ளுமாறு எடுக்கப்பட்ட தீர்மானம் பிரதமமந்திரியால் 2017 மே 05 ஆந் திகதி அமைச்சரவைக்குச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதில் சனாதிபதி அவர்களின் அவதானிப்பானது அரசாங்கத்தின் பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளின் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணானது என்பதனால் தீர்மானத்திற்கு வருவதற்கு முன்னர் இந்த விடயத்தை CCEM மற்றும் அமைச்சு கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக்கொள்வது பொருத்தமானதாகும் என்பதாகும். அமைச்சரவையின் தீர்மானமானது அந்த விடயத்தை CCEM இன் கவனத்திற்கு கொண்டு வருவதாகும்.

7.3.2.36 செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் 2017 மே 22 ஆந் திகதி Fujita கம்பனிக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் அக்கம்பனியின் கேள்வியின் செல்லுபடியாகும் காலத்தை 2017 ஆகஸ்ட் 23 ஆந் திகதி வரை நீடிப்பதாகக் காட்டப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அக்கம்பனி கணிசமாக மறுதலிப்புச் செய்யாத கேள்விதாரர் என தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக் குழுவால் உறுதிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தும் கால நீடிப்புச் செய்தமை கணக்காய்வில் பிரச்சினைக்குரியதாகும்.

7.3.2.37 2017 மே 03 ஆந் திகதி பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான பொருளாதாரக் குழுவின் கட்டளையின் பிரகாரம் செயற்திட்ட குழுவால் (PC) Fujita இன் கேள்வியை மீண்டும் கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக் கொண்டதன் பின்னர் 2017 மே 16 ஆந் திகதி சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட அறிக்கையின் பிரகாரம் Fujita வின் கேள்வியை மதிப்பீடு செய்த போது எந்த வகையிலும் நியாயமின்மை இடம்பெற்றிருக்கவில்லை என்பது தெளிவாக உறுதிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது. 2017 மே 16 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய CANC குழுவின் அறிக்கையின் மூலமும் Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வியை மதிப்பீடு செய்த போது எதுவித நியாயமின்மையும் இடம்பெற்றிருக்கவில்லை என்பதாக செயற்திட்ட குழு (Project Committee) வழங்கிய இறுதித் தீர்மானம் அக்குழுவின் மூலமும் உறுதிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.38 2017 மே 29 ஆந் திகதிய பிரதம மந்திரியின் செயலாளரால் உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சின் செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் 2017 மே 24 ஆந் திகதி கூடிய CCEM இன் தீர்மானத்தின் பிரகாரம் Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வியை மதிப்பீடு செய்த போது எது வித நியாயமின்மையும் இடம்பெற்றிருக்கவில்லை எனவும் இந்த நிலைமையை ஐப்பான் அரசாங்கத்திற்கு அறிவிக்குமாறு ஐப்பான் தூதுவரிடம் வேண்டிக் கொள்ளப்படுகின்றதாகவும் அடுத்த நடவடிக்கை ஐப்பான் அரசாங்கத்தின் மறுதலிப்பின் அடிப்படையில் எடுக்கப்படும் எனவும் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 21)

7.3.2.39 பிரதம மந்திரியின் செயலாளரால் 2017 யூன் 23 ஆந் திகதி உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் (பின்னிணைப்பு ...) அமைச்சரவையின் தீர்மானத்திற்குப் பின்னர் Consortium of joined venture உருவாக்குவது தொடர்பாக கலந்துரையாடலாம் எனவும் அமைச்சரவைப் பத்திரத்தின் மூலம் அமைச்சரவையின் அங்கீகாரத்தைப் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளலாம் எனவும் தெரியப்படுத்தப்பட்டுள்ளது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 22)

7.3.2.40 2017 யூன் 30 ஆந் திகதி பிரதம மந்திரியின் செயலாளரால் மீண்டும் உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சின் செயலாளருக்கு விலாசமிடப்பட்ட கடிதத்தின் பிரகாரம் 2017 யூன் 28 ஆந் திகதி CCEM குழுவின் குறிப்புக்களுக்கு இணங்க ஐப்பான் அரசாங்கம் Fujita கம்பனி சம்பந்தமாக உறுதியாக சிபாரிசு செய்தமையை (Strong recommendation) கவனத்தில் கொண்டு Fujita கம்பனியையும் Taisei கம்பனியையும் ஒன்றிணைப்பதற்கு தீர்மானம் எடுக்கலாம் எனவும் அதற்காக அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரத்தை அமைச்சரவைப் பத்திரத்தை சமர்ப்பித்ததன் பின்னர் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட வேண்டுமெனவும் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 20) 2017 யூலை 11 ஆந் திகதி நடைபெற்ற அமைச்சரவைக் கூட்டத்தின் போது பின்வருவனவற்றிற்காக அங்கீகாரம் வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு – 23)

(i) நாட்குறிப்பின் 3.0 ஆம் பந்தி 3.1 உப பந்தியில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட (i) மற்றும்

(ii) சிபார்சுகளுக்காகச் சமர்ப்பித்தல்

(ii) உத்தேச கம்பனிகளின் பங்குடைமையை தோற்றுவிப்பதற்கு கூறிய பணிப்புக்கள் மற்றும் நிபந்தனைகளை ஐப்பானிய M/S Taisei Corporation மற்றும் M/S Fujita Corporation ஆகிய 02 கம்பனிகள் மற்றும் இலங்கை அரசாங்கம் இணங்ககூடியவைகளாக அவை இருத்தல் வேண்டும்.

7.3.2.41 இந்த இரண்டு கம்பனிகளுக்குமிடையே இணக்கப்பாட்டினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்காக பல்வேறு கலந்துரையாடல்களும் கடித பரிமாற்றங்களும் இடம்பெற்றிருந்ததுடன் 2018 டிசெம்பர் 10 ஆந் திகதி வரை இறுதித் தீர்மானத்திற்கு வந்திருக்கவில்லை. எவ்வாறாயினும் Taisei Corporation மற்றும் M/s Fujita Corporation ஆகிய 02 கம்பனிகளுக்கிடையே கையெழுத்திடப்பட்டிருந்தும் அதனை செல்லுபடியாக்குவதற்கு வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையின் இணக்கப்பாடு கணக்காய்வுத் திகதி வரையும் வழங்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை. மேலும் Taisei Corporation இற்கு ஒப்பந்தத்தை வழங்குவதற்கான அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் 2018 பெப்ரவரி 20 ஆந் திகதி வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது. (பின்னிணைப்பு 24)

7.3.2.42 2018 டிசெம்பர் 10 ஆந் திகதி வரை செயற்திட்டத்தின் நிர்மாணங்களை ஆரம்பிப்பதற்குத் தேவையான கடன் பணத்தை Tokoyo – Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. வங்கியிடமிருந்து பெற்றுக்கொள்வதற்காகச் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட வேண்டிய சமூக மற்றும் சுற்றாடல் ரீதியாக உருவாகும் தாக்கம் தொடர்பான அறிக்கையை தயாரிப்பதற்கான ஆய்வு நடவடிக்கை இடம்பெற்று வருவதுடன் அதற்காகச் செலுத்த வேண்டிய பணமாகிய ஜப்பான் யென் 30 மில்லியனுக்கான அங்கீகாரம் 2017 ஒக்தோபர் 10 ஆந் திகதி வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

7.3.2.43 உரிய முறைப்படி பூரணப்படுத்தப்பட்ட சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு அறிக்கை இல்லாதிருந்தும் மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியின் முதலாவது மற்றும் இரண்டாவது பகுதிகளின் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகள் தற்பொழுது வரை இடம்பெற்றுக் கொண்டிருக்கின்றது. முதலாவது பகுதியாகிய கடவத்தையிலிருந்து மீரிகம வரையான 37.09 கிலோ மீற்றர்களை நிர்மாணிக்கும் நடவடிக்கை சீனாவின் EXIM வங்கியின் கடன் பணத்தின் கீழ் மேற்கொள்வதற்கு திட்டமிடப்பட்டிருந்தும் இதுவரை கடன் பணம் கிடைக்காதிருந்தும் ஒப்பந்தகாரரின் செலவில் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகள் இடம்பெற்றுவருவதுடன் இப்பகுதிக்குரிய காணிகளைச் சுவீகரிப்பதற்காக 2018 ஆகஸ்ட் 31 ஆந் திகதியில் ரூபா 5635 மில்லியன் செலவு செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தது.

இதற்கு மத்தியில் இரண்டாவது பகுதியாகிய மீரிகமவிலிருந்து குருணாகல் வரை 39.9 கிலோ மீற்றரானது நான்கு பகுதிகளாகப் பிரித்து உள்நாட்டு ஒப்பந்தகாரர்கள் மற்றும் உள்நாட்டு ஆலோசகர்களால் தேசிய வங்கியின் கடன் பணத்தின் கீழ் நிர்மாண நடவடிக்கைகள் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டு வருகின்றன. இந்தப் பகுதியின் காணிகளைச் சுவீகரிப்பதற்காக 2018 ஆகஸ்ட் 31 ஆந் திகதியில் உள்ளவாறு ரூபா 5,842 மில்லியன் செலவு செய்யப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அத்திகதியில் உள்ளவாறு தேசிய வங்கியின் மூலம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளக் கூடியதாக இருந்த கடன் ரூபா 30,855 மில்லியனாக இருந்தது.

நிர்மாண வேலைகள் ஆரம்பிக்கப்படாத பொதுஹெரவிலிருந்து கலகெதர வரையான மூன்றாம் பகுதியின் காணிகளைச் சுவீகரிப்பதற்காக 2018 ஆகஸ்ட் 31 ஆந் திகதியில் உள்ளவாறு மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட செலவு ரூபா 1,971 மில்லியனாகும். நான்காவது பகுதியின் காணிகளைச் சுவீகரிக்கும் நடவடிக்கை தற்பொழுது இடம்பெற்றுக் கொண்டிருந்ததுடன் கொடுப்பனவு நடவடிக்கைகள் இடம்பெற்றிருக்கவில்லை.

8. அவதானிப்புகள்

- 8.1 மத்திய அதிவேக வீதியின் 03 ஆம் பகுதிக்குரிய ஆலோசனைக் கம்பனியையும் ஒப்பந்தக் கம்பனியையும் தெரிவு செய்யும் நடைமுறை 2006 அரசாங்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையின் 1.1 ஆம் பிரிவின் பிரகாரம் அக்குறிக்கோள்களுக்கு முரணாக அமுல்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 8.2 போட்டி விலை முறைமையைக் கடைப்பிடிக்காமையின் காரணமாக 2006 அரசாங்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையின் 1.2.1 ஆம் பிரிவிற்கு முரணானதாக இருந்தது.
- 8.3 ஒப்பந்தக்காரரைத் தெரிவு செய்யும் போது கடைப்பிடிக்கப்பட்டுள்ள நடைமுறையின் பிரகாரம் அது அரசாங்க பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையின் 1.4.2 மற்றும் 1.4.3 ஆம் வழிகாட்டிகளில் காட்டப்பட்டுள்ள பெறுகைப் பண்புகளுக்கு முரணானதாக இருந்தது.
- 8.4 ஜப்பான் தூதுவரால் பெயர் குறிப்பிடப்பட்ட நிறுவனங்களிடமிருந்து கேள்விகளை அழைப்பதற்காக தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக்குழு சிபாரிசு செய்திருக்கவில்லை.
- 8.5 ஜப்பான் தூதுவராலயத்தால் இந்த முறையற்ற பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளுக்கு விருப்பமின்மையை வெளிப்படுத்தியிருந்தும் அமைச்சு செயலாளரால் கேள்விதாரர்களைப் பெயர் குறிப்பிடுமாறு ஜப்பான் தூதுவருக்கு கடிதம் சமர்ப்பிக்கும் ஆற்றல் பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவைக்கு இணக்கமின்றி இருந்தது.
- 8.6 கேள்வி ஆவணங்களைச் சமர்ப்பித்தல் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையின் தலைவரால் இடம்பெறுகின்றமை குறிப்பிடப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் அவ்வாறு பெறுகை நிறுவனத்திற்குப் புறம்பான நபர் ஒருவர் இந்த நடைமுறைக்காக பங்குபற்றுதலானது பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவையில் காணப்படுகின்ற ஏற்பாடுகளுக்கு முரணானதாகும்.
- 8.7 கேள்வி திறக்கும் திகதி பல சந்தர்ப்பங்களில் பிற்போடப்பட்டிருந்ததுடன் திறக்கும் திகதி உறுதியாகக் குறிப்பிடப்படாதிருக்கவில்லை. இந்நிலைமையானது வெளிப்படைத்தன்மை எனும் பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணானதாகும்.
- 8.8 நிதி அமைச்சரும் எதிர்ப்பை வெளிப்படுத்தியிருந்தும் கடைப்பிடிக்கப்பட்டிருந்த போட்டி கேள்வி நடைமுறைகளை நிறுத்தி அதற்கு மாற்றமாக அமைச்சரின் அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்தில் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டவாறு Fujita கம்பனியால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட கேள்வி தொடர்பாக அந்த நிறுவனத்துடன் (Fujita) கலந்தாலோசிப்பதற்கு முயற்சி எடுத்தமை பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவைக்கு முரணானதாகும்.
- 8.9 உத்தேச நடைமுறையானது அரசாங்க பெறுகை நடைமுறையின் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணானது என்பதனால் தீர்மானத்திற்கு வருவதற்கு முன்னர் இந்த விடயத்தை CCEM மற்றும் அமைச்சு கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக் கொள்ளல் பொருத்தமானது என

சனாதிபதி அவர்களால் குறிப்பிடப்பட்டிருந்தும் அது தொடர்பாக கவனத்திற்கு எடுத்துக் கொள்ளப்படாது மிகுதி நடவடிக்கைகள் எடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தன.

- 8.10 செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் Fujita கம்பனி கணிசமான அளவு மறுதலிப்புச் செய்யாத கேள்விதாராக தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக் குழுவால் உறுதிப்படுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தும் அக்கம்பனியின் கேள்வியின் செல்லுபடியாகும் காலம் நீடிக்கப்பட்டதாகத் தெரிவித்து கடிதம் அனுப்பியமை பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களும் முரணானதாகும்.
- 8.11 இயலுமை இல்லாததனால் Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வி நிராகரிக்கப்பட்டிருந்தும் அக்கேள்வியும் மீண்டும் ஒரு தடவை மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு உட்படுத்தப்பட்டு ரூபா 24.2 பில்லியனால் பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீட்டை மிகைத்திருந்தும் ஐப்பான விசேட ஆலோசகரின் வேண்டுகலை ஏற்று அமுல்படுத்தியமை பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிகளுக்கு முரணானதாகும்.
- 8.12 Fujita கம்பனியின் கேள்வியை நிராகரித்தமை சரியானது என மீண்டும் பெறுகைக் குழு சிபார்சு செய்திருந்தும் அதற்கு முரணாக அக்கம்பனிக்கு பெறுகையை வழங்குவதற்காக உரிமையுள்ள Taisei கம்பனியுடன் கூட்டுச் சேர்வதற்கு அங்கீகாரத்தைப் பெற்றுக் கொள்ளுதல் மற்றும் அதற்காக பலவந்தப்படுத்துதல் பெறுகைத் தத்துவங்களுக்கு முரணானதாகும்.
- 8.13 III ஆம் கட்டத்திற்கான பொறியியலாளர் மதிப்பீட்டிற்கு கிடைத்த அங்கீகாரம், அது அங்கீகரிக்கப்பட்ட திகதி, அம் மதிப்பீட்டை தயாரித்த உத்தியோகத்தர்களின் பெயர்கள், கையொப்பம், உத்தியோக முத்திரை என்பன காணப்படவில்லை.
- 8.14 கணக்காய்வுத் திகதி வரை அதிவேக வீதியை தெளிவாக இனங்கண்டு மதிப்பீட்டினைத் திருத்தம் செய்யாத நிலைமையின் கீழ் கேள்வி ஆவணங்களைத் தயாரித்தல் இடம் பெற்றிருக்காததுடன் கேள்விகளை மதிப்பீடு செய்தலின் சரியானதன்மையும் கணக்காய்வில் பிரச்சினைக்குரியதாகும்.
- 8.15 SMEC உடன் புரிந்துணர்வு உடன்படிக்கை கையெழுத்திட்ட சந்தர்ப்பம் வரை தொழில்நுட்ப மற்றும் நிதிப் பிரேரணை கிடைத்திருக்காததுடன் பொறியியல் மதிப்பீடும் TOR உம் தயாரிக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 8.16 SMEC நிறுவனத்தால் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்ட வரைவு இறுதி அறிக்கைக்காக செயற்திட்டத்தினால் கருத்துரைகள் சமர்ப்பிக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 8.17 SMEC நிறுவனத்திற்காகத் தயாரிக்கப்பட்ட TOR இனை தயாரிப்பதற்குரியதான உத்தியோகத்தர்கள் அல்லது அதற்குரிய கோவைகள் செயற்திட்டத்திடம் காணப்படவில்லை.

- 8.18 செயற்திட்ட பணிப்பாளரால் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபைக்குச் சொந்தமான மனித வளங்களை SMEC நிறுவனத்திற்கு வழங்குவதற்குரிய விளக்கம் மற்றும் உறுதியான அங்கீகாரம் காணப்படவில்லை.
- 8.19 2014 திசெம்பர் 31 ஆந் திகதி வரை SMEC நிறுவனத்திற்கு ரூபா 1,759 மில்லியன் செலுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தும் அந்த நிறுவனத்தின் அறிக்கை ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளக் கூடிய நிலைமையில் இல்லாததன் காரணமாக இது சம்பந்தமாக பல்வேறு ஆய்வுகளுக்காக 2017 திசெம்பர் 31 ஆந் திகதி வரை வெளி நிறுவனங்களுக்கு ரூபா 65 மில்லியன் செலுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தும் இறுதி அறிக்கை தயாரிக்கப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 8.20 SMEC International Pvt Ltd இன் மூலம் சாத்திய வள ஆய்வானது அதிக செலவு மற்றும் காலம் செலவிடப்பட்டு இடம்பெற்றிருந்தும் உரிய அறிக்கை தொடர்பான நம்பிக்கை செயற்திட்டத்திற்கு அல்லது வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபைக்கு இல்லாதிருந்தது. மேலும், சரியான மற்றும் ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளக் கூடிய சாத்திய வள ஆய்வு அறிக்கையானது 17 ஆண்டுகள் கடந்திருந்தும் தயாரித்துக் கொள்வதற்கு அதற்குப் பொறுப்பான தரப்பினர் தோல்வியுற்றிருந்தும் சாத்தியவள ஆய்விற்காக ரூபா 2,193.8 மில்லியன் இதுவரை செலுத்தப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 8.21 சாத்தியவள ஆய்விற்காகப் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட ரூபா 119 மில்லியன் நிதி உதவியில் ரூபா 85.1 மில்லியனை பணம் வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபையால் செலவு செய்யப்பட்டிருந்தும் கணக்கீடு செய்யப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 8.22 பொருளாதார முகாமைத்துவம் தொடர்பான பாராளுமன்ற தெரிவுக் குழுவால் (CCEM) எடுக்கப்பட்டுள்ள சில தீர்மானங்களை நடைமுறைப்படுத்துவதற்காக அமைச்சரவை அங்கீகாரம் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்டிருக்கவில்லை.
- 8.23 அதிவேக வீதியின் முதலாவது மற்றும் இரண்டாவது பகுதிகளுக்கான ஒப்பந்தம் MCC நிறுவனத்திற்கு வழங்கப்பட்டிருந்தும் அந்த ஒப்பந்தகாரர் முன்றாவது பகுதிக்காக உடன்படிக்கை செய்திருந்தும் கடன் பணம் இல்லாததன் காரணமாக இணங்கிக் கொள்ளப்பட்ட நிபந்தனைகள் தொடர்பாக செலுத்த வேண்டிய பணத்தை தீர்த்து வைப்பதற்காக பெறுகை வழிகாட்டிக் கோவைகளுக்கு முரணாக நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.
- 8.24 2012 திசெம்பர் 31 ஆந் திகதி வரை மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட செலவாகிய ரூபா 369.1 மில்லியன் நிதிக் கூற்றுக்களிலிருந்து மறைக்கப்பட்டிருந்தது.

9. சிபார்சுகள்

- 9.1 பெறுகைகளுக்குரிய கோவைகளை முறைப்படியாக பேணுவதற்காக உத்தியோகத்தர்களுக்கு உறுதியாக ஆலோசனைகள் வழங்கப்பட்டு அது தொடர்பாக பொறுப்புக்கள் ஒப்படைக்கப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.

- 9.2 கேள்வி ஆவணங்களைப் பெற்றுக்கொண்ட கேள்விதாரர்கள் தொடர்பான தரவுக் கோவைகளைப் பேணுதல் மற்றும் கேள்வி ஆவணங்களும் ஏனைய அனைத்து திருத்தங்களும் உரிய தரப்பினர்களுக்கு அனுப்பி வைக்கப்பட்டது என்பதற்கான / அனுப்பிவைக்கப்படும் என்பதற்கான உறுதிப்படுத்தல்கள் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.3 அமைச்சரவை சரியான தீர்மானத்திற்கு வருவதற்காக தேவையான அனைத்து உள்ளபடியான மற்றும் சட்டரீதியான தகவல்களை அமைச்சரவை விஞ்ஞாபனத்தின் மூலம் அமைச்சரவைக்கு தெரிவிப்பதற்கு பொறுப்பு மிக்க உத்தியோகத்தர்கள் நடவடிக்கை எடுத்தல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.4 பெறுகைகளின் போது பாதுகாக்கப்பட வேண்டிய பணத்துக்கான பெறுமதி என்ற கருதுகோளை பாதுகாக்கும் வகையில் சிக்கனமற்ற தன்மை, செயற்றிறன், விளைத்திறன் ஆகிய பண்புகளைப் பாதுகாக்கும் வகையில் பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகள் செயற்படுத்தப்படல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.5 கேள்விகளுக்கு முன்னைய கூட்டங்களை நடாத்துவதற்குரிய தரப்பினர்கள் கவனிக்கப்பட வேண்டியதுடன் அதன் மூலம் எதிர்காலத்தில் ஏற்படக் கூடிய சிக்கல்களைக் குறைப்பதற்கு நடவடிக்கை எடுத்தல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.6 அமைச்சு வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபை மற்றும் மத்திய அதிவேக செயற்திட்டங்களுக்கு மத்தியில் சிறந்த தொடர்புகளையும் பொறுப்புகளையும் கட்டியெழுப்பும் வகையில் கூட்டங்களை நடாத்துதல் மற்றும் அக் கூட்டங்களின் அறிக்கைகளை உரிய தரப்பினர்களுக்கு மத்தியில் முறையாக பரிமாற்றம் செய்தல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.7 பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளில் போது கடைபிடிக்கப்பட வேண்டிய பொதுவாக ஏற்றுக்கொள்ளப்பட்ட பணிப்புரைகளை எவ்வேளையிலும் கடைப்பிடித்தல்.
- 9.8 நிர்மாணங்கள் சம்பந்தமாக விலைக் குறைப்புக்களின் நலன்கள் அரசாங்கத்திற்கு கிடைக்கும் வகையில் அது தொடர்பாக கவனம் செலுத்தி வீதிகளைத் திட்டமிடல், கேள்விகளைக் கோருதல், பெறுகை முறைமைகளைத் தீர்மானித்தல் என்பன மேற்கொள்ளப்படுதல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.9 பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளில் போது உடன்படிக்கைகளைச் செய்து கொள்ளும் போது அவற்றின் சட்டரீதியான பின்னணி தொடர்பாக உறுதிப்படுத்திக் கொள்வதற்காக சட்டமா அதிபரின் அபிப்பிராயங்களைப் பெற்றுக்கொள்ளுதல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.10 தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக் குழுவின் சிபாரிசுகள் மற்றும் பெறுகைக் குழுவின் தீர்மானத்தின் பிரகாரம் மேலதிக நடவடிக்கைகளை மேற்கொள்வதனை உறுதிப்படுத்திக் கொள்வதற்காக முறையான பொறிமுறையினை தயாரித்தல் வேண்டும்.

- 9.11 போட்டி விலை முறைமைக்குப் புறம்பாக ஆலோசனையாளர்கள் மற்றும் ஒப்பந்தக்காரர்களைத் தெரிவு செய்யும் இயலுமையையும் வெளிப்படைத் தன்மையையும் கவனத்தில் கொள்ளுதல் வேண்டும்
- 9.12 கேள்வி மதிப்பீட்டின் போது தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக் குழு மற்றும் பெறுகைக் குழுவால் எடுக்கப்பட்ட தீர்மானங்களின் குறைபாடுகள், பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளுக்காக நியாயமற்ற காலம் எடுத்தல், கேள்வி ஆவணங்களின் வெளிப்படைத் தன்மையை அதிகரித்தல் ஆகிய குறைபாடுகளை நீக்கிக் கொள்வதற்காக பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளில் காணப்பட வேண்டிய போட்டித்தன்மையை அதிகரித்துக் கொள்வதற்கு நடவடிக்கை எடுத்தல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.13 திட்டமிடலில் மற்றும் பெறுகை நடைமுறைகளில் காணப்படும் பலவீனங்களின் காரணமாக இடம்பெறுகின்ற தேவையற்ற காலதாமதங்களைக் குறைக்கும் வகையில் நடவடிக்கை எடுப்பதற்கு அதற்குப் பொறுப்பான உத்தியோகத்தர்கள் கவனம் செலுத்துதல் வேண்டும்.
- 9.14 உலகத்தில் பல நாடுகளில் அதிவேக வீதிகளைத் திட்டமிடும் போதும் நிர்மாணிக்கும் போதும் கடைப்பிடிக்கப்படுகின்ற சுற்றாடல் மற்றும் பொருளாதார ரீதியாக சிறந்த விளைதிறனான முறைமையை முடியுமான வகையில் கடைப்பிடிப்பதற்கு கவனம் செலுத்துதல் வேண்டும்.

10. இறுதித் தீர்வுகள்

- 10.1 முறையான சாத்தியவள ஆய்வினை மேற்கொள்ளாமையும் திட்டங்களைத் தயாரிப்பதற்கு போதியளவு காலம் வழங்கப்படாமையும் காரணமாக மத்திய அதிவே செயற்திட்டத்தை நிர்மாணிக்கும் நடவடிக்கையானது நியாயமற்ற வகையில் தாமதித்துள்ளது என்பது இறுதித் தீர்வளிக்கின்றேன்.
- 10.2 பொறுப்புக் கூறக்கூடிய தரப்பினர்களால் முறையற்றவகையில் தீர்மானம் எடுத்ததன் காரணமாகவும் எடுக்கப்பட்ட தீர்மானம் மற்றும் நோக்கெல்லை மாற்றத்திற்கு உள்ளடக்கியதன் காரணமாகவும் செயற்திட்ட கிரயம் தொடர்பாக பாதகமான தாக்கம் ஏற்படுத்தியுள்ளது என இறுதித் தீர்வளிக்கின்றேன்.
- 10.3 பெறுகை நடவடிக்கைகளின் போது உயர்கல்வி மற்றும் பெருந்தெருக்கள் அமைச்சு, வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபை, நிதி மற்றும் வெகுசனத் தொடர்பு அமைச்சு, செயற்திட்ட அலுவலகம் ஆகிய நிறுவனங்களும் இதற்காக நியமிக்கப்பட்ட தொழில்நுட்ப மதிப்பீட்டுக் குழு மற்றும் அமைச்சரவையால் நியமிக்கப்பட்ட நிலையான பெறுகைக் குழு மற்றும் ஏனைய தொடர்புபட்ட குழுக்களால் தமது நடவடிக்கைகளை நிறைவேற்றும் போது முறைப்படி தொழில்சார் கவனத்துடன் (Professional due care) நடவடிக்கை எடுக்கப்படவில்லையெனவும் பெறுகை

நடைமுறைகளிலிருந்து எதிர்பார்த்த அடிப்படைக் குறிக்கோள்களை நிறைவேற்றும் வகையில் அவை நிறைவேற்றப்படவில்லை எனவும் இறுதித் தீர்வளிக்கின்றேன்.

- 10.4 ரூபா 2,193 மில்லியன் செலவு செய்யப்பட்ட சாத்தியவள ஆய்வு அறிக்கையினைப் பயன்படுத்தாமையின் காரணமாக இழக்கப்பட்ட இந் நிதி சம்பந்தமாக உரிய தீர்மானம் எடுக்கப்பட்ட மற்றும் தீர்மானத்தை அமுல்படுத்திய தரப்பினர் பொறுப்புக் கூற வேண்டுமென இறுதித் தீர்வளிக்கின்றேன்.

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கணக்காய்வாளர் தலைமை அதிபதி
2018 திசெம்பர் 28

ஓப்பம்./எச்.எம். காமினி விஜேசிங்ஹ
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Special Audit Report on Feasibility Study and Procurement Activities of the Central Expressway Project

1. Executive Summary

Construction of a Northern Expressway had been identified according to the Expressway Master Plan for the year 2007 to 2017 of the Road Development Authority (RDA) by the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, presently the Ministry of Highways and Road Development. In further consideration, it is confirmed that plans had been implemented to construct a Highway to the Central Province since 1990. Since there was no national policies related to these constructions, the loss to the country cannot be estimated and some of the observations had been included in this report. However, this report is forwarded according to the concurrence with the request made to the Auditor General to prepare a special audit report based on the information provided by the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, Road Development Authority and the Project Director at the COPE discussion held on 19 September 2017 at 1430 hour on the progress of the Central Expressway Project and on the current issues of the Project.

- (i)** SMEC, the consultant for feasibility study had been paid an amount of Rs.1,759 million as at 31 December 2014 and since the reports are not in an acceptable position, a sum of Rs..65 million had also been paid to outside institutions for various studies. However, a final feasibility study report had not been prepared even up to date.
- (ii)** As the estimates had not been revised after identification of actual trace of the highway, the preparation of bid documents and the accuracy of evaluation of bids is doubt to the audit.
- (iii)** The names, signatures and the designations of the officers for preparation, approval on the engineering estimates for the Project, approved date and seal of the prepared officers had not been mentioned.
- (iv)** The procedure for selecting a consultant and a contractor for the Section I,II and III of the Central Expressway had been contravened to the Section 1.1 of the Public Procurement Guideline -2006.

- (v) Because of not following a competitive bidding process, it had been contravened to the Section 1.2.1 of the Public Procurement Guidelines -2006.
- (vi) According to the procedure followed in selecting the contractor, it had been contravened to the procurement principles in the 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 of the Public Procurement Guidelines.
- (vii) The recommendation had not been obtained from the Technical Evaluation Committee to call bids from the institutions named by the Japanese Ambassador.
- (viii) Even though the Embassy of Japan has shown their un-wiliness for following such an informal procurement process, the Secretary of the Ministry had not been taken care of that and sent letters to the embassy by contrary to the Procurement Guidelines.
- (ix) Although the Minister of Finance has expressed his un-wiliness against the proposal of being considered and negotiate with Fujitha Corporation that had been stated in the memorandum of the Subject Minister by cancelling the present bidding process was contrary to the Procurement guidelines.
- (x) Even though, the bid submitted by Fujitha had been rejected due to lack of capacity, accepting and implementing the request made by the Japanese special advisor to re consider and evaluate the bid once again was contrary to the procurement guidelines.
- (xi) Although the procurement committee has recommended that the Fujita corporation is not qualified, making effort by forcing Thaisei Corporation, the selected bidder to form a Consortium with Fujita is contrary to the principles of the procurement guidelines.

It was observed that public money and other resources are wasted due to the above mentioned mismanagement and there is a big difference between the cost and the value addition. Public debt utilized for projects should be spent efficiency, economically and effectively. It is the responsibility of the management to plan, implement and maintain adequate internal control systems to ensure that the public resources are utilized such manner. Further, when designing and implementing such large scale Projects implemented under foreign funds, the officers who are involving with project activities should carry out a proper professional behavior and the related institutions should work in a good governance framework.

2. Background of issuing such report and nature of the report.

This report is forwarded according to the concurrence with the request made to the Auditor General to prepare a special audit report based on the information provided by the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, Road Development Authority and the Project Director at the COPE discussion held on 19 September 2017 at 1430 hour on the progress of the Central Expressway Project and on the current issues of the Project.

3. The following documents were examined in preparing this report

3.1 Procurement Guidelines and the manual No.NPA/CEO/18 of 2006.

3.2 Procurement supplementaries issued apart from the procurement manual.

3.3 Cabinet memorandums and Cabinet decisions relevant to the Project activities.

3.4 Documents exchanged between the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, Road Development Authority (RDA) , Project Office and the cabinet sub - committee on economic management.

3.5 Reports of the project committees and cabinet appointed negotiation committees.

3.6 Documents exchanged between the embassy of Japan, Project Office, Minister, and Secretary of the Ministry and Chairman of the Road Development Authority.

3.7 Documents such as pre bid meeting reports, bidding documents, Preliminary designs of the expressway, estimates, and addendums to the bidding documents.

3.8 Reports published in newspapers.

3.9 Articles and reports on various websites.

3.10 Minutes of the interviews held with different parties.

4. Scope of the Audit

Under infrastructure development activities, the Colombo - Kandy expressway and the Colombo - Jaffna expressway were identified in accordance with the highway master plan prepared by the Road Development Authority in the year 2007. But, there had been a proposal and effort to construct the Colombo -Kandy expressway since 1990 to July 2012 and a Project Monitoring unit (PMU) had already been established and implemented. Further, the same PMU had been continued from the year 2012 to July 2015 with a view to constructing the Northern expressway considering Colombo - Kandy expressway and Colombo - Jaffna expressway as a one project from Enderamulla to Kurunegala comprised in two sections and with a link road to Kandy. A process had been launched by the Project for selecting contractors, consultant for project supervision and feasibility studies.

Since July 2015 this expressway was named as Central Expressway comprising three sections from Kadawatha to Dambulla and connecting road to Kandy and is being implemented for feasibility studies and constructing activities. The project had spent a huge amount of money and also a plenty of cabinet memorandums and relate decisions had been taken at regular intervals. The scope of audit is restricted to examination on economy, efficiency and effectiveness of feasibility studies and procurement of the project.

5. Scope limitations

5.1 The Project was unable to provide the way of spending the amount of Rs.85.1 million by the RDA out of the grant of Rs. 119 million received from the Government of Swedish and the Swedish International Development Agency.

5.2 The agreement that had been cancelled by obtaining an approval of Cabinet of Ministers in a relation to a private companies in Malaysia and the activities performed by them and other related information and also the transactions between both parties were not revealed to the audit.

6. Introduction of the process

- * Evolution Of the expressway from Colombo - Kandy expressway to Northern expressway and then to Central expressway since 1990.
- * Feasibility studies, signing agreements, preparing Terms Of References(TOR) and engineering estimates, giving Extensions of Time (EOT), forwarding Variation Orders (VO) and the progress of feasibility study reports pertaining to Colombo - Kandy expressway, Northern expressway and Central expressway.
- * Procurement process implemented in relation to the selection of contractors and consultants for the Projects.

7 The Process

7.1 Evolution of the Central Expressway

7.1.1 Colombo - Kandy expressway

7.1.1.1 The cabinet approval had been obtained on 4 October 1990 to construct an expressway to Central province considering Colombo - Kandy road and the cabinet approval for constructing it under the Built Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis had been obtained on 18 September 2002. The Project management unit had been established for the activities of this Project and only carried out feasibility studies. However, the financial statements had been prepared till end of the year 2012.

7.1.2 Northern expressway

7.1.2.1 Forwarding a cabinet memorandum by the Minister of Fort and Highways on 9 July 2012 had been proposed to construct the Northern expressway up to Hedeniya interchange as Colombo - Jaffna highway from Colombo to Kurunegala by dividing 2 sections and with connecting road to Colombo - Kandy expressway which recognized under 01 out of 6 expressways in the master plan for expressways prepared by RDA for the year 2007 to 2017.

Section - 1 Enderamulla – Horape – Ragama – Walpola – Batuwatta – Bulugahagoda – Ganemulla – Yagoda – Gampaha – Daraluwa – Bemmulla – Magalegoda – Heendeniya – Veyangoda – Wandurawa – Keenawala – Pallewela – Meerigama interchange (42 Km)

Section - 2 Meerigama interchange – Boyawalana – Pothupitiya interchange – Dampalassa – Ganegoda – Dehikumbura – Pallandeniya interchange (35 Km)

Section 3 (Link expressway)

Pothupitiya interchange – Nugawela – Poramadala – Polgahawela – Rambukkana – Hatharaliyadda – Hedeniya interchange (44 Km)

7.1.2.2 It had been proposed basically this expressway would be constructed in 4 lanes and in future section I and Section II would be expanded as 6 lanes. The approval for this cabinet memorandum had been obtained on 18 July 2012.

7.1.2.3 Meanwhile the Project Management Unit had been implemented according to the cabinet approval on 18 July 2012 for selecting contractors on feasibility study, construction and consultancy services.

7.1.3 Central Expressway

7.1.3.1 The Cabinet memorandum submitted by the Minister of Higher Education and Highways on 6 July 2015 which was identified as the Northern expressway, being named as the Central expressway and approved as a Project of national priority was approved on 8 July 2015.

7.1.3.2 Furthermore the Project management unit is being implemented according to the approval of the cabinet of ministers on 08 July 2015 on feasibility study for the Central Expressway and the necessary infrastructure facilities for the construction of the connecting road from Pothuhera to Galagedara and separate Project management units have been established for the first section of the road from Kadawatha to Meerigama

the second from Meerigama to Kurunegala and the fourth from Kurunegala to Dambulla.

7.2 Feasibility studies pertaining to the Colombo – Kandy expressway, the Northern expressway and the Central expressway.

7.2.1 Selecting an institute for feasibility studies and funding

7.2.1.1 As per the decision of the cabinet of Ministers, the approval had been obtained to implement the Colombo – Kandy expressway Project by the government of Malaysia and so a memorandum of understanding(MOU) had been signed between the government of Sri Lanka and Government of Malaysia on 10 September 2003.

7.2.1.2 According to this memorandum of understanding, a grant from the Government of Swedish and Swedish international and development agency amounted to Rs. 119 million had been provided for due detail feasibility study as per the MOU and a feasibility study had been done along 98 Km of the Central expressway by Sweden consultancy company called Euro infra group.

7.2.1.3 Amounting to Rs.85.1 million from afore said grant had been expended by the RDA before establishing the PMU and not been accounted.

7.2.1.4 It is observed that the trace was not identified and acquired due lands even by the 30 May 2005.

7.2.1.5 Meanwhile Cabinet approval had been granted on the June 2007 to implement this Project on private investment.

7.2.1.6 However, the time period of the memorandum of understanding signed with the Government of Malaysia had been extended in two times on 10 September 2007 and later on 30 June 2008.

7.2.1.7 The period of the agreement exceeding 30 June 2008 was completed and the Cabinet approval had been obtained on 23 June 2010 for the work of the phase - 1 of the Project, to be implemented under the funds of Asian Development Bank and to annual the

process with the private company of Malaysia. However, the process which was carried out with such companies was not revealed to the audit.

- 7.2.1.8** A Project management unit was setup to carry out this work and the approval for its staff was granted by the Department of Management Services on 25 September 2003. By the end of the year 2012, the total expenditure incurred on that unit was Rs.284 million. The work of the Colombo - Kandy expressway had been closed and a sum of Rs.284 million which was accounted for that and a sum of Rs.85.1 million which was not accounted by RDA totaling to Rs.369.1 million was observed as an uneconomical and hidden expense from the accounts.
- 7.2.1.9** Under the Cabinet Memorandum submitted on 09 July 2012 by the Minister of Ports and Highways, a feasibility study and environmental impact assessment is required before constructing detailed studies and plans for the construction of the Northern Expressway. Further, it has indicated that for the feasibility of this project, the advisor of Colombo – Katunayake Expressway, SMEC International Pvt Ltd in Australia would have relevant experience.
- 7.2.1.10** In order to be launched as soon as possible, preparation of documents for the feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment, calling for Expressions of Interest (EOI) and Request For Proposals from Shortlisted Investors for this project is expected to be fulfilled via direct contracting method by the SMEC International Pvt Ltd and required funds to be obtained from the Consolidated Fund. Cabinet approval was granted for this purpose on 18 July 2012.
- 7.2.1.11** On 10 September 2012, the RDA has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the SMEC International Pvt Ltd for the commencement of activities before the contract was signed, due to the importance and urgency of construction of the Northern Expressway.
- 7.2.1.12** Further, on the same day, the Chairman of the Road Development Authority addressed a letter to the said institution indicating that, after evaluating and negotiating of the technical and financial proposals which they offer, the contract will be signed and it is

necessary to mobilize as soon as, until the contracts are signed, since the government has given high priority to the project.

7.2.2 Preparation of Terms of Reference (TOR)

7.2.2.1 It was informed in addition to the Letter addressed by the Secretary of the Ministry of Highways on 17 September 2012, further information was given from a separate TOR. On the same day, the Procurement Committee appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers have approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) and Request for Proposals (RFP) by the Project Management Unit (PMU).

7.2.2.2 The financial and technical proposals of the SMEC amounted to AUD 4,504,896 and LKR 499,503,825 had been presented on 24 September 2012.

7.2.2.3 Although the SMEC was informed to sign a MOU and initiate the work early as possible, there were no TOR, engineering estimates and financial and technical proposals submitted at that time.

7.2.2.4 The Cabinet Appointed Procurement Committee (CAPC) has assessed the proposal of SMEC in accordance with the letter addressed to the Standing Cabinet Appointed Review Committee (SCARC) on 20 November 2012 by the Secretary of the Ministry of Highways and three rounds were discussed and that the rates are high and if reduction is possible it will be recommended by the Standard Cabinet Appointed Review Committee (SCARC). Accordingly, the Cabinet Appointed Consultative Procurement Committee (CACPC) appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers has made a reduction in cost, from Rs. 499,503,825 to 422,164,626 and AUD 4,504,897 to 4,375,839.

7.2.2.5 After further discussions, the Review Committee of Cabinet of Ministers has decided to award the contract to Australian Dollars (AUD) 3,998,671 and to LKR 414,233,734. Cabinet approval has been obtained for this on 19 December 2012.

7.2.3 Submission of Variation Orders

7.2.3.1 As per the letter dated 31 May 2013, addressed to the Secretary to the Ministry by the Acting Project Director, the SMEC institute has submitted the variation order 01 and the

details of the letters, comments and recommendations of the committees exchanged are given in Annexure 01-(i) ,(ii) ,(iii) ,(iv) ,(v) ,(vi) ,(vii).

7.2.3.2 However, after several amendments, the last amended variation order no. 01 of 23 June 2013 was submitted on 23 June 2013. However in the course of audit, the project director was unable to answer properly regarding the person who informed about the expansion of their scope to the SMEC, and what procedures were followed in the process of expanding the scope. However, the Cost Estimates Evaluation Committee (CEEC) had recommended the following variation order.

7.2.3.3 Cabinet approval has been granted for this variation - 01 on 03 January 2014. Accordingly, the total contract value has been increased to Rs. 583,070,286 and Australian Dollars 3,998,671. The contract period has been extended up to 31 March 2014. However, with exceeding the approvals of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Project Director has extended the extension of time from time to time and ultimately, extended until 31 December 2014. Variation order - 02 was submitted on 22 August 2014. (Annexure 02 – (i), (ii) ,(iii))

7.2.3.4 Variation order -02 had been submitted on 22 August 2014.

7.2.3.5 Based on the tasks handed over to the SMEC by the Project Director superseding the TOR, the SMEC has submitted Variation Order - 02 modifying from time to time and finally, for the 7th time on 03 March 2015, Variation order – 02 was submitted.

7.2.3.6 In relation to this order, on 26 May 2017, a letter was received from the SMEC Institute attorney and on 2 June 2017 a committee was appointed with the chairmanship of the Planning Director to evaluate this situation. Again referring to the letters sent on 22 June 2017 and 09 August 2017 by the SMEC, they had informed to the Road Development Authority that if the payments were not settled within 30 days, again, based on the 8.2 of General terms of the agreement, interest has to be applied and legal procedures to be followed.

7.2.3.7 The Senior Deputy Solicitor General of the Attorney General's Department informed to the Director of the Road Development Authority (Legal) by a letter dated 04 October 2017, that he had referred this dispute to a Dispute Adjudicatory Board.

7.2.4 Submission of feasibility study reports

7.2.4.1 Based on the TOR pertaining to the agreement signed on 09 January 2013, between the Road Development Authority and the SMEC with regard to the feasibility study, the draft report in six copies along with the soft copy need to be submitted within six months from initiation of the work.

7.2.4.2 Comments should be made on the matters indicated in the final draft report by the Road Development Authority within one month. Further, within 1 month of receipt of comments to SMEC. The final report should be submitted in 20 copies along with the soft copy.

7.2.4.3 However, a copy of the final draft had been submitted on the 22nd of November 2013 with 06 copies along with soft copy. However, no comments were sent by the Road Development Authority to this report. However, the total amount that has been paid for SMEC International Pvt Ltd by 30 December 2014 was found to be Rs.1, 759,123,766. (Annexure 03)

7.2.4.4 Although the agreement has been signed with SMEC International Pvt Ltd and the draft final report has been already submitted for receiving comments for the final report, and in a situation where the final report has not been brought, the work to be done under such agreement in terms of Annex 04- (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v) with other institutions amounting to Rs. 97,255,497 had been contracted.

7.3 Procurement procedure followed by the Central Expressway Project

Informal decisions were taken for constructing an expressway for the Central Province and then an expressway to the Northern Province with a connected road to the Kandy, by spending a considerable amount of time and cost without a lack of a definite national policy for construction of expressways and this is described in detail in Chapter 7.1 and 7.2 of this report. The procurement for the Central Expressway has been undertaken to

the third section of the road from Pothuhera to Galagedara and it was observed that Procurement activities of the first and second sections were also carried out in accordance with the above procedure. The procurement process can be considered mainly under 02 subject fields.

7.3.1 Selecting of a Consultation Company for the Section 03

7.3.1.1 Cabinet approval had been granted on 9 December 2015 to call Expression of Interest from Consultation companies. The method of selecting a Consultation company, the Quality Consultants Based Selection (QCBS) was decided by the Cabinet Appointed Consultation Committee at the meeting held on 29 December 2015.

7.3.1.2 In order to call for letters of Expression (EOI), in response to a paper advertisement published on 16 December 2015, 04 proposals had been received and for submitting proposal letters, assessment criteria's as well as technical and financial proposals, the Cabinet Appointed Procurement Committee had given approval on 16 and 29 February 2016.(Annexure 05)

7.3.1.3 In accordance with the Cabinet Memorandum dated on 06 May 2016 of the Minister of Higher Education and Highways due to the complex nature of the contract, the proposal to award this procurement to an international consultancy firm who has experience was proposed and Cabinet approval was granted on 10 May 2016. (Annexure 06)

7.3.1.4 According to the Cabinet Committee on Economic Management (CCEM) report of 18 May 2016, considering the nature of the structure of the Central Expressway Section III with considering construction difficulties, flyovers and tunnels, it requires foreign expertise and experience and further based on the visit of the prime minister in Japan, the construction of these projects should be led by Japanese contractors with concessionary financing from Mitsubishi Bank. It was decided to appoint Technical and Procurement Committees for this.

7.3.1.5 According to the meeting held at the Parliament on 20 May 2016 between the Japanese Ambassador, Subject Minister, and Secretary to the ministry, the Chairman of the Road Development Authority and high ranking officials, the Japanese ambassador had been

requested to nominate 03 Japan's Construction and 03 Consultancy Companies. Accordingly, in response to the letters dated 25 May 2016 and 31 May 2016, the following 03 companies which were registered with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, in the relevant field and where offices located in Sri Lanka were nominated and sent, (Annexure 07) , (Annexure 08)

(i) Nippon Koei Company Ltd

(ii) Oriental Consultants Company Ltd

(iii) Katahira and Engineering International (Pvt) Ltd.)

7.3.1.6 In order to evaluate and to determine whether the rates are reasonable of the above mentioned consultancy firms, a Cabinet Appointed Procurement Committee consisting of 05 members were appointed by the Public Finance Department on 30 May 2016. Cabinet decisions were granted on 23 August 2016, after nearly three months to implementation these decisions. Prior to that, proposals were already sent to Advisory firms on 24 June 2016, and only two Consulting Companies, Orientale Consulting Company Limited and Katahira and Engineering International (Pvt) Limited, had provided proposals on 29 July 2016. The technical proposals presented by the two companies were first evaluated and since the Oriental Consultant Company Limited has not received the cut off marks, Katahira & Engineering International (Pvt) Limited's proposal was suggested to approve by the Cabinet Appointed Procurement Committee on 09 March 2017. The financial proposal was evaluated over two months and it was completed on 09 May 2017 which had been decided to offered for an amount Rs.1,159,192,476 without VAT (Japanese Yen 1,199,148,000) for Katahira and Engineering International Pvt Ltd with a consortium of Green Tech Consultants (Pvt) Ltd and Project Management Associate International (Pvt) Ltd.

7.3.2 Selecting a Construction Company

7.3.2.1 According to an outlined agreement signed in China between the Road Development Authority and Chinese companies on May 28, 2013, a MOU had been signed on 17 October 2013 by the Secretary, Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping with China

Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) for the designing, funding, construction and implementation of maximum length of 46 kilometers from Ambepussa to Kandy in Section -3 of Northern Expressway. Both parties have agreed to keep this as a confidential document and according to that document the land should be given by the Ministry and had agreed to acquire the necessary lands for development of related property in accordance with the existing rules regulations in Sri Lanka and to lease to MCC on lease basis including other condition, validity period of this was 18 months.(Annexure -09 (i))

7.3.2.2 Cabinet Memorandum had been approved on 30 October 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers to award the contract at a cost of Rs. 48,200 million to MCC to construct from Pothuhera to Rambukkana and Interchanges in Rambukkana and Pothuhera including 3.5 km from section -4 of the Central Expressway as well. Accordingly, on 17 November 2014, the agreement was signed between the Road Development Authority and MCC.(Annexure - 09 (ii))

7.3.2.3 In accordance with this agreement, the Government of Sri Lanka intended to borrow a loan from EXIM Bank in China, and if the loan agreement between EXIM Bank and the Government of Sri Lanka was not signed within 180 days, the agreement would be terminated automatically and the Employer must release the Performance Security within 10 days and pay all the expenses incurred by the Contractor.

7.3.2.4 In accordance with the agreement, it has also been agreed from the date of signing the agreement to visit the site, prepare detailed engineering plans and to carry out the construction work

7.3.2.5 Existing agreement with MCC has been terminated due to non-signing of loan agreement with Exim Bank. Due to inability of paying the expenses incurred by the MCC, Cabinet of Ministers approval had been granted to award the contract to the MCC at Rs million 158,386 for the first part of the project from Kadawatha to Meerigama contrary to the procurement principles on 16 July 2015 as per the cabinet memorandum No. 15/1021/602/040 submitted by the Hon. Prime Minister on 06 July 2015

- 7.3.2.6 An agreement had been signed between the Road Development Authority and the MCC on 20 June 2016, If the loan agreement between China EXIM Bank and the Government of Sri Lanka is not signed within 365 days according to the agreement, the above agreement will be terminated automatically and the Performance Security should be released within 10 days by the employer and all expenses incurred by the Contractor shall be paid.
- 7.3.2.7 According to the above agreement, from the date of signing the agreement, it was agreed to visit the site, to prepare the detailed engineering plans and to carry out the construction work
- 7.3.2.8 The validity period of the agreement had been terminated due to the non-signing of loan agreement and extension of time had been granted up to 15 November 2018 by making seven amendments to the agreement. By the date of the report, the extended period had also been expired and it was not clear to the audit that how payment are made to that company incurred by the contractor for the construction work.
- 7.3.2.9 Construction work of the first section of the Road was given to MCC as per above 7.3.2.5 paragraph and planned to carry out the constructions of the third section of the express way by dividing the whole length into five sections through the local contractors and consultants and Cabinet approval for that had been obtained for this on 09 December 2015. Later, Cabinet approval had been obtained on 26 April 2016 to annul that procurement process by pointing out the necessity to select a foreign contractor for the construction works by considering the Construction difficulty according to the nature of the land, the flyovers and the tunnels of the road in Section III as it is essential to have foreign experts' expertise knowledge and experience
- 7.3.2.10 The 12 local contractors whose were considered for prequalification and 04 consultancy companies and it was decided to award to the four construction partnerships / joint ventures set up by them self and consultancy company for the construction of section 2 of the project from Mirigama to Kurunegala by dividing into 4 packages and cabinet approval had been obtained for that on 08 November 2016. Further, cabinet approval had been obtained on 28 June 2016 to provide required funds through the local bank loans.

Procurement activities were occurred contrary to the procurement principles and in this section the construction work is being carried out by the date of the report

7.3.2.11 After cancelling the process with domestic contractors as stated in the above paragraph 7.3.2.9, through the letter dated 25 May 2016 of the Deputy Head of the Embassy of the Embassy of Japan had informed to the chairman of the Road Development Authority that they are ready for further discussion to select a construction company as a result of a discussion held in Parliament as stated in above paragraph 7.3.1.5. Further, as per the letter dated 31 May 2016 addressed to the chairman of RDA, the below mentioned 03 construction companies have been nominated by the Head of the Deputy Embassy in Japan.

(i) Ms Taisei Corporation.

(ii) Pentagon Ocean Construction Company Ltd.

(iii) Wakachiku Construction Company Ltd.

7.3.2.12 In order to call bids from these companies the approval had been granted by the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Economic Development on 01 June 2016 and also advices had been given to call for tenders from these companies by the letters addressed to Secretary to the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways on 06 and 08 June 2016 by the Secretary to the Prime Minister. (Annexure -10 (i), (ii))

7.3.2.13 Bid documents prepared by the project have been approved by the Cabinet Appointed Negotiating Committee on 17 June 2016 and an invitation for bids had been sent to the companies Taisei, Wakachiku, Penta ocean on 22 June 2016 and it was announced that the closing date for the bid submission is as 2 August 2016. (Annexure 11)

7.3.2.14 Approval had been granted to the Cabinet Memorandum submitted by Minister of Higher Education and Highways on 23 August 2016 to obtain approval for lists of Japanese Contractors in order to obtain Bids and Proposals.

- 7.3.2.15 According to the addendum-3 dated 29 July 2016, sent to the Taisei Company by the Project Director stated that the closing date of the submission of bids would be 31 August 2016. Further, it was observed that company had sent a letter to clarify the bidding documents sent and proposed construction contract and had made request for clarification meeting by only that company.
- 7.3.2.16 Even through the addendum-6 dated 29 August 2016, the issues that need to be clarified should have been completed by the project there were facts that had not given clear instructions and statistics by completing, therefore, had decided to extend again the final date for submission of bids as on 30 September 2016.
- 7.3.2.17 According to the CANC notes dated 10 October 2016, the closing date of accepting the bids was September 30, and Penta ocean and Wakachika had informed in writing that they were not in a position of submitting bids. Under these circumstances, Taisei had only submitted the bids and as bid bond had not been presented for that bid and recommendation had been given by the project committee to cancel the bid by considering the bidder as a substantially non responsive bidder. It is mentioned that, CANC had also decided Taisei as substantially non responsive bidder. (Annexure 12)
- 7.3.2.18 Decision of the economic management committee meeting on 10 October 2016 had stated that re- call the bids from the Japanese construction companies as approved by the Japanese Embassy as indicated in the letter of the Secretary of Ministry dated 28 October 2016 sent to the Japanese Ambassador and notice for that have been already published in the web site of the Road Development Authority and to nominate the Japanese companies those who have more capabilities and should take action to bring bids from them. Further, according to the published notice of the web, bid opening date was 15 November 2016.
- 7.3.2.19 According to the letter dated 31 October 2016 of the Prime Minister's Office addressed to the Secretary of the Ministry, the CCEM which met on 26 October 2016 decided to request to submit three new bids from three bidders with a formal bid bonds within two weeks.

- 7.3.2.20 Through a letter dated 02 November 2016 sent by the councilor of the Japanese Embassy to the acting Secretary of the Ministry stated that the Japanese Embassy will not be in a position to intervene in the procurement procedure in Sri Lanka, the information mentioned in the letter will be given to the bidders and they are expecting that the Ministry will act as they will be able to submit new bids with the bid security.(Annexure 13)
- 7.3.2.21 The invitation for bids were sent to the Taisei, Wakachiku, Penta ocean on 03 November 2016 and the bid closing date was 15 November 2016. Fujita Company has requested an order to purchase Bidding Documents related to this project by a letter dated 03 November 2016 written to the Project Director. In the same day, the Embassy of Japan has requested through a letter to submit the bidding documents to Fujita Company as well. According to a letter dated 11 November 2016 addressed to the Secretary of the Ministry by project Director as approval had been granted by the committee of Cabinet of Ministers on economic management to submit the bid documents only to aforementioned cabinet approved 3 companies, advices have been requested from the CCEM to present the bid documents to Fujita company.
- 7.3.2.22 Furthermore, as per the letter dated 13 November 2016 addressed to the Secretary of Ministry by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, as approval had been received from the Committee on Cabinet of Ministers on Economic Management met on 09 November 2016 to submit the bid document to Fujita company and bid closing date had been extended by another week as Committee feels that it is a more competitive. (Annexure 14)
- 7.3.2.23 As per a letter dated 18 November 2016 of the project director addressed to the Chairman of the Project committee, decision had been taken by the committee on Economic Management to invite the bids from 4 bidders to increase the competitiveness on request of the Japanese ambassador, accordingly, invite bids from four bidders and closing date for calling bids will be 23 November 2016.

- 7.3.2.24 Furthermore, the Chairman of the Road Development Authority has sent the Bidding documents to Fujita on 15 November 2016 and the closing date for the submission of bids has been given as 23 November 2016. (Annexure 15)
- 7.3.2.25 As per the letter dated 24 November 2016 addressed to the chairman of the Road Development Authority by the project director had informed that it had received bids only from two entities and it exceeds the engineering estimate as details are given below. (Annexure 16)

	Engineer's Estimate (Rs.Billion)	Bid price (Rs.Billion)	Difference (Rs.Billion)
Taisei	123.5	159.6	36.1
Fujita	123.5	147.7	24.2

- 7.3.2.26 The Minister of Higher Education and Highways has proposed to the Road Development Authority to cancel the existing bidding process as stated in the Cabinet memorandum dated 2 December 2016 and to consider the bid received from Daiwa House Group / Fujita Corporation on 02 June 2016 to the value of Rs.144,749,920,000 and due to the fact that the procurement was done on a competitive price system, it was not taken into account and now the proposal could be considered and seek for Cabinet approval.
- 7.3.2.27 For this, the Minister of Finance remarks that the Bidding was called from the CCEM approved four Japanese companies under the rival competitive bid and cannot be negotiated with an ineligible bidder in an open bidding process, contrary to procurement guidelines. The Cabinet decided to keep a track of the Minister of Finance.
- 7.3.2.28 The Cabinet Decisions of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Project Committees report on 06 December 2016 were considered by the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) on 15 December 2016. Having considered the decisions of the Project Committees and Cabinet Ministers, the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) has requested to evaluated the lowest Bid submitted by Fujita

Company and requested the Project Committee to recommend to the Cabinet Appointed Review Committee (CANC) on 17 December 2016.

- 7.3.2.29 CANC Meeting on 22 December 2016 took into account the project committee to evaluate the Fujita bid that submitted lowest bids in the competitive bidding process. Number of observations assessed by the Project Committee by evaluating the Fujita. CANC considered that Fujita has failed to meet the basic criteria of bidding, and it has been decided to inform the Cabinet to take approval to evaluate the next lowest bid.
- 7.3.2.30 The CANC has given their recommendation in a meeting held on 11 January 2017 by considering the minutes of the Committee on Economic Management of the Cabinet of Ministers (CCEM) held on 4 January 2017 and the Project Committee Reports of 11 January 2017. Accordingly, the Project Committee had agreed to accept the Taisei Company as a responsive bid, and the Cabinet of Ministers by considering the project report had decided to request from the Project Director further written evidence and submit them within two weeks. Also, the Committee Report of the Cabinet Decisions Committee (CANC) meeting held on 13 February 2017 took into account the project committee report on February 6, 2017, to reduce the prices available for the Project Co-coordinating Authority to further reduce the contract prices. Later, CANC decided to discuss the reduction of the final price. It was pointed out that there is 29.24% variation between the engineer's estimate and the bid price presented by Taisei is shown.
- 7.3.2.31 Further, Cabinet approval had been granted on 17 January 2017 to the CCEM decision of 04 January 2017.
- 7.3.2.32 The Additional Secretary (Engineering) of the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways announced by the letter addressed to the chairman of the Fujita company dated 03 April 2013 saying that the Fujita had failed to meet the requirements and therefore the second bargaining company, Taisei, was evaluated, selected and recommended to award the contract at Rs 134,905,155,000. Fujita has been informed that this notice will be issued as per the Circular CSA / 4 / PAB / 01-III dated October

- 7, 2014 and the circular CSA / 4 / PAB / 01-1 dated on 27 February, 2012 issued by the Secretary to the President. Annexure -17
- 7.3.2.33 According to the Economic Management Committee dated 3 May 2017, in the letter addressed to the Secretary of the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways by the Secretary to the Prime Minister on 05 May 2017, the government of Japan has informed that Fujita is a major contractor for the construction of highways, which is technically and financially capable of civil works contracts. Further, the Chairman of the Cabinet Negotiation Committee had given an order to the Project Committee on 8 May 2018, in order to reconsider Fujita's bid by re-examining the criteria for reviewing whether Fujita was ill-treated at the bid evaluation. (Annexure -18) (Annexure – 19)
- 7.3.2.34 In the meanwhile, on 12 April 2017, a special cabinet consultant from Tokyo asked from Minister Lakshman Kiriella to pay special attention to Fujita Company. (Annexure - 20)
- 7.3.2.35 The Prime Minister on 05 May 2017 made the decision to revisit the Fujita's bid at the CCEM committee meeting held on 03 May 2017. The President's observations includes about the proposed procedure is contrary to the principles of the government procurement process and this is a matter that should be considered by CCEM and the Ministry before reaching a decision. The cabinet decided that the matter should be referred to CCEM.
- 7.3.2.36 The Project Director stated that the bid validity period will be extended up to 23 August 2017 on Fujita's letter addressed and the extension is proving problematic even though the technical evaluation committee has confirmed that the company is not a substantially responsive bidder.
- 7.3.2.37 As per the orders of the Economic Committee on Economic Management, report by the Project Committee (PC) on 03 May 2017, the Fujita bidding had not been made any kind of injustice. The Committee also confirmed the conclusion of the Project Committee that Fujita did not have any unfairness in evaluating the Bid evaluation on 16 May 2017 by the CANC Committee report.

- 7.3.2.38 In accordance with the CCEM's decision of 24 May 2017, in the letter addressed to Secretary of the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways by the Prime Minister's Secretary; any injustice has not occurred during the evaluation of the Fujita's bid, and this situation need to inform to the Japanese Ambassador that any injustice has not occurred during the evaluation of the Fujita bid and the next steps will be taken based on the response of the Japanese Government. (Annexure -21)
- 7.3.2.39 Secretary of the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways had been informed by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, on 23 June 2017 that the Cabinet of Ministers could discuss the formation of the Consortium of Joint venture after the Cabinet decision and that Cabinet approval could be obtained through a Cabinet paper. (Annexure -22)
- 7.3.2.40 In the letter addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education and Highways on 30 June 2017 by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, the CCEM Committee in the report on 28 June 2017 had decided to consider strong recommendations of the Japanese Government, Fujita and Taisei could be decided upon to join and the Cabinet approval should be obtained after submitting a cabinet paper (Annex - 23). At the Minister meeting on 11 July 2017, the approval was granted for the following:
- (i) Submission of Recommendations (i) and (ii) in paragraph 3.0 of 3.1 of the Code and
 - (ii) The relevant terms and conditions for the establishment of the proposed group of companies (Consortium) should be agreed between the two companies of Japan M / S Taisei Corporation and M / S Fujita Corporation and the Government of Sri Lanka.
- 7.3.2.41 Different discussions and correspondence have been exchanged between these two companies for arrangements and no final decision was reached by 10 December 2018. However, although an agreement had been signed between Taisei Cooperation and M/S Fujita Cooperation for the consortium, the consent of RDA had not been granted to valid it up to the date of audit. Further, Cabinet approval was granted to handover the contract to the Taisei Cooperation on 20 February 2018. (Annexure - 24)

7.3.2.42 Studies are being done to prepare the report on the social and environmental impact by 10 December 2018 of obtaining the loan from the Bank of Tokyo - Mitsubishi UF Ltd. to start the construction work and the approval for paying 30 million Yen regarding the studies had been obtained on 10 October 2017.

7.3.2.43 Although there was no a feasibility report which has been completed properly, the construction of section I and II of the Central expressway are being implemented by now. The construction work of the first section from Kadawatha to Meerigama alone 37.09 Km has been planned to carry out under the EXIM Bank loan of China, though the loan has not yet been received, the construction is being carried out at the expense of the contractor and amount of Rs. 5,635 million has been spent for the acquisition of lands in this section as at 31 August 2018. Meanwhile, the second part from Meerigama to Kurunegala alone 39.9 Km was divided in to four sections and construction works are being carried out by domestic contractors and consultants under loans from local banks. A sum of Rs.5,842 million had been spent for the acquisition of lands in this section as at 31 August 2018 and on that day the value of the loans received by the local banks was Rs.30,855 million.

The expenditure inquired for the acquisition of lands from Pothuhera to Galagedara is Rs.1,971 as at 31 August 2018. The acquisition of land in the fourth section is in progress and payments have not been made. Constructions in both Section 3 and 4 not yet been commenced.

8. Observations

8.1 The procedure for selecting a consulting company and a contractor in relation to the section 01, 02 and 03 of the Central Expressway had been in violation of section 1.1 of Public Procurement Guidelines in 2006.

8.2 Because the competition price system was not followed contrary to section 1.2.1 of the Public Procurement Guidelines in 2006.

8.3 According to the procedure followed in selecting the contractor, it was contrary to the Section No.1.4.2 and 1.4.3 of the Public Procurement Guidelines

- 8.4 The recommendation for calling bids from the institutions named by Japan ambassador had not been obtained.
- 8.5 Despite the fact that the informal procurement process was being disputed by the Japanese embassy, the Secretary of the Ministry did not comply with the procurement guidelines to send letters to the Japanese ambassador to nominate the bidders.
- 8.6 The bid submission was done by the Chairman of Road Development Authority and it is contrary to the provisions in the procurement guide lines to participate in this process by an outsider who is not in the process of procurement.
- 8.7 Opening dates were postponed on several occasions and the date of opening was not specified. This state of affairs is contrary to the principle of transparency.
- 8.8 Even though the Minister of Finance has also objected to stop the competitive bidding process that had been followed and attempting to negotiate with Fujita on the bid submitted by Fujita as mentioned in the Cabinet paper of the Minister, is contrary to the procurement guidelines.
- 8.9 Because the proposed action in paragraph 7.3.2.26 above was contrary to the principles of the government procurement process, the president had stated that it was appropriate to consider that the CCEM and the Ministry before coming to decision. But actions had been made without considering such observations of the President.
- 8.10 Although the Technical Evaluation Committee has confirmed that Fujita is a non-responsive bidder, sending letters informing that Fujita's bids valid time is extended by the Project Director is contrary to the bidding principle.
- 8.11 Although the Fujita's bid had been rejected due to lack of capacity and been exceeded the engineering estimate by Rs.24.2 billion, afore said bid was to be evaluated once again accepting and implementing the special request of the Japanese special advisor contrary to the procurement guidelines.

- 8.12 The procurement committee again has recommended that the refusal of Fujita's bid be correct, contrary that receiving the approval and forcing to Taisei who entitled to award the procurement, to be join with aforesaid company is being contravened to the procurement guidelines.
- 8.13 There were no the date of receiving approval for engineering estimates of the Project approved dates and signatures and seals of the officers who prepared the estimates.
- 8.14 The bidding documents and the estimates have been prepared under a condition that by the date of the audit, the trace of the expressway has not yet been clearly identified and therefore the accuracy of the bid evaluation is problematic to the audit.
- 8.15 By the time the signing the agreement with SMEC, technical and financial proposals had not been received and not been prepared the engineering estimates and terms of reference as well.
- 8.16 The comments for the draft final report submitted by SMEC had not been forwarded by the Project.
- 8.17 The Project has no information relating to the officers who prepared terms of reference for SMEC and the relevant files.
- 8.18 There had been no clear and definite approval to the Project Director to giving the human resources of RDA to SMEC.
- 8.18 Although SMEC had been paid Rs.1,759 million as at 31 December 2014, due to the absence of such reports the amount of Rs. 65 million was paid out by 31 December 2007 for various studies although a final report had not been prepared.
- 8.19 Although SMEC had been paid Rs.1,759 million as at 31 December 2014, the reports of that institute are not in a condition of accepted level, an amount of Rs.65 million had been paid to other institutes for various studies relating to that as at 31 December 2017.
- 8.20 Although the feasibility study has been carried out by SMEC for a considerable amount of time and incurring a large amount of money, there is a lack of confidence for a correct and acceptable feasibility report even a sum of Rs.2, 193.8 million had been paid for

feasibility studies by now. However, the responsible parties had failed to prepare a final feasibility study report.

- 8.21 By the grant amounting to Rs.119 million received for the feasibility study, an amount of Rs.85.1 million had been spent by the RDA and not been accounted.
- 8.22 For implementing some decisions taken by the CCEM, the approval of the Ministers of Cabinet had not been obtained.
- 8.23 The construction activities of section I of the Highway had been awarded to the MCC Company in China to offset the damage to the contractor (MCC) of the third section of the expressway due to not signing agreements and not receiving the loan, and contract activities of the Section 02 had been awarded to local contractors, due to non-recognition of the actual trace of the expressway. Further, this whole process is contrary to the procurement guidelines.
- 8.24 The amount of Rs.369.1 million incurred up to 31 December 2012 had been hidden from the financial statements.

9. Recommendation

- 9.1 The officers should be given specific advices to maintain the files relevant to the procurement process and should be entrusted with the task.
- 9.2 Evidence of the bidders who obtain the bid documents and other amendments that are sent to all relevant parties must be obtained.
- 9.3 The responsible officers in charge of communicating to the Cabinet through the Cabinet memorandum should take actions to give all relevant necessary and legally binding information required for the correct decision by the Cabinet of Ministers.
- 9.4 Procurement shall be guided with the protection of economic, efficiency and effectiveness so as to preserve the value for money to be delivered in the procurement process.

- 9.5 The parties concerned must make sure that pre - bid meetings are conducted to minimize potential problems in the future.
- 9.6 Conduct meetings and coordinate between the Ministry, the Road Development Authority and the Central Expressway Project in a proper manner and formally communicate the reports to the relevant parties.
- 9.7 The valid rules and generally applicable requirements shall be in conformity with the procurement process.
- 9.8 So the advantage of the inflation in relation to the construction can be obtain to the government, that make decisions in consideration with planning of roads, bidding and procurement procedure should be done
- 9.9 The Attorney-General's clearance should be obtained to establish their legal background in the procurement process and the agreements.
- 9.10 A formal mechanism should be established to ensure that the work is carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Technical Evaluation Committee and the Procurement Committee decisions.
- 9.11 The possibility and transparency of selecting consultants and contractors under direct contracting with being competitive must be considered.
- 9.12 Action should be taken to improve the competitiveness of the procurement process in order to overcome the shortcomings of the technical evaluation committee and the procurement decisions taken by the procurement committee, the extra time for the procurement process and the improvement of the transparency of the bids.
- 9.13 Responsible Officers should ensure that they act to minimize unnecessary time periods due to the weaknesses of the planning and procurement process.
- 9.14 In many countries of the world are being followed environmentally and economically most effective ways of designing, building and implementing of expressways and it has to be ensured that as many as possible

10. Conclusion

- 10.1 It is concluded that there is an unusual delay in construction activities of the Central Expressway due to non-carrying out of a formal feasibility study and non-allocation of adequate time for planning.
- 10.2 It is concluded that the cost of the Central Express Way had been adversely affected due to making of decisions in an informal manner and also altering such decisions frequently.
- 10.3 It is concluded that the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, Road Development Authority, Ministry of Finance and Mass Media, Project Office and Appointed Technical Evaluation Committee and Cabinet Appointed Procurement Committee and other related Committees have not been engaged in due professional care and not been implemented as reaching the basic objectives of the desired procurement process.
- 10.4 It is concluded that the parties who had made the decisions and also the parties who had implemented such decisions should be responsible for not using the feasibility study report as well as the cost of Rs. 2,193 million spent on it.

H. M. Gamini Wijesinghe

Auditor General

Sgd./ H.M. GAMINI WIJESINGHE
Auditor General

28 December 2018

MINUTES OF THE CABINET APPOINTED CONSULTANTS PROCUREMENT

Nature of the Procurement Committee		CACPC	Name of the Procurement Entity		MOP&H
Title of Procurement		Consultancy services to carryout feasibility studies, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of Documents to Invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I of the proposed Northern Expressway.			
Meeting No:	01	Date	7 th and 13 th June 2013	Purpose/s	Approval of the CACPC to be obtained for the Variation order No 01.

PRESENT

In Attendance		Others
Members of the CACPC		
Mr. R W R Pemasiri Secretary, Ministry of Ports & Highways	(Chairperson)	Mr. W A S Weerasinghe Director General, RDA
Mrs. D M A Harasgama Director General Dept. of Public Enterprises,	(Member)	Mr. L V S Weerakoon, Acting Project Director, (Northern Expressway)
Mr. D K R Swarna Director, Engineering Services, RDA	(Member)	Mr. Gamini Rathnayake Procurement Consultant, MOP&H
Mr. W K Kodituwakku Project Director (NHSP), RDA	(Member)	Ms. H L N Nuwangi Engineer, Northern Expressway Project
Mr. G D Jinadasa Chief Accountant, Ministry of Ports & Highways	(Member)	

DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED

The Cabinet Appointed Consultant Procurement Committee (CACPC) reviewed the revised inputs requirement submitted by M/s SMEC international Ltd Australia in consultation with Ocyana Consultants (Pvt) Ltd along with the Cost Estimate prepared by the Project Management Unit (PMU) of Northern Expressway Project.

CACPC OBSERVATIONS

The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) embarked on determining of a suitable road corridor to construct the Northern Expressway with an Expressway link to Kandy considering both the present and future development scenario of the country and also having minimum impact on the General Public and Land Acquisition. In the process, the RDA has identified tentative road trace with following phases.

- i. Enderamulla to Meerigama
- ii. Meerigama to Kurunegala
- iii. An Expressway link to Kandy

It has been decided to carry out Feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Detail Engineering Design etc. The Cabinet of Ministers at its meeting held on 18th July 2012 has decided to award the consultancy services pertaining to "carry out Feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of Documents to invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I of the proposed Northern Expressway" to M/s SMEC International Ltd Australia on Single Source Selection (SSS) basis.

Accordingly, the consultancy service of "Feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of Documents to Invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I of the proposed Northern Expressway" was awarded to M/s SMEC International Ltd Australia on Single Source Selection (SSS) basis for a contract sum of AUD 3,998,671.00 plus LKR 414,233,734.00 (Excluding VAT and NBT).

The scope of the original contract was carry out Feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of Documents to Invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I, where the trace identified only up to Kurunegala. Subsequently, the Government decided to increase it up to the Dambulla town, where further 61km to be added. As such, the inputs of the consultancy have to be amended in order to include the new trace. M/s SMEC International Ltd Australia, the consultant, in consultation with Ocyana Consultants (Pvt) Ltd have submitted a proposal for this task.

The CACPC noted that, rates of the original contract are used for the most of the items of revised proposal and negotiated with the consultant to reduce the cost. The summary of the cost breakdown of original and after negotiation contract pertaining to foreign and local component are given in the Table 01 and 02 below respectively.

Item	Original Contract (AUD)	Revised Contract (AUD)
Remuneration		
International	3,191,763.00	4,506,314.19
Other Expenses		
Foreign	578,400.00	819,300.00
Provisional Sums		
Training and workshops	40,000.00	40,000.00
Contingency	188,508.00	250,000.00
Totals	3,998,671.00	5,615,614.19

Table 01

Local component

Item	Original Contract (Rs.)	Revised Contract (Rs.)
Remuneration		
National	80,847,842.00	87,603,087.28
Other Expenses		
Local	82,170,000.00	105,701,257.00
Provisional Sums		
Satellite Images and Maps	5,400,000.00	8,000,000.00
Satellite DEM	12,100,000.00	18,000,000.00
GPS Control points	10,350,000.00	14,500,000.00
Topographic surveys and mapping of centre line	40,000,000.00	54,000,000.00
Geotechnical Investigations	135,000,000.00	190,000,000.00
Sociological Surveys	5,800,000.00	9,000,000.00
Resettlement Studies	5,790,000.00	9,000,000.00
Traffic Studies	4,450,000.00	14,500,000.00
Environmental Studies	15,425,000.00	23,000,000.00
Hydrological Studies	7,500,000.00	10,000,000.00
Training and Workshops	1,250,000.00	1,800,000.00
Contingency	8,150,892.00	11,000,000.00
Totals	414,233,734.00	556,104,344.28






Table 04

The CACPC is of the view that, the required additional inputs for the variation is reasonable and the revise contract is justified, as the rates of the original contract are used for the variation.

CACPC DECISIONS:

The CACPC having carefully studied the contents mentioned above, decided to recommend to the Cabinet of Ministers to revise the original contract sum of Consultancy service of "Feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of Documents to Invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I of the proposed Northern Expressway", which was awarded to M/s SMEC International Ltd Australia, from AUD 3,998,671.00 to AUD 5,615,614.19 plus LKR 414,233,734.00 to 556,104,344.28. (Excluding VAT and NBT) in order to extend the original trace up to Dambulla town increasing an additional 61km length. The increased amount of foreign component of AUD is equivalent to LKR 202,182,576.47 (as at 14th June 2013 rate @ AUD 1 = LKR 125.0400). The increased amount of local currency component is LKR 141,870,610.28.

Signatures

Name	Capacity	Agree with the above decision/s (yes/no)	Signature
Mr. R W R Pemasiri	Chairman	yes	
Mrs. D M A Harasgama	Member	yes	
Mr. D K R Swarna	Member	yes	
Mr. W K Kodiruwakku	Member	yes	
Mr. G D Jinadasa	Member	Yes	



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 Secretary

වරාය හා මහමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය

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 Fax

துறைமுகங்கள் மற்றும் நெடுஞ்சாலைகள் அமைச்சு විද්‍යුත් තැපෑල

MINISTRY OF PORTS & HIGHWAYS

மின் அஞ்சல் } sec@slpa.lk (Ports)
 E-mail } sec@mohsl.gov.lk (Highways)

මගේ අංකය } MPH/HWY/PRC/02/09-1-1
 எனது இல. }
 My No. }

ඔබේ අංකය }
 உமது இல. }
 Your No. }

දිනය } **21-June 2013**
 திகதி }
 Date }

Director General.
 Department of Public Finance,
General Treasury.

SUBMISSION OF DOCUMENTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY COST ESTIMATE EXAMINATION COMMITTEE (CEEC).
VARIATION NO.1 FOR CONSULTANCY SERVICES FOR NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY FEASIBILITY STUDY.

This refers to the Public Finance Circular No.02/2012 dated 7th August 2012 on the approval to the variations of contracts and changing the Total Cost Estimate (TCE).

Accordingly, we forward herewith necessary documents pertaining to variations issued for the above project to be considered for the consideration of Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC).

We shall much appreciate if you could schedule an **early date for the meeting of CEEC** to consider the above variation.

R.W.R. Pemasiri.
Secretary,
 Ministry of Ports & Highways.

The Chairman,
Cost Estimate Examination Committee,
Department of Public Finance,
General Treasury.

REVISION OF THE TOTAL COST ESTIMATE FOR RECONCILLATION OF CONTRACT COST ESTIMATE

Name of Procurement:- Variation No.1 for Consultancy Services for Northern Expressway feasibility study.

1	Name of the procuring Entity	Road Development Authority	
2	Line Ministry	Ministry of Ports and Highways	
3	Name of the project	Northern Expressway Project	
4	Source of funding	Local Funds	
5	Original contract price and date of award of contract (as approved by the Cabinet of Ministers)	AUD Component - 3,998,671.00 LKR Component - 414,233,734.00 Total Value in LKR - 958,052,990.00 (1 AUD = 136 LKR) Date of commencement - 2012 - 09 - 10 (After signing the MOU) Last Cabinet Decision Made on - 2012-12-19	
6	The schedule date of the contract completion date as per the original contract	End of May 2013	
7	The schedule date of the contract completion date as per the (Cabinet approved) revised contract	Consultant should submit the reports within 6 month of time according to the Cabinet Decision. According to the Contract Agreement time period shall be 8 months from the date of commencement	
8	Contingency Provision (Original Contract)	AUD Component - 188,508.00 LKR Component - 8,150,892.00	
9	Allocated budgetary provisions and total expenditure incurred to date	Year	End of May, 2013
		Amount (Rs)	594.00 Mn
		Expenditure (Rs)	439.00 Mn
10	Reasons for current variation / variations (more relevant reasons)		
	Reasons	Description	Amount of variations
11	Change of the scope	GOSL decided to extend the expressway from Kurunegala to Dabulla	AUD Component - 1,616,943.19
			LKR Component - 141,870,610.28
11	Overall variation as a percentage		
	Overall variation as a percentage of the cabinet approved revised contract sum	AUD Component - 40.44% LKR Component - 34.25%	
12	Anticipated time frame to obtain additional provisions required for variation	Year	2013
		Amount	Rs. 344. Mn
13	Report of the Technical Evaluation Committee pertaining to the new cost (Revised cost estimate) - Annexure - I		
Observations of the secretary of the Line Ministry: <u>Recommended</u>			
Date: 2/06/2013			



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அரசு நிதித் திணைக்களம்

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC FINANCE

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ඇමුණුම 01 - (iii)

මහ නාණ්ඩාගාරය, මුදල් හා ක්‍රමවේදාත්මක අමාත්‍යාංශය, කොළඹ-01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව.
கொழும்புத் திணைக்களம், நிதி திணைக்களம் அமைச்சு, கொழும்பு-01, இலங்கை.
General Treasury, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Colombo-01, Sri Lanka.

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මගේ අංකය
எனது இல
My No

PFD/PMD/CEEC/47

මෙහි අංකය
உமது இல
Your No

MPII/HWY/PRC/02/09-1-1

දිනය
திகதி
Date

30 07.2013

Secretary
Ministry of Ports and Highways

Dear Sir

Submission of Documents to be considered by Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC) – Variation No. 01 for Consultancy Services for Northern Expressway Feasibility Study

This refers to your letter of even number dated 21 June 2013 sent along with the request for revision of TCE for reconciliation of contract cost variations, for the recommendation of the Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC).

The request was reviewed by the CEEC at the meeting held on 23 July 2013 and the observations and recommendations of the committee are as follows.

According to the reports submitted by the Ministry of Ports and Highways, Northern Expressway Project (NEP) and the presentation made before the Committee, it is reported that the contract has been awarded on 10 September 2012 for **AUS \$ 3,998 671.00** and **SLRs 414,233,734.00**. The Contract Completion date was 10 May 2013.

The Committee Observed that the contract has been awarded (on 10.09.2012) after issuing of circular regarding the Revision of the Total Cost Estimates for Reconciliation of Contract Cost Variations on 07.08.2012. Therefore, the committee instructed the Secretary of the line Ministry to provide underline reasons attributed to the change of scope of the project.

As a result of these changes in the scope, the committee noted that the foreign consultancy cost on other expenses has been increased from AUS \$ 578,400.00 to AUS \$ 819,300.00 by 42%. The Local Consultancy cost item on Traffic Studies cost too has been increased from SLRs. 4,450,000.00 to SLRs 14,500,000.00 by 226%.

Therefore the committee instructed the secretary of the line Ministry to submit: (a) The detail analysis with justification for the increase in foreign consultancy cost item of Other Expenses and local consultancy cost item of traffic studies separately, and (b) reasons for the change of scope.

Yours faithfully

P. Algama
Director General

DP/PTA

DP/NEP

30/07/2013



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 Secretary

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துறைமுகங்கள் மற்றும் நெடுஞ்சாலைகள் அமைச்சர் விடயத் துறை

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මගේ අංකය } MPH/HYWC/PRO/02/092104
 எனது இல. } 4104
 My No. } Your No.

දිනය } 16 August 2013
 திகதி }
 Date }

Director General
Department of Public Finance
General Treasury

Northern Expressway Project Consultancy, Addition of Kurunegala –Dambulla Section for the original scope – submission of Additional Information

This refers to the clarifications raised at the Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC) meeting held on 23.07.2013 pertaining to the variation order to be issued to the Consultant (SMCE International Pty Ltd) regarding the above subject.

According to the decision taken by Ministers of the Cabinet, at its meeting held on 2012 - 12 -19 , the Cabinet has granted its approval to carry out Feasibility study , preparation of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) report and preparation of relevant documents such as Request For Proposal (RFP), etc to implement the Northern Expressway Project and on the Single Source Selection basis (SSS), M/s SMEC International (Pty) has been appointed to carry out aforesaid studies and preparation of relevant documents for the project. (Copy annexed please)

According to the original scope, the study area comprises Three Phases as follows

- Phase I – Enderamulla to Meerigama
- Phase II - Meerigama to Pellandeniya (Kurunegala)
- Phase III- Pothupitya to Kandy via Rambukkana. ✓

However, based on findings from the initial studies especially on Traffic studies, at the very beginning, Phase I extended up to Ambepussa Via Meerigama and Phase III from Ambepussa to Kandy via Rambukkana and all relevant studies are being carried out by the Consultant (SMEC) without any amendments to the contact amount negotiated by the Cabinet Appointed Consultancy Procurement Committee (CACPC) and Standing Cabinet Appointed Review committee (SCARC).

Whilst the above studies have been in progress, scope of winding and improving of Ambepussa – Kurunegala- Tricomalee (A-6) road section from Ambepussa to Dambulla into four lane sections standards has been reduced in to two lane sections standards except major towns location such as Alawwa, Polgahawela, Kurunegala, Ibbagamuwa etc. due to the proposed Northern Expressway.

Findings from Traffic studies carried out by the Consultant based on this scenario, revealed the requirement of extending the Northern Expressway to the Dambulla. Extending the Northern Expressway to Dambulla, will reduce the present traffic congestion on Ambepussa – Kurunegala – Trincomalle (A-6) road and the investment on the Northern Expressway will be more economically feasible.

This matter was discussed at several meetings including the Secretary of Finance. During the discussions, the Secretary to Finance has accepted the extending the Northern Expressway to Dambulla. Therefore, the Ministry of Ports & Highway has decided to extend the scope from Pellendeniya (Kurunegala) to Dambulla as Phase IV comprising about 60 kilo meter in length.

Accordingly, the consultant has been asked to submit a final proposal as a variation order for the extending the study as it is not in the original scope of the work and also it is far beyond the manageable financial limit in the original contract value.

The submitted variation order has been negotiated by the Cabinet Appointed Consultant Procurement Committee (CACPC) had been forwarded to the CEEC for the consideration.

Your early action in this regard is highly appreciated.


R.W.R.Pemasiri

Secretary

Ministry of Ports & Highways



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අවුණුම 01 - (v)

அரசு நிதித் திணைக்களம்

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC FINANCE

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මහ නායකවරයා, මුදල් හා කුමන්ත්වය අමාත්‍යාංශය, කොළඹ-01, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව
பொதுத் திணைக்களம், நிதி திட்டமிடல் அமைச்சு, கொழும்பு-01, இலங்கை.
General Treasury, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Colombo-01, Sri Lanka.

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எனது இல
My No

PFD/PMD/CEEC/47

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உமது இல
Your No

MPH/HYWC/PRO/02/09-1-1

දිනය
திகதி
Date

22.10.2013

Secretary
Ministry of Ports and Highways

Attention Ms. Nawangi - 2785719

Dear Sir

Northern Expressway Project Consultancy, Addition of Kurunegala – Dambulla section for the original scope – Submission of Additional Information

This refers to your letter of even number dated 16.08.2013 sent along with the request for revision of TCE for reconciliation of contract cost variations, for the recommendation of the Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC).


The request was reviewed by the CEEC at the meeting held on 03 October 2013 and the observations and recommendations of the committee are as follows.


The CEEC meeting held on 23.07.2013 instructed the secretary of the line ministry to submit: (a) the detail analysis with justification for the increase in foreign consultancy cost item of other expenses and local consultancy cost item of traffic studies separately, and (b) reasons for the change of scope.

According to the reports submitted by the Ministry of Ports and Highways, Northern Expressway Project (NEP) and the presentation made before the committee, it was revealed that the scope of the project has been further changed. Accordingly new report will be submitted to the CEEC by the Secretary to the Ministry of Ports and Highways incorporating the new changes of scope.

The CEEC taking the above factors into account, decided to make their recommendation after review the new report. The Committee also advised to the Secretary of the line ministry to provide the documents pertaining to policy decision for change of scope.

Yours faithfully


P. Algama
Director General



Attention: Ms. Nuwanjaya, Eng.

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Secretary

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MINISTRY OF PORTS & HIGHWAYS

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எனது இல
My No.

MPH/HYWC/PRO/02/09-11

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உமது இல
Your No.

දිනය
திகதி
Date

11th November 2013

Mr. S Amarasekara
Secretary to the Prime Minister
Chairman, CEEC

Northern Expressway Project Consultancy, Addition of Kurunegala –Dambulla Section for the original Scope – submission of Additional Information

This refers to the observations/recommendations of the Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC) meeting held on 3rd October 2013 pertaining to the variation order to be issued to the Consultant (SMCE International Pty Ltd) regarding the above subject.

Accordingly, the justifications for the change of the original scope of the project are summarized below.

The trace for Phase I comprising the following Stages were originally decided tentatively by Road Development Authority for the purpose of carrying out Feasibility Study.

Stage I – Enderamulla to Meerigama

Stage II - Meerigama to Pellandeniya (Kurunegala)

Stage III- An Expressway Link to Kandy.

Accordingly, the original Contract for Consultancy Service was awarded to carry out feasibility study on the above tentative alignments with a provision that the Consultant shall propose alternative proposals depending on the findings of feasibility study.

While the Feasibility Study was in progress, it was observed that the forecast traffic from the original trace was not adequate enough to generate revenue to make the project feasible under a PPP/BOT basis.

Simultaneously, a Framework Agreement (FA) has been entered on 28 May 2013 among the Ministry of Ports & Highways, M/s China Merchants Holdings (International) Co. Ltd (CHHI) and M/s China Merchants Huajian Highway Investment Co. Ltd (CMHH) in the presence of His Excellency the President of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and His Excellency the President of People's Republic of China for planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of Stage I & II on Public - Private Partnership (PPP) basis.

The M/s CMHH carried out a separate study and submitted several proposals for Stage I & II. According to their proposal, the Expressway Alignment for Stage I remain unchanged and the alignment for Stage II deviates from original alignment at Wilgamuwa and connect south of Kurunegale (not Pellandeniya as proposed in the original proposal). Further, M/s CMHH has proposed a new alignment for Expressway link to Kandy.

The studies carried out by both SMEC and CMHH and their proposals were further studied and discussed at several meetings.

As a result of these discussions, it was observed that the Construction of Phase I of NEP on original trace was not feasible to be implemented on PPP/BOT basis due to inadequate traffic.

Further, the need to extend the Expressway up to Dambulla as included in the Expressway Master Plan required to be addressed.

Therefore, it was decided that the Phase 1 of Northern Expressway required to be extended further up to Dambulla having an additional interchange at A6(at Pothupitiya), a link to A10(at Kurunegale) and a best option for Expressway Link to Kandy in order to attract more traffic, thereby increasing revenue required for making the proposal feasible.

Thus, the Ministry of Ports and Highways has taken a decision to carry out feasibility study on Stage IV- the section from South of Kurunegale to Dambulla, on the Section of CMHH proposal for Stage II from Wilgamuwa to Kurunegale and a best option for Expressway Link to Kandy in order to attract more traffic from Dambulla, A6(at Pothupitiya), A10(at Kurunegale)and Kandy in order to make the proposal feasible to be implemented on PPP/BOT basis.

R.W.P.Pemasiri
Secretary

Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping

o/c



Attention: Ms. Newangi.

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அரச நிதித் திணைக்களம்

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC FINANCE

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பொதுத் திறைச்சேரி, நிதி திட்டமிடல் அமைச்சு, கொழும்பு-01, இலங்கை.

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Director General

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எனது இல
My No

PFD/PMD/CEEC/47

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உமது இல
Your No

MPH/HYWC/PRO/02/09- 1-1

දිනය
திகதி
Date

30.11.2013

Secretary

Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping

Dear Sir

Northern Expressway Project Consultancy, Addition of Kurunegala – Dambulla section for the original scope

Submission of Additional Information

This refers to your letter of even number dated 06.11.2013 sent along with the request for revision of TCE for reconciliation of contract cost variation, for the recommendation of the Cost Estimate Examination Committee (CEEC).

The request was reviewed by the CEEC at the meeting held on 12 November 2013 and the observation and recommendations of the committee are as follows.

The CEEC meeting held on 03.10.2013 instructed to the Secretary, Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping to provide the documents pertaining to policy decision for change of the scope of Northern Expressway project.

According to the documents pertaining to the policy decision for change of the scope of the project and the presentation made before the committee it was revealed that the consultancy service of "Feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of documents to Invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I of the proposed Northern Expressway" has been awarded to M/s SMEC International Ltd Australia on Single Source Selection (SSS) basis for a contract sum of AUS \$ 3,998,671.00 plus LKR 414,233,734.00 (Excluding VAT and NBT).

The scope of the original contract was to carry out feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of documents to invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I, where the trace identified only up to Kurunegala. The Government later decided to increase it up to the Dambulla town, where further 61km to be added. As such, the inputs of the consultancy have to be amended in order to include the new trace.

Subsequently, a Framework Agreement (FA) has been entered on 28 May 2013 among the Ministry of Highways, Ports & Shipping, M/s China Merchants Holdings (International) Co. Ltd (CHHI) and M/s China Merchants Huajian Highway Investment Co. Ltd (CMHH) in the presence of His Excellency the President of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and

His Excellency the President of People's Republic of China for planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of Stage I & II on Public - Private Partnership (PPP) basis.

Accordingly (the consultant was requested) to submit their technical and financial proposal to carry out Feasibility Studies, Environmental Impact Assessment and preparation of documents to invite Expression of Interest and Request for Proposals incorporating above changes.

The consultant has quoted only the original rates for all inputs and agreed to abide by original Conditions of Contract. As per the proposal submitted by the consultant, the consultancy service is to be completed on 31 March 2014. The Foreign component of the cost has been increased from AUS\$ 3,998,671.00 to AUS\$ 6,304,159.18 and the local component has been increased from Rs. 414,233,734.00 to Rs. 583,070,286.74.

The consultancy cost variations are as follows


Item No	Description	Cost	
		AUS \$	SL Rs
i.	Original Contract Sum (without contingencies)	3,998,671.00	414,233,734.00
ii.	Variation (without contingencies)	2,305,488.18	168,836,552.74
iii.	Final Total Cost (without contingencies)	6,304,159.18	583,070,286.74
iv.	Variation as a percentage of Original Contract Sum	57.66%	40.76%

The Committee observed that, the variation has been recommended by the Cabinet Appointed Consultancy Procurement Committee (CACPC) and the Cost Management Unit (CMU) of the Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping. The CEEC is of the view that, the revision of the contract is justified, as it is a policy decision of the Government and the required additional inputs for the variation is reasonable and the revised contract is justified, since the rates of the original contract are used for the variation.

Accordingly, the committee recommended the variation amounting to Aus \$ 2,305,488.18 plus LKR 168,836,552.74 and the revision of the original contract sum of consultancy service of "feasibility study, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), and preparation of documents to invite Expression of Interest (EOI) and Request for Proposal (RFP) for the phase I of the proposed Northern Expressway", from AUS \$ 3,998,671.00 to AUS \$ 6,304,159.18 plus LKR 414,233,734.00 to 583,070,286.74. (Excluding VAT and NBT).

Yours faithfully


P. Algama
Director General



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NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY PROJECT

අමුණුම 02 - (i)

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No.	RDA/NEP/PRO	ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No.	දිනය திகதி Date	18/02/2014
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Mr. Wasantha Dasanayake
 Country Manager
 SMEC International Pty Ltd

Dear Sir

Northern Expressway Project
 Contract for Consultancy Service for Northern Expressway Feasibility Study

APPROVAL FOR VARIATION ORDER NO 1 AND FURTHER EXTENSION OF TIME

This refers to your letter dated 1 November 2013 submitting Technical and Financial proposals submitted for Variation Order No 1 to the above Contract.

We are pleased to inform you that your Technical and Financial Proposals are hereby approved.

Thus, pursuant to Clause 2.4 of General Conditions of Contract signed on 9th January 2013, the following amendments are hereby affected.

- 1) The Contract sum is amended from AUD 3,998,671.00 to AUD \$ 6,304,159.18 and plus LKR 414,233,734.00 to 583,070,286.74(Excluding VAT & NBT)
- 2) Time extension is granted till 30 June 2014 subject to the Conditions stated in my letter No RDA/NEP/FS dated 03/02/2014

You are informed that the service shall be rendered in accordance with approved Technical and Financial Proposals given as Annex 1.

Please note that all applicable and relevant Terms and Conditions stated in the original Contract will remain unchanged for this extension.

Thanking you.

Yours faithfully,

L. V. S. Weerakoon

Act. Project Director

Northern Expressway Project

L V S Weerakoon

Actg. Project Director (NEP)

Cc. The Secretary-Ministry of Highways, Ports & Shipping
 The Chairman –Road Development Authority
 Project Accountant

- f.i please
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 - f.i & n.a please



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 MINISTRY OF HIGHWAYS, PORTS & SHIPPING

ඇමුණුම 02 - (ii)

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 வடக்கு கடுகதிப்பாதை செயற்திட்டம்
 NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY PROJECT

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No.	RDA/PD/NEP/FS13	ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No.	දිනය திகதி Date	3.08.2014
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Team leader,
 SMEC International Pty Ltd

Dear Sir,

RE: NEP Contract packages

Followed the discussion had with Secretary Ministry of Highways Ports and Shipping on 12th August 2014 at the Ministry Auditorium and the subsequent discussion had today, following discisions were agreed upon to be adopted for all stages of NEP. Accordingly you are requested to adopt the following considerations in finalizing the contract packages.

- (1) Adopt the CSS attached herewith (Refer annexure) for all stages.
- (2) Adopt the AUSTROADS standard.
- (3) pavement designs should be with cement stabilized pavement based on Road Note 31 or AASHTO

As agreed you need to deliver the following within two weeks from the day one you have your designers available in Colombo. Please confirm when you could get them in Colombo at your earliest.

- (1) HA&VA designs for all section of NEP
- (2) Designs CSS at least 50m intervals.
- (3) Bill of quantities, developed for each contract package separately. (A copy of the list of contract packages is attached herewith)
- (4) Preliminary drawings (both Geometrical and Structural)related all contract packages.

Further please find the attached following documentations related to OCH 3 for your observations and amendments.

- (1) OCH 3 - Contract document
- (2) Specifications - General and particular conditions.

You are still need to deliver the respective ROW drawings , in case you need the assistance of our design engineers, please let me know as early as possible.

As all above deliverable constitute a variation, you are requested to submit the proposal for the variation.

We would be able to consider time extension till December 2014.

Act. Project Director
Northern Expressway Project

Copy:
 The Secretary, Ministry of Highways, Ports & Shipping

- f.i.pl



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MINISTRY OF HIGHWAYS, PORTS & SHIPPING

අමුණුම 02 - (iii)

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NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY PROJECT

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 My No. } RDA/NEP/PD/FS13

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 29 AUG 2014

Country Representatives,
 SMEC International Pty Ltd.

Dear Sir,

RE: NEP Contract Packaging

This is with reference to your letter No. CM/SMEC/IMP/15/035-VOL II dated 22nd August 2014 and our letter No. RDA/PD/NEP/FS13 dated 13th August 2014.

As indicated in our letter and the subsequent follow up discussions had with Mr. Tom, we allocated a team of design engineers from RDA and they were entrusted to carryout part of deliverables as stated in our above letter. As at today our team is engaged in compiling following.

- I. Preliminary geometric design of all packages.
- II. Preliminary structural designs of all packages.
- III. Contract documentation relevant to all packages.
- IV. Bill of quantities relevant to all packages.

*Mrs N.
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 16/5/2015*

Accordingly you are requested to reconsider the submitted variation order via your above letter variation taking in to consideration the inputs contributed by RDA design team and make it effectively reflected in your submission.

Beside above, as stated in our above letter you are requested produce and deliver the new ROW drawings, for all seven packages, yet giving priority for the sections, we have already dispatched to Survey Department for fixing final ROW on site. Hence it is my understand that the proposed human resource inputs would be significantly reduced taking in to consideration the RDA inputs and reduced scope of works.

In addition you are requested, to expedite the task of getting EIA approval initially for the contract package 7, & subsequently for remaining six (6) packages.

564/1, ජය මාවත, අකුරේගොඩ පාර, පැලවත්ත, බත්තරමුල්ල
 564/1, Jaya Mawatha, Akuregoda Road, Pelawatta, Battaramulla

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
E-mail - rdadnne@gmail.com

Accordingly, expected work scope will be limited to following deliverables.

- a) Produce corresponding ROW plans for all several packages with priority given to the ROW files already delivered to Survey Department.
- b) Get the CEA approval for all seven packages with package 7 given the utmost priority.
- c) Amend the hydrological report based on topographical data files (A separate letter is to be dispatched to this effect).

You are requested to submit a time schedule for above deliverables at your earliest and to formulate the resulted new variation order. With regard to time frame we would be able to consider an extension till end of December 2014.

Thanking you
Yours faithfully


.....

Act. Project Director
Northern Expressway Project

Cc. The Secretary, Ministry of Highways, Ports & Shipping - f. i. pl.



Consultant's Project Office

Level 1, No 575 Nawala Rd., Rajagiriya, Sri Lanka

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www.smec.com

22 November 2013

Reference 5068037/PPP/

Mr.L.V.S Weerakoon
Acting Project Director,
Northern Expressway Project,
Road Development Authority,
564/1, Jaya Mawatha
Akuregoda Road, Pelawatta
Battaramulla.

Dear Sir,

**Re: Revised Economic and Financial Report on the Northern Expressway
Affordability and Delivery Models**

We have pleasure in submitting 6 copies of the Economic and Financial Report on the Northern Expressway **Affordability and Delivery Models Revision 2** together with 6 copies of Appendix E – Supplementary Report.

These documents should be read in conjunction with the previously submitted volumes in August 2013 such that the complete report comprises of:

Volume	Revision No.	Dated
Economic and Financial Report on the Northern Expressway Affordability and Delivery Models	2	November 2013
Appendix A – Traffic Report	1	August 2013
Appendix B – Costs	0	August 2013
Appendix C – Economic Analysis Report	0	August 2013
Appendix D – Financial Analysis Report	0	August 2013
Appendix E – Supplementary Report	0	November 2013


We also enclose 2 CDs with copies of the complete report and annexes.

Yours faithfully,

Greg Goodsell
Team Leader



SMEC International Pty Ltd

**DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF SRI LANKA
MINISTRY OF PORTS AND HIGHWAYS
ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY**



**NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY PROJECT
FEASIBILITY STUDY**



 A1/A6	COLOMBO 4 hours
 NEP	COLOMBO 40 minutes

**ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REPORT ON THE NORTHERN
EXPRESSWAY AFFORDABILITY AND DELIVERY MODELS**

Revision 2



November 2013

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1 Executive Summary

This Economic and Financial Report on the Northern Expressway Affordability and Delivery Model is one of the deliverables due under the Northern Expressway Feasibility Study. One of the aims of the study is to investigate the feasibility of delivering the project utilising a Public Private Partnership (PPP) delivery model.

The scope of work for the study includes the following project configuration:

- Stage 1 – Enderamulla to Meerigama
- Stage 2 – Meerigama to Kurunegala
- Stage 3 – An expressway link to Kandy
- Stage 4 – Kurunegala to Dambulla.



Figure 1-1: Northern Expressway Project Alignment, Stages & Sections

The other primary aims of the Northern Expressway Feasibility Study included undertaking the following tasks:

- Traffic and Tolling Analysis;
- Economic Evaluation; and
- Financial Analysis

Traffic and Tolling Analysis

In order to assess the potential future traffic demand for the proposed toll road SMEC has undertaken detailed traffic and tolling analysis.

The purpose of this analysis was to identify likely future year traffic volumes along the expressway for each of the assessment years, by staged development and by a range of development profiles where traffic demand would differ in relation to a range of socio-economic parameters. Changes to traffic along the existing alternative routes, the A1 and A6 were also identified.

A project specific traffic model using the commercial traffic modelling software package Cube Voyager was developed to aid the traffic analysis of the Northern Expressway (NE). This model is identified as the Northern Expressway Strategic Traffic Model (NESTM).

Full details of the model development and outcomes are provided in Appendix A – Traffic Study.

The traffic and tolling analysis incorporated the following assessment parameters:

- A 20 year assessment period from 2016 to 2036 inclusive of intermediate years 2021 and 2026.
- Staged development of the NE from stage 1 to full development with all logical combinations across all assessment years. For comparison purposes a fully developed project with all stages in place from 2016 was assessed.
- Six future year development profile Scenarios.

These scenarios were developed to reflect the range of future year socio-economic conditions. As a developing country the nature of the future socio - economic conditions, and the associated traffic volumes on the expressway is difficult to predict. To reflect all possible outcomes we have identified six possible future year scenarios ranging from Conservative reflecting present day conditions to Ultimate Development where the NE has contributed to a significant change on travel patterns with higher economic development reflected in a greater demand from more vehicles on the road network, in particular Commercial Vehicles (CVs).

These scenarios are:

1. Conservative
2. Improved Connections
3. Mid-way
4. GDP linked CV growth – toll on NE
4A GDP linked CV growth – No toll on NE
5. Ultimate Development

The **Conservative** scenario represents a situation where current travel behaviour and economic activity does not significantly change as a result of the NE.

Improved Connections reports on the benefits that improved access onto the NE, in particular a direct connection to the Kelani bridge area and onto the port affords.

Mid-Way introduces the effects of changes to travel behaviour as a result of the NE that occur through increases in value of time.

GDP linked CV growth – toll on NE identifies further changes in travel behaviour and economic activity with growth in the number of commercial vehicles linked to projected GDP growth. The **4A no-toll subset** provides a sensitivity test on the effect of a no toll expressway.

The **Ultimate Development** scenario represents a future year case where travel behaviour and economic activity have significantly altered in response to the NE.

Table 1-1 identifies Average Weekday Daily Traffic (AWDT) two way volumes of private cars and commercial vehicles movements along the expressway by stage and section (as identified in Figure 1-1) for Scenario 5 at 2036. This represents a situation with the highest potential tolled volume of vehicles along the expressway.

Table 1-1: Scenario 5 (Stages 1, 2, 3, 4) NE at 2036

Interchange	Interchange	Stage/ Scenario	1	2	3	4	4A	5
Enderamulla	Gampaha	1	10,610	28,250	36,170	57,490	61,140	68,290
Gampaha	Veyangoda	1	5,090	7,770	15,620	34,160	43,490	48,610
Veyangoda	Meerigama	1	6,040	7,570	15,160	31,320	43,330	47,890
Meerigama	Ambepussa	1	3,750	4,130	7,690	16,400	26,840	28,720
Meerigama	Narammala	2	5,280	6,000	11,230	22,530	36,470	36,260
Narammala	Pellandeniya	2	4,970	5,540	9,790	18,040	31,130	30,870
Ambepussa	Devalegama	3	3,100	3,380	6,410	13,530	26,160	26,370
Devalegama	Rambukkana	3	2,290	2,470	4,800	10,850	19,730	22,120
Rambukkana	Galagedara	3	2,400	2,590	4,700	11,460	19,990	21,770
Pellandeniya	Melsiripura	4	3,470	3,650	6,540	14,090	22,390	25,220
Melsiripura	Dambulla South	4	2,920	3,020	5,090	11,250	19,810	20,670
Dambulla South	Dambulla Central	4	3,400	3,430	5,820	12,150	19,520	20,630

Scenario 5 - Ultimate Development - performs the best with over 68,000 vehicles (AWDT) on the Enderamulla –Gampaha section at 2036 with a fully staged development in place. This is to be expected as this scenario represents a future case of advanced economic development with a high number of vehicles wishing to use the expressway. Conversely, Scenario 1 – Conservative – represents a future case with very little new or existing vehicle demand for the NE.

Stage 1 is the best performing stage as it is located within an existing traffic generating area and as such attracts traffic in its own right.

The Stages 1,2,4 route corridor has planned major planned new development near Dambulla, along with growing existing urban centres en route. It therefore provides a high speed alternative to the existing parallel transport corridor of the A1 and A6 and as such outperforms stage 3 that has less future year traffic demand from the limited planned new land use development in the Kandy region.

Overall commercial vehicles made up a high proportion of traffic on the expressway indicating that the main clientele that would use this road would be freight operators wishing to move goods across the country.

Economic Evaluation

A cost-benefit analysis was undertaken to determine the economic justification of the Northern Expressway Project. A separate economic evaluation report, undertaken by Deloitte, has been prepared outlining the full details underpinning the cost-benefit analysis. The Economic Evaluation of the Northern Expressway Project Report is provided in Appendix C.

The overall results of the economic evaluation are shown in Table 1-2.

Table 1-2: Cost-benefit Analysis Options Analysis Results

Output	NPV	BCR	IRR	FYRR
Stage 1	\$4,976m	5.58	19%	14%
Stage 1 and 2	\$5,516m	4.04	16%	7%
Stage 1, 2 and 3	\$5,433m	3.04	14%	7%
Stage 1 and 3	\$5,733m	3.97	16%	8%
Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4	\$5,260m	2.45	13%	5%
Stage 1, 2 and 4	\$5,160m	2.86	14%	6%

Source: Deloitte, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario

The ranking of the options is based on a review of all economic decision criteria. Typically, the ranking of options is based on the net present value criterion. However, as all options are dependent on the delivery of Stage 1, the ranking of options is based on the first year rate of return criterion (FYRR). The FYRR measures the economic return in the first year of operation and is used to determine the timing for project delivery (i.e. if the FYRR is greater than the discount rate, immediate delivery of the project is warranted).

Stage 1 produces the highest FYRR of 14%. This shows that immediately delivery of Stage 1 is justified while deferral of other stages may be warranted.

Table 1-3: Cost-benefit Analysis Options Analysis Ranking of Stages

Output	NPV	BCR	IRR	FYRR	Overall Ranking – timing for delivery
Stage 1	6	1	1	1	1
Stage 1 and 2	2	2	2	3	3
Stage 1, 2 and 3	3	4	4	4	4
Stage 1 and 3	1	3	3	2	2
Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4	4	6	6	6	6
Stage 1, 2 and 4	5	5	5	5	5

Source: Deloitte, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario

The ranking of options based on the FYRR is as follows:

1. Stage 1
2. Stage 1 and 3
3. Stage 1 and 2
4. Stage 1, 2 and 3
5. Stage 1, 2 and 4
6. Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4

The cost-benefit analysis shows that the project returns a positive economic result as an overall project or in individual stages. From an economic point of view the project provides an efficient use of resources and construction of the project may be warranted.

In general, the project will act as a catalyst for land use change, particularly the relocation of firms to the expressway corridor. Ultimately, this will improve productivity of firms and potential lower prices for domestic consumers through lower transportation costs. These long term benefits need to be weighed against the short term costs, which are substantial. Should the project proceed, it is recommended that Stage 1 be considered as the first works package and that all other sections be reassessed at a later date after commissioning.

This will enable an ex-post evaluation of Stage 1 traffic forecasts to be undertaken to determine the likely willingness to pay of road users and therefore the potential demand on other sections of the project.

Financial Analysis

A financial analysis was undertaken to determine the financial viability of the proposed Northern Expressway Project. A separate financial analysis report, undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers, has been prepared outlining the full details underpinning the financial analysis. The Northern Expressway Financial Analysis Report is provided in Appendix D.

The purpose of the financial analysis was to assess alternative options for the design, delivery and financing of the NEP. The financial analysis was structured into two separate stages:

- An assessment of the relative financial affordability to Government of alternative stages or combinations of stages of the NEP, and
- An assessment of the potential value for money to Government from alternative delivery models involving private sector financing, or Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).

The core of the analysis was a quantitative assessment applying discounted cashflow (or DCF) methodology to forecasts for the nominal net cashflow outcomes for Government. This DCF approach supports direct comparison of the relative financial value or cost to Government of alternative scenarios for the NEP.

The analysis also included a high level qualitative assessment of alternative delivery models. The quantitative analysis results provide an estimate of potential value, but these estimates are only as reliable as the key assumption data utilised in the calculations. In recognition of this, it is important that appropriate weight is given to qualitative aspects of the analysis of alternative project options.

The affordability assessment for the NEP was undertaken on the basis of each of four separate stages of the NEP, as well as the overall project and various combinations of stages. Key assumptions and scenarios applied in the analysis are outlined in the Financial Analysis Report.

For the purposes of the financial analysis we adopted the following traffic scenarios for toll revenue estimation:

- Traffic scenario 1 (Conservative) – ‘downside’ or lower revenue outcome
- Traffic scenario 4 (GDP linked CV growth – tolled) – ‘base case’ or expected revenue outcome
- Traffic scenario 5 (Ultimate) – ‘upside’ or upper revenue outcome.

The following table summarises the expected values for affordability for each stage of the NEP, and the relative contribution of each stage to overall NEP affordability. It also includes the same analysis of the expected values for nominal risk-adjusted construction costs for each stage of the NEP. This indicates a strong correlation between construction cost and relative affordability between stages (except for Stage 1 which is distinguished from other stages by a relatively higher level of expected toll revenues – approximately 49% of total toll revenues estimated for the NEP).

Table 1-4: Construction costs and project affordability by NEP stage (USD)

Project Stage	Construction Cashflows (USD Nominal)	Construction Cashflows (% of Total)	Mean NPC Net Cashflows (USD)	Mean NPC Net Cashflows (% of Total)
Stage 1	(\$1,423m)	31%	(\$693m)	24%
Stage 2	(\$909m)	20%	(\$599m)	21%
Stage 3	(\$1,069m)	23%	(\$761m)	26%
Stage 4	(\$1,250m)	27%	(\$842m)	29%
Total NEP	(\$4,651m)	100%	(\$2,895m)	100%

Source: PwC, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario and mean risk-adjustment values

The affordability assessment estimated Net Present Cost to Government for the base case scenario for the total NEP as a risk-adjusted range of \$2,562 million to \$3,687 million, with a mean or expected value of \$2,895 million, expressed in US Dollars.

The assessment indicated that Stage 3 and Stage 4 of the NEP are the least affordable from a financial perspective, based on expected (or mean) Net Present Cost values. However, Stage 1 has the highest estimated variability in potential affordability, primarily attributable to the risk impact on relatively high estimated toll revenues.

As Stage 1 is the part of the corridor which links to the existing network infrastructure around Colombo, it is considered to be the minimum project scope despite Stage 2 presenting a less expensive individual affordability outcome. Therefore, Stage 1 was used as the basis for broader affordability outcomes assessed against potential project configuration options (or combinations of stages).

Based on the estimated affordability of combinations of different stages of the NEP, the following relative ranking of possible project options was estimated, from 'most affordable' to 'least affordable'.

1. Stage 1
2. Stage 1 and 2
3. Stage 1 and 3
4. Stage 1, 2 and 3
5. Stage 1, 2 and 4
6. Total NEP (Stages 1 – 4)

Key strategies to improve estimated affordability may include:

- Efficient management of project risks to mitigate variability (or uncertainty) to target risk outcomes less than the expected values.
- Efficiencies in project design, construction or delivery (or reductions in project specifications) to realise reductions in project capital costs.

The affordability assessment has focused on potential financial costs or value able to be reasonably estimated and directly linked to (or captured by) the NEP. There may be other broader financial benefits to Government which are partly driven or enhanced by delivery of the NEP. These may include:

- Potential increases in tax revenues to the extent the NEP contributes to an improvement in regional economic activity or asset values;
- Potential increases in the value of property or businesses owned by Government in the NEP corridor or region, or
- Decreases in the cost of upgrading or maintaining existing roads or infrastructure as a consequence of traffic demand shifting to the NEP.

Delivery Model Assessment

Investigation of the financial impacts to Government of potential private sector delivery and financing under a PPP model compared the traditional delivery model to three alternative models (including two sub-options for the service payment PPP model). The following table summarises the quantitative analysis results for the expected values for Net Present Costs (NPC) to Government.

Table 1-5: Summary Delivery and Financing Scenario Results – Total NEP

Delivery Model	Traditional Delivery NPC (USD)	PPP Delivery NPC (USD)	Potential Value	Comment
Traditional Delivery	(\$2,895m)	n/a	n/a	Traditional delivery option – no alternate delivery option value.
Service payment PPP– no contribution	(\$2,895m)	(\$3,020m)	(4%)	Suggests small potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Service payment PPP– Gov't contribution	(\$2,895m)	(\$2,918m)	(1%)	Suggests relatively immaterial value difference at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Economic / hybrid PPP	(\$2,895m)	(\$3,127m)	(8%)	Suggests modest potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.

Source: PwC, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario and mean risk-adjustment values

The quantitative assessment suggested relatively minor value for money potential from each PPP model (or minor value loss if only the mean Net Present Cost outcomes are compared). A key driver of potential value for money to Government from each PPP model would derive from an increase in certainty around future Government financial outcomes. This was evidenced by a narrowing of the risk-adjusted range of Net Present Cost outcomes for Government under the PPP models versus the traditional delivery model, and an improvement in estimated 'downside' or 'worst case' outcomes.

The above results of the comparative value for money estimates are broadly applicable to individual stages or combinations of stages of the NEP. A key exception to this is Stage 1 of the project, which has the lowest estimated value for money potential from PPP delivery options, when measured by the comparative mean Net Present Cost outcomes for Government. Stage 1 is distinguished from the other stages of the NEP by having significantly higher expected toll revenues.

The assessment of value potential is sensitive to assumptions around the expected private sector risk pricing (i.e. financing costs) as well as the discount rates applied to forecast residual cashflows to Government. Relatively modest changes in the assumed cost of private debt and equity finance will

erode or enhance the estimated potential for value for money. This sensitivity is minimised for the service payment PPP option where there is a material upfront Government contribution to private sector construction costs, as the magnitude of private finance invested in the project is reduced.

Several qualitative factors with the potential to impact on the value for money from a PPP delivery option are relevant and should be considered in combination with the quantitative estimates of potential value for money. These have the scope to enhance or detract from the actual financial outcomes achieved by Government depending on how effectively they are managed.

The following table presents a summary assessment of the potential advantages or disadvantages of alternative delivery and financing models based on a high level qualitative assessment.

Table 1-6: Summary Delivery and Financing Model Assessment

Potential Advantages	Potential Disadvantages	Conclusion
Traditional delivery model		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existing procurement experience and procedures for Government ▪ Fastest (potentially) procurement period ▪ Reduced initial procurement and contractual complexity ▪ Limited constraints on management of the project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum upfront project funding requirement for Government ▪ Direct exposure of Government to the majority of key project risks ▪ Reduced certainty over long-term funding requirements ▪ Reduced commitment to the long-term maintenance of project infrastructure 	<p>This model offers lower process risks associated with implementation of a new project procurement and delivery model, but also avoids the potential advantages of an appropriately designed and delivered PPP model.</p> <p>Its success will depend on the capacity of Government to finance the relevant profile of risk-adjusted net costs under this model.</p>
Service payment PPP – no contribution		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimal upfront project funding requirement for Government ▪ Reduced exposure to material project risks ▪ High level of certainty around long-term funding requirements ▪ Contractual commitment to maintaining a high standard of transport service over the project lifecycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initially more complex procurement process and contract management ▪ Significant ongoing budget commitment for the service payments ▪ Significant private financing required may not be available, or on reasonable commercial terms 	<p>Despite the potential benefits of this model, it is expected to have a low probability of success due to concerns around the potential availability of the significant initial private financing required and the ongoing high funding commitments for Government to support the relatively high service payments</p>
Service payment PPP – Government contribution		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Balances upfront project funding requirement and ongoing budget commitment for Government ▪ Reduced exposure to material project risks ▪ Reduced exposure to unavailability of sufficient private financing ▪ High level of certainty around long-term funding requirements ▪ Contractual commitment to maintaining a high standard of transport service over the project lifecycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initially more complex procurement process and contract management ▪ Reduced, but still significant upfront project funding requirement for Government ▪ Requires a long-term budget funding commitment for service payments 	<p>This model is expected to deliver the potential advantages of a PPP model while balancing the potential disadvantages. It balances initial and ongoing funding commitments required from Government, reducing the risks of initial private financing availability while retaining financial incentives to drive long-term performance in transport service delivery.</p> <p>Its success will depend on the capacity of Government to finance the relevant profile of risk-adjusted net costs under this model.</p>
Economic/Hybrid PPP		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimises exposure to material project risks (i.e. transfers traffic risk) ▪ Hybrid or service payment element can be structured to capture similar advantages as outlined for the relevant service payment PPP option 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forecast toll revenues are modest, requiring material service payment support and attracting similar disadvantages as outlined for the service payment PPP option without a Government contribution ▪ Private sector may be unwilling to accept traffic risk, or heavily discount expected traffic outcomes in its pricing ▪ May increase constraints on Government network management and tolling policies 	<p>The additional complexities of this model and the potential reluctance of the private sector to accept traffic risk suggest that this would not be a preferred delivery and financing model for the project, particularly given the relatively modest tolling revenues estimated</p>

If Government elects to pursue a PPP delivery option, the option which may present an appropriate balance between risk and opportunity is expected to be a service payment PPP where there is a material upfront contribution from Government towards private sector construction costs. This view is based on a consideration of the quantitative and qualitative assessment outcomes, and is expected to be preferred to other models for the following key reasons.

- Estimated quantitative value potential is optimised relative to that estimated for other PPP delivery models.
- Significant private sector investment reduces the initial funding requirement from Government for the NEP.
- Significant private sector investment supports effective transfer of risk and financial incentives for the private sector to maintain the specified standard of transport service over the concession period.
- A material upfront contribution from Government reduces potential risks associated with the availability and pricing of private sector finance for a 'first mover' PPP project in Sri Lanka.
- A material upfront contribution from Government moderates the ongoing service payment obligation for Government.
- The private sector may resist attempts to transfer demand risk under an economic PPP structure, or accept only on unreasonable commercial terms.

While the delivery and financing model assessment identified potential value for money relative to a traditional delivery, the results are not expected to materially alter either:

- The general scale of affordability estimated for the NEP or its component stages, or
- The ranking of each NEP stage or combination of stages, based on relative expected affordability.

Supplementary Report

A supplementary report has been undertaken at the request of the Road Development Authority (RDA) in response to the following:

- To report on the outcomes of the Traffic Growth Workshop held on the 8th October 2013
- To report on the outcomes of the modelling undertaken on an alternative stage 2 trace proposed by the M/S China Merchant Group and associated changes to the other stages, including alternative stage 3 alignments
- To report on a revised tolling regime as proposed by THI Asia Consultants, traffic consultants to the M/S China Merchant Group.

This report forms Appendix E of this report

Outcomes of the Traffic Growth Workshop

The workshop was convened to present the findings of the traffic analysis as reported in Appendix A of this report and to seek feedback on the traffic growth assumptions adopted for the study. The format of the workshop was a presentation that stepped through the process used in developing the traffic model, the nature and source of the key data inputs and concluded with mapping and data that identified the potential traffic volumes on the northern Expressway (NE) at 2036 for one of the development scenarios. Workshop participants were then invited to join three groups that

discussed in detail the land use growth assumptions and distribution for three spatial sectors of the study area.

Although participants acknowledged that the data used for the land use in the model was using official projections from the Dept. of Census and Statistics and other government departments they expressed an opinion that projected growth in some centres in the study area and the northern part of Sri Lanka was perhaps under represented. To address these concerns throughout October SMEC reengaged with government departments to verify the accuracy and status of data previously collected. The review of land use data concluded that the data collected and used in the model is a fair and accurate representation of planned development in Sri Lanka as currently available.

Alternative Stage 2 CMG or 2A Alignment

This option saw the northern portion of the original Stage 2 alignment altered to follow a more southerly route with a proposed interchange with the A10 and Stage 4 of the NE now located just south of Kurunegala, as opposed to being approximately 30km north of the town as occurred in the original stage 2 alignment.

Although the traffic analysis identified a small increase in traffic using the stage 2A alignment when compared to the original Stage 2 alignment this not a proportionally significant with the difference in traffic demand at 2036 being less than 5%.

Alternative Stage 3 Options

The Stage 2A trace provides an opportunity for the Stage 3 expressway to Kandy to be much shorter and hence much cheaper to construct and operate. Based on this new Stage 2A trace being in place three alternative Stage 3 alignments were tested, including reference to the original Stage 3 alignment (Stage 3A). These were:

- Stage 3B – an amended alignment of Stage 3A that provides a more direct east-west alignment from the A10 north of Kandy to Stage 2
- Stage 3C – a spur extension of Stage 3A to the new Stage 2A alignment south of Kurunegala
- Stage 3D – an alternative expressway option from Kandy to Kurunegala running generally parallel to the A10

Across all stages overall, Stage 3D was identified as the best performing option in terms of traffic volumes using the NE, all stages. This can be attributed to a number of factors based around improved accessibility to key activity centres and a projected future year development scenario.

All of the modelling undertaken for this supplementary report was based on Scenario 4 GDP Growth of the 5 future year development scenarios provided. These scenarios identified a range of possible future year development profiles ranging from Scenario 1 Conservative where the level of economic activity and associated travel patterns had not significantly changed from the present day. Therefore, the likely demand to use the Expressway is low with average daily volumes on the most popular section of the expressway being less than 10,000 vehicles per day. At the other end of the Scale Scenario 5 - Ultimate Development - identifies a significant change in economic activity and travel patterns with corresponding volumes on the same section of the expressway averaging over 60,000 vehicles per day. Scenario 4 is one step down but still with a high traffic demand, in particular commercial vehicles.

Therefore, using Scenario 4 there is a high number of trucks using the road network with a strong preposition to use the NE as it enables them to reach their destination in a shorter travel time. For Stage 3D it retains much of the traffic heading towards Colombo from the previous Stage 3A whilst

also picking up new traffic heading north which previous alignments did not provide suitable attraction above and beyond the A10 and alternative routes towards Kurunegala and beyond (Dambulla and Anuradhapura).

Economic Evaluation of Alternative Alignment Options

The RDA also requested that SMEC undertake an economic evaluation of the proposed changes to the route alignments for the Northern Expressway as part of the Supplementary report. This section compares the original cost-benefit analysis results with the results obtained for the alternative route alignments as proposed by the China Merchants Group to determine whether these alternative routes achieve a better economic outcome.

The cost benefit analysis for these alternative route alignments follows the same methodology adopted in **Appendix C – Final Report Economic Evaluation of the Northern Expressway**. Further detail on the framework used may be found in that report.

The base case for this addendum uses the same 'do minimum' base case as the initial analysis. It follows existing routes along the A1 (Kandy Road) from Colombo (Enderamulla) to Kandy and along the A6 from Ambepussa to Kurunegala. This base case includes planned road upgrades and new infrastructure, as identified by the RDA, which would occur during the evaluation period.

The project case is defined as the development of the Northern Expressway Project (NEP). This cost-benefit analysis considers the aforementioned sections in the following combinations as the project options:

1. **Option 1:** Stage 1, Stage 2 CMG, Stage 3A, Stage 4A
2. **Option 2:** Stage 1, Stage 2 CMG, Stage 3B, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A
3. **Option 3:** Stage 1, Stage 2 CMG, Stage 3C, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A
4. **Option 4:** Stage 1, Stage 2 CMG, Stage 3D, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A

In assessing economic viability, a broad assessment of the likely impacts of the project, including its impact on both private vehicle and commercial expressway users has been made.

Of the four new alignments examined, only one option produces a better NPV result than the original alignment – the modified Option 1, which includes Stage 1A, Stage 2 CMG, Stage 3A, and Stage 4A.

This preferred option delivers a marginally higher NPV and improves the BCR from 2.45 to 2.46 when compared to the original alignments.

The cost benefit analysis demonstrates that:

- Option 1 provides the highest NPV, however there is no discernible difference between the original alignment proposed by SMEC and the alignment proposed by the China Merchants Group;
- Options 2, 3 and 4 which propose changes to Stages 2 and 3 along with a link to Ambepussa, produce slightly lower economic results, compared to the original alignment.
- All options produce significantly high NPVs and are justified in economic terms.

Given these outcomes of the cost-benefit analysis, it is evident that the main advantage of adopting the China Merchant Alignment for Stage 2 is the potential capital cost savings associated with a shorter Stage 3. This is then a matter of project affordability rather than demonstrated outright economic value for the Stage 3 options.

Alternative Tolling Regimes

The purpose of this analysis was to identify changes in traffic volumes using the NE what adopting a tolling regime as provided by THI Asia Consultants Limited, the traffic consultant for the M/S China Merchant Group.

The tolling regime provided by THI consultants provided a flat rate per km by vehicle type as such did not provide the distance and capping discounts that the previous tolling regime offered. Therefore, not only was the unit rate per km higher but that this difference became more pronounced the longer the trip. For example, a heavy commercial vehicle travelling over 80km would pay at an overall rate of 12 Rs per km in the original scenario but 47 Rs per km under the THI rates.

All other model inputs as identified under alternative stage 2 and 3 options remained the same. Therefore, the route choice of a potential user of the NE is a function of where they wish to travel to and from, the imperative to reach that destination in the shortest time, the accessibility and associated travel time options between the expressway and local roads with the cost of a toll being the only differing variable.

As expected there is a reduction in vehicle using the expressway of between 17% and 57% across the four stages. Stage 1: 17% to 18%, Stage 2: 41 to 45%, Stage 3: 31 to 46%, Stage 4: 48 to 52%,

The reductions in vehicle demands by stage are less near Colombo due to congestion on local alternative roads and much shorter trips (i.e. Stage 1) while large differences occur the further away from Colombo with less congestion and longer trips

2 Introduction and Project Configuration

This report is one of the deliverables due under the Northern Expressway Feasibility Study. One of the aims of the study is to investigate the feasibility of delivering the project utilising a Public Private Partnership (PPP) delivery model.

The Northern Expressway will form a part of the national expressway network extending northwards from Colombo and connecting to both Jaffna and Trincomalee.

Figure 2-1 illustrates the planned national expressway network.




Figure 2-1: Planned National Expressway Network

The scope of work for the study includes the following project configuration:

- Stage 1 – Enderamulla to Meerigama
- Stage 2 – Meerigama to Kurunegala
- Stage 3 – An expressway link to Kandy
- Stage 4 – Kurunegala to Dambulla.

Figure 2-2 illustrates the location of the various stages of the project.




Figure 2-2: The Four Stages of the Northern Expressway Project Considered

Consideration has been given to the project being possibly delivered as one package (incorporating all Stages) and also to combinations of Stages which may form a project of a lesser scale. All possible configurations considered include Stage 1, which adjoins Colombo. The combinations of stages considered in this report are given in the table below:

Table 2-1: Project Configurations Considered Under the Study

Project Configuration	Incorporating Stage	Comments
A	1	
B	1 and 2	
C	1,2 and 3	
D	1,2,3 and 4	
E	1 and 3	
F	1,2 and 4	

The target design speed for Stages 1, 2 and 4 of the expressway is 120kph with a posted limit of 100kph. Stages 1, 2 and 4 are to be initially constructed in four lane configuration with provision for expansion to six lanes in the future. Stage 3 of the expressway will be constructed, and remain, a four lane configuration.

This report provides details of the traffic and tolling analysis, economic justification and financial affordability assessment of each of the stages, and combinations of stages, of the proposed Northern Expressway Project. Drawing on the results of this analysis, this report recommends the project delivery model most likely to provide a value for money outcome to the Sri Lankan government through the delivery of the Northern Expressway Project.

3 Evaluation Process

3.1 Traffic Analysis

The evaluation process adopted for the traffic analysis to meet the Project Terms of Reference (TOR) and objectives was:

- Identify the current status of the transport network as applicable to this project.
- Develop a suitable traffic forecasting model to undertake the analysis.
- Identify a study area based on the likely road alignment.
- Obtain all the necessary data to undertake the traffic analysis using existing sources and where required, undertake new surveys.
- Prepare traffic forecasts which identify volumes along the proposed expressway, covering the twenty years from the planned opening of the expressway (2016-2036).

Each of these tasks is discussed below. Note. This is not a sequential process and the existing conditions review, model development, study area identification and data collection was an integrated process undertaken concurrently to allow the generation of future year traffic forecasts.

3.1.1 Existing Traffic Conditions

Details on existing travel patterns, as collated for the model base year of 2012 was obtained from a review of published reports and existing traffic modelling data as held by the Road Development Authority and the University of Moratuwa, discussions with road users, government agencies and academics and personnel observations from on-site inspections. A gap analysis of this data identified significant shortcoming in the quality and coverage of the data and an extensive program of traffic counts, travel behaviour and freight transport surveys were commissioned. This is discussed under Section 3.1.4.

Key findings on existing traffic conditions, as applicable to the modelling undertaken for this project are discussed below.

For the transport infrastructure:

- The road itself, irrespective of its official designated status as key urban arterial or a local access road is seen as a place of business with multiple interactions occurring between road traffic and adjoining land uses. Road conditions and alignment outside of Colombo are also not conducive to heavy vehicle movements. Therefore, outside of the Southern Expressway there is as such no dedicated highway for high speed movement of goods and people to and from urban centres and key development and agricultural areas.
- The road is the major transport provider, carrying 95% of all freight with overall 90% of ground trips by road.
- Outside of Colombo there are a limited number of alternative routes to the countries hinterland.

For traffic operations on the network:

Trip Distribution

The majority of all trips are short in distance. An assessment of travel behaviour to and from Kandy using origin destination survey data identified that over 80% of the trips from and to the Kandy Four

Gravets DSD were short distance trips travelling within the Kandy District. Trip numbers significantly reduced as travel distance increased.

This data supports the observation that residents tended to live close to their place of work and car ownership rates were low less than 1 private car per 10 households on average, reflecting low household income levels.

Figure 3-1 identifies travel patterns to and from the Kandy Region.




Figure 3-1: Trip Patterns – Kandy

Traffic Composition - Trip Patterns – Kandy

Vehicle composition on the modelled A and B class roads (roads that carry the bulk of traffic) are made up of up to 50% of slow moving moped and three-wheelers in urban areas decreasing to approximately 30% outside of urban centres. These vehicles are banned on expressways. Coupled with poor driving behaviour urban travel speeds are averaging less than 20km/hr only increasing to approximately 35km/hr along inter-urban routes.

On average approximately 40% of traffic eligible to use the NE are commercial vehicles.

The A1 and A6 are the two key alternative routes for traffic along the NE.

Traffic count locations from survey and existing data were identified along the A1 and A6 to provide data on traffic operations along these roads and to also allow us to identify broadly spatially equivalent sections of road to those found on the northern expressway.

Figure 3-2 identifies these locations.



Figure 3-2: A1 and A6 Count Locations

Table 3-1 identifies the traffic composition along the A1 and A6 at these locations.

Table 3-1: A1 and A6 Traffic Composition – 2012 (All vehicle types)

No.	Road	Location	Traffic Composition (%)					
			Three Wheeler	Motor Cycle	Car	LCV	MCV	HCV
1	A1	between B161 and B214	28%	12%	36%	2.6%	20%	0.7%
2	A1	2km south of Kalagedihena WP	14%	23%	35%	3.6%	24%	1.3%
3	A1	1 km north of Nittambuwa	21%	17%	32%	3.7%	25%	1.2%
4	A1	between B127 and A19	23%	22%	30%	2.8%	21%	1.1%
5	A1	between A21 and B199	22%	21%	33%	2.8%	21%	1.1%
6	A1	between B278 and B279	21%	22%	32%	3.5%	22%	0.7%
7	A1	2km west of Kadugannawa	19%	18%	36%	3.0%	24%	1.3%
8	A6	between A1 and B539	14%	21%	33%	4.2%	27%	1.3%
9	A6	1km south of B384	13%	27%	30%	5.4%	24%	1.2%
10	A6	between B300 and B159	13%	29%	24%	5.8%	27%	1.1%
11	A6	between B610 and B346	13%	19%	22%	6.7%	37%	1.4%
12	A6	between B423 and AB24	24%	7%	24%	6.6%	37%	1.3%

Figure 3-3 and Table 3-2 identify the eligible traffic along these sections of the A1 and A6.



Figure 3-3: Average Weekday Daily Traffic Flow on A1 and A6 (Cars and Commercial Vehicles) - % = commercial vehicles

Table 3-2: A1 and A6 Traffic Composition (Northern Expressway Eligible Vehicles) – 2012

No.	Road	Location	NE Eligible Traffic Composition (%)			
			Car	LCV	MCV	HCV
1	A1	between B161 and B214	60%	4%	34%	1%
2	A1	2km south of Kalagedihena WP	55%	6%	38%	2%
3	A1	1 km north of Nittambuwa	52%	6%	40%	2%
4	A1	between B127 and A19	55%	5%	38%	2%
5	A1	between A21 and B199	57%	5%	36%	2%
6	A1	between B278 and B279	55%	6%	38%	1%
7	A1	2km west of Kadugannawa	56%	5%	37%	2%
8	A6	between A1 and B539	51%	6%	41%	2%
9	A6	1km south of B384	50%	9%	39%	2%
10	A6	between B300 and B159	41%	10%	47%	2%
11	A6	between B610 and B346	33%	10%	55%	2%
12	A6	between B423 and AB24	35%	9%	53%	2%

Travel Times – A1 & A6

Table 3-3 identifies the observed travel times along the inter-urban sections of these roads. As designated key inter-urban arterial roads these travel speeds are very low.

Table 3-3: A1 and A6 Observed Travel Time (2013 Survey) – Two Directional Average

Road	Route	Distance (km)	Average Time (min)	Average Speed (km/hr)
A1	Colombo (New Kelani Bridge/Kandy Road intersection) - Ambepussa (A1/A6 intersection)	52.4	98.9	31.8
A1	Ambepussa (A1/A6 intersection) - Kandy (A1/B027 intersection)	53.8	97.1	33.3
A6	Ambepussa (A1/A6 intersection) - Kurunegala (A6/B51 intersection)	34.5	56.7	36.5
A6	Kurunegala (A6/B51 intersection) - Dambulla (A6/A9 intersection)	55.8	82.8	40.5

Traffic Growth

The AWDT traffic growth from 2012 to 2016 along the A1 and A6 was forecast to grow by up to 44% (9.5% per year) for cars and by up to 63% (13% per year) for commercial vehicles, particularly close to the major urban centres, decreasing the further away from these centres. Table 3-4 provides a snap shot view of traffic growth as identified at the nominated locations. This confirms the complex nature of traffic flows along these roads and how local trips play a large part in the composition of traffic at any point.

Overall, the projected growth will see the aforementioned congestion and associated slow travel speeds are only get worse along the A1, A6 and other roads, especially in and around urban centres.

Table 3-4: A1 and A6 Forecasted Traffic Volumes (Cars and Commercial Vehicles)

No.	Road	Location	Traffic Growth between 2012 and 2016 (%)		
			Car	CV	Total
1	A1	between B161 and B214	36%	63%	47%
2	A1	2km south of Kalagedihena WP	28%	33%	30%
3	A1	1 km north of Nittambuwa	3%	32%	17%
4	A1	between B127 and A19	16%	1%	9%
5	A1	between A21 and B199	21%	8%	16%
6	A1	between B278 and B279	10%	8%	10%
7	A1	2km west of Kadugannawa	44%	6%	27%
8	A6	between A1 and B539	12%	30%	21%
9	A6	1km south of B87	12%	23%	18%
10	A6	between B300 and B159	5%	12%	9%
11	A6	between B610 and B346	11%	15%	14%
12	A6	between B423 and AB24	13%	15%	14%

Conclusions – Existing Conditions

The analysis confirmed that existing travel patterns are complex. Intuitively, one would assume that a large proportion of traffic would transfer from the A1 and A6 onto the NE. However, our analysis identified that only around half of this traffic is eligible to use the expressway, and of this traffic the vast majority are undertaking short trips within the locality. In addition, the potential benefits accrued by any increase in road space along the A1 and A6 as traffic diverts to the NE may not be realised as this road space is likely to be taken up by the general growth in traffic across the study area and diversion of traffic from nearby B class roads onto the A1 and A6.

Therefore, a significant change in the socio-economic profile of the study area and country in general would need to occur to see a change in current travel patterns to illicit a high demand in traffic volumes willing to use the expressway.

3.1.2 Develop a Suitable Traffic Forecasting Model to Undertake the Analysis

A review of existing traffic models within Sri Lanka and the requirements of the project to develop a robust traffic analysis to allow an investment decision to be made resulted in the decision to develop of a Project Model using a commercial software package. Based on the strategic nature of the project, the quality of the data available and the need to create a model legacy that can be used and developed over time it was decided to use the modelling software package Cube Voyager. This is a widely used commercial package throughout the world.

This model developed for this project is identified as the Northern Expressway Strategic Traffic Model (NESTM).

Cube Voyager provides an industry standard strategic level 4-step model. The four steps represent Trip Generation, Trip Distribution, Mode Choice and Assignment. These steps are now briefly explained:

1. **Trip Generation** – calculates by trip purpose the number of trips produced and attracted to traffic zones within the model. Trips are usually determined by the land use, household demographics and other socio-economic factors.

2. **Trip Distribution** – spreads the trips by zone (from Trip Generation so they have an origin and destination). The travel cost is normally applied as the impedance to undertake the trip which results in shorter trips being more favoured over longer ones.
3. **Mode Choice** - allocates each trip to a mode. Each trip is associated with a cost generally based on time, distance, tolls and parking costs for cars while fares, wait times, in-vehicle time, boarding penalties etc. are used for public transport. The total cost is then fed into a mode choice model (logit) to assign a proportion of demand to each mode.
4. **Assignment** - allocates the route taken for each trip by mode. For highway trips, characteristics of that route, number of lanes, connection with the wider road network, where the travel demand is going to and from and so forth will help determine the 'attractiveness' of each route for each trip.

In the case of this project where only the highway assignments was required, the third step (Mode Choice) was removed and the preceding two steps only relate to highway demand i.e. vehicle trips (as opposed to person trips).

The Northern Expressway Strategic Traffic Model is a 3-Step strategic model as the focus is on the highway assignment along the Northern Expressway.

The first step in developing a project model was to establish and validate the performance of a base case model. 2012 is the base case year for the Project Model. In this case the available data to compare the model performance against observed conditions was obtained from traffic counts and travel time surveys. Validation of the model occurs by comparing modelled traffic volumes along a link with observed volumes provided from traffic counts; and by comparing modelled travel times with observed travel times. If the modelled volumes are within acceptable bounds of the observed volumes, then the model can be seen as predicting representative traffic demand. If the travel time is within acceptable bounds as well, then the model is accurately reflecting the real life delay experienced by road users traversing the network in the given time periods. Thus the model can be deemed as being fit for purpose and so can be reliably used to forecast alternate scenarios and future year options.

Two key aspects in developing the model were to establish a study area and obtain all of the necessary data.

3.1.3 Study Area

Defining a study area is based around achieving a balance between using too small a study area where there is a danger that not all of the relevant data will be captured against using too large an area which can result in wasted time collecting data that is not relevant.

The study area used here defines the extent of the detailed assessment and collection of data on transport infrastructure, travel patterns and demographic data. It is based on incorporating an area where existing and likely future travel patterns will influence and be influenced by the development of the expressway. Therefore, key destinations such as Colombo metropolitan urban area, Gampaha, Kandy, Kurunegala, Trincomalee and Anuradhapura are included along with major roads such as the A1, A6, A9 and A10.

As the project was undertaken in two phases, as identified in Figure 3-4 below, the initial study area, stretching from Colombo to Kandy and Kurunegala was later extended to include Dambulla, Anuradhapura and Trincomalee to the north.




Figure 3-4: Study Area: Phases 1 and 2 of Project

Integral to identifying the study area is the need to establish a traffic zoning system. A zone is a spatial area from which demographic and land use data is represented. The zone acts a generator of trips (origin) and a place where trips of attracted to (destination).

The study area boundary and traffic zoning system within the study area needed to reflect an administrative boundary which defines a data source. There are four levels of government administration that data is reported upon, Provincial (9), District (25), Divisional Secretary's Divisions

(DSD) and Grama Niladharis (GN). The DSD was identified as being the most appropriate in terms of size and availability of data and was used as the basis for the traffic zones within the study area.

NESTM includes 187 internal and 29 external traffic zones across the Phase 1 and Phase 2 study area. The coverage and zone system of the traffic model are shown in Figure 3-5.




Figure 3-5: NESTM Model Coverage and Zone System (Phase 1 & 2) - DSD by Districts

3.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis

In standard industry practice a historical set of classified counts, journey to work, travel time, household travel survey and other data is available as reference. However, in this case much of this data was unavailable and as such data was collected from a variety of sources including:

- Commissioned surveys
- Purchase and review of existing data sets
- Consultation and on-site surveys by the traffic team

Commissioned Surveys

An extensive program of surveys was commissioned. These were:

- **Origin Destination and Manual Classified Counts.** 72 Surveys sites were identified for origin and Destination (OD) and Manual Classified Counts (MCC).
- **Travel Time Surveys.** 18 survey routes with over 100 surveys were conducted using a GPS logger that recorded the time taken and the speed of the vehicle.
- **Freight Surveys.** Twenty nine freight forwarding companies and major businesses where transport plays a major part of their everyday business activities located within the Phase 1 study area were identified for survey. Face to face surveys were organised and data was collected through a structured questionnaire. For Phase 2, 150 companies were initially contacted by telephone to identify the nature of their business and its relevance to this project of which 40 were selected for the more detailed face-to-face surveys. In addition, the original 29 companies were also contacted again.

Purchase and Review of Existing Data Sets

Road Network

Data bases from the RDA and the University of Moratuwa were obtained and reviewed. However, the data set was incomplete and extensive updates were required by the traffic team. Therefore, this data was supplemented by a program of site inspections and road video surveys.

Demographic Data Collection

A data set for each of the DSD traffic zones was collected. This identified:

- Resident population Number of households
- Number of students enrolled
- Number of private vehicles (cars) registered
- Employment by classified type

Existing employment was distributed manually within each DSD using land use mapping commissioned from Image Scientific (Pvt) Ltd through the Department of Planning and Policy, data from the Department of Labour, the census, local knowledge and assumptions over travel patterns and behaviour based around a relatively short commuter pattern from home to work.

Future year land use forecasts were identified for 2016, 2021, 2026 and 2036.

A number of growth areas identified in the National Physical Planning Policy & Plan as prepared by the National Physical Planning Department, Ministry of Construction, Engineering Services, Housing

and Common Amenities were located within the study area. Very little information on the demographic profile of these growth areas was provided by this department outside of the general intent on their potential size, location and role. Based on existing land use densities and form identified from the 2001 and 2011 census and land use mapping data potential demographic profiles were identified for the traffic zones where these growths areas were located in the National Plan.

The following assumptions applied to determining future employment and population growth:

- Annual growth rates will progressively slowdown in the long term future
- Average household size will gradually reduce in the future
- Vehicles per household will gradually increase in the future
- Employment: population rate will gradually increase in the future
- Total population and employment growth within the study area was balanced against the projected growth rate for that date period

Figure 3-6 identifies the growth centre identified within the study area.




Figure 3-6: Growth Centres located within the Study Area

3.1.5 Future Year Assessment & Modelling Scenarios

As identified under Section 3.1.2 prior to undertaking future year assessment it was important to obtain a robust base year (2012) model.

Model Validation

The model was calibrated to 2012 daily average weekday conditions. The validation data sets used were the observed daily counts (all factored to represent 2012 average weekday daily volumes) as identified at the model screenlines and the travel time surveys (the A1 and A6). The screenline validation indicates whether the right amount of demand is moving within the model, while the travel time surveys indicate whether the right amount of delay on average is occurring within the model.

The locations of these screenlines are identified in Figure 3.7.




Figure 3-7: Project Screenlines

A screenline is a conceptual line within the study area representing a strategically important location such as natural features, administrative boundaries or the boundary of the study area. The aggregate and individual collection of observed traffic count volumes along these screenlines are compared against modelled volumes for the same year period to determine if the right level of demand is moving past this imaginary line. This forms a key component of validating a strategic transport model.

The Northern Expressway Strategic Traffic Model is a mixture of rural and urban areas. Thus the initial focus of the validation was at a district level, due to the large differences in trips (land use) within each district. Reviews were conducted at the screenline level, for individual counts and for travel time. The focus in providing a fit for purpose model was therefore centred around generating the right level of demand in the various regions.

The final fit (for all user-classes) for the given screenlines is provided in Figure 3-8. Although there are some differences overall all screenlines provide an acceptable fit. Differences are due to a number of reasons particular to that site. For example, as mentioned above, the model covers both urban and rural areas and the study area is large. Thus, screenlines 1, 2 and 4 (Colombo and Gampaha regions) contains many trips that are short in nature and would not appear within the model, i.e. intra-zonal; as such these trips are not relevant to the main focus of the model. Screenline 6 contains a count near Yakkala. The count (in context with other adjacent counts and the screenline itself) shows that it is likely that many local trips had to be recorded at the count site in order to produce such a large count. These trips are also intra-zonal in nature and again are not assigned to the network.

A 'modelled versus observed' scatter plot of all count sites for those screenlines is provided in Figure 3-9.

In order to show an acceptable fit, the scatter should be centred around the $y=x$ line. This plot shows this to be the case, indicating there is no inherent bias in the results and that the model is performing suitably.

Figure 3-10 and Figure 3-11 display the travel time performance along the designated routes.

- Route 1 - A1 between Colombo (New Kelani Bridge/Kandy Road intersection) and Kandy (A1/B027 intersection).
- Route 2 - A6 between Ambepussa (A1/A6 intersection) and Dambulla (A6/A9 intersection).

The maximum and minimum travel times are also displayed in these plots to show the variation in travel times within the network. As can be seen in the plots, the model performs well on most roads with regards to replicating average travel times across the majority of the network.




Figure 3-8: Screenline Modelled vs. Observed (All User-Classes combined)




Figure 3-9: Modelled vs. Observed (All User-Classes combined) by Count Site (Line - Y=X)




Figure 3-10: Travel Time Results (Route 1)




Figure 3-11: Travel Time Results

Assessment Time Frames

The project Terms of Reference (TOR) identified a 20 year assessment period. 2016 was identified as a practical reference year for project opening. Assessment timeframes were identified at 5 year increments to 2036. However, following a review of available data it became clear that after 2026 confidence levels on likely future road networks and land use patterns were low with very little robust planning or committed works for this time period. It was therefore decided that the assessment time period of 2031 did not add any value to the project and as such was omitted.

The assessment time periods were therefore:

- 2012
- 2016
- 2021
- 2026
- 2036

Model Runs by Stage by Date

The following modelling options by expressway stage and date period were undertaken for this phase of the assessment.

Table 3-5: Model Runs by Stage and Date Period

Years	2012	2016	2021	2026	2036
Base Case	•				
Do Minimum		•	•	•	•
1		•	•	•	•
1,2		•	•	•	•
1,2,3		•	•	•	•
1,2,3,4		•	•	•	•
1,2,4		•	•	•	•
1,3		•	•	•	•

- Base case represents current modelled traffic patterns on local roads within the study area. If these are shown to adequately reflect observed patterns then the model can be deemed to be fit for purpose.
- Do-minimum identifies a reference case date period without the NE in place.
- Stage 1 - Enderamulla to Ambepussa.
- Stage 2 – Meerigama to Pellandeniya (intersection with A10 near Kurunegala).
- Stage 3 – Ambepussa to Kandy. (intersection with A10 north of Kandy)
- Stage 4 - Pellandeniya to Dambulla

All options were tested across all assessment time frames. Although in practical constructability terms full project development at 2016 or even 2021 was unlikely these model runs provided data on all possible staging options.

Do Minimum - 2016

The do-minimum was modelled for all assessment years under the following model parameters:

- Medium land use growth profile
- All improved road connections, as proposed by SMEC, in place
- All road upgrades as proposed by the RDA, in place, as appropriate for that assessment year (note upgrades for 2021 are replicated at 2026 and 2036)
- Value of Time (VoT), Vehicle operating Costs (VOC), Commercial Vehicle (CV) growth rates as used for Scenario 3

Model Runs by Scenario

A range of possible socio-economic development profiles that would generate differing traffic volumes on the NEP were identified. These were:

1. Conservative
2. Improved Connections
3. Mid-way
4. GDP linked CV growth – toll on NE
 - 4A. GDP linked CV growth – No toll on NE
5. Ultimate Development

The **Conservative** scenario represents a situation where current travel behaviour and economic activity does not significantly change.

Improved Connections reports on the benefits that improved access onto the NE, in particular a direct connection to the Kelani bridge area and onto the port affords.

Mid-Way introduces the effects of changes to travel behaviour that occur through increases in Value of Time where the needs of a road user in reaching a destination quicker is perceived to be higher and as such they are willing to pay a toll to achieve this time saving.

GDP linked CV growth – toll identifies further changes in travel behaviour and economic activity with a higher a growth in the number of commercial vehicles as it is linked to a projected annual national GDP rather than the lower growth value of employment. The 4A **no-toll subset** provides a sensitivity test on the effect of a no toll expressway.

The **Ultimate Development** scenario represents a future year case where travel behaviour and economic activity have significantly altered due to much increased economic activity across all variables and a low toll rate on the NE.

Table 3-6 lists the scenarios tested.

Table 3-6: Scenarios Tested

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local road network, port and expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
1. Conservative (SC2)	M	None	M (original)	M	linked to land use growth
2. Improved connection (ST2_1)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NE – all in	M (original)	M	linked to land use growth
3. Midway (ST2_2)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NE – all in	New medium Value	M	linked to land use growth
4. GDP linked CV growth (ST2_3)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NE – all in	New medium Value	M	GDP linked to growth
4A. Scenario 4 - No Toll (ST2_4)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NE – all in	New medium Value	No Toll	GDP linked to growth
5. Ultimate Development (ST2_5)	H	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NE – all in	H +20% to new Medium	L	GDP linked to growth

Notes:

Land Use

M= Medium

H = High

Land use data identified by the Sri Lankan government

Connections

Hypothetical road upgrades or new road links as identified by SMEC

Value of Time

Scenarios 1 and 2 adopted a Medium VoT derived from Sri Lankan data. Scenarios 3 onwards identify a new medium value based identified by the Economics team with sensitivity testing of +/- 20% for low and high

CV Generation Rates

The number of commercial vehicle traffic movements and the growth in these were initially related to the growth in overall employment for Scenarios 1 and 2. Based on World Bank and other research this was linked to the country's GDP growth for Scenarios 3 onwards as identified by the Economics team

It is outside the scope of this report to model all of the possible changes to the socio-economic development profile. For example, although we model medium or high land use (population and employment) growth this is based on existing urban areas or proposed growth centres. However, they do provide a range of plausible outcomes for consideration.

Full details around model set are provided in Appendix A – Traffic and Tolling Analysis Report.

3.2 Economic Analysis

A cost-benefit analysis was undertaken to determine the economic justification of the Northern Expressway Project. A separate economic evaluation report, undertaken by Deloitte, has been prepared outlining the full details underpinning the cost-benefit analysis. The Economic Evaluation of the Northern Expressway Project Report is provided in Appendix C.

3.2.1 Approach

Cost-benefit analysis is a method of measuring and evaluating the relative merits of public expenditure based on sound economic principles. Project justification is measured as economic

worth to society. To evaluate a project a cost-benefit analysis compares the costs of the project to the community (including the road agency) to deliver and sustain it with its benefits to the community, ideally over the entire project lifetime. If overall benefits are demonstrated to exceed the expected costs, the project is considered economically viable.

Cost-benefit analysis has a consistent approach and methodology that can be applied to all road projects thus enabling projects or project-elements to be compared. The method applies monetary values to a project to ensure a robust measure of the economic costs and benefits. This creates a degree of transparency and comparability for the decision maker when considering competing alternatives for funding.

This evaluation uses a cost-benefit analysis framework for transport projects that is well established internationally. This approach applies a measurement of the economic cost to road users that are incurred when a trip is undertaken. As there is no real market for road expenditure (with a few exceptions such as toll roads), consumers are not able to register their preferences as they would in a competitive market. In this sense there is no effective market force which can be used to indicate the amount or frequency of road investment. In the absence of these market forces, cost-benefit analysis provides a framework to consider whether proposed allocations of resources are optimal.

The evaluation follows standard methodologies for assessing projects of this nature. These include:

- World Bank (2005) “Notes on the Economic Evaluation of Transport Projects” and the “Handbook on Economic Analysis of Investment Operations” (1996).
- Asian Development Bank (1997) “Guidelines for the Economic Analysis of Projects”.
- Australian Transport Council (ATC, 2006) “National Guidelines for Transport System Management in Australia” Volume 3 and Volume 5.
- Austroads (2005) “Guide to Project Evaluation”.

Based on our experience of undertaking economic evaluations in different jurisdictions, these various approaches are generally consistent with each other, albeit for a few minor issues. For the purposes of this evaluation, the World Bank guidelines will have precedence. It is proposed that any significant differences in assumptions or approach will be discussed and agreed with the project team. The impact of potential differences in input assumptions will be tested in the sensitivity analysis.

3.2.2 Steps in Methodology

A cost-benefit analysis approach is used to estimate the economic worth of the project. The methodology involves the following steps:

1. Defining the project objectives and scope
2. Defining the project options which form the basis of the economic evaluation
3. Defining the base case against which the project options are compared
4. Identifying the incremental costs and benefits that might be expected in moving from the base case to each of the options
5. Undertake traffic modelling of the options
6. Identifying and agreeing the core parameters of the evaluation (e.g. time scale, base year for prices to calculate present dollar values, discount rate)
7. Where possible, quantifying the costs and benefits over the expected lifecycle and discounting future values to express them in current equivalent values

8. Building the CBA model using discounted cash flow techniques over the evaluation period and generating performance measures including:
 - Net Present Value (NPV)
 - Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR)
 - Internal rate of return (IRR)
 - First year rate of return (FYRR)
9. Testing the sensitivity of these performance measures to changes in the underlying assumptions utilised
10. Ranking the options according to Net Present Value per unit of capital Invested (NPVI) to determine which option represents the best performing in value for money terms.

3.2.3 Base Case and Project Case

The economic evaluation compares the proposed upgrade options against a base case. The specification of the base case is especially important in estimating project benefits, which in most cases, are calculated in incremental terms (i.e. project case minus the base case).

It is important to determine a realistic base or 'without project' case to accurately assess the merits of the project options. If the base case is over specified it will involve additional costs of infrastructure provision but will reduce the relative merit of the project options and reduce the benefits that would otherwise contribute to a positive outcome in the evaluation.

Conversely, if the base case is underspecified it could make the base case overly pessimistic in terms of congestion and capacity constraints which would result in an overly optimistic estimation of the incremental benefits of the project case in the evaluation. This would lead to an inefficient use of capital in that project implementation would occur before its optimal timing.

Base Case

The base case is defined as the case where the project is not implemented. Consequently, it includes ongoing maintenance and rehabilitation of current road assets, with an allowance for committed network enhancements.

Project Case

The project case is defined as the development of the Northern Expressway Project (NEP).

3.2.4 Traffic Modelling For the Economic Evaluation

Levels of travel demand and their forecasts are crucial to the economic viability of infrastructure projects. The key outputs from the traffic model that are used in the cost-benefit analysis are VHT and VKT. The traffic modelling results were produced for each origin-destination pair in the defined network. Results were produced for the base case and project case.

The results of the traffic modelling for the base case are shown in Table 3-7.

In the cost-benefit analysis, VKT was only calculated on those trips that are made using the expressway. This is to capture the VOC and accident benefits of those trips that divert from existing roads to the expressway. This is because we expect VOC and accident costs to be the same for those trips that remain on the existing network. Trips that divert to the expressway will benefit from a better quality (i.e. lower VOCs) and safer road (i.e. less accidents).

The main traffic assumption used in the economic evaluation is that commercial vehicle growth is linked to GDP growth.

Table 3-7: Base Case Traffic Modelling Results - Daily

	Unit	2016	2021	2026	2036
Demand					
Car – Private	trips	563,233	611,839	659,216	746,378
Car – Business	trips	85,945	94,389	103,062	119,252
LCV	trips	53,497	69,256	89,342	145,328
MCV	trips	247,231	321,003	415,221	677,448
HCV	trips	13,836	17,984	23,291	38,070
VHT					
Car – Private	.hours	589,816	720,334	970,748	2,291,896
Car – Business	hours	73,051	90,709	124,683	311,521
LCV	hours	55,913	78,264	118,876	353,057
MCV	hours	329,208	461,512	703,804	2,190,209
HCV	hours	19,291	27,329	42,628	140,116

Source: SMEC, GDP linked CV growth

The results of the traffic modelling for the project case (overall Northern Expressway project) are shown in Table 3-8.

Table 3-8: Project Case Traffic Modelling Results - Daily

	Unit	2016	2021	2026	2036
Demand					
Car – Private	trips	563,233	611,839	659,216	746,378
Car – Business	trips	85,945	94,389	103,062	119,252
LCV	trips	53,497	69,256	89,342	145,328
MCV	trips	247,231	321,003	415,221	677,448
HCV	trips	13,836	17,984	23,291	38,070
VKT					
Car – Private	km	504,429	625,446	775,264	1,356,897
Car – Business	km	204,876	261,157	362,392	697,385
LCV	km	75,882	102,340	144,133	295,712
MCV	km	1,514,443	2,010,079	2,796,582	5,215,643
HCV	km	176,608	236,158	323,966	582,072
VHT					
Car – Private	hours	555,710	703,713	916,847	2,008,714
Car – Business	hours	68,099	89,142	117,785	271,329
LCV	hours	52,959	76,610	112,912	311,494
MCV	hours	300,955	440,454	649,428	1,860,754
HCV	hours	16,917	25,367	37,974	115,573

Source: SMEC, GPD linked CV growth

Note: VKT only relates to 'diverted' trips on to the expressway, while the demand values relate to total trips in the study area.

The traffic modelling results used in the economic evaluation for all sections are detailed in the Economic Evaluation Report. For further information on the assumptions that underpin the traffic modelling, please refer to the Traffic and Tolling Analysis Report in Appendix A.

3.2.5 Costs

The conversion from financial to economic costs, is carried out by separating general costs into foreign and domestic components, removing the tax and duty element from domestic and foreign costs and applying a shadow exchange rate factor (SERF) to the foreign component only. The conversion steps are summarised below:

1. Separate costs into foreign and local currency.
2. Calculate shadow price factors to remove tax and duties.
3. Calculate shadow exchange rate factor to account for exchange rate distortions.
4. Adjust foreign costs by shadow price factors and shadow exchange rate factor and adjust domestic costs by shadow price factors.

When the tax and duty elements are removed from construction costs and the various shadow pricing is applied, the resulting financial to economic conversion is as shown in the table below.

Table 3-9: Conversion from Financial to Economics Costs – Capital Costs Undiscounted

	Financial costs (\$m)	Economic costs (\$m)	Factor
Stage 1	1,190	1,004	0.844
Stage 2	757	639	0.844
Stage 3	890	752	0.844
Stage 4	1,040	877	0.844
Total	3,877	3,272	0.844

Source: SMEC cost estimate, Deloitte calculations

The overall resulting conversion from financial cost for capital is a factor of 0.844. A breakdown by cost item is shown in the table below.

Table 3-10: Conversion from Financial to Economics Costs by Capital Cost Item - Undiscounted

	Financial Costs (\$m)	Economic Costs (\$m)	Factor
Government Project Management	36	32	0.880
Land Acquisition	135	119	0.880
Consultant Supervision	55	49	0.893
Detailed Design	36	32	0.893
Establishment and Management	340	306	0.899
Public Utility Adjustments	110	97	0.880
Earthworks and Drainage	1,150	981	0.853
Structures and Tunnels	850	712	0.838
Pavements	555	453	0.817
Furniture and Miscellaneous	210	165	0.787
Tolling and ITC Systems	125	95	0.761
Contingency	275	232	0.842
Total	3,877	3,272	0.844

Source: SMEC cost estimate, Deloitte calculations

Next, the same process is applied to operating costs. The resulting financial to economic conversion is as shown in the table below.

Table 3-11: Conversion from Financial to Economics Costs – Operating Costs Undiscounted

	Financial Costs (\$m)	Economic Costs (\$m)	Factor
Stage 1	640	531	0.830
Stage 2	550	457	0.831
Stage 3	609	505	0.830
Stage 4	633	525	0.830
Stage 1	640	531	0.830

Source: SMEC cost estimate, Deloitte calculations

The overall resulting conversion from financial costs for operations is a factor of 0.830. A breakdown by cost item is shown in the table below.

Table 3-12: Conversion from Financial to Economics Costs by Operating Cost Item – Undiscounted

Operating	Financial Costs (\$m)	Economic Costs (\$m)	Factor
Government Project Management	120	106	0.880
Toll Cash Collection	98	82	0.842
ETC Toll Processing Fees	24	21	0.872
Support Services	308	260	0.847
Routine Maintenance	690	563	0.816
Pavement Rehabilitation	736	603	0.819
Contingency	456	384	0.842
Total	2,431	2,019	0.830

Source: SMEC cost estimate, Deloitte calculations

3.2.6 Benefits

The benefits of the NEP will primarily be concerned with transport system benefits. These benefits include changes in the cost of travel for road users. The economic benefits (savings) are measured in terms of the value of vehicle operating costs, travel time costs, and crash savings.

VOC

Vehicle operating costs (VOC) are the costs associated with the running of a motor vehicle. Vehicle operating costs are made up of fuel, oil, tyre, repair and maintenance and interest and depreciation costs.

Unit vehicle operating costs, measured in rupees per kilometre has been calculated using results from previous studies. The unit vehicle operating costs for cars and commercial vehicles is shown in Table 3-13. These prices are in economic terms and exclude all taxes and excises.

Table 3-13: Perceived Vehicle Operating Costs (US/km) – 2012 Prices

Road Class	Car	Commercial
Class A	30.65	53.04
Expressway	27.23	44.35

Source: Original data sourced from the SMEC traffic modeling team

The above border prices are converted into the world currency using the official exchange rate¹. Therefore, the economic value of time in the world currency used in the cost-benefit analysis is shown in Table 3-14.

Table 3-14: Perceived Vehicle Operating Costs (\$US/km) – 2012 Prices

Road Class	Car	Commercial
Class A	\$0.24	\$0.42
Expressway	\$0.21	\$0.35
Benefit (%)	13%	17%

Source: Deloitte calculations

¹ No further adjustment for the shadow exchange rate factor is made as domestic prices are not distorted by the exchange rate. We assume that only the foreign component of tradeable goods is distorted by the exchange rate.

Travel Time Cost Savings

There is currently no endorsed unit value of time for road project evaluation in Sri Lanka. Deloitte has estimated value of time for private and business trips. The economic value of time in the world currency used in the cost-benefit analysis is shown in Table 3-15.

Table 3-15: Economic Value of Time by Vehicle Type and Trip Purpose

Vehicle Type and Trip Purposes	Economic Prices Rupees Per Hour	Economics Prices – \$US Per Hour
Car – business	592 Rs/hr	\$4.64/hr
Car – private	237 Rs/hr	\$1.86/hr
Light Commercial	103 Rs/hr	\$0.81/hr
Medium Commercial	1,162 Rs/hr	\$9.11/hr
Heavy Commercial	4,261 Rs/hr	\$33.40/hr

3.2.7 Accidents

Significant research has been conducted in developed nations to establish the value of a statistical life (VSL). However, there is limited information for developing nations. The two main ways used to establish crash cost values are the human capital method and the willingness-to-pay method. Due to a lack of information and the inability to conduct willingness-to-pay surveys to determine the value of life, the rule of thumb method developed by the International Road Assessment Programme (iRAP) has been used.

This method utilises data from countries which have previously conducted willingness-to-pay calculations combined with the relationship between the value of a statistical life and gross domestic product (GPD) per capita. The rule of thumb method uses the following formula:

$$\text{VSL} = 70 \times \text{GDP/capita}$$

GDP per capita data in 2012 is estimated at Rs 339,219 which results in a VSL of Rs 23,745,323 . These values are then converted into the world currency using the official exchange rate². Therefore the value of life has been estimated at \$186,092.

Given the lack of appropriate data to estimate an accident rate, we have adopted accidents rates used by the University of Moratuwa (2012). The accident rates used in the cost-benefit analysis are shown in Table 3-16.

Table 3-16: Accident Rate (per mVKT)

Accident Rate (accidents per mVKT)	
Base case – A Class roads	0.12
Project case – Expressways	0.05
Reduction in fatal accidents	0.07

Source: University of Moratuwa (2012) "Feasibility Study to Connect Padeniya to an Appropriate Location on the Expressway Network"

² iRAP (2009) "Road crashes result in a lot of pain and suffering, but they also have an economic cost" and "Road crashes result in a lot of pain and suffering, but they also have an economic cost" website <http://toolkit.irap.org/default.asp?page=management&id=1> last accessed 31/05/2013.

² From the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2012) "and adjusted for inflation to convert to 2012 prices.

² No further adjustment for the SERF is made as domestic prices are not distorted by the exchange rate. We assume that only the foreign component of tradeable goods is distorted by the exchange rate.

The savings in the economic costs of accidents is based on the VKTs diverted from the base case network to the NEP.

3.2.8 Rehabilitation Cost Deferral

The delivery of the NEP will enable some rehabilitation costs on the existing road network to be deferred. Our assumption is that the reduction in traffic on the existing network may enable deferral of rehabilitation works by 2 years.

The average costs for rehabilitation works on A class roads is based on the data provided by SMEC on the Northern Road Connectivity Project (NRCP). The average rehabilitation costs for the NRCP are around Rs 72.8 million rupees or around US\$500k per kilometre when converted into economic terms at the world price.

For the cost-benefit analysis we have assumed that these rehabilitation costs can be deferred by two years if the Northern Expressway project is built (with rehab occurring every ten years). Therefore the rehabilitation costs remain the same, however there is a benefit in present value terms by deferring the rehabilitation expenditure. We assume that all other recurrent costs remain the same.

Rehabilitation costs are shown in Table 3-17.

Table 3-17: Rehabilitation Costs on the Existing A Class Roads

Stages	KMs	Rehabilitation Costs (every ten years)
Stage 1	52	\$26.2 million
Stage 2	38	\$19.1 million
Stage 3	46	\$23.1 million
Stage 4	61	\$30.7 million

Source: provided by SMEC, Deloitte calculations

3.3 Financial Analysis and Delivery Model Assessment

A financial analysis was undertaken to determine the financial viability of the proposed Northern Expressway Project. A separate financial analysis report, undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers, has been prepared outlining the full details underpinning the financial analysis. The Northern Expressway Financial Analysis Report is provided in Appendix D.

3.3.1 Approach

The purpose of the financial analysis was to assess alternative options for the design, delivery and financing of the NEP. The financial analysis was structured into two separate stages:

- An assessment of the relative financial affordability to Government of alternative stages or combinations of stages of the NEP, and
- An assessment of the potential value for money to Government from alternative delivery models involving private sector financing, or Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).

The core of the analysis was a quantitative assessment applying discounted cashflow (or DCF) methodology to forecasts for the nominal net cashflow outcomes for Government. This DCF approach supports direct comparison of the relative financial value or cost to Government of alternative scenarios for the NEP.

The analysis also included a high level qualitative assessment of alternative delivery models. The quantitative analysis results provide an estimate of potential value, but these estimates are only as

reliable as the key assumption data utilised in the calculations. In recognition of this, it is important that appropriate weight is given to qualitative aspects of the analysis of alternative project options.

Apart from potential Value Added Tax (VAT) receipts associated with toll payments from road users, the financial analysis did not include the potential impacts of other taxes on the project. This approach was based on:

- A general expectation that the whole-of-Government impact of various direct or indirect taxes affecting project activities would be broadly neutral to estimated project affordability (e.g. any change to the estimated project costs arising from tax obligations would be broadly matched by an offsetting change to tax receipts for Government), and
- Uncertainty around the tax position and investment structuring strategies (e.g. tax minimisation options) which may apply to potential private sector investors for a PPP option.

The methodology and results of the affordability and delivery model analysis are based on key assumptions applied and information reasonably available at the time of the assessment. Changes or additions to these assumptions or information may change the estimated values or conclusions, perhaps materially.

Further information on the analysis methodology and key assumptions applied in the financial analysis is provided in Appendix D.

For the purposes of the financial analysis, we adopted the following traffic scenarios for toll revenue estimation:

- traffic scenario 1 (Conservative) – ‘downside’ or lower revenue outcome
- traffic scenario 4 (GDP linked CV growth – tolled) – ‘base case’ or expected revenue outcome
- traffic scenario 5 (Ultimate) – ‘upside’ or upper revenue outcome.

Other scenarios developed by the traffic and tolling analysis were not investigated as a part of the financial analysis as they produced revenue outcomes which were within the range of revenue outcomes of the three traffic scenarios above.

The general analysis logic, including the application of key inputs and cashflows is illustrated in the following diagram. This highlights the general distinction between the two stages of the quantitative assessment.




Figure 3-12: Approach to Quantitative Assessment of Affordability and Delivery Models

3.3.2 Definition of Delivery Models

Three primary delivery models were identified to present a relatively wide range of alternative commercial and financial outcomes. Each model was considered in relatively generic form, but in practice would require specific customisation to the requirements and characteristics of the NEP. These primary delivery model options, and sub-options where relevant, are summarised in the following table.

Table 3-18: Delivery and Financing Options Assessed

Primary Option	Sub Option	Description	Purpose
Traditional delivery	Budget finance	Assumes all project cashflows immediately accrue to the public budget	Examines raw cashflow profile for Government without consideration of public financing strategies
	Public debt finance ¹	Assumes various options for public debt financing of project capital costs	Examines impact to public budget of public debt financing options
Service Payment PPP	No upfront contributions	Assumes private sector finances all allocated capital costs	Identifies service payment funding necessary to support full private finance
	Upfront Government contribution	Assumes additional public budget contributions to reduce required private sector financing	Identifies upfront public financing necessary to moderate service payment funding requirements
Economic PPP	Hybrid	Service payments from Government are made to 'top up' toll revenues	Identifies 'top up' funding to toll revenues necessary to support full private finance

Note 1: This sub-option reflects an assessment of potential options for Government to finance its forecast expenditure requirements under a traditional delivery model rather than being a true alternative delivery model.

Traditional Delivery Model

The traditional delivery model is intended to proxy for the most likely delivery method which would be adopted by Government to deliver the NEP in the absence of private financing or PPP delivery strategies. The affordability assessment is based on a traditional delivery of the NEP, reflecting the expected financial cost (or benefit) of procurement and delivery of the project infrastructure and services over the entirety of the project life and on a 'whole-of-Government' basis.

A traditional delivery structure entails financing and ownership of the NEP by Government. The NEP would be delivered through a Design & Construct or a Design, Construct and Maintain style of contract (or a variation on these structures), with Government entering into various shorter term contracts for the long term operation and/or maintenance of the NEP. Through this approach, Government would retain ultimate responsibility for most major project risks.

For the affordability assessment, the financial analysis focused on a comparison of the Net Present Cost of forecasts for net Government cashflows for different project stages or options. This analysis also investigated the potential impacts to the expenditure profile for the public budget of alternative approaches to public funding of a traditional delivery (e.g. scenarios for public bonds or concessional debt from a development agency).

PPP Delivery Models

PPP delivery models can be based around a variety of financial and commercial strategies. However, as a general principle, typically Government would contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV) specifically established by the private sector to deliver the NEP infrastructure and services. The contract would be in the nature of a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer arrangement (or a variation on this structure) with the SPV assuming responsibility for specified design, construction, operation, maintenance and financing obligations over an agreed period (typically longer-term and aligned to the useful life of the initial capital investment).

For the purposes of this analysis, we investigated relatively 'vanilla' PPP models based around:

- A service payment PPP structure, and
- An economic PPP structure.

In the context of the NEP, a service payment PPP involves demand risk being predominantly retained by Government. Under this model, the private sector would finance delivery of the NEP infrastructure and services but would require a regular service payment from Government as the means of earning its return on investment, as opposed to through revenue from road user tolls. The payment of the service payments would be governed by a payment mechanism where the private sector is measured for compliance against key performance indicators. The revenue from any user tolls received by Government could partially offset the cost of its service payment obligations.

Two alternative options for the service payment model were analysed. These were essentially differentiated by whether or not Government makes an upfront financial contribution towards the private sector's construction costs as a means of reducing the amount of private sector financing required and, by extension, the size of ongoing service payments required from Government.

An economic PPP would involve an allocation to the private sector of the benefits and risks associated with road user tolls for the NEP. In other words, private sector investors assume demand risks associated with the project and directly rely upon revenues from road user tolls to fully or partially provide a return on and return of capital invested in the NEP.

Due to the relatively modest forecast value for toll revenues a 'pure' economic PPP, in the sense of private financing being predominantly supported by project revenues, was not feasible. An alternative model adopted for the purposes of the analysis reflected a hybrid of an economic PPP and a service payment PPP. This hybrid model essentially reflected a service payment model where demand risks were transferred to the private sector and toll revenues applied to reduce the level of service payment required from Government.

4 Evaluation Results

4.1 Traffic and Tolling Analysis

4.1.1 Model Outputs

The principal model outputs as reported here is average weekday traffic volumes (AWDT) on the expressway. Volumes are obviously determined on all roads within the study area and can be documented as required. However, for reporting purposes likely future year traffic volumes on the NE are identified here. Namely:

- Total two way AWDT volumes by stage, by sections of each stage (intersection to intersection), with spatially equivalent road sections of the A1 or A6, as appropriate to that stage of the NE, with all stages being in place by assessment year 2036 only, and by development profile scenario, in A3 mapping form.

Vehicles

Reporting is only on volumes of vehicles permitted to use the Northern Expressway, namely private cars and commercial vehicles and identifies the total two way, midblock as relevant to that road link or stage on the NE.

Modelling Data - Other

For the broader financial and economic analysis data has been provided to the other assessment discipline teams for them to undertake their analysis. This has included:

- Vehicle Kilometres Travelled
- Vehicle Hours Travelled
- Toll Revenue

This data has been incorporated into assessment models used by these teams and reported in this document. To avoid any confusion the reporting of these model outcomes is not discussed under the Traffic and Tolling Analysis section.

4.1.2 Traffic Analysis - Results

A variety of scenarios based around the staged development of the expressway were modelled. This analysis has resulted in over 600 forecast year model runs being undertaken providing a wealth of data.

The tables and figure below identifies the forecasted volumes along stage links at 2036 with all stages in place for each of the scenarios with the corresponding changes along the A1 and A6. This highlights the likely maximum values for the assessment time period for each of the combinations presented for the staged development of the expressway.

Model parameters are defined in Section 3.1.5 of this report.

Scenario 1 Conservative

This scenario replicates a future year socio-economic development profile where the expressway is in place but that there has been little change in terms of existing travel behaviour and patterns from an increase in the Value of Time, greater economic activity as identified by higher CV generation and from improved road connections allowing greater accessibility to the NE.

This scenario is termed ‘conservative’ as it assumes that even over a 20 year period, with this major addition to the road network in place, this has still not changed the nature of economic development in the study area or across the country in general nor how people travel.

In terms of traffic volumes on the expressway this represents the worst case scenario with very low volumes along all sections and stages of the NE. This scenario acts as a reference case to the other 5 scenarios which assume an ever growing change in the socio-economic profile and travel behaviours within the corridor.

The model parameters adopted to replicate this scenario are identified in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1: Model Parameters – Conservative Scenario

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local roads, port and other Expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
Conservative (SC2)	M	None	M	M	linked to land use growth




Figure 4-1: NE A1 A6 NEP volumes – 1234 Conservative

Scenario 2 - Improved Connections

The purpose of this scenario is to illustrate the effects of improved accessibility to the NE resulting in higher volumes along sections, stages and in total.

A number of local road upgrades linking intersections along the expressway to key major roads such as the A1 and A6 over and above the improvements proposed as part of the intersection design were incorporated. The most significant change was the improved connection to the CKE and local roads at the Kelani bridge intersection and a dedicated port access road.

Table 4-2 identifies the model parameters assessed under this scenario.

Table 4-2: Model Parameters – Improved Connections

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local roads, port and other Expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
Conservative (SC2)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NEP	M	M	linked to land use growth

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


Figure 4-2: NEP A1 and A6 NEP Volumes - 1234 Improved Connection

Scenario 3 - Midway

As the title of this scenario suggests this scenario represents a future socio-economic profile that sits generally mid-way between the low project traffic volume produced for the Conservative Scenario and the high volume, high growth and change found in the Ultimate Development Scenario.

The change from the Improved Connection scenario is a higher Value of Time. Travel time costs are a key model determinant in replicating a drivers route choice. The higher the value of time the more attractive the NE becomes as a route choice.

Table 4-3 identifies the model parameters assessed under this scenario.

Table 4-3: Model Parameters – Midway

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local roads, port and other Expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
Conservative (SC2)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NEP	New Medium	M	linked to land use growth

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


Figure 4-3: NEP A1 and A6 NEP Volumes – 1234 Midway

Scenario 4 - GDP Linked CV Growth

The purpose of this scenario is to represent the next stage in a change in the socio-economic profile of the study area and country as a result of the NE helping to stimulate economic growth and resultant changes in travel behaviour and patterns.

A review of research undertaken on the growth of freight in developing countries, such as that undertaken by the World Bank suggests a strong link between GDP growth and that of freight vehicle traffic. Therefore, this scenario adopts the parameters of the previous Midway Scenario with the exception that the growth in commercial vehicle traffic is now linked to the higher value of GDP as opposed to the standard employment growth value.

Table 4-4 identifies the model parameters assessed under this scenario.

Table 4-4: Model Parameters – GDP Linked CV Growth

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local roads, port and other Expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
Conservative (SC2)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NEP	M	M	GDP linked to growth

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


Figure 4-4: NEP A1 and A6 NEP Volumes - 1, 2, 3 & GDP Link CV Growth - Toll

Scenario 4A - GDP Linked CV Growth - No Toll on Northern Expressway

The purpose of this scenario is that it provides a reference case to the evaluation of the tolling price and regime as discussed further in the Financial Report of this study.

This scenario is a sensitivity test of the previous GDP linked growth Scenario. The only change is that there are no tolls on the NE.

Table 4-5 identifies the model parameters assessed under this scenario.

Table 4-5: Model Parameters GDP Linked Growth – No Toll

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local roads, port and other Expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
Conservative (SC2)	M	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NEP	M	No toll	GDP linked to growth

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


Figure 4-5: NEP A1 and A6 NEP Volumes = 1234 GDP Link CV Growth - No Toll

Scenario 5 - Ultimate Development

The purpose of this scenario is to replicate a future socio-economic profile where the NE has contributed to a significant change in economic activity and travel behaviour and patterns. The potential number of traffic using the expressway is therefore at one of its highest levels although proportionally toll revenues could be lower as this scenario makes the NE as attractive as possible with a low toll option being adopted.

Table 4-6 identifies the model parameters assessed under this scenario.

Table 4-6: Model Parameters – Ultimate Development

Scenario	Land Use	Connections to local roads, port and other Expressways	VOT	Toll Price	CV generation – all areas
Conservative (SC2)	H	CKE link, Port access road, local road connections to NEP	H	low toll	GDP linked to growth

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


Figure 4-6: A1 and A6 NEP Volumes – 2034 Ultimate Development

Summary and Conclusions

The traffic analysis has identified the following two aspects of the project:

- Current traffic operations, in particular along the A1 and A6 that offer an existing alternative route to the NE and as such are not only a potential source of demand but also help demonstrate the challenges the project faces in attracting traffic.
- The performance of the NE against a range of development performance scenarios.

Existing Conditions

Travel patterns in Sri Lanka are complex with limited previous research on this matter. The work undertaken for this project has allowed a better understanding of current travel patterns to occur.

The road is not only the primary means of land based travel for passenger and freight movement within Sri Lanka and they are expected to carry more traffic as the economy develops but the road also the primary place of business. This dual purpose is reflected in the fact that irrespective of the official functional hierarchy the roads are used by a conflicting range of slow moving three-wheelers, and mopeds (on average between 40-50% of all vehicles), pedestrians, cars and commercial vehicles all trying to access services, businesses and homes located along the road throughout the day and night. This sees average travel speeds along key highways such as the A1 and A6 reach only around 35km in the inter-urban links, and below 20kms in urban areas. Intuitively, the high speed uncongested proposed NE running parallel to the A1 and A6 would be expected to attract traffic from these roads. However, eligible traffic for the NE along these roads is only approximately half of all vehicles. Car ownership, as a reflection of limited disposal household income, is very low, averaging 1 car per 10 households, and even less in the rural areas through which the NE primarily runs through. In addition, the vast majority of trips, nearly 80% in respect to the Kandy region, are within the immediate area reflecting established trip patterns.

As such, the alignment of the expressway and tolling strategy would need to maximise the potential demand. In particular, ease of accessibility to and from existing trip patterns, something the Southern Expressway does not currently achieve. Furthermore, a significant change in the socio-economic profile of the study area and country in general would need to occur to see a change in current travel patterns to generate traffic volumes on the Expressway. To explore this further 6 future year development profiles were developed.

Future Conditions

The six scenarios reflected a range of development profiles.

Table 4-7 summarises the performance of each section and stage of the expressway by development scenario at 2036 with all stages in place. As such, this identifies the maximum volumes on the expressway for each scenario.

Table 4-7: AWDT Volumes 2036, all stages, by Scenarios

Interchange	Interchange	Stage	1	2	3	4	4A	5
Enderamulla	Gampaha	1	10,610	28,250	36,170	57,490	61,140	68,290
Gampaha	Veyangoda	1	5,090	7,770	15,620	34,160	43,490	48,610
Veyangoda	Meerigama	1	6,040	7,570	15,160	31,320	43,330	47,890
Meerigama	Ambepussa	1	3,750	4,130	7,690	16,400	26,840	28,720
Meerigama	Narammala	2	5,280	6,000	11,230	22,530	36,470	36,260
Narammala	Pellandeniya	2	4,970	5,540	9,790	18,040	31,130	30,870
Ambepussa	Devalegama	3	3,100	3,380	6,410	13,530	26,160	26,370
Devalegama	Rambukkana	3	2,290	2,470	4,800	10,850	19,730	22,120
Rambukkana	Galagedara	3	2,400	2,590	4,700	11,460	19,990	21,770
Pellandeniya	Melsiripura	4	3,470	3,650	6,540	14,090	22,390	25,220
Melsiripura	Dambulla South	4	2,920	3,020	5,090	11,250	19,810	20,670
Dambulla South	Dambulla Central	4	3,400	3,430	5,820	12,150	19,520	20,630

Notes: AWDT – Average Weekday Daily Traffic, two volumes

1. Conservative
2. Improved Connections
3. Mid-way
4. GDP linked CV growth – toll on NE
- 4A GDP linked CV growth – No toll on NE
5. Ultimate Development

Scenario Performance

As one would expect the more advanced economic development profile under scenarios of 4 to 5 identify significantly more vehicles on the NE as compared to the other scenarios.

Scenario 5 - Ultimate Development - performs the best with over 68,000 vehicles (AWDT) on the Enderamulla –Gampaha section at 2036. At 2016 this section of the NE has more traffic on it than the corresponding link on the A1, the only scenario to achieve this. By 2036 stages 1, 2 & 4 carry more traffic than the corresponding links on the A1 and A6.

Conversely Scenario 1 – Conservative - is the worst performer of all the Scenarios with less than 11,000 vehicles (AWDT) on the Enderamulla –Gampaha section at 2036. This scenario reflects a future year development profile where little has changed in terms of economic activity, land use patterns and accessibility to the NE beyond standard growth trends and committed road works.

Scenario 2 – Improved Connections – demonstrates the importance of improved accessibility with the addition of local connections. With all other variables remaining the same the introduction of improved connections to key destination such as the port, northern Colombo and other local urban centres such as Gampaha and key roads has seen traffic volumes almost triple on the Enderamulla – Gampaha section at 2036 which benefits most by virtue of locations and current land use patterns.

Stage Performance

Using the criteria of volumes per stage for all staged development up to 2036 then stage 1 is the best performing stage as it is located within an existing traffic generating area and as such attracts traffic in its own right, followed by 2, 4 than 3. In addition, the significant planned population and employment growth for the national growth centres at Dambulla and Anuradhapura help to generate traffic growth along this Stage 1, 2 & 4 corridor.

Conversely, the modelled alignment of the NE for stage 3 is located north of the A1 and the existing traffic generators and attractors along that road. In addition, current planning for Kandy has constrained employment and population growth as such reducing any growth in demand.

Vehicles Using the Northern Expressway

The modelling has identified that overall commercial vehicles made up a high proportion of traffic on the expressway indicating that the main clientele that would use this road would be freight operators wishing to move goods across the country.

The high proportion of CV's also reflects the low car ownership per household, household income levels and home based work and other trip patterns. Although growth projections used in the model see a significant increase in private car ownership it is coming from a low base. Therefore, an increase in private vehicle use on the NE would take time to occur and would have to be linked to changed land use patterns and disposal household income levels.

Conclusions

The development scenarios assessed here were developed to reflect a broad spectrum of future socio- economic activity which could be plausible as is or in part, overtime. For example Scenario 1 reflects a very conservative outcome with no change in behaviour or associated development which is more likely to occur in the early assessment years whilst Scenario 5 represents a big change that one would reasonably expect to take a longer time frame to occur.

The model is testing these likely future scenarios based on limited locally available data on future economic growth patterns. For example, although government planning clearly links planned economic growth of the country with the development of a country-wide expressway network accessing a number of proposed growth centres, the detailed planning of these growth centres is not well progressed or directly related to the actual alignment of the NE. In addition, there is a limited amount of locally derived research and support data on the relationship between economic growth and generated traffic demand on new expressways such as the NE. Therefore, the data that underpins these scenarios will invariably be open to differing interpretations. However, despite these limitations the Project Traffic Model has been proven to be a robust assessment tool and the traffic analysis reported here, in conjunction with the financial and economic analysis does provide a sufficiently detailed and credible insight into likely future operations of the NE from which to progress the development planning of the project.

4.2 Economic Assessment

4.2.1 Introduction

The NEP was compared with the base case using a discounted cash flow technique on the bases of a real discount rate of 7%. Project capital expenditure is assumed to take effect from 2013 and all values are expressed in 2012 dollars. The benefits of the project were assessed over a 30 year operational period. This section of the report presents the overall project results and includes the results of the options analysis. The main CBA results are then tested for changes in the capital and operating cost estimates and the discount rate. Finally, a series of scenario tests are conducted on the key assumptions in the traffic model to measure the sensitivity of the CBA results to the traffic modelling.

4.2.2 Overall Project

Table 4-8 summarises the results of the economic evaluation for the NEP at a 7% real discount rate and indicates the results incremental to the base case. The economic evaluation results show that the overall NEP (consisting of all stages) produces a positive economic return with a NPV of \$5.2 billion and a BCR of 2.45. The largest component of benefits is savings in travel time (43%) for medium commercial vehicles. This component represents the redistribution of commercial vehicle trips as firms relocate closer to the expressway. The reduction in accidents due to improved safety conditions on the expressway as opposed to A class roads accounts for 2% or \$170.4 million of total project benefits.

Table 4-8: Northern Expressway Project Cost-Benefit Analysis Results - \$2012, 7%

CBA Results	Present Value (\$m)	Percentage Contribution (%)
BENEFITS		
		% of benefits
Travel Time Costs		
Car (private use)	2,906.5	33%
Car (commercial use)	161.2	2%
LCV	102.8	1%
MCV	3,799.3	43%
HCV	953.2	11%
Vehicle Operating Costs		
Car (private use)	68.9	1%
Car (commercial use)	32.9	0%
LCV	31.5	0%
MCV	580.3	7%
HCV	66.0	1%
Accident Costs	170.4	2%
Rehabilitation Cost Savings	9.4	0%
TOTAL	8,882.6	100%
COSTS		
		% of costs
Construction Costs	2,978.0	82%
Operating Costs	644.5	18%
TOTAL	3,622.5	100%
Decision Criteria		
NPV	5,260.1	
BCR	2.45	
IRR	13%	
FYRR	5%	

Source: Deloitte calculations based on SMEC traffic modelling (GDP linked CV growth)

4.2.3 Sensitivity testing

Sensitivity testing has been undertaken on the capital, operating costs estimates and the discount rate. The results are shown in Table 4-9 below.

Table 4-9: Northern Expressway Project Sensitivity Test Results

Sensitivity Testing	NPV	BCR	IRR
Main case	\$5.3 billion	2.45	13%
Capital costs +30%	\$4.4 billion	1.97	11%
Capital costs -30%	\$6.2 billion	3.25	15%
Operating costs +30%	\$5.1 billion	2.33	13%
Operating costs -30%	\$5.5 billion	2.59	13%
Discount rate – 4%	\$12.7 billion	4.10	13%
Discount rate – 10%	\$1.7 billion	1.51	13%
Discount rate – 15%	-\$0.8 billion	0.74	13%

Source: Deloitte calculations based on SMEC traffic modelling (GDP linked CV growth)

Given the current scope of works, the sensitivity analysis of costs shows that the cost-benefit analysis results are robust and that the project continues to be economically viable under the overall project case except when the discount rate is increased to 15%.

4.2.4 Scenario Testing

The results reported above are based on the best estimates of road user behaviour. However, different outcomes could occur in practice because of different behavioural responses by the community and changes in exogenous issues such as fuel prices, environmental concerns and the state of the economy. Consequently, the robustness of the economic evaluation results is assessed in a series of scenarios, reflecting scenario tests undertaken by SMEC. As outlined below, the scenarios examine the effect of better connections to the local road network, port and CKE, changes to the value of time and tolling.

Table 4-10: Modelling Scenarios

Scenario	Road Connections	Value of Time	Low Toll Price	CV Growth Linked to GDP
CV growth linked to GDP	✓	-	-	-
Improved	✓	Low VoT	-	-
Midway	✓	-	-	-
No Toll	✓	-	No Toll	✓

Source: Deloitte from SMEC traffic modelling scenarios

The scenarios assessed have been informed by the relative uncertainty for the outlook of these variables. The scenario test assumptions are shown below.

The value of time calculation has been informed by willingness to pay surveys and calculation based on the income approach. In practice, however, individuals may make travel decisions that do not fully perceive their value of time, or 'cost'.

Table 4-11: Scenario Test Parameters

Assumptions	Main assumption	Sensitivity
Change in commercial vehicle growth (%)	GDP growth (%)	Employment growth (%)
2012	-	-
2016	5.4%	2.0%
2021	5.4%	1.8%
2026	5.3%	1.7%
2036	5.0%	1.6%
Change in the Value of Time	VoT	Low VoT
Car – business	592 Rs/hr	466 Rs/hr
Car – private	237 Rs/hr	186 Rs/hr
Light Commercial	103 Rs/hr	844 Rs/hr
Medium Commercial	1,162 Rs/hr	844 Rs/hr
Heavy Commercial	4,261 Rs/hr	844 Rs/hr
Connecting Road Upgrades		
It was assumed in the traffic model that additional road capacities would be provided to the road links to improve accessibility between urban centres and Northern Expressway.	The following connecting road upgrades are included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A6 link to A1 from Ambepussa intersection (Stage 1) ▪ B17/B445 to A1 from Veyangoda (Stage 1) ▪ Direct link from OCH intersection to CKE (Stage 1) ▪ A33 from Gampaha intersection to A3 via Ekala (Stage 1) ▪ A10 to Kurunegala from Kurunegala intersection (Stage 2) ▪ A19 link to A1 from Devalegama intersection (Stage 3) 	
No Toll		
Travel on the Northern Expressway is free for all road users.	Rs 0	

Source: Data sourced from SMEC modelling

The results of the scenario testing are shown below. The table shows that under the ‘improved connections’ scenario, which adopts a low value of time and employment linked CV growth, the BCR is expected to fall to 0.44, making the project unviable.

Table 4-12: Northern Expressway Project Scenario Testing Results

Scenario Testing	NPV	BCR	IRR
CV growth linked to GDP	\$5.3 billion	2.45	13%
Improved connections	-\$2.0 billion	0.44	1%
Midway	-\$1.1 billion	0.70	4%
No Toll	\$7.4 billion	3.06	15%

Source: Deloitte

4.3 Financial Analysis and Delivery Model Assessment

4.3.1 Financial Affordability Assessment

The affordability assessment for the NEP was undertaken on the basis of each of four separate stages of the NEP, as well as the overall project and various combinations of stages. Key assumptions and scenarios applied in the financial analysis are outlined in Appendix D.

The following table summarises the expected values for affordability for each stage of the NEP, and the relative contribution of each stage to overall NEP affordability. It also includes the same analysis of the expected values for nominal risk-adjusted construction costs for each stage of the NEP. This indicates a strong correlation between construction cost and relative affordability between stages (except for Stage 1 which is distinguished from other stages by a relatively higher level of expected toll revenues – approximately 49% of total toll revenues estimated for the NEP).

Table 4-13: Construction costs and project affordability by NEP stage (USD)

Project Stage	Construction Cashflows (USD Nominal)	Construction Cashflows (% of Total)	Mean NPC Net Cashflows (USD)	Mean NPC Net Cashflows (% of Total)
Stage 1	(\$1,423m)	31%	(\$693m)	24%
Stage 2	(\$909m)	20%	(\$599m)	21%
Stage 3	(\$1,069m)	23%	(\$761m)	26%
Stage 4	(\$1,250m)	27%	(\$842m)	29%
Total NEP	(\$4,651m)	100%	(\$2,895m)	100%

Source: PwC, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario and mean risk-adjustment values

This data in the above table is derived from the base affordability scenario, including expected values for risk outcomes. Potential outcomes are more reliably represented by consideration of the range of risk-adjusted outcomes for estimated affordability.

The risk-adjusted ranges of affordability outcomes estimated for each stage of the NEP are summarised in the following table.

Table 4-14: P5C or Affordability by Stage (USD)

Project Stage	NPC at 5 th Percentile	Mean NPC	NPC at 95 th Percentile
Stage 1	(\$572m)	(\$693m)	(\$968m)
Stage 2	(\$534m)	(\$599m)	(\$755m)
Stage 3	(\$694m)	(\$761m)	(\$926m)
Stage 4	(\$763m)	(\$842m)	(\$1,039m)
Total NEP	(\$2,562m)	(\$2,895m)	(\$3,687m)

Source: PwC, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario

These risk-adjusted Net Present Cost ranges of are illustrated in the following diagram.




Figure 4-7: Net Present Costs by NEP stage

The summary results indicate that Stage 3 and Stage 4 of the NEP are the least affordable from a financial perspective, based on expected (or mean) Net Present Cost values. However, Stage 1 has the highest estimated variability in potential affordability result, primarily attributable to the risk impact of relatively high estimated toll revenues – approximately 49% of total toll revenues estimated for the NEP.

As Government may seek to investigate alternative configuration options for the various stages of the NEP, the following table summarises the estimated nominal construction costs and risk-adjusted ranges for the Net Present Cost (or affordability) outcomes for several combinations of NEP stages.

Table 4-15: Construction Costs and Affordability by Project Combination (USD)

Project Stage	Construction Cashflows (USD Nominal)	NPC at 5 th Percentile (USD)	Mean NPC (USD)	NPC at 95 th Percentile (USD)
Stage 1	(\$1,423m)	(\$572m)	(\$693m)	(\$968m)
Stage 1 and 2	(\$2,332m)	(\$1,106m)	(\$1,292m)	(\$1,722m)
Stage 1, 2 and 3	(\$3,401m)	(\$1,799m)	(\$2,053m)	(\$2,648m)
Total NEP	(\$4,651m)	(\$2,562m)	(\$2,895m)	(\$3,687m)
Stage 1 and 3	(\$2,492m)	(\$1,242m)	(\$1,431m)	(\$1,870m)
Stage 1, 2 and 4	(\$3,742m)	(\$1,864m)	(\$2,130m)	(\$2,757m)

On the basis of these potential project configuration options, Stage 1 alone would be the most affordable option, followed by an option reflecting a combined Stages 1 and 2.

4.3.2 Public Funding Options for Traditional Delivery

As a traditional delivery method for the NEP, the PSC or affordability assessment essentially assumes that Government is required to fund the cashflow requirements of the project as incurred by the project.

The following table outlines the forecast net Government funding commitments for each stage of the NEP under a traditional delivery, over the first eight years of the project (including the benefit of VAT inclusive toll revenues), based on the expected risk-adjusted outcomes. As expected, this reflects a significant weighting towards the initial years of project construction.

Table 4-16: Net Project Funding Requirements for Government (Nominal USD)

Project Stage	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22
Stage 1	(\$294m)	(\$433m)	(\$506m)	(\$191m)	\$2m	\$10m	\$13m	\$17m
Stage 2	(\$159m)	(\$280m)	(\$333m)	(\$136m)	(\$12m)	(\$6m)	(\$5m)	(\$4m)
Stage 3	(\$192m)	(\$322m)	(\$386m)	(\$168m)	(\$17m)	(\$12m)	(\$12m)	(\$12m)
Stage 4	(\$222m)	(\$376m)	(\$452m)	(\$200m)	(\$13m)	(\$8m)	(\$7m)	(\$7m)
Total NEP	(\$866m)	(\$1,412m)	(\$1,678m)	(\$695m)	(\$39m)	(\$15m)	(\$12m)	(\$6m)
Stage 1 and 2	(\$453m)	(\$713m)	(\$840m)	(\$327m)	(\$9m)	\$4m	\$8m	\$12m

Note: Shaded cells in the table indicate operating periods for the relevant project stage.

It is overly simplistic to assume that Government will have the financial resources or flexibility to fund a cash expenditure profile outlined above from the annual public budget. In practice, Government would be expected to borrow funds sufficient to satisfy the majority of the initial capital funding requirement. This approach helps to spread the capital payment for the infrastructure and services over a longer period, more closely aligned to the period of benefit from the infrastructure.

Government borrowings for infrastructure funding are typically at relatively low rates which may not reflect the commercial risk profile of the investment (i.e. there is an implicit guarantee of the borrowings from taxpayers, through the public budget).

The following table outlines the potential changes to the expected budget funding requirements for Government reflected in the previous table, assuming:

- Public debt funding of 75% of project capital costs
- A 20 year debt repayment period
- An effective interest cost of 6% per annum

Table 4-17: Net Project Funding Requirements for Government – Public Debt Funding (Nominal USD)

Project Stage	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22
Stage 1	(\$73m)	(\$108m)	(\$127m)	(\$48m)	(\$91m)	(\$83m)	(\$80m)	(\$76m)
Stage 2	(\$40m)	(\$70m)	(\$83m)	(\$34m)	(\$71m)	(\$65m)	(\$64m)	(\$64m)
Stage 3	(\$48m)	(\$81m)	(\$97m)	(\$42m)	(\$87m)	(\$82m)	(\$82m)	(\$82m)
Stage 4	(\$55m)	(\$94m)	(\$113m)	(\$50m)	(\$95m)	(\$89m)	(\$89m)	(\$88m)
Total NEP	(\$217m)	(\$353m)	(\$419m)	(\$174m)	(\$343m)	(\$319m)	(\$316m)	(\$310m)
Stage 1 and 2	(\$113m)	(\$178m)	(\$210m)	(\$82m)	(\$162m)	(\$148m)	(\$145m)	(\$140m)

Note: Shaded cells in the table indicate operating periods for the relevant project stage.

The above data demonstrates the potential to materially alter the expected budget funding requirements for Government, if appropriate public debt is available. The impact is a material decrease in the required financial commitments from the public budget to meet construction period expenditures, but an increase in the recurring public budget funding requirements during the operating periods.

The scale of the increase in the estimated funding requirements during the project operating periods to service the public debt finance is directly influenced by:

- How much initial capital expenditure is funded through public debt finance (i.e. how much finance is drawn)
- The repayment period and terms
- The interest rate for the financing

At the end of the repayment period for the public debt in the above example, the estimated budget funding between the base affordability estimates and the public debt funding profiles becomes identical (i.e. reflects net project operating cashflow requirements only).

This is illustrated by the following diagram which presents a comparative budget funding profile for Government over a 35 year project operations period. The public debt funding is estimated to be fully repaid by 30 June 2038 (i.e. after 20 years).




Figure 4-8: Comparative Funding Requirements for Government – Total NEP

The potential budget outcomes illustrated in the above assessment of public financing would be improved to the extent that Government is able to access financing assistance from external parties (e.g. development agency funding) on terms which are more advantageous than what could be achieved through more traditional Government borrowing sources.

4.3.3 Delivery Model Assessment

Quantitative

Investigation of the financial impacts to Government of potential private sector delivery and financing under a PPP model compared the traditional delivery model to three alternative models (including two sub-options for the service payment PPP model).

The following tables summarise the quantitative analysis results for the expected values for Net Present Costs to Government. The comparison is between the estimated Net Present Cost for the PSC (or traditional delivery model) and the estimated Net Present Cost for the relevant PPP delivery model. The data is presented for the total NEP, Stage 1 only and a Stage 1 and 2 project configuration.

Table 4-18: Summary Delivery and Financing Scenario Results – Total NEP1

Delivery Model	PSC NPC (USD)	PPP NPC (USD)	Potential Value	Comment
Traditional Delivery	(\$2,895m)	n/a	n/a	Traditional delivery option – no alternate delivery option value.
Service payment PPP–no contribution	(\$2,895m)	(\$3,020m)	(4%)	Suggests small potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Service payment PPP–Gov't contribution	(\$2,895m)	(\$2,918m)	(1%)	Suggests relatively immaterial value difference at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Economic / hybrid PPP	(\$2,895m)	(\$3,127m)	(8%)	Suggests modest potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.

Table 4-19: Summary Delivery and Financing Scenario Results – Stage 1

Delivery Model	PSC NPC (USD)	PPP NPC (USD)	Potential Value	Comment
Traditional Delivery	(\$693m)	n/a	n/a	Traditional delivery option – no alternate delivery option value.
Service payment PPP–no contribution	(\$693m)	(\$762m)	(10%)	Suggests modest potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Service payment PPP–Gov't contribution	(\$693m)	(\$733m)	(6%)	Suggests minor potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Economic / hybrid PPP	(\$693m)	(\$833m)	(20%)	Suggests significant potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.

Table 4-20: Summary Delivery and Financing Scenario Results – Stages 1 and 2

Delivery Model	PSC NPC (USD)	PPP NPC (USD)	Potential Value	Comment
Traditional Delivery	(\$1,292m)	n/a	n/a	Traditional delivery option – no alternate delivery option value.

Delivery Model	PSC NPC (USD)	PPP NPC (USD)	Potential Value	Comment
Service payment PPP– no contribution	(\$1,292m)	(\$1,383m)	(7%)	Suggests modest potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Service payment PPP– Gov't contribution	(\$1,292m)	(\$1,331m)	(3%)	Suggests minor potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.
Economic / hybrid PPP	(\$1,292m)	(\$1,468m)	(14%)	Suggests significant potential value loss at the mean Net Present Cost outcome.

The above quantitative results suggest that there is little scope for material value for money for Government through the investigation of a PPP delivery model, with each model indicating a potential value loss for Government, potentially significant depending on the project configuration and delivery model selected.

The quantitative estimates of potential value under alternative delivery and financing options is sensitive to the relative materiality of forecast tolling revenues for each stage of the NEP. Stage 1 of the NEP has the most significant estimated traffic and toll revenues, and is associated with the lowest estimated value potential from alternative delivery and financing options.

The following table illustrates this effect across project stages and for various combinations of stages, using the service payment PPP option with an upfront Government contribution.

Table 4-21: Summary Value Potential by Stage – Service Payment with Government Contribution

Project Stage	PSC NPC (USD)	PPP NPC (USD)	Potential Value
Stage 1	(\$693m)	(\$733m)	(6%)
Stage 2	(\$599m)	(\$599m)	0%
Stage 3	(\$761m)	(\$751m)	1%
Stage 4	(\$842m)	(\$835m)	1%
Total NEP	(\$2,895m)	(\$2,918m)	(1%)
Stage 1 and 2	(\$1,292m)	(\$1,331m)	(3%)
Stage 1, 2 and 3	(\$2,053m)	(\$2,083m)	(1%)
Stage 1 and 3	(\$1,585m)	(\$1,593m)	(1%)
Stage 1 2 and 4	(\$2,311m)	(\$2,314m)	(0%)

However, caution should be exercised in using mean Net Present Costs as a sole guide to potential value.

As the scale of the estimated value outcomes is relatively small, it may be reversed by relatively small changes in the private sector's risk appetite and approach to risk pricing for the project. For instance, an improvement of 100 basis points (1%) to each of the assumed rates for the cost of debt and equity would be sufficient to estimate potential positive value for service payment PPP options (equally, a deterioration in finance costs would further erode estimated value potential).

Value may be offered through the potential reduction in uncertainty around the realised (versus estimated) financial outcomes for Government. As a general observation, the variability of Net

Present Cost outcomes estimated for Government reduces under the PPP delivery options, and estimated 'downside' or 'worst case' outcomes are improved. This is achieved through the transfer of key project risks to be managed by the private sector, essentially exchanging uncertain project cashflow outcomes for relatively more certain payments to the private sector.

The range of risk-adjusted Net Present Cost outcomes estimated for Government under alternative delivery and financing scenarios, relative to that for a traditional delivery option, is illustrated in the following diagrams. Again, for the purposes of the illustration, the data is presented for the total NEP, Stage 1 only and a Stage 1 and 2 project configuration. The same potential benefit applies to other stages or combinations of stages of the NEP.




Figure 4-9: Comparative Net Present Cost Ranges for Government – Total NEP




Figure 4-10: Comparative Net Present Cost Ranges for Government – Stage 1




Figure 4-11: Comparative Net Present Cost Ranges for Government – Stages 1 and 2

Qualitative Assessment

The above quantitative analysis suggests relatively minor value for money potential (or minor value loss if only the mean Net Present Cost outcomes are compared) from pursuing a PPP delivery model, subject to the reliability of key assumptions, delivery model selected and project configuration. However, there are a number of qualitative factors which need to be considered when assessing the potential for estimated value to be realised by Government.

High level consideration of key qualitative risks and opportunities are outlined in the following table, including a general indication of the nature of the potential impact and comparative relevance to each delivery model. In the table, a cross (✖) indicates a potential risk to value for money and a tick (✓) indicates potential opportunity for value for money. Multiple ticks or crosses are intended to reflect greater relevance of a particular issue between delivery models, but do not reflect a relative weighting of importance between different issues.

Table 4-22: Qualitative Assessment Issues

Qualitative Risk or Opportunity	Service Payment PPP – no cont'n	Service Payment PPP – cont'n	Economic / Hybrid PPP
Procurement Process			
The procurement process for a PPP is generally more complex than for a traditional delivery, and Government procurement teams may have less experience in efficient implementation of a PPP procurement. This can present additional complexity for initial PPPs.			
Development of a properly scoped and supported bid for a PPP process can also involve a substantial investment of resources by private sector bidders. Where there is potential uncertainty around the reliability of the procurement process, there may be reputational or financial risks to Government from material changes to a procurement process.	✖	✖	✖
The exclusion of a specific adjustment for this risk in the quantitative analysis may overstate potential value from a PPP.			
Contract Management			
One of the primary sources of potential value for money from a PPP delivery is the transfer of responsibility for 'whole-of-life' management of key project risks to the private sector. The effectiveness of this risk transfer and, therefore, the realisation of estimated value depends on the diligent management of well structured project contracts to monitor	✖✖	✖✖	✖

Qualitative Risk or Opportunity	Service Payment PPP – no cont'n	Service Payment PPP – cont'n	Economic / Hybrid PPP
<p>and enforce Government's rights and obligations under the contracts.</p> <p>The exclusion of a specific adjustment for this risk in the quantitative analysis may overstate potential value from a PPP.</p>			
<p>General Risk Appetite / Pricing</p> <p>The private sector will determine its willingness to participate in the project, and the level of the financial return required for such participation, based on its assessment of the risks of the investment opportunity being offered by Government. This may have implications for the private sector's:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ general level of interest in the project as an opportunity ▪ willingness to commit the level of financing sought by Government ▪ acceptance of the preferred allocation of key project risks ▪ pricing for perceived uncertainty or higher risk <p>The exclusion of specific quantitative analysis scenarios designed to reflect potential impacts on risk allocation, pricing and financing constraints due to this risk may overstate potential value from a PPP.</p>			
	xx	x	xx
<p>Traffic Risk Appetite / Pricing</p> <p>The Economic PPP delivery model assumes that the private sector has an appetite to accept exposure of its financial returns to traffic / demand risk. This is expected to be an optimistic assumption and potentially not achievable for the NEP. Traffic outcomes can be impacted by many factors not within the reasonable control of a private sector road operator, limiting a willingness to assume responsibility for this risk.</p> <p>If this risk was partly or wholly transferred to the private sector, the risk pricing may include an additional premium above that included in the current quantitative analysis (or a substantial discounting of forecast traffic numbers relative to what is considered by Government to be a reasonable estimate).</p> <p>The exclusion of a specific adjustment for this risk in the quantitative analysis may overstate potential value from an Economic PPP.</p>			
	-	-	x
<p>Financing Capacity</p> <p>Private debt and equity investors may seek to limit their financial exposure to specific projects, industries and countries. An investment in a PPP project is relatively long-term and illiquid. The amount of financing any single investor or consortium of investors may be willing to commit to a PPP will be influenced by their confidence in the transparency and stability of the investment environment. Where that environment is still evolving or is in the relatively early development stages, there may be implicit constraints on the quantum of private sector financing which can be achieved for a specific project, irrespective of whether the estimated project cashflows can theoretically support a higher level of private finance.</p> <p>The exclusion of specific quantitative analysis scenarios designed to reflect potential impacts on private financing constraints due to this risk may overstate potential value from a PPP.</p>			
	xx	x	xx
<p>Network / Project Integration</p> <p>Stage 1 of the NEP (and the NEP more broadly) will form a critical element of the Sri Lankan road transport network. The Government can be expected to want to manage the project as part of the broader road network while a private sector investor may be focused on the</p>			
	x	x	xx

Qualitative Risk or Opportunity	Service Payment PPP – no cont’n	Service Payment PPP – cont’n	Economic / Hybrid PPP
<p>optimisation of project management as a separate piece of infrastructure. This potential conflict could result in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> constraints on Government’s efficient utilisation of the project as an element of the broader transport network compensation claims from private sector investors <p>The exclusion of a specific adjustment for this risk in the quantitative analysis may overstate potential value from a PPP.</p>			
<p>Project Variations</p> <p>A potential benefit of a PPP delivery is the increased financial certainty around project outcomes it can offer to Government. This is driven by comprehensive specification of service outcomes in project contracts. However, this can also make future material variation of the project scope by Government more complex and costly, particularly if this has the potential to materially change the project documents upon which private financing has been committed.</p> <p>It is difficult to estimate whether this may have an impact on potential value from a PPP, as a strategy to mitigate this risk involves a more detailed initial specification of the project requirements by Government. This has the potential to reduce the risk of variations during the initial design and construction phase versus a traditional procurement.</p>	✓/x	✓/x	✓/x
<p>Innovation / Whole-Of-Life Optimisation Value Drivers</p> <p>A PPP delivery transforms the profile for private sector returns from a short-term to a long-term project investment, with significant interrogation of design, construction, operations and maintenance strategies by private sector debt and equity investors. This challenges the private sector to seek innovation in the whole-of-life design, delivery and financing of the project and in the strategies to achieve the standards of transport services specified by Government. A well managed and competitive procurement process can capture a significant share of potential innovation value for Government in the bids.</p> <p>The exclusion of a specific adjustment for this opportunity in the quantitative analysis may understate potential value from a PPP.</p>	✓	✓	✓
<p>Service Standards</p> <p>A PPP delivery is based on a comprehensive specification of minimum service standards to be maintained throughout the lifecycle of the project. Long-term performance and funding commitments incorporated into the project contracts are designed to ensure these standards are delivered throughout the entire project lifecycle. This helps minimise the risks of deteriorating services and asset condition potentially associated with inadequate maintenance activities or funding.</p> <p>The exclusion of a specific adjustment for this opportunity in the quantitative analysis may understate potential value from a PPP.</p>	✓	✓	✓
<p>Tax And Insurances</p> <p>The quantitative analysis was undertaken on a pre-tax basis and did not include consideration of the potential tax risks or opportunities existing for alternative financial, commercial or legal structures which may be considered by potential private sector investors in a PPP. This would require a detailed investigation of the existing (or proposed) Sri Lankan tax environment as it applies to domestic or foreign investors and the commercial and legal structuring options available.</p>	✓/x	✓/x	✓/x

Qualitative Risk or Opportunity	Service Payment PPP – no cont'n	Service Payment PPP – cont'n	Economic / Hybrid PPP
<p>A favourable tax environment may have the potential to enhance investment outcomes and the potential value from a PPP but, equally, an uncertain or evolving tax environment can introduce significant additional risk for private sector investors.</p> <p>The analysis also did not consider the requirement for, availability, or cost of insurances for specific project, investment or financing risks.</p> <p>It is relevant to note that any tax options need to be considered from a whole of Government perspective, in that a tax saving passed through to Government in lower project pricing may be offset by the reduction in tax revenues associated with the saving.</p> <p>It is difficult to estimate whether these items may have an impact on potential value from a PPP without further detailed investigation and project refinement.</p>			

5 Recommendation

5.1 Economic Perspective

The purpose of the options analysis is to compare the results of staging the Northern Expressway Project. The potential staging options to deliver the project include the following:

1. Stage 1
2. Stage 1 and 2
3. Stage 1, 2 and 3
4. Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4 (overall project)
5. Stage 1 and 3
6. Stage 1, 3 and 4

The objective of the options analysis is to determine the net incremental benefit of each stage. This helps determine the delivery of the project and whether certain stages are more economically viable than others.

The overall results of the options analysis are shown Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Cost-benefit Analysis Options Analysis Results (7% discount rate)

Output	NPV	BCR	IRR	FYRR
Stage 1	\$4,976m	5.58	19%	14%
Stage 1 and 2	\$5,516m	4.04	16%	7%
Stage 1, 2 and 3	\$5,433m	3.04	14%	7%
Stage 1 and 3	\$5,733m	3.97	16%	8%
Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4	\$5,260m	2.45	13%	5%
Stage 1, 2 and 4	\$5,160m	2.86	14%	6%

Source: Deloitte

The ranking of the options is based on a review of all economic decision criteria. Typically, the ranking of options is based on the net present value criterion. However, as all options are dependent

on the delivery of Stage 1, the ranking of options is based on the first year rate of return (FYRR) criterion as shown in Table 5-2. The FYRR measures the economic return in the first year of operation and is used to determine the timing for project delivery (i.e. if the FYRR is greater than the discount rate, immediate delivery of the project is warranted).

Stage 1 produces the highest FYRR of 14%. This shows that immediately delivery of Stage 1 is justified while deferral of other stages may be warranted.

Table 5-2: Cost-benefit Analysis Options Analysis Ranking of Stages

Output	NPV	BCR	IRR	FYRR	Overall Ranking – timing for delivery
Stage 1	6	1	1	1	1
Stage 1 and 2	2	2	2	3	3
Stage 1, 2 and 3	3	4	4	4	4
Stage 1 and 3	1	3	3	2	2
Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4	4	6	6	6	6
Stage 1, 2 and 4	5	5	5	5	5

Source: Deloitte, using GDP linked CV growth traffic modelling scenario

The ranking of options based on the FYRR is as follows:

1. Stage 1
2. Stage 1 and 3
3. Stage 1 and 2
4. Stage 1, 2 and 3
5. Stage 1, 2 and 4
6. Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4

The cost-benefit analysis shows that the project returns a positive economic result as an overall project or in individual stages. From an economic point of view the project provides an efficient use of resources and construction of the project may be warranted.

In general, the project will act as a catalyst for land use change, particularly the relocation of firms to the expressway corridor. Ultimately, this will improve productivity of firms and potential lower prices for domestic consumers through lower transportation costs. These long term benefits need to be weighed against the short term costs, which are substantial. Should the project proceed, it is recommended that Stage 1 be considered as the first works package and that all other sections be reassessed at a later date after commissioning.

This will enable an ex-post evaluation of Stage 1 traffic forecasts to be undertaken to determine the likely willingness to pay of road users and therefore the potential demand on other sections of the project.

5.2 Financial Affordability Perspective

The affordability assessment estimated Net Present Cost to Government for the base case scenario for the total NEP as a risk-adjusted range of \$2,562 million to \$3,687 million, with a mean or expected value of \$2,895 million, expressed in US Dollars. The assessment indicated that Stage 3 and Stage 4 of the NEP are the least affordable from a financial perspective, based on expected (or

mean) Net Present Cost values. However, Stage 1 has the highest estimated variability in potential affordability, primarily attributable to the risk impact on relatively high estimated toll revenues.

As Stage 1 is the part of the corridor which links to the existing network infrastructure around Colombo, it is considered to be the minimum project scope despite Stage 2 presenting a less expensive individual affordability outcome. Therefore, Stage 1 was used as the basis for broader affordability outcomes assessed against potential project configuration options (or combinations of stages).

Based on the estimated affordability of combinations of different stages of the NEP, the following relative ranking of possible project options was estimated, from 'most affordable' to 'least affordable'.

1. Stage 1
2. Stage 1 and 2
3. Stage 1 and 3
4. Stage 1, 2 and 3
5. Stage 1, 2 and 4
6. Total NEP (Stages 1 – 4)

Key strategies to improve estimated affordability may include:

- Efficient management of project risks to mitigate variability (or uncertainty) or target risk outcomes less than the expected values
- Efficiencies in project design, construction or delivery (or reductions in project specifications) to realise reductions in project capital costs

The affordability assessment has focused on potential financial costs or value able to be reasonably estimated and directly linked to (or captured by) the NEP. There may be other broader financial benefits to Government which are partly driven or enhanced by delivery of the NEP. These may include:

- Potential increases in tax revenues to the extent the NEP contributes to an improvement in regional economic activity or asset values
- Potential increases in the value of property or businesses owned by Government in the NEP corridor or region, or
- Decreases in the cost of upgrading or maintaining existing roads or infrastructure as a consequence of traffic demand shifting to the NEP.

5.3 Delivery Model Assessment

The quantitative assessment suggested relatively minor value for money potential from each PPP delivery model (or minor value loss if only the mean Net Present Cost outcomes are compared). A key driver of potential value for money to Government from each PPP model would derive from an increase in certainty around future Government financial outcomes. This was evidenced by a narrowing of the risk-adjusted range of Net Present Cost outcomes for Government under the PPP models versus the traditional delivery model, and an improvement in estimated 'downside' or 'worst case' outcomes.

The estimates for potential value for money are relatively sensitive to assumptions for private sector risk pricing (i.e. cost of finance), with relatively modest changes in the assumed cost of private debt

and equity finance either eroding or enhancing the estimated potential for value for money. This sensitivity is minimised for the service payment PPP option where there is a material upfront Government contribution to private sector construction costs, as the magnitude of private finance invested in the project is reduced.

Several qualitative factors with the potential to impact on the value for money from a PPP delivery option are relevant and should be considered in combination with the quantitative estimates of potential value for money. These have the scope to enhance or detract from the actual financial outcomes achieved by Government depending on how effectively they are managed.

The following table presents a summary assessment of the potential advantages or disadvantages of alternative delivery and financing models based on a high level qualitative assessment.

Table 5-3: Summary Delivery and Financing Model Assessment

Potential Advantages	Potential Disadvantages	Conclusion
Traditional delivery model		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Existing procurement experience and procedures for Government ▪ Fastest (potentially) procurement period ▪ Reduced initial procurement and contractual complexity ▪ Limited constraints on management of the project 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maximum upfront project funding requirement for Government ▪ Direct exposure of Government to the majority of key project risks ▪ Reduced certainty over long-term funding requirements ▪ Reduced commitment to the long-term maintenance of project infrastructure 	<p>This model offers lower process risks associated with implementation of a new project procurement and delivery model, but also avoids the potential advantages of an appropriately designed and delivered PPP model.</p> <p>Its success will depend on the capacity of Government to finance the relevant profile of risk-adjusted net costs under this model.</p>
Service payment PPP – no contribution		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimal upfront project funding requirement for Government ▪ Reduced exposure to material project risks ▪ High level of certainty around long-term funding requirements ▪ Contractual commitment to maintaining a high standard of transport service over the project lifecycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initially more complex procurement process and contract management ▪ Significant ongoing budget commitment for the service payments ▪ Significant private financing required may not be available, or on reasonable commercial terms 	<p>Despite the potential benefits of this model, it is expected to have a low probability of success due to concerns around the potential availability of the significant initial private financing required and the ongoing high funding commitments for Government to support the relatively high service payments</p>
Service payment PPP – Government contribution		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Balances upfront project funding requirement and ongoing budget commitment for Government ▪ Reduced exposure to material project risks ▪ Reduced exposure to unavailability of sufficient private financing ▪ High level of certainty around long-term funding requirements ▪ Contractual commitment to maintaining a high standard of transport service over the project lifecycle 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Initially more complex procurement process and contract management ▪ Reduced, but still significant upfront project funding requirement for Government ▪ Requires a long-term budget funding commitment for service payments 	<p>This model is expected to deliver the potential advantages of a PPP model while balancing the potential disadvantages. It balances initial and ongoing funding commitments required from Government, reducing the risks of initial private financing availability while retaining financial incentives to drive long-term performance in transport service delivery.</p> <p>Its success will depend on the capacity of Government to finance the relevant profile of risk-adjusted net costs under this model.</p>
Economic/Hybrid PPP		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Minimises exposure to material project risks (i.e. transfers traffic risk) ▪ Hybrid or service payment element can be structured to capture similar advantages as outlined for the relevant service payment PPP option 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Forecast toll revenues are modest, requiring material service payment support and attracting similar disadvantages as outlined for the service payment PPP option without a Government contribution ▪ Private sector may be unwilling to accept traffic risk, or heavily discount expected traffic outcomes in its pricing ▪ May increase constraints on Government network management and tolling policies 	<p>The additional complexities of this model and the potential reluctance of the private sector to accept traffic risk suggest that this would not be a preferred delivery and financing model for the project, particularly given the relatively modest tolling revenues estimated</p>

If Government elect to pursue a PPP delivery option, the option which may present an appropriate balance between risk and opportunity is expected to be a service payment PPP where there is a material upfront contribution from Government towards private sector construction costs. This view is based on a consideration of the quantitative and qualitative assessment outcomes, and is expected to be preferred to other models for the following key reasons.

- Estimated quantitative value potential is materially equivalent to that estimated for other PPP delivery models.
- The private sector may resist attempts to transfer demand risk under an economic PPP structure, or accept only on unreasonable commercial terms.
- Significant private sector investment reduces the initial funding requirement from Government for the NEP.
- Significant private sector investment supports effective transfer of risk and financial incentives for the private sector to maintain the specified standard of transport service over the concession period.
- A material upfront contribution from Government reduces potential risks associated with the availability and pricing of private sector finance for a 'first mover' PPP project in Sri Lanka.
- A material upfront contribution from Government moderates the ongoing service payment obligation for Government.

While the delivery and financing model assessment identified potential value for money relative to a traditional delivery, the results are not expected to materially alter either:

- The general scale of affordability estimated for the NEP or its component stages, or
- The ranking of each NEP stage or combination of stages, based on relative expected affordability.

6 Supplementary Considerations

A Supplementary Report, identified as Appendix E – Supplementary Report - has been added to this report for the following purposes:

1. A Traffic Growth Workshop was convened on 8 October 2013 to present the findings of the Appendix A – Traffic and Tolling Analysis Report and to seek feedback on the traffic growth assumptions adopted for the study. This volume reports on the outcomes.
2. An offer to finance, design build and operate Stages 1 and 2 of the project is under preparation by M/s China Merchant Group. This offer involves an alternative trace for the northern part of Stage 2. If adopted, the trace for Stage 4 will also need to be changed and the trace for Stage 3 will also potentially be different. This volume reports on the effects of adopting the alternate M/s China Merchant proposal.
3. To report on a revised tolling regime as proposed by THI Asia Consultants, traffic consultants to the M/S China Merchant Group

6.1 Traffic Growth Workshop

On the 8th October 2013 a Traffic Growth Workshop was convened to present the findings of the traffic analysis as reported in the August 2013 version of this document. Representatives from a range of governmental agencies located within the study area or from nearby regions were invited, including representatives of organisations with an interest in the project such as the World Bank. The purpose of the workshop was to not only explain the process but also to seek feedback on the traffic growth assumptions used in the model, in particular the land use projections.

A presentation stepped through the process used in developing the traffic model, identified the nature and source of the key data inputs. Workshop participants were then invited to join three groups facilitated by SMEC staff that discussed in detail the land use growth assumptions and distribution for three spatial sectors of the study area.

Although participants acknowledged that the data used for the land use in the model was using official projections they expressed an opinion that projected growth in some centres in the study area and in particular the northern part of Sri Lanka Since the cessation of hostilities from the civil war, was perhaps under represented. To address these concerns throughout October SMEC re-engaged with government departments to verify the accuracy and status of data previously collected. The review of land use data concluded that the data collected and used in the model is a fair and accurate representation of planned development in Sri Lanka as currently available.

Further, the model contains a range of five development profiles from Scenario 1 Conservative, with limited economic growth to Scenario 5, ultimate Development that represented very aggressive future year growth. These scenarios were based on data and research obtained from government agencies and the project financial team. Scenario 4 contained a growth rate of 5% per annum for commercial vehicles, which make up over 80% of traffic using the northern sections of the expressway and is far in excess of the national average growth rate. It was therefore felt that this scenario fairly represented a high growth pattern in northern Sri Lanka.

6.2 China Merchant Proposal

M/s China Merchant have proposed an alternative trace for Stage 2 of the project. The northern section of Stage 2 passes to the east of Kurunegala instead of to the west as proposed in the RDA/SMEC trace. The advantages of this trace are that it crosses the A6 to the south of Kurunegala,

potentially improving the traffic attraction rate onto the expressway and it provides an opportunity for the Stage 3 expressway to Kandy to be much shorter and hence much cheaper to construct and operate.

M/s China Merchant do not proposed to extend Stage 1 from Meerigama to Ambepussa (as was included in the RDA/SMEC proposal) and if any of the Stage 3 Alternatives other than 3A is adopted, it will be necessary to construct the Ambepussa Link separately to attract traffic from the A1 onto the expressway.

These concepts are illustrated in the following figures:




Figure 6-1: M/S China Merchant Group proposals shown as dotted line




Figure 6-2: Stage 3 Alternative Options

To test these options the following traffic modelling was undertaken:

Table 6-1: Model Runs

Option	Modified stage 1	Stage 2 CMG	Stage 3 A (as previous)	Stage 3 B	Stage 3 C	Stage 3D	Modified Stage 4	Ambepussa Link
Stage 3A	X	X	X				X	
Stage 3 B	X	X		X			X	X
Stage 3 C	X	X			X		X	X
Stage 3D	X	X				X	X	X

Model runs were undertaken for all the assessment years, 2016, 2021, 2026 and 2031, with all for stages being in place and under the development Scenario 4 – GDP Growth.

Stage 2 CMG or Stage 2A

Table 6-2 below identifies vehicle demand on all four stages of the NE for Stage 2A option and the original Stage 2 alignment.

Table 6-2: NE Alignment Options Stage 2 Vehicle (Toll) Demand by Stage (Year 2036)

Option	Stage 1		Stage 2		Stage 3		Stage 4		Ambepussa Link	
	Total	%CV	Total	%CV	Total	%CV	Total	%CV	Total	%CV
Original Stage 2	83,400	67%	39,400	73%	21,400	70%	18,600	81%	-	-
Stage 2A	83,100	67%	41,600	74%	21,500	71%	19,700	81%	-	-

The analysis identified that although traffic demand at 2036 along Stages 2 and 4 for the Stage 2A was slightly higher, 2,200 and 1,100 vehicles, respectively this was not proportionally significant with the difference in traffic demand at 2036 being less than 5%.

When viewing these figures it must be borne in mind that the modelling undertaken here addressed the effects of differing route alignments, where all other drivers of demand, including land use remained the same. Although Stage 2A is picking up some additional demand much of the available demand under development Scenario 4, as modelled, was largely captured in the previous alignment.

Alternative Stage 3 Options

Three alternative Stage 3 alignments were tested, including reference to the original Stage 3 alignment (Stage 3A). These were:

- Stage 3B – an amended alignment of Stage 3A that provides a more direct east-west alignment from the A10 north of Kandy to Stage 2
- Stage 3C – a spur extension of Stage 3A to the new Stage 2A alignment south of Kurunegala
- Stage 3D – an alternative expressway option from Kandy to Kurunegala running generally parallel to the A10

As with the alternative Stage 2 analysis, all drivers of demand in the model were the same for all options. The Stage 2A alignment was the base reference alignment for Stages 1, 2 and 4. The analysis was focused solely on the effects of alternative alignments.

Table 6-3 identifies the outcomes of the modelling.

Table 6-3: NE Alignment Options Stage 3 Vehicle (Toll) Demand by Stage (Year 2036)

Option	Stage 1		Stage 2		Stage 3		Stage 4		Ambepussa Link	
	Total	%CV	Total	%CV	Total	%CV	Total	%CV	Total	%CV
Stage 3A	83,100	67%	41,600	74%	21,500	71%	19,700	81%	-	-
Stage 3B	81,600	66%	41,600	75%	19,900	74%	20,100	82%	4,600	71%
Stage 3C	80,500	67%	46,900	76%	16,200	77%	19,700	81%	6,700	75%
Stage 3D	80,200	67%	43,300	75%	21,300	80%	25,300	82%	7,000	75%

In terms of traffic volumes Stage 3D was identified as the best performing option.

Modelling undertaken for these Stage 3 options used Scenario 4 GDP Growth of the 5 future year development scenarios provided. Scenario 4 reflected a likely future development profile of much higher level economic activity and associated traffic demand than that currently found in Sri Lanka. Therefore, in this case there is a high number of trucks using the road network with a strong preposition to use the NE as it enables them to reach their destination in a shorter travel time.

Stage 3D due to providing improved access to key economic centres, directly and indirectly benefits the most under this development scenario. Therefore it retains traffic demand to Colombo that will

use the NE despite the alignment being longer, simply because it is quicker than using the A1 which the alternative route option. It also picking up new traffic heading north which previous alignments did not provide suitable attraction above and beyond the A10 and alternative routes towards Kurunegala and beyond (Dambulla and Anuradhapura).

Economic Analysis

The RDA also requested that SMEC undertake an economic evaluation of the proposed changes to the route alignments for the Northern Expressway as part of the Supplementary report. This section will compare the original cost-benefit analysis results with the results obtained for the alternative route alignments as proposed by the China Merchants Group to determine whether these alternative routes achieve a better economic outcome.

The cost benefit analysis for these alternative route alignments follows the same methodology adopted in Appendix C – Interim Report Economic Evaluation of the Northern Expressway. Further detail on the framework used may be found in that report.

Summary of Results

The overall results of the options analysis are shown in Table 6-4. The ranking of mutually exclusive options is based on the net present value criterion.

Based on the results of the cost-benefit analysis, the ranking of the alternate alignments is as follows:

1. **Option 1:** Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3A, Stage 4A
2. **Option 4:** Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3D, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A
3. **Option 3:** Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3C, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A
4. **Option 2:** Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3B, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A.

Of the four new alignments examined, Option 1, which includes Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3A, and Stage 4A offers a marginally higher NPV than the original RDA alignment, although the difference is not statistically significant.

In incremental terms, Options 2, 3 and 4 produce a lower NPV than the original RDA alignment. While these options offer a lower cost alternative, they also provide significantly lower road user benefits. In net incremental terms, this results in a lower NPV.

Table 6-4: Cost-benefit analysis options analysis results - 7% discount rate

#	Options	NPV	% change
1	Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3A, Stage 4A	\$5,313	1%
2	Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3B, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A	\$4,293	-18%
3	Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3C, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A	\$4,446	-16%
4	Stage 1A, Stage 2A, Stage 3D, Ambepussa Link, Stage 4A	\$4,857	-8%
Original	Stage 1, 2, 3 and 4	\$5,260	

Source: Deloitte

Recommendations

The cost benefit analysis demonstrates that:

- Option 1 provides the highest NPV, however there is no discernible difference between the original alignment proposed by SMEC and the alignment proposed by the China Merchants Group;
- Options 2, 3 and 4 which propose changes to Stages 2 and 3 along with a link to Ambepussa, produce slightly lower economic results, compared to the original alignment.
- All options produce significantly high NPVs and are justified in economic terms.

Given these outcomes of the cost-benefit analysis, it is evident that the main advantage of adopting the China Merchant Alignment for Stage 2 is the potential capital cost savings associated with a shorter Stage 3. This is then a matter of project affordability rather than demonstrated outright economic value for the Stage 3 options.

6.3 Alternative Tolling Regimes

An alternative tolling regime was proposed by THI Asia Consultants Limited, the traffic consultant for M/S China Merchant Group. The purpose of this analysis is to identify changes in traffic volumes using the NE under this new tolling regime for the route alignments, development scenarios and assessment time frames previously identified in this report. Therefore, the modelling input parameters and outputs adopted to analyse the alternative stage 2 and 3 alignments, are replicated here with the single change being the implementation of an alternative tolling regime for the NE only, as provided by THI Asia Consultants Limited.

Table 6-5 identifies the tolling regime originally used. Here identified as Tolling Regime Option 1.

Table 6-6 identifies the tolling regime provided by THI Consultants converted to NEP Traffic Model vehicle categories. Here identified as Tolling Regime Option 2.

Table 6-5: Tolling Regime Option 1 (2012 Rs value)

Vehicle Class	Toll Rate (Rs./km) for travel within that band					
	0-20 km	20-40 km	40-60 km	60-80 km	80-100 km	After 100 km
Light (Car and LCV)	9	7	5	3	1	0
Medium (MCV)	22.5	17.5	12.5	7.5	2.5	0
Heavy (HCV)	36	28	20	12	4	0

Table 6-6: Tolling Regime Option 2 (2012 Rs value)

Vehicle Type	Toll Rate (Rs./km)
Light (Car and LCV)	9.5
Medium (MCV)	33.00
Heavy (HCV)	47.00

The THI Consultants Tolling Regime Option 2 identifies a flat rate per km. Therefore, unlike Tolling Regime Option 1 there is no benefit of a reduced unit rate per km the further you travel although of course the total charge is always higher the further you travel. In addition, the flat rate is higher when compared to the 0-20km bracket for Tolling Regime Option 1.

Therefore, overall under Tolling Regime Option 2 it is more expensive to use the expressway, especially for longer distance trips.

As one would expect this has seen a reduction in vehicles using the NE, with in 2036 reductions of between 17% and 57% across the four stages. Stage 1: 17% to 18%, Stage 2: 41 to 45%, Stage 3: 31 to 46%, Stage 4: 48 to 52%,




The reduction in vehicle demands by stage is less near Colombo due to congestion on alternative nearby roads and much shorter trips while large differences occur the further away from Colombo with less congestion on alternative routes and longer trips. This is consistent with development scenario modelled here, namely Scenario 4 – GDP Growth which sees a higher number of trucks on the network and an imperative to reach the destination in the shortest timeframe. For Stage 1 local roads such as the A1 are still heavily congested and as such the NE provides a viable time saving alternative. For stage 4 volumes on nearby roads such as the A6 are much lower and offer a competitive choice to using the NE and therefore the reduction in traffic on the NE are much higher.

F-PM10407	Output Control Form
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Project Name: Northern Expressway Feasibility Study **Project No:** 5068037

Output Name: Economic and Financial Report on the Northern Expressway Affordability and Delivery Models Rev 2

Output Status: Final

PREPARATION, REVIEW AND AUTHORISATION	
Prepared by: T Stead..... Position: PPP Specialist..... (Project/Proposal/EOI Manager or delegate)	Signature:  Date: 22 November 2013
Reviewed by: G Goodsell (Team Leader)	Signature:  Date: 22 November 2013
Approved for Issue by: R. Jenkins Position: Project Director (Project Director or delegate)	Signature:  Date: 22 November 2013

Distribution List

Client: Project Director, Northern Expressway Project, Road Development Authority.....

Associates: Ocyana

Proposal/EOI/Project File *(copy of this form only necessary)*:

Date Issued	No. of Copies
22 November 2013	6 hard 1 soft
22 November 2013	1 soft
	1 soft

REVISION PREPARATION, REVIEW ISSUE

Revision	Date	Prepared by	Reviewed by	Issued to Distribution List by:
1	22 Aug. 2013	T Stead	G Goodsell	As above
2	22 November 2013	T Stead	G Goodsell	As above

EIA
Environmental Impact
Assessment CONTRACT

RECEIVED
ACCOUNTS DIVISION
Date 09/12/15

අලුත් 04 - (i)

THIS CONTRACT ("Contract") is entered into on this 25th September 2015, by and between the Central Expressway Project of the Road Development Authority ("the Client") having its principal place of business at 3rd Floor, Wing 1, Sethsiripaya, Batramulla and Director – Center for Sustainability, Department of Forestry & Environmental Science, University of Sri Jayewardenepura, Gangodawila, Nugegoda.

WHEREAS, the Client wishes to have the Consultant perform the services hereinafter referred to, and WHEREAS, the Consultant is willing to perform these services,

NOW THEREFORE THE PARTIES hereby agree as follows:

1. **Services**
- (i) The Consultant shall perform the services specified in Annex A, "Terms of Reference and Scope of Services" which is made an integral part of this Contract ("the Services").
 - (ii) The Consultant shall provide the personnel listed in Annex B, "Consultant's Personnel," to perform the Services.
 - (iii) The Consultant shall submit to the Client the reports in the form (hard and soft versions) and within the time periods specified in the Consultants Proposal.
 - (iv) Consultant should take part in all TEC meetings to be convened by CEA and should address the requests of other potential stakeholders until final approval is granted.

2. **Term**

The Consultant shall perform the Services during the period commencing 25th September 2015 and continuing through 09th January 2016, or any other period as may be subsequently agreed by the parties in writing.

3. **Payment**

A. Ceiling

For Services rendered pursuant to Annex A, the Client shall pay the Consultant an amount not exceeding LKR 17,607,075.00 (Sri Lankan Rupees Seventeen million six hundred and seven thousand and seventy five only).

B. Schedule of Payments

The schedule of payments is specified below:

25% of the Contract Sum, Rs. 4,401,768.75 (Rupees ⁴ for Million Four Hundred and One Thousands Seven Hundred and Sixty eight and Cents Seventy Five only) upon the Client's receipt of a copy of the inception report, acceptable to the Client;

35% of the Contract Sum, Rs. 6,162,476.25 (Rupees Six Million One Hundred and Sixty Two Thousands and Four Hundred and Seventy Six and Cents Twenty Five only) upon the Client's receipt of the draft final report, acceptable to the Client; and

30% of the Contract Sum Rs. 5,282,122.50 (Rupees Five Million Two Hundred and Eighty Two Thousand One Hundred Twenty Two and Cents Fifty only) upon the Client's receipt of the final report, acceptable to the Client.

10% of the contract sum Rs. 1,760,707.50 will be released once the final CEA approval for the EIA is received.

C. Payment Conditions

Payment shall be made in Sri Lankan Rupees, no later than 60 days following submission by the Consultant of invoices in duplicate to the Coordinator designated in paragraph 4.

4. **Project Administration**

A. Coordinator.

The Client designates Eng. J A G R Jayalath as Client's Coordinator; the Coordinator will be responsible for the coordination of activities under this Contract, for acceptance and approval of the reports and of other deliverables by the Client and for receiving and approving invoices for the payment.

B. Reports.

The reports listed in Annex C, "Consultant's Reporting Obligations," shall be submitted in the course of the assignment, and will constitute the basis for the payments to be made under paragraph 3.

5. **Performance Standards**

The Consultant undertakes to perform the Services with the highest standards of professional and ethical competence and integrity. The Consultant shall promptly replace any employees assigned under this Contract that the Client considers unsatisfactory.

6. **Confidentiality**

The Consultants shall not, during the term of this Contract and within two years after its expiration, disclose any proprietary or confidential information relating to the Services, this Contract or the Client's business or operations without the prior written consent of the Client.

7. **Ownership of Material**

Any studies reports or other material, graphic, software or otherwise, prepared by the Consultant for the Client under the Contract shall belong to and remain the property of the Client. The Consultant may retain a copy of such documents and software.

8. **Consultant Not to be Engaged in Certain Activities**

The Consultant agrees that, during the term of this Contract and after its termination, the Consultant and any entity affiliated with the Consultant, shall be disqualified from providing goods, works or services (other than the Services and any continuation thereof) for any project resulting from or closely related to the Services.

- 9. Insurance** The Consultant will be responsible for taking out any appropriate insurance coverage.
- 10. Assignment** The Consultant shall not assign this Contract or sub-contract any portion of it without the Client's prior written consent.
- 11. Law Governing Contract and Language** The Contract shall be governed by the laws of Government of Sri Lanka, and the language of the Contract shall be English
- 12. Dispute Resolution** Any dispute arising out of the Contract, which cannot be amicably settled between the parties, shall be referred to adjudication/arbitration in accordance with the laws of the Client's country.

FOR THE CLIENT

Prof. J. M. S. J. BANDARA
Chairman
Road Development Authority

J. M. S. J. Bandara

Signed by: Prof. J M S J Bandara
Title: Chairman
Road Development Authority
Maganagama Mahamadura
Koswatta, Battaramulla.

FOR THE CONSULTANT

Priyan Perera

Signed by: Dr. Priyan Perera
Title: Director/Center for Sustainability
University of Sri Jayewardenepura
Gangodawila,
Nugegoda.



Witness:

1. *[Signature]*

Name: *L. V. S. Weerakoon*

Witness:

1. *[Signature]*

Name: *M. T. C. Perera*

*As above 18 Oct 2017
90% of deliverables have been done
25/2/10/06.*

Gracie R. Jayalath
Deputy Director
Central Expressway Project III
Road Development Authority

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex A: Terms of Reference and Scope of Services

Annex B: Consultant's Personnel

Annex C: Consultant's Reporting Obligations

Annex A

Terms of reference for Amalgamation of Environmental Impact Assessment Reports

- Central Expressway Project –

1. General

The Government of Sri Lanka has decided to construct the Central Expressway starting from Kadawatha to Dambulla with a link expressway from Pothuhera to Galagedera. The first part of the Central Expressway (from Kadawatha to Gampaha) will construct along the selected trace of the former Colombo-Kandy Alternative Highway and then it will follow the Northern Expressway corridor including a link expressway from Pothuhera to Kandy.

In order to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions under the National Environmental Act (NEA) and associated regulations, as well as other relevant legislation and policies linked to road works, an Environmental Impact Assessment with the Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan (EMMP) has to be undertaken.

1.1 Environmental Impact Assessment Legislative Requirements

1. **National laws and regulations:** The National Environmental Act (NEA) has made Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) a legal requirement for a range of development projects. A list of projects requiring an EIA is prescribed in Gazette (Extra Ordinary) No. 772/22 dated June 24, 1993. Accordingly the Central Expressway has to obtain approval from the Central Environmental Authority and undergo Environmental Impact Assessment procedure.

2. Scope of Work

The consultant is required to amalgamate three (03) Environmental Impact Assessment Reports prepared by the Road Development Authority for the following expressway segments.

- i. Environmental Impact Assessment Report for Colombo-Kandy Alternative Highway (from Kadawatha to Kandy).

- ii. Environmental Impact Assessment Report from Enderamulla to Kurunegala with a link road from Meerigama to Ambepussa of Northern Expressway.
- iii. Environmental Impact Assessment Report from Kurunegala to Dambulla section of Northern Expressway Project.
- iv. Environmental Impact Assessment Report from Pothuhera to Galagedara section of Northern Expressway Project.

- Terms of Reference issued by the Central Environmental Authority which is attached hereto providing guidance for preparation of EIA report.
- The consultant can carry out further studies for preparation of EIA report in addition to the data available in the current EIA reports.
- It is expected that EIA report will be prepared in close collaboration with the relevant project staff of the Central Expressway Project and Environmental and Social Development Division of the Road Development Authority.

2.1 Social Issues Mitigation Report to comply requirements of the ADB and JAICA Policies.

In addition to the ToR issued by the Central Environmental Authority, a comprehensive Social Issues Mitigation Report should be prepared by the consultant to be submitted to the above donor agencies which shall be complied with their guidelines. The report should consist of following chapters.

Summary

Introduction

Proposed Grievance Redress Mechanism to the Project

Information Disclosure of the Project

Public consultation

Conclusion and Recommendations

3.0 Consulting team

The team should include experts with experience conducting environmental Impact assessments in the roads sector development projects, conducting cost benefit analysis, assessing alternatives and suggesting alternative low cost solutions. The team should be formed in minimum as indicated below with the expertise defined:

Team Leader should be either the Environmentalist or an engineer with experience preparing environmental impact assessments and competent of overall team guidance.

- *Environmentalist/Ecologist* - with experience undertaking Environmental Impact Assessments and terrestrial and aquatic ecology.

- **Environmental Economist** - experience to assess the environmental economic aspects of the proposed project.
- **Geologist** – experience to assess the geological aspects of the project.
- **Hydrologist** - with additional experience on disaster/climate change risk assessment and to assess hydro geological aspects.
- **Highway Engineer** – experience to assess the traffic and safety aspects of the proposed project.
- **Flora and Fauna specialist** – experience assess the ecological aspects of the proposed project.
- **Sociologist** – experience to study social aspects related to the proposed project.
- **Archeologist** – Experience to assess the archeological aspects of the proposed project.
- **GIS Specialist**
- **Data Analyst**

The Team Leader should be either the Environmentalist or an Engineer with experience preparing Environmental Impact Assessments.

3.1 Reporting and feedback schedule

- All submissions related to the assignment should be submitted to Project Director of Project Management Unit (PMU) of the Central Expressway Project, as hard copies and electronically.
- The report will be reviewed by the Environmental and Social Development Division of the RDA before submission to the CEA.
- If changes to improve the draft report requested during this stage are not satisfactory to the employer, the consultant will be required to work further on the document until it is considered satisfactory.
- Any feedback/discussions/meetings in addition to above can be requested by the employer as well as the consultancy firm for clarification and further assistance.
- During the final submission of the EIA report, Hard and Electronic versions of the final report should be in Word form. All maps, graphs, photos etc., shall be clear color prints. Maps and drawings shall be of appropriate scale.
- The consultant should provide adequate numbers of draft reports (English) as requested by the Employer to submit to the CEA.
- Once the CEA accepted the final report the consultant will be asked to prepare and submit translations (Sinhala and Tamil) to the project Director. Total number of reports to be submitted will be informed by the employer as per requirements of the CEA.

- All the consultants/experts who prepared the report should attend to the Technical Evaluation Committee Meetings organized by the CEA to review the EIA report.

Description	Deadline	Feedback
Submission of the inception report.	02 weeks after signing the contract agreement.	Within 02 weeks, comments and suggestions will be provided in writing A meeting will be organized by the employer for discussions/clarifications and provide additional feedback.
Submission of the draft EIA report.	06 weeks after receiving comments.	Within 2 week, comments, corrections and further information necessary will be provided in writing
Submission of the final EIA report.	02 weeks after receiving comments	Submission of Final Reports (5 soft copies and three hard copies). However required copies need to provide as per 3.1 in three language to submit CEA.

Duration: 14 weeks

3.2 Information to be provided by Employer

In order to expedite the process, the PMU will provide copies of the already prepared EIA reports for this expressway corridor. The PMU will also provide any documents related to the project. In addition, relevant sections of the contract drawings, drawings of structures and preliminary approvals obtained from the Government agencies. A meeting to discuss any clarifications with PMU and the Environmental and Social Division of the RDA in reference to this ToR can be arranged on request.

PMU office is located at the following address and you may contact following officials for further clarifications.

Central Expressway Project,
3rd Floor, Sethsiripaya
Battaramulla
Tel : 94 0112877708
Fax: 94 0112877708
Email: rdapdcep@gmail.com

Contact personnel:

Mr L V S Weerakoon (PD) - mobile 0777-664214
Mr J A G R Jayalath (DPD) - mobile 0773-536596
Mr A B K S Rangana (Engineer) - mobile 0715-468355

Detailed Hydrology Study
for CEP

අමුණු 04 - (ii)

CONTRACT

THIS CONTRACT ("Contract") is entered into on this 28th September 2015, by and between the Central Expressway Project of the Road Development Authority ("the Client") having its principal place of business at 3rd Floor, Wing 1, Sethsiripaya, Battramulla and Additional General Manager (Technical), Sri Lanka Land Reclamation & Development Corporation (SLLRDC), #03, Sri Jayawardhanapura Mawatha, Welikada, Rajagiriya.

WHEREAS, the Client wishes to have the Consultant perform the services hereinafter referred to, and WHEREAS, the Consultant is willing to perform these services,

NOW THEREFORE THE PARTIES hereby agree as follows:

1. **Services**
- (i) The Consultant shall perform the services specified in Annex A, "Terms of Reference and Scope of Services" which is made an integral part of this Contract ("the Services").
 - (ii) The Consultant shall submit to the Client the reports in the form (hard and soft versions) and within the time periods specified in the Consultants Proposal & as well as in the TOR.
 - (iii) Consultant should take part in all TEC meetings to be convened by RDA or CEA/ Stake holders and should address the requests of all potential stakeholders until the final approval is granted.

2. **Term**
- The Consultant shall perform the Services during the period commencing 15th October 2015 and continuing through 15th April 2016, or any other period as may be subsequently agreed by the parties in writing.

3. **Payment**
- A. Ceiling

For Services rendered pursuant to Annex A, the Client shall pay the Consultant an amount not exceeding LKR 70,768,163.27 (Sri Lankan Rupees Seventy Million Seven Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand One Hundred and Sixty Three Cents Twenty Seven Only) including all taxes.

- B. Schedule of Payments

The schedule of payments is specified below:

An advance payment of 20% of Total contract will be paid the day the agreement is signed.

20% of the total contract sum Rs. 14,153,632.65 (Rupees Fourteen Million One Hundred And Fifty Three Thousand Six Hundred And Thirty Two And Cents Sixty Five Only) to be paid upon submission of Inception report.

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20% of the total contract sum Rs. 14,153,632.65 (Rupees Fourteen Million One Hundred And Fifty Three Thousand Six Hundred And Thirty Two And Cents Sixty Five Only) upon submission of Interim Design Report.

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25% of the total contract sum Rs.17,692,040.80 (Rupees Seventeen Million Six Hundred And Ninety Two Thousand Forty And Cents Eighty Only) upon submission of the Draft Final Report.

Final 15% of the total contract sum Rs.10,615,224.48 (Rupees Ten Million Six Hundred And Fifteen Thousand Two Hundred And Twenty Four And Cents Forty Eight Only) upon submission & once approval is received for the final report.

C. Payment Conditions

Payment shall be made in Sri Lankan Rupees, no later than 60 days following submission by the Consultant of invoices in duplicate to the Coordinator designated in paragraph 4.

4. **Project Administration**

A. Coordinator.

The Client designates Eng. J A G R Jayalath as Client's Coordinator; the Coordinator will be responsible for the coordination of activities under this Contract, for acceptance and approval of the reports and of other deliverables by the Client and for receiving and approving invoices for the payment.

B. Reports.

The reports listed in section 8 of the TOR shall be submitted in the course of the assignment, and will constitute the basis for the payments to be made under paragraph 3.

5. **Performance Standards**

The Consultant undertakes to perform the Services with the highest standards of professional and ethical competence and integrity. The Consultant shall promptly replace any employees assigned under this Contract that the Client considers unsatisfactory.

6. **Confidentiality**

The Consultants shall not, during the term of this Contract and within two years after its expiration, disclose any proprietary or confidential information relating to the Services, this Contract or the Client's business or operations without the prior written consent of the Client.

7. **Ownership of Material**

Any studies reports or other material, graphic, software or otherwise, prepared by the Consultant for the Client under the Contract shall belong to and remain the property of the Client. The Consultant may retain a copy of such documents and software.

LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex A: Terms of Reference and Scope of Services

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Terms of Reference for Detailed Hydrology Study of Central Expressway

1. Background

The Government of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has decided to construct the Central Expressway from Kadawatha on the Outer Circular Highway (OCH) as in the previously proposed Colombo-Kandy Alternate Highway (CKAH). The newly proposed expressway is a combination of previously proposed two expressway traces. i.e. Segment from Kadawatha to Gampaha remains unchanged as in the CKAH trace and the trace will follow the former Northern Expressway trace beyond Gampaha. New trace is named as the Central Expressway and consists of following segments.

1. Kadawatha- Kossinna (4.4 km)
2. Kossinna-Mirigama (32.5km)
3. Mirigama-Kurunegala (39.72 km) & Ambepussa Link Road (9.3 km)
4. Pothuhera-Galagedara (32.5 km)
5. Kurunegala-Ridigama (12.5 km)
6. Ridigama-Melsiripura (18.9 km)
7. Melsiripura-Galewela (16.2 km)
8. Galewela-Dambulla (12.7 km)

Sri Lanka Land Reclamation and Development Corporation (SLLRDC) has done a ^{hydrology} ~~hydraulically~~ study for section from Kadawatha to Gampaha under Colombo-Kandy Alternative (CKAH) Project in 2001. Preliminary hydrological studies for the Central Expressway beyond Gampaha have been undertaken by SLLRDC and reports are available in the Road Development Authority (RDA).

2. Objectives of Consultancy

The Consultant shall study the topography and identify the locations where the expressway pass through natural rivers/streams, water paths, marshes, storage pools etc. by studying the rainfall/ geography/runoff characteristics and the effect of constructing an embankment as the first update of expressway platform with bridges/culverts provided for river/stream crossings while identifying

the openings required for each with respect to flood heights for relevant storm of defined return periods as specified for different structures depending on their importance.

It is to be noted that the underside of the structure shall have sufficient freeboard as defined below depending on the discharge through the structure. After this the Consultant shall consider other implications of providing the embankment with above openings such as upstream flooding due to the prevention of over ground flow (sheet flow) and allowing higher discharge through natural channels hitherto not imposed on them which could lead to bottom and bank erosion and high speeds effecting society at large.

The Consultant shall modify their original considerations based on above analysis if necessary and finally provide the openings required for cross drainage with existing/new openings required to prevent runoff/flood related social problems, due solely to construction of the expressway, at its finished condition and while during construction.

The consultant shall undertake the hydrological study of Central Expressway for following Sections.

- a) Kadawatha-Meerigama (37km)
- b) Meerigama-Kurunegala (41km) and Ambepussa Link (9km)
- c) Pothuhera-Galagedara (33 km)
- d) Kurunegala-Dambulla (60km)

Scope of the Consultancy Services

- i) Conduct and complete the consultancy as per the agreed TOR and scope of the consultancy
- ii) Collect data as needed for the study from concerned institutions. The consultants shall acquire ^{available past} real time data.
- iii) Conduct field visits for required data collection or to verify model results.
- iv) Carry out detailed hydrological studies and study the hydraulics of watercourses at the proposed bridge and culvert sites. The requirements for cross drainage of the central expressway and local roads (including bridges) shall be determined as follows or using any other approved method:

- a) Major catchments (greater than 30 sq.km.),
 - Soil conservation Service (SCS) Unit Hydrograph Method developed by the US Corps of Engineers and, where applicable , frequency analysis of flood flows;
- b) Minor catchments (greater than 15 sq. km and less than 30 sq. km.),
 - The modified Rational Method;
- c) Minor catchments (less than 15 sq. km)
 - The Rational Method.

The cross drainage structures shall be designed to withstand floods or return periods and freeboard as follows:

Description	Return Period (Years)	Freeboard (m)	
		Discharge > 300 cu. m/s	Discharge < 300 cu. m/s
Major Roads			
a) Bridges	100	0.9	0.6
b) Major culverts (>2 m diameter or equivalent)	50	0.3	0
c) culverts (<2 m diameter or equivalent)	25	0.3	0
d) Side Drains	5	0	0
Minor (Local) Roads			
a) Bridges	25	0.9	0.6
b) Culverts	10	0.3	0
c) Side Drains	5	0	0

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v) Hydrological analysis shall be carried out using the appropriate computer software. The work to be undertaken shall include, but not to be confined to;

a) Collect, review and analyze relevant data

Primarily, intensity –duration analysis shall be carried out using data from the relevant rain gauge stations of the Department of Meteorology. When such data are not available following approach may be adopted for the absence of better method, the annual maximum daily rainfall data for ten stations in close proximity to the Project Area shall be converted to maximum 24-hourly rainfalls, and these data shall be subjected to extreme value analysis to derive the annual maximum 24-hourly peak hydrograph for the required return periods. The peak hydrograph for shorter periods may be computed by empirical methods applicable. The results derived shall be compared to forecast obtained from actual data in similar regions.

b) Collect, review and analyze stream flow data


Stream flow data available for gauging stations operated by the Irrigation Department shall be collected. These data shall be reviewed and shall be subjected to value analysis to produce flows and levels for 10- and 100- year flood hydrographs. The synthetic 10- year flood hydrograph for this catchment shall be developed using the peak rainfall obtained as above and the relevant catchment characteristics. The two estimates of the 10-year flood shall be compared and adjustments shall be made to the parameters of the synthetically generated flood hydrograph. The adjusted method shall then be applied to the major catchments for which no hydrological data are available and respective flood hydrographs shall be derived.

c) Estimate design flood discharges for smaller catchments

The Modified Rational Formula and Rational Formula shall be used to estimate the design flood flows for minor catchments. These computations shall be based on the rainfall intensities obtained above with an assessment of catchment characteristics. Provide inundation zones and flood levels.

d) Hydraulic design of structures

The requirement of waterway opening sizes for the proposed bridges and sizes of cross drainage culverts shall be determined using the Manning Formula or any other applicable formulae. The roughness of the upstream and downstream channels shall be estimated and compared with the derived values from known locations. The slopes and channel cross sections may be obtained from topographic surveys. The backwater effects (if any) for upstream of proposed river structures shall be determined.



vi) Provide comprehensive review of flood forecasting undertaken by SLLRDC for section from Kadawatha to Gampaha under Colombo-Kandy Alternative (CKAH) Project in 2001 and update using recent hydrological data.

vii) Review and update the preliminary hydrological studies completed for the Central Expressway beyond Gampaha by SLLRDC.

viii) Study and assess sediment load and scouring depths of major rivers.

4. Data, Services and facilities for the Services

The following amenities will be provided by the Client:

a. Office space, for the consultant, to access data and reports, Topo sheets, reports and preliminary design, maps, historic and current data on hydrometeorology, hydrology and hydraulics; rainfall and flood forecast reports will be provided only if available in the RDA.

b. Assistance by other Government agencies for data collection.

The Department of Meteorology of Sri Lanka provides historical daily rainfall Data at various stations Island wide.

Department of Irrigation operates island wide hydro-meteorological observation network for:

- i) Management of hydro-meteorological database and information system to meet the present and future requirements of the country.
- ii) Flood mapping including collection of required data and information related to major floods.
- iii) River gauging.

Hydrometric Network of Sri Lanka

There are 103 major river basins in Sri Lanka which cover the 90 % of total land extent of the country. The remaining 10% which is situated along the coast and Jaffna peninsula is covered by small watersheds which are not much important in hydrological aspect.

About 24 major rivers (out of 103) convey the 80% of total flows generated within the Island and these are considered highly important in hydrological point of view. The present hydrometric network of Hydrology Division of the Department of Irrigation comprises of 33 permanent stations and 40 peripheral stations covering 19 river basins. Department uses manually operated instruments in all those stations except for few rain rainfall recorders and data loggers installed. Thirty-three permanent stations, record hourly water levels by the Department and most of those stations are equipped with manual rain gauges which record rainfalls at 3 hr. intervals.

Processed hydrological data (Daily average discharges (m³ / sec), Monthly stream flow in MCM , Single Flood Event (WL & Q), Annual maximum / minimum values and River water levels) may be obtained from the Department of Irrigation.

River Cross-sectional Survey

River cross-section data will be provided if available in the RDA.

5. Reporting Requirement

a) Inception Report

The consultant shall submit an inception report within one month assessing accuracy and quality of data, methods to be adopted in analyzing data, review of experience and methodology for the development of suitable models for the analysis. Identification of data inputs for the model, outputs expected, methodology for calibration and validation of model.

b) Interim design report in sections –after 3 months and 5 months from start.

c) Draft final report, including all models, tools and acceptance testing.

d) Final report and models and tools after acceptance in hard copy and electronic form.

6. Schedule for Completion of Services

The activities described earlier and the outputs described below shall be completed within a period of seven months.

7. Qualification Requirement of the Consultant

a) Advanced academic degree in Hydrology, Hydraulic and / or Water Resources engineering.

b) At least 10 years working experience in flood modeling tools used for flood forecasting; shall have very good experience in rainfall- run-off modeling.

8. Payments

a) Advance Payment on award of consultancy services - ^{20%}10% of Total Contract Sum. ✓

b) At the submission of Inception Report - ^{20%}10% of Total Contract Sum (end of 1st Month). ✓

c) ~~Interim Design Report 1 - 10% of Total Contract Sum (end of 3rd Month).~~

d) Interim Design Report 2 - 20% of Total Contract Sum (end of 5th Month).

e) Draft Final Report - 25% of Total Contract Sum (end of 6th Month).

f) Final Report - ^{15%}25% of Total Contract Sum (end of 7th Month). ✓

22/9/2015

[Handwritten signature]

Advance Payment shall be paid against an unconditional n demand bank guarantee or any other security acceptable to the RDA.

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Agreement

THIS Agreement is entered into on this 20th March 2017, by and between the Road Development Authority (RDA) ("the Client") having its Head office at Maganeguma Maha Medura, Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha, Koswatte, Battaramulla and Professor K. Karunathilaka, (herein after referred to as the consultant) Department of Sociology, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka.

WHEREAS, the Client wishes to have the Consultant perform the services hereinafter referred to, and WHEREAS, the Consultant is willing to perform these services,

NOW THEREFORE THE PARTIES hereby agree as follows:

1. Services

- (i) The Consultant shall perform the services specified in Annex A, "Terms of Reference and Scope of Services" which is made an integral part of this Contract ("the Services").
- (ii) The Consultant shall submit to the Client the reports in the form (hard and soft versions) and within the time periods specified in the Consultants Proposal.
- (iii) Consultant should take part in all meetings to be convened by RDA and donor agency and should address the requests of other potential stakeholders until final approval is granted.

2. Term

The Consultant shall perform the Services during the period commencing 20th March, 2017 and continuing through 2nd May 2017, or any other period as may be subsequently agreed by the parties in writing.

3. Payment

A. Ceiling

For Services rendered pursuant to Annex A, the Client shall pay the Consultant an amount not exceeding LKR 1,964,750.00.

B. Schedule of Payments

The schedule of payments is specified below:

10% of the Contract Sum (Rs. 196,475.00) upon the client's receipt of the inception report in accordance with the consultant's reporting obligations. (Refer Annex - B)

50% of the contract sum (Rs. 982,375.00) upon client's receipt of a copy of the draft report acceptable to the Client. (Refer Annex - B)

40% of the contract sum (Rs. 785,900.00) upon the client's receipt of the Final Report acceptable to the client together with all soft files, databases programs etc. (Refer Annex - B)

Dr. Karunathilaka / Ms. Subeeka

Dr. Karunathilaka, the consultant
in this RAP, study had
received the inception report.
per the contract, consultant
entitled for 10% i.e.
196,475.00 payment.

will for make necessary arrangement
make the payout (subjected to PD's approval)

PAID

Handwritten signatures and initials.

2017/4/07

C. Payment Conditions

Payment shall be made in Sri Lankan Rupees, no later than 60 days following submission by the Consultant of invoices in duplicate to the Coordinator designated in paragraph 4.

4. **Project Administration**

A. Coordinator.

The Client designates Project Director, Central Expressway Project (Section III) as Client's Coordinator; the Coordinator will be responsible for the coordination of activities under this Contract, for acceptance and approval of the reports and of other deliverables by the Client and for receiving and approving invoices for the payment.

B. Reports.

The reports listed in Annex B, "Consultant's Reporting Obligations," shall be submitted in the course of the assignment, and will constitute the basis for the payments to be made under paragraph 3.

5. **Performance Standards**

The Consultant undertakes to perform the Services with the highest standards of professional and ethical competence and integrity. The Consultant shall promptly replace any employees assigned under this Contract that the Client considers unsatisfactory.

6. **Confidentiality**

The Consultants shall not, during the term of this Contract and within two years after its expiration, disclose any proprietary or confidential information relating to the Services, this Contract or the Client's business or operations without the prior written consent of the Client.

7. **Ownership of Material**

Any studies reports or other material, graphic, software or otherwise, prepared by the Consultant for the Client under the Contract shall belong to and remain the property of the Client. The Consultant may retain a copy of such documents and software.

8. **Consultant Not to be Engaged in Certain Activities**

The Consultant agrees that, during the term of this Contract and after its termination, the Consultant and any entity affiliated with the Consultant, shall be disqualified from providing goods, works or services (other than the Services and any continuation thereof) for any project resulting from or closely related to the Services.

9. **Insurance**

The Consultant will be responsible for taking out any appropriate insurance coverage.

10. **Assignment**


The Consultant shall not assign this Contract or sub-contract any portion of it without the Client's prior written consent.


11. Law Governing Contract and Language The Contract shall be governed by the laws of Government of Sri Lanka, and the language of the Contract shall be English

12. Dispute Resolution Any dispute arising out of the Contract, which cannot be amicably settled between the parties, shall be referred to adjudication/arbitration in accordance with the laws of the Client's country.

FOR THE CLIENT


FOR THE CONSULTANT



.....
Eng. Nihal R. Sooriyarachchi
Chairman
Road Development Authority
Signed by: Eng. Nihal R. Sooriyaarachchi
Title: Chairman,
Road Development Authority
Maganaguma Mahamadura
Koswatta, Battaramulla.



.....
Signed by: Prof. K. Karunathilaka
Title: Professor/ Dept. of Sociology
University of Kelaniya

Witness:

Witness:

1. 
.....
Name: A.R. Jayalath

1. 
.....
Name: D.M.S. Disenayake

physical payment is at on 18th Oct 2017
is approximately 60%

2017/10/18

Granie R. Jayalath
Deputy Director
Central Expressway Project III
Road Development Authority

PAID



LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex A: Terms of Reference and Scope of Services

Annex B: Consultant's Reporting Obligations

Terms of reference to Update the Resettlement Action Plan for Central Expressway Project.

- From Pothuhera to Galagedera, Section III (00+00 – 32+480km)

1. General

The Government of Sri Lanka has decided to construct the Central Expressway starting from Kadawatha to Dambulla with a link expressway from Pothuhera to Galagedera. The first part of the Central Expressway (from Kadawatha to Gampaha) will construct along the selected trace of the former Colombo-Kandy Alternative Highway and then it will follow the Northern Expressway corridor including a link expressway from Pothuhera to Kandy.

1.1 National Laws and Regulations

National Involuntary Resettlement Policy (NIRP)

The Government has adopted NIRP in order to address the adverse social and economic impacts on people who are affected by the acquisition of land by the state for development purposes. The hardships encountered by displaced persons due to involuntary land acquisition often caused social unrests and miseries adding turmoil to various disruptions. Among these miseries, impoverishment of displaced families due to loss of land and livelihood opportunities, food insecurity, lack of access to common property and public services, issues with host communities, and disruption to existing social organizations were very noticeable. The development taking place without due consideration to resettlement issues of the displaced persons caused loss of public interest and confidence on development. This led to growing public resistance for development which has very negative implications in the process of development.

The legislative enactments like LAA and other such provisions and regulations with their amendments are directed towards paying compensation for land, structures and crops to lawful owners of such assets. These enactments do not have remedial measures for non-titled holders although they are using the land in question over many years. The consequences of involuntary land acquisition occurring to them are completely outside matters that have to be solved differently. In addition, apart from provision of funds for compensation payments,

2. Scope of Work

The consultant is required to extract data / information from resettlement action plan prepared by the Road Development Authority for the following expressway segments also.

- i. Resettlement Action Plan for Colombo-Kandy Alternative Highway (from Kadawatha to Kandy).
 - ii. Resettlement Action Plan for Kadawatha to Meerigama with a link road from Meerigama to Ambepussa of the Central Expressway.
 - iii. Resettlement Action Plan for Meerigama to Kurunegala of the Central Expressway.
- The consultant can carry out further studies for preparation of this report in addition to the data available in the current Resettlement Action Plans.
 - It is expected that Resettlement Action Plan will be prepared in close collaboration with the relevant project staff of the Central Expressway Project and Environmental and Social Development Division of the Road Development Authority.

3.0 Consulting team

The team should include experts with experience conducting social assessments in the roads sector development projects, conducting community based consultations, analysis, assessing social mitigation cost etc. The team should be formed in minimum as indicated below with the expertise defined:

Team Leader should be a Sociologist with experience preparing Social Assessments and Resettlement Action Plans and competent of overall team guidance.

- Data analyst quantitative
- Data Analyst qualitative
- GIS Expert
- Field coordinator
- Data operators

ANNEX B

Consultant's Reporting Obligations

Description	Deadline	Feedback
Submission of the inception report.	01 week after signing the contract agreement.	Within 02 days , comments and suggestions will be provided in writing. A meeting will be organized by the employer for discussions/clarifications and provide additional feedback.
Submission of the draft RAP to the RDA.	02 weeks after receiving comments.	Within 1 week , comments, corrections and further information necessary will be provided in writing
Submission of the final RAP to the RDA.	03 week after receiving comments	Submission of Final Reports (5 soft copies and 05 hard copies).

Duration : 42 days

Central Expressway Project,
3rd Floor, Sethsiripaya
Battaramulla
Tel : 94 0112877708
Fax: 94 0112877708
Email: rdapdcep@gmail.com
Alternative e-mail/ contacts
Mr. D. M. S. dissanayaka – envoff_wbrsap@yahoo.com
Mr. Granie R. Jayalath - granierj@eol.lk

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

CONTRACT

THIS CONTRACT ("Contract") is entered into on this 04th September 2015, by and between the Central Expressway Project of the Road Development Authority ("the Client") having its principal place of business at 3rd Floor, Wing 1, Sethsiripaya, Battaramulla and Head of the Department, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Moratuwa, Katubedda, Moratuwa.

WHEREAS, the Client wishes to have the Consultant perform the services hereinafter referred to, and WHEREAS, the Consultant is willing to perform these services,

NOW THEREFORE THE PARTIES hereby agree as follows:

1. Services

- (i) The Consultant shall perform the services specified in Annex A, "Terms of Reference and Scope of Services" which is made an integral part of this Contract ("the Services").
- (ii) The Consultant shall submit to the Client the reports in the form (hard and soft versions) and within the time periods specified in the Consultants Proposal & as well as in the TOR.
- (iii) Consultant should take part in all TEC meetings to be convened by RDA or CEA/ Stake holders and should address the requests of all potential stakeholders whenever needed until the final CEA approval is granted for EIA.

2. Term

The Consultant shall perform the Services during the period commencing 4th September 2015 and continuing through 4th January 2016, or any other period as may be subsequently agreed by the parties in writing.

3. Payment

A. Ceiling

For Services rendered pursuant to Annex A, the Client shall pay the Consultant an amount not exceeding LKR 2,126,250.00 (Sri Lankan Rupees Two Million One Hundred and Twenty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Only) including all taxes.

B. Schedule of Payments

The schedule of payments is specified below:

An advance payment of 20% of Total contract sum Rs.425,250.00 (Sri Lankan Rupees Four Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Two Hundred and Fifty Only) will be paid the day the agreement is signed.

25% of the total contract sum Rs.531,562.50 (Sri Lankan Rupees Five Hundred Thirty One Thousand Five Hundred and Sixty Two and Cents Fifty Only) to be paid upon submission of Inception report.

25% of the total contract sum Rs.531,562.50 (Sri Lankan Rupees Five Hundred Thirty One Thousand Five Hundred and Sixty Two and Cents Fifty Only) to be paid upon submission of Interim Report.

30% of the total contract sum Rs.637,875.00 (Sri Lankan Rupees Six Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy Five Only) upon submission of final Report.

C. Payment Conditions

Payment shall be made in Sri Lankan Rupees, no later than 60 days following submission by the Consultant of invoices in duplicate to the Coordinator designated in paragraph 4.

4. **Project Administration**

A. Coordinator.

The Client designates Eng. Granie R. Jayalath as Client's Coordinator; the Coordinator will be responsible for the coordination of activities under this Contract, for acceptance and approval of the reports and of other deliverables by the Client and for receiving and approving invoices for the payment.

B. Reports.

The reports listed in section 8 of the TOR shall be submitted in the course of the assignment, and will constitute the basis for the payments to be made under paragraph 3.

5. **Performance Standards**

The Consultant undertakes to perform the Services with the highest standards of professional and ethical competence and integrity. The Consultant shall promptly replace any employees assigned under this Contract that the Client considers unsatisfactory.

6. **Confidentiality**

The Consultants shall not, during the term of this Contract and within two years after its expiration, disclose any proprietary or confidential information relating to the Services, this Contract or the Client's business or operations without the prior written consent of the Client.

7. **Ownership of Material**

Any studies reports or other material, graphic, software or otherwise, prepared by the Consultant for the Client under the Contract shall belong to and remain the property of the Client. The Consultant may retain a copy of such documents and software.

Consultant Not to be Engaged in Certain Activities

The Consultant agrees that, during the term of this Contract and after its termination, the Consultant and any entity affiliated with the Consultant, shall be disqualified from providing goods, works or services (other than the Services and any continuation thereof) for any project resulting from or closely related to the Services.

Physical Programs as at on 1st Oct 2019
251
85/- completed for
DPO. 5/12/10/06.

Deputy Director
Expressway Project III
Road Development Authority

1/20
R00

[]

**Terms of Reference for a Consultancy Services to carry-out an
Economic Feasibility Study for Central Expressway**

1. Background

At present the Central and Northern part of the country has no direct connection from Colombo, the capital city through expressway network. The central expressway has been proposed to enhance the connectivity between Colombo and central part of the country through high mobility link.

Feasibility study for the Colombo-Kandy Alternate Highway from Kadawatha to Katugasthota via Ambepussa has been completed in December 2001 – by EURO Infra Group of Sweden in association with Resources Development Consultants of Sri Lanka.

Feasibility study for the Northern Expressway from Enderamulla to Dambulla via Meerigama, Kurunegala with an expressway link to Kandy at Pothuhera has been completed in December 2014.

The Central Expressway has been proposed from Kadawatha to Dambulla with Kandy link on a combined trace from the two traces identified in above mentioned feasibility studies. The detailed feasibility study for the Colombo-Kandy Alternate Highway contains the section from Kadawatha to Gampaha and the section from Gampaha to Dambulla with expressway link from Pothuhera to Gannoruwa includes in the Northern Expressway feasibility study.

The combined trace has been spilt out in to five sections as stated below;

- a) Section 1 -Kadawatha – Gampaha
- b) Section2 -Gampaha– Mirigama
- c) Section 3 -Mirigama_Kurunegala
- d) Section 4 - Pothuhera –Galagedera
- e) Section 5 - Kurunegal–Dambulla

Basic Engineering Attributes- Design standard adopted was AUSTROADS and the geometric design guideline of RDA.

- (i) Main line design parameters: From Kadawatha to Dambulla.
- a) Design speed. - 120 km/hr
 - b) Operational speed - 100 km/hr
 - c) No. of lanes - 4 lane with provision for 6 lanes.
 - d) Carriageway width - 3.6 m
 - e) Shoulder width - 2.5 m
 - f) Centre median width - 2.0 m

(ii) Main design parameters: Section from Pothuhera to Aladeniya

- a) Design speed - 100 km/hr
- b) Operational speed - 80 km/hr
- c) No. of lanes - 4 lane
- d) Carriageway width - 3.6 m
- e) Shoulder width - 2.5 m
- f) Centre median width - 2.0 m

(iii) Main design parameters: Section from Aladeniya to Gannoruwa

- a) Design speed -80 km/hr
- b) Operational speed -70 km/hr
- c) No. of lanes -2 lane
- d) Carriageway width - 3.6 m
- e) Shoulder width - 2.5 m
- f) Centre median width - 2.0 m

2. Objective

The Objective of the study is to carryout Economic Feasibility Study for the proposed central expressway from Kadawatha to Dambulla via Gampaha, Merigama, Kurunegala with an expressway link to Kandy at Pothuhera. The consultant shall use the data and information on the previous feasibility studies carried out for the Colombo-Kandy Alternate Highway and Northern Expressway after reviewing the accuracy and acceptability.

3. Scope of Work

The scope of work shall include the following main tasks, and any additional work necessary to meet the objective of the study;

1. Review the accuracy and acceptability of the economic analysis of feasibility studies for the Colombo-Kandy Alternate Highway and Northern Expressway
2. Identify the most suitable alignment to satisfy the design criteria along the selected corridor?
3. Determine suitable road safety and traffic management system
4. Integrate public transport requirements in to the Central Expressway
5. Development of a traffic demand model and validation
6. Carry out economic analysis (preferably using HDM4) for the complete development of proposed central expressway and individually for each section and estimate the economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR), Net Present Value (NPV) and Benefit Cost Ratio (B/C) of the investment.
7. Recommendation for phasing out of the project for implementation
8. Provide manning schedule describing the utilization of experts within the stipulated time period.
9. Submission of cost proposal to carry out the above tasks in detail with respect to the time frame of the Study

4. Reports and Time Schedule

All reports except the Final Report shall be submitted in three copies plus one original. The final Report shall be submitted in 5 copies plus 1 Original and one set of soft copy. All computer related material shall also be submitted in CD.

All reports shall include a summary of the work carried out up to submission.

It is required to carry out a Power Point Presentation with the submission of draft final report to RDA.

4.1 Inception Report

The report shall be submitted within four (4) week from commencement of work highlighting the progress made and shall include the initial findings from review of previous feasibility studies, data, and alignment trace and recommending any proposed changes. The inception report shall include proposals for road safety and traffic management systems, integrate public transport requirements and the methodology of each activity of the study with the schedule of each activity.

A work methodology and program shall be presented to RDA for its review/comments and approval, including project milestones and RDA shall review and grant approval.

4.2 Draft Final Report

The Draft Final Report shall be submitted within Twelve (12) weeks from the commencement of work.

4.5 Final Report

The Final Report shall incorporate RDA's comments on the Draft Final Report. It shall be submitted within two weeks from the receipt of comments by RDA. The Final Report shall be presented in self-contained Volumes (Hard copy, Soft copy and reproducible) in the following manner:

- (i) **Volume I : Main Report**
 - Executive Summary
 - Project Description
 - Sri Lanka's profile and economic setting/Socio-economic profile of the Project area
 - Methodology adopted for the studies
 - Route Identification Study?*
 - Traffic studies and analysis
 - Geo Technical & Hydrological Studies and Analysis*
 - Description of Technical/Engineering alternative*
 - Alignment Screening*
 - Ranking of Alternatives*
 - Cost Estimates
 - Economic analysis
 - Financial analysis
 - Conclusions and Recommendations

- (ii) **Volume II : Preliminary Design Report**
 Basic Geometric design of proposed trace
 Proposed standards for the road
 Pavement designs
 Quantity and cost estimates
 Bill of Quantities
- (iii) **Volume III : Initial Environmental and Social Assessment Report**
 It has to be decided on whether to include in the FS or carryout separately.
- (iv) **Volume IV : Risk Assessment**
 Risk identification
 Risk assessment
 Allocation of risks
 Risk mitigation
- (v) **Volume V : Drawings**
 Location Map cum Site plan
 Longitudinal Plan and cross –sections
 Typical Cross-sections for pavement and other related details
 General arrangement drawings with cross-section of bridges, if any
 Substructure and foundation details, protective works
 Drawings for cross-drainage and other structures
 Road Intersection drawings

5. Staff Requirements

You need to nominate potential experts in order to achieving the study objective within a period of four (04) months period.

A team consisting of the specialists listed below shall carry out the study. The team shall also have multidisciplinary skills with previous experience in conducting feasibility studies and social and environmental studies for similar projects.

- Transport Specialist(Planning/Economics)
- Highway Engineer
- Structural Engineer
- Hydrologist/ Geotechnical Engineer

6. Cost Proposal

The consultant shall submit a cost proposal considering the staff and other resource requirements and time frame.

7. Payments

The payments will be made according to the payment schedule which should be clearly defined in the reporting schedule.

Reporting schedule

Submit the proposed work programme clearly indicating the input of each consultant.

CONTRACT

THIS CONTRACT ("Contract") is entered into on this 1st day of February 2017, by and between the Road Development Authority a body corporate established by Road Development Authority Act No. 73 of 1981 having its head office Maganeguma Mahamedura, Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha, Battramulla here in after, referred to as Client of the one part and University of Moratuwa, a University established under the provisions of the Universities Act No.16 of 1978 here in after referred to as Consultant.

WHEREAS, the Client wishes to obtain the Consultant to perform the services hereinafter referred to, and WHEREAS, the Consultant has agreed to perform the services hereinafter mentioned,

NOW THEREFORE THE PARTIES hereby agree as follows: ,

1. **Services**
- (i) The Consultant shall perform the services specified in Annex 1, "Terms of Reference" which is made an integral part of this Contract ("the Services").
 - (ii) The Consultant shall submit to the Client the reports in the form (hard and soft versions) and within the time periods specified under section 13 "Time frame and deliverables" of the TOR.
 - (iii) Consultant should take part in all TEC meetings to be convened by the client.

2. **Term**
- The Consultant shall perform the Services during the period commencing from 1st February 2017 and continuing through 22nd May 2017, or any other extended period as may be subsequently agreed by the parties in writing.

3. **Payment**
- A. Ceiling
- For Services rendered pursuant to Annex -1, the Client shall pay the Consultant LKR 3,871,259.00.

B. Payment Schedule

- (a) An advance payment of Rs. 774,251.00 will be paid within one week from the date, letter of acknowledgement is received from the consultant.
- (b) A second payment of Rs. 774,252.00 will be paid within 3 weeks, from the date the inception report is received by the client.
- (c) A 3rd payment of to Rs. 1,161,378 will be paid within 3 weeks from the date the final draft report is received by the client.
- (d) Final payment of Rs. 1,161,378.00 to be paid within 1 month from the date the final report is received by the client.

11. Law Governing Contract and Language The Contract shall be governed by the laws of Government of Sri Lanka, and the language of the Contract shall be English

12. Dispute Resolution Any dispute arising out of the Contract, which cannot be amicably settled between the parties, shall be referred to the two Secretaries of the line ministry which parties belongs to and the decision of two Secretaries will be the final and bound by the parties.

FOR THE CLIENT

FOR THE CONSULTANT

.....
(Handwritten signature)

.....
J.M.S.J. Bandara

Signed by: Mr.N.R.Sooriarachchi
Chairman, ~~(Eng. Nihal R. Sooriyarachchi)~~
Road Development Authority, chairman
Maganaguma Mahamudara, Road Development Authority
Koswatta, Battaramulla.

Signed by: Prof. Saman Bandara
Title: Head, Department of Civil Engineering
University of Moratuwa
Katubedda, ~~Professor J M S J Bandara~~
Moratuwa. **Head, Department of Civil Engineering**
University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka.

Witness:
1. *D.A. Gomic R Jayalath*
.....
(Handwritten signature)
Name:

Witness:
1. *(Handwritten signature)*
.....
Name: *Dr. H.R. Pasindu*

*Physical programs as above
18 Oct 2017 - 20 Feb 2018
S.S.D. DPD.
2017/10/06.*
Granie R. Jayalath
Deputy Director
Central Expressway Project III
Road Development Authority

Latest -
25/1/2016

THE TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. The objective of the study is to compile a Single Feasibility Study (SFS) report for the Central Expressway Project, covering entire trace. I.e. all four sections stated below.

Section 1: **Kadawatha to Mirigama (North)**

Section 2: **Mirigama (North) to Kurunegala with Ambepussa Link**

Section 3: **Pothuhera – Galagedara**

Section 4: **Kurunegala – Dambulla**

2. The single feasibility report is to be compiled based on the following study reports available in respect of CEP. Refer Table 01.

Table 01

Report No. 1	The feasibility study carried out for Northern Expressway Project by SMEC International, 2013
Report No. 2	The feasibility study carried out for Colombo-Kandy Alternative Highway by EURO INFRA Group in 2001
Report No. 3	Economic feasibility study carried for the Central Expressway by University of Moratuwa, 2016
Report No. 4	Feasibility study report prepared for Central Expressway – Section 1 (RDA CEP 1) by Road Development Authority, 2016

3. The template and content of the single feasibility study report should be similar to the one prepared by Road Development Authority for Central Expressway Section 1 (RDA CEP 1), i.e. Report No. 4 stated under item No. 2 in Table 01.
4. Engineering estimates related to civil works have already being prepared for almost all sections of CEP. As such consultant is needed to incorporate these cost figures in compiling the SFS report.
5. Analysis can be carried out taking the Ambepussa link as included.
6. The alternative analysis for the entire trace and section wise can be based on the analysis given in the Report No. 3. Stated in Table 01.
7. The RDA/TEC decided to have the CUBE Model correctly calibrated and validated considering base year as 2016. Hence consultant is needed to carryout cube model calibrated & validated as well (In respect of Traffic volumes and & speeds). This may warrant the need to carry out few screen traffic counts and speed surveys.
8. It is our understanding that traffic demand model (cube) used by SMEC for Northern Expressway Feasibility Study had been used for Central Expressway Project Economic Feasibility Study with updates done on following areas.
 - a) CEP commencing point was changed from Enderamulla to Kadawatha.
 - b) Network in CUBE was updated with new interchanges at Polgahawela, Rambukkana on Kandy link & at Mirigama North, Rideegama & Galagedara on mainline.
 - c) CEP was considered connected to a local improved road network in and around Kandy as confirmed by RDA.
 - d) The Ambepussa link with a standard two lane, two-way road was connected to the CEP at Meerigama north IC.

9. Further cube model parameters were changed to suit the values indicated in Table 02, 03 and 04, for the purpose of Economic Feasibility Study of CEP on recommendations of RDA & same updated version could be used for this stage too.

Table 02 - Values of VOT and VOC

Vehicle Type	VOT (Rs./hr)	VOC (Rs./km)
Private Vehicle Non Business Car Trip (PV NB)	407	28.77
Private Vehicle Business Car Trip (PV B)	597	28.77
Light Commercial Vehicle Trip (LCV)	517	28.77
Medium Commercial Vehicle Trip (MCV)	850	47.10
Heavy Commercial Vehicle Trip (HCV)	1250	68.37

Regression model was developed to identify the current tolling strategy of RDA and following values were used.

Table 03- Tolling Rates

Vehicle Category	Fixed Cost (Rs.)	Variable Cost (Rs/km)	R ² of the Estimate
Category 1 (Car, Van, LCV)	76.47	3.64	0.9613
Category 3 (MCV)	76.32	11.85	0.9974
Category 4 (HCV)	93.77	15.53	0.9891

Vehicle growth rates were adjusted to match the observed and recommended values as given below under CEP CAGR.

Table 04 – Vehicle growth rates

SC2_3	Based Year 2012 Trips	NEP 2036 Trips	NEP (CAGR)	CEP (CAGR)
PV_NB	611339	854331	1.40%	5.0%
PV_B	102895	146007	1.47%	5.0%
LCV	58970	199436	5.21%	4.0%
MCV	222564	753206	5.21%	3.5%
HCV	11878	40086	5.20%	2.5%

10. The section on Economic Feasibility Study of the single feasibility report should include the following components. All relevant assumptions should be clearly stated together with relevant references.
- (i) Overview of regional economic characteristics
 - (ii) Estimation of Economic costs and benefits
 - (iii) Estimation of Economic Performance Indicators (i.e B/C ratio, EIRR, NPV etc..)
 - (iv) Sensitivity analysis
11. All of the scenarios stated in the Table 05, that were evaluated for each sections during the EFS, should be included in the single feasibility report. For each and every scenario stated in table 05, it is required to assess the roadway design capacities too.

Table 05 – Scenarios for Analysis

Feasibility Report	Base case	Analysis Scenarios
Entire trace	Do nothing	Entire trace (Section 1-4) Kadawatha to Kurunegala with Ambepussa link (Section 1+2) Kadawatha to Kurunegala with Ambepussa link and Pothuhera to Galagedara (Section 1+2+3) Kadawatha to Kurunegala & then to Dambulla (1+2+4) Kadawatha to Kurunegala without Ambepussa link & Pothuhera to Galagedara (Section 1+2+3)

12. Financial Analysis (FA)

In general FA should include the components covered by the RDA (CEP-1) report. Consultant is requested include an appropriate financing mechanism in consultation with the RDA. FA component in the full feasibility report should include following elements.

- (i) Estimation of toll revenue
- (ii) Cash flow calculation
- (iii) Financial performance indicators (NPV, FIRR & Cost recovery)

13. Time Frame & Deliverables

- (i) Submission of Inception report - 3 weeks period from the date the advanced Payment is received by UOM.
- (ii) RDA/TEC comments - 2 weeks from the date inception report is received by RDA.
- (iii) Submission of Draft Report - 3 months period from the date RDA/TEC comments are received by UOM.
- (iv) Submission of the Final Report - 2 weeks period from the date RDA/TEC comments are received by UOM.

Annex-2 provides a tentative chapter outline of the single feasibility study.

14. Interim Progress Monitoring & Payment Schedule

- (i) Interim progress review sessions will be held on 3rd Monday of each month until the final assignment is delivered. These review sessions will be chaired by DG,RDA & will be held at 1st floor, RDA, Head office.
- (ii) Payment Schedule.
 - (a) An advance payment equivalent to Rs.774,251.00 will be released within one week from the date, letter of acknowledgement is received from University of Moratuwa.
 - (b) A second payment equivalent to Rs. 774,252.00 will be released within 3 weeks, from the date the inception report is received by RDA/TEC.
 - (c) A 3rd payment in equivalent to Rs. 1,161,378 will be released within 3 weeks from the date the final draft report is received by RDA/TEC.

- (d) Final payment in equivalent to Rs. 1,161,378.00 is released within 1 month from the date the final report is received by RDA/TEC.

ANNEX -2

Chapter outline of the full Feasibility Study

Chapter	Title	Source
1	Introduction	-
2	Socio-Economic Profile of Country Regional Characteristics Road Transport Sector Importance of the Sector to the Economy Authorities Responsible for the Sector Demand of the Sector and the Extent to which the Demand is satisfied Budgeting and Expenditure Master Plan Out Comes	Consultant, Report No. 4 Consultant, Report No. 1, 4 Report No. 4, RDA to provide other information if necessary
3	Alternative corridor Analysis	Report 3
4	Geotechnical Investigations	RDA to provide updated information for each section
5	Material Availability	
6	Hydrological Study	
7	Traffic studies and Demand Forecasting TRAFFIC SURVEYS AND ANALYSES TRAFFIC DEMAND ANALYSIS Calculation of Capacity requirement for Expressway	Report No. 1,2, with model calibrated to base year considered as 2016. Consultant, follow capacity analysis method in Report No. 4
8	Highway Engineering Design Criteria and Technical Standards Geometric Designs of the Expressway Positioning of the Interchanges Structural Designs of the Expressway elements Planning & design of Toll plazas Drainage Designs	RDA to provide updated information for each section. Consultant is needed to have an interim briefing session once the traffic forecast is completed in order to get the consent of RDA/ TEC.
9	Economic Analysis Estimation of Economic Returns Project Risks Base Case and Alternatives Economic Cost Estimate Operations & Maintenance Cost Maintenance Cost Calculation Periodic Maintenance Cost Benefit Stream Analysis – Methodology and Assumption Result of the Economic Analysis with Sensitivity Analysis	RDA to provide construction cost for each section, maintenance and operating cost estimates, The other assumptions and missing data will be based on the available information in Report No.4
10	Financial Analysis Estimation of Toll Revenue Financial Calculation	RDA to provide funding mechanism proposed for each section, including loan amount, period, interest rate etc., Toll revenue estimation will be based on the toll rates adopted in the demand model. Alternatively consultant too, is requested to propose desirable funding mechanisms.



GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND HIGHWAYS

INVITATION FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST (EOI)

**PROVIDING CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION CONSULTANCY SERVICES
FOR THE SECTION FROM POTHUHERA AND PROCEEDS UP TO
GALAGEDARA VIA RAMBUKKANA OF CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY SECTION 3**


- 1.0 The Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) intends to select a Local Engineering Consultancy Firm (individual or joint venture / consortium) through a process of Expression of Interest (EOI) and thereby calling technical and financial proposals from the short-list who could meet following requirements:
 - i. Financing through local banks or locally operated international banks for at least Rs. 2 billion.
 - ii. Possibility of obtaining the services of at least 10 experts for specialized areas.
 - iii. Having minimum of 5 years experience in the construction supervision of expressway / highways as an individual or joint venture / consortium.
- 1.1 The Consultancy firm selected should obtain a loan from a local bank or an international bank operated in Sri Lanka to cover up the fees for Consultancy Services which will be payable by the Government within a period of fifteen (15) years including a grace period of three (03) years.
- 2.0 The Expressway Construction contracts will be administered under the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction (First Edition 1999). The construction operation will be based on the Quality Assurance System. These civil works contracts will be awarded on the basis of design done by the RDA from which schedules of quantities have been derived. The contracts provide for the contractor to carry out survey and setting out of design details and prepare detailed cross-sections, based on the actual cross-sections and design details. These designs require the approval of the Engineer.
- 3.0 The civil works contracts will involve a length of four lanes two way expressway equal to 32.5 km. This whole section is to be divided into five (5) contract packages so that each package will have an approximate value of construction and an approximate length in the range of 4.5 to 7.5km. The proposed construction period of each package will be 36 months.
- 4.0 It is intended to procure the services of one consultancy firm (individual or joint venture / consortium) with some foreign inputs including 5 sets of field staff to supervise each and every contract package to function as the Engineer for the Central Expressway Section 3.
- 5.0 Scope of Consultancy services will include preconstruction review of design and any revision to them, Construction supervision, Contract Administration/Management, Quality Assurance, Safety and preparation of necessary reports, assistance as required for the resolution of disputes and also statement at completion.
- 6.0 Local engineering consultancy firms (individual or joint venture/consortium) are invited to indicate their interest in providing the required services by submitting an Expression of Interest (EOI) in a standard format available at the address given below on working days from 9.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. from 16.12.2015 to 29.12.2015.

Project Director
Central Expressway Project (III)
Road Development Authority
3rd Floor,
Sethsiripaya (Stage I),
Battaramulla
Tel: 0112873232
Fax: 0112877708
- 7.0 A short list will be prepared based on the evaluation of the EOI. The final selection of the consultancy firm to undertake the assignment will be made from short list after inviting detailed Requests for Proposals (RRPs).
- 8.0 The EOI must be submitted to the address given below before 14.00 hrs. on 31.12.2015.

Chairman,
Cabinet Appointed Consultancy Procurement Committee
C/o Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
08th Floor,
"Maganeguma Mahamedura"
Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha,
Koswatta, Battaramulla.
- 9.0 The Consultancy firms will be selected in accordance with the procedures set out in the National Procurement Agency Guidelines for selection and employment of consultants.

Secretary
Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
08th Floor
"Maganeguma Mahamedura"
Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha,
Koswatta,
Battaramulla.

Copy to be submitted by 16/12/2015



(copy)

අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල කාර්යාලය
அமைச்சரவை அலுவலகம்
OFFICE OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS

CABINET DECISION අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණය அமைச்சரவைத் தீர்மானம்

පිටපත් : ජනාධිපති ලේකම්.
 අමාත්‍යාණ්ඩ ලේකම්.
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 ආර්.ක. ලේකම්.
 මුදල් ලේකම්.
 විගණකාධිපති.

මගේ අංකය: අමප/16/0837/713/004-II
2016 මැයි මස 18 දින.

COM PD 92/108

ක්‍රියා කළ යුතු : උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්.

මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය - පොකුණුර සිට ගලගෙදර දක්වා (කි.මී.32.5) දක්වා වන 3 වන කොටස ඉදි කිරීම - සවිස්තරාත්මක සැලසුම්, ඉදි කිරීම සහ කොන්ත්‍රාත් පැමිණිලි කිරීමට අරමුදල් සැපයීම සහ ඉදි කිරීම අධීක්ෂණය සඳහා උපදේශකයෙකු තෝරාගැනීම සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබාගැනීම

(උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග ගැ ඇමතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ 2016-05-06 දිනැති සංදේශය)

2016 මැයි මස 10 දින පැවැත්වුණු අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී එළඹී තීරණයක් අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු සඳහා මේ සමඟ එවා ඇත.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ඒ.එස්.ප්‍රනාන්දු
අතිරේක ලේකම්.

අ.කමල්/එස්.අබේසිංහ
අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම්.

(ඇ) දෙවන පරිපූරක න්‍යාය පත්‍රයේ විෂයයන්:

- 44. අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක 16/0837/713/004-II වූ, “මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය - පොකුණුර සිට ගලගෙදර දක්වා (කි.මී.32.5) දක්වා වන 3 වන කොටස ඉදි කිරීම - සවිස්තරාත්මක සැලසුම්, ඉදි කිරීම සහ කොන්ත්‍රාත් පැමිණිලි කිරීමට අරමුදල් සැපයීම සහ ඉදි කිරීම අධීක්ෂණය සඳහා උපදේශකයෙකු තෝරාගැනීම සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබාගැනීම” යන මාගෙන් උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග ඇමතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ 2016-05-06 දිනැති සංදේශය - (අමප අංක 16/0740/713/004-I පිළිබඳව වූ 2016-04-26 දිනැති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණයට අදාළව) ඉහතින් සංදේශය මුදල් ඇමතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ සමඟ සලකා බලන ලදී. මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කිරීමෙන් අනතුරුව, සංදේශයේ 3.1 ඡේදයේ සඳහන් (i), (ii), (iii) සහ (iv) යෝජනා සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා දීමට තීරණය කරන ලදී.

මෙහි තීරණය සම්පූර්ණයෙන් වැඩිදුර පැහැදිලි කර ඇති බව අවධානය යොමු කර තීරණයකර 2329671 දුරකථන අංකය මගින් අතිරේක ලේකම් විමසීම වැනවි.

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ක්‍රියා කළ යුතු:

උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය - ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණ යා කොට ඇත.

පිටපත්:

ජනාධිපති ලේකම් - සංදේශයේ පිටපතක් හා ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණ යා කොට ඇත.

අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් - සංදේශයේ පිටපතක් හා ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණ යා කොට ඇත.

ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය - සංදේශයේ පිටපතක් හා ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණ යා කොට ඇත.

මුදල් අමාත්‍යාංශය

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A Decision of the Cabinet meeting held on 2016.05.10

(C) **Second Supplementary Agenda Items:**

44. Cabinet Paper No.16/0837/713/004-II, a Memorandum dated 2016-05-06 by the Minister of Higher Education and Highways on "Central Expressway Project - Construction of Section 3 from Pothuhera to Galagedara (32.5 km) - Requesting approval to receive proposals for Detailed Design, Construction and Financing of Contract Packages and for the Selection of a Consultant for Construction Supervision" - (Cabinet decision dated 2016-04-26 on CP No.16/0740/713/004-I refers) the above Memorandum was considered along with the observations of the Minister of Finance. After discussion, it was decided to grant approval to the proposals (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) in paragraph 3.1 of the Memorandum.

Action by: **My/Higher Education and Highways** - above observations annexed.

Copied to: **Secretary to the President** - copy of Memorandum and above observations annexed.

Secretary to the Prime Minister - copy of Memorandum and above observations annexed.

My/National Policies and Economic Affairs - copy of Memorandum and above observations annexed.

My/Finance

(85)



Cabinet Memorandum

CM No.: 23 /2016

CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY PROJECT
CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 3 - FROM POTHUHERA TO GALAGEDERA (32.5 km)
REQUESTING APPROVAL TO RECEIVE PROPOSALS
FOR DETAILED DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING OF CONTRACT PACKAGES
AND FOR THE SELECTION OF A CONSULTANT FOR CONSTRUCTION SUPERVISION

1.0 BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The Cabinet of Ministers granted approval on 2016-04-26 to annul the procurement process that has been already commenced for the selection of civil works contractors for the construction of the Section 3 of the Central Expressway from Pothuhera to Galagedera in order to incorporate major changes to the design of this section of the expressway due to environmental concerns. (Ref: Cabinet Memorandum No. 16/0740//713/004-I dated 2016-04-24)
- 1.2 The Cabinet Committee on Economic Management granted approval on 2016-05-04 for the Request for Proposal document prepared by the Ministry of Higher Education & Highways based on the revised designs and to receive proposal from interested international/ local construction companies / joint ventures having experience in expressways for detailed design, construction and financing of two contract packages for the construction of Section 3 of the Central Expressway.
- 1.3 In view of the changes made in the designs and in the number of contract packages it is recommended to annul the procurement process that has been already commenced for the selection of consultants for construction supervision after obtaining approval of the Cabinet of Ministers on 2015-12-09 (Ref: Cabinet Memorandum No. 15/1879/713/020-I dated 2015-12-03 and the Note to the Cabinet No.16/0113/713/004 dated 2016-01-19) It is now recommended to engage an international consultancy firm having experience in the construction of expressways in association with local consultancy firms to provide consultancy services for construction supervision for the entire Section 3 of the Central Expressway. from Pothuhera to Galagedera due to the complexities involved in the nature of construction.

2.0 COMMENTS

- 2.1 To be eligible for the submission of proposal, the project proponent should have the required experience in the construction of expressways, technical and financial capabilities stipulated in the Request for Proposals and submit documentary evidence for making arrangements to finance the project by an local/international lending agency at the terms and conditions acceptable to the Government of Sri Lanka.

2.2 The proposals will be evaluated on competitive basis and successful project proponent for each contract package will be selected by the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC). Although one particular project proponent may submit proposals for more than one contract package it will be eligible for the award of contract for only one contract package. The award of contracts will be determined on the basis of the quality of technical proposal and least cost to the client.

2.3 In order to provide consultancy services for construction supervision for the entire Section 3 of the Central Expressway from Pothuhera to Galagedera comprising of two contract packages as stated in paragraph 1.3 above an international consultancy firm in association with local consultancy firms needs to be selected on competitive basis after receiving and evaluating of technical and financial proposals from interested international consultancy firms.

3.0 RECOMMENDATION

3.1 Therefore approval of the Cabinet of Ministers is sought for the following;

- (i) To receive separately for each of the two contract packages, proposals from interested international/local construction companies / joint ventures who have experience in expressways for detailed design, construction and financing;
- (ii) To authorize the General Treasury to appoint a Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) for evaluation of proposals, conducting negotiations with the project proponents and to submit recommendations for the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers.
- (iii) To annul the procurement process that has been already commenced for the selection of consultants for construction supervision after obtaining approval of the Cabinet of Ministers on 2015-12-09 and to receive technical proposals and financial proposals from interested international consultancy firms who have experience in expressways for providing consultancy services for construction supervision for the entire Section 3 of the Central Expressway. from Pothuhera to Galagedera; and
- (iv) To authorize the General Treasury to appoint a Cabinet Appointed Consultants Procurement Committee (CACPC) to evaluate technical proposals and financial proposals to be received from interested international consultancy firms, to conduct negotiations and to submit recommendations for the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers.



LAKSHMAN KIRIELLA
MINISTER OF HIGHER EDUCATION & HIGHWAYS

06 May 2016.

THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN
IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

20, SRIMATH R.G. SENANAYAKE MAWATHA
COLOMBO 07, SRI LANKA.
TEL : 011 2693831 - 3
FAX : 011 2698629
http : //www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp



25th May 2016

Mr. N. R. Suriyarachchi
The Chairman
Road Development Authority
"Maganeguma Mahamedura"
No: 216, Derzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha
Koswatta
Battaramulla

Dear Sir,

RE: CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY SECTION - 3

We refer to the discussions between Mr. Lakshman Kiriella, Minister of University Education and Highways and Mr. Kenichi Suganuma, Ambassador of Japan on 20th May and your letter dated 24th May 2016 with regard to the implementation of the captioned project, and are pleased to inform you the followings.

1. We received confirmation from Japanese construction companies that they are in principle ready to enter into detailed discussion about the project, on the premise that they will arrange for concessional financing from Japanese financial institutions.
2. The envisaged commencement of work and the construction period should be included in the Request for Proposal to be issued to Japanese contractors, and interested contractors will reply accordingly.
3. The cost for Land Acquisition could be covered by the above financing as long as the financial institution agrees.
4. The Embassy could provide name of three or more contractors and construction supervision consultants, based on the advice of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Sri Lanka by 10th June 2016.

Trust the above clarifies.

Thanking you

Yours faithfully

Koji Yagi

Koji Yagi
Deputy Head of Mission
Embassy of Japan


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L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

CC Hon. Minister - Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
Director General, Road Development Authority
Project Director, Central Expressway Project - 3

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THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN
IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA20, SRIMATH R.G. SENANAYAKE MAWATHA,
COLOMBO 07, SRI LANKA.
TEL: 011 2693831-3
FAX: 011 2698629
http://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp

May 31, 2016

Mr. N.R. Sooriyarachchi
Chairman-Road Development Authority
"Maga Neguma Mahamedura"
No.216, Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha
Battaramulla

Dear Mr. Sooriyarachchi,

RE: Central Expressway Project - Section 3

I write with reference to your letter to H. E. Mr. Kenichi Suganuma, Ambassador of Japan, dated May 24, 2016 as well as my letter addressed to you on the following day regarding the implementation process of the above project.

As requested, we are pleased to inform you, upon consultation with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Sri Lanka, that the following Japanese companies are prominent civil works contractors capable to construct a 32.5km long, 4 lane two way expressway, mentioned in your letter:

Contractors

- Taisei Corporation
- Penta-Ocean Construction Co., Ltd
- Wakachiku Construction Co., Ltd

We are also informing you that the following Japanese construction supervision consultants are able to manage the construction supervision of the same expressway.

Consultants


- Nippon Koei Co., Ltd
- Oriental Consultants Co., Ltd
- Katahira & Engineers International (Private) Limited

All of the above companies are registered to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Sri Lanka and have offices in Sri Lanka.

I look forward to your favourable consideration of this reply.

Thank you in advance for your kind cooperation.

Yours sincerely,


Koji Yagi
Deputy Head of Mission
Embassy of Japan

Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

c.c. Hon. Mr. Lakshman Kiriella, Minister, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
Mr. R. Paskaralingam, Sr. Advisor to the Prime Minister
Mr. D. C. Dissanayake, Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
Mr. M. P. K. L. Gunaratne, Director General, Road Development Authority
Mr. L. V. S. Weerakoon, Project Director, Central Expressway Project- 3

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வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபை
Road Development Authority

"මගනුම මහමදුර", නො. 216, ඩෙන්සිල් කොබ්බෑකඩුව මාවත,
කොස්වත්ත, බත්තරමුල්ල.

"மகநெகுமா மஹமெதுரா", இல: 216, டென்சில் கொப்பேகடுவ மாவத்தை,
கொஸ்வத்தை, பத்தரமுல்லை.

"Maga Neguma Mahamedura", No: 216 Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mw,
Koswatta, Battaramulla.

ඔබේ අංකය }
எனது இல }
My No. }

RDA/CH/CEP-3

ඔබේ අංකය }
உமது இல }
Your No. }

දිනය }
திகதி }
Date }

24th May 2016

His Excellency, Kenichi Suganuma
Ambassador of Japan
No 20,
Srimath R.G.Senanayake Mawatha,
Colombo 07.

Your Excellency,

RE: Central Expressway Project – Section -3

This is further to the discussion had with your Excellency, Honorable Minister of Higher Education & Highways, Secretary to the Ministry, myself and other officials of the Road Development Authority at the Sri Lanka Parliament Premises on 20th May 2016, with regard to the implementation of the section 3 of the Central Expressway Project.

As discussed, on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, I kindly request Your Excellency to make necessary arrangement to nominate three (3) or more prominent & capable civil works contractors in order for us to receive detailed proposals to construct the 32.5km long, 4-lane two way expressway that passes through a terrain having complex topographic and geotechnical issues.

Further your similar patronage is seek for us to receive proposals by nominating three (3) or more capable construction supervision consultants to manage the constructions supervision.

The proposed organizations should be capable to source the concessionary finances form Japanese lending agencies.

Your Excellency's early response is greatly appreciated.

Thank you

Yours faithfully



N.R. Sooriyarachchi

Chairman

Road Development Authority

CC: Hon. Minister, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
Director General, Road Development Authority
Project Director, Central Expressway Project -3

Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

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Notes:-

Phone Numbers: 2862767, Director General 2862795, Working Director 2887257, General Numbers +94-11-2046200

Postal Director Generals {Projects 2862485, AO&M 2864804, CD 2882194, NP 2887463}

Departments {Administration 2865245, Engineering Services 2864803, EO&M 038-2291373, ESD 2187165, Finance 2864799.

Highway Designs 2874024, Internal Audit 2872661, Lands 2889350, Legal 2186044, Mechanical 2872273, MM&C 2882196,

Planning 2882995, Procurement 2886863 R&D 2632646, Rural Bridges 2623896, Training 2869342, Works 2864388}

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE MINISTRY OF HIGHWAYS, PORTS AND SHIPPING, SRI LANKA

&

METALLURGICAL CORPORATION OF CHINA LTD

FOR

**THE PLANNING, DESIGNING, FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION
OF APPROXIMATELY 46 KM OF STAGE 3 OF NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY FROM AMBEPUSSA TO
KANDY & THE ASSOCIATED PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT**

....OCTOBER 2013

271

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE MINISTRY OF HIGHWAYS, PORTS AND SHIPPING, SRI LANKA

&

METALLURGICAL CORPORATION OF CHINA LTD

FOR

THE PLANNING, DESIGNING, FINANCING THE DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION, AND OPERATION OF APPROXIMATELY 46 KM OF STAGE 3 OF NORTHERN EXPRESSWAY FROM AMBEPUSSA TO KANDY & THE ASSOCIATED PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT

This Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as MOU) entered on 7th October 2013, between the Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (hereinafter referred to as Ministry) on the one part and Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd of No 28, Shuguangxili, Chaoyang District, Beijing, PR China (hereinafter referred to as MCC) on the other part for the planning, designing, financing the development, construction, and operation of approximately 46 Km of Stage 3 of Northern Expressway from Ambepussa to Kandy and the associated property development (hereinafter referred to as Project).

The Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping and Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Parties) guided by the long-established warm and friendly relationship between Governments of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the People's Republic of China and their endeavor to contribute to the further development of Sri Lanka and recognizing the efforts of the Government of Sri Lanka for the development of infrastructures as enshrined in the "Mahinda Chinthana-Vision for the Future", have reached the following understanding:

Article 1

Project Objectives

MCC shall plan, design and finance the development and construction and operation of approximately 46 Km of Stage 3 of Northern Expressway from Ambepussa to Kandy and the associated property development.

The completion of the project shall be on Public - Private Partnership (PPP) basis or on any other basis mutually agreed by parties depending on the outcome of the Feasibility Study. Financing mechanism shall be detailed by MCC in their proposal.

Article 2

Planning, Designing, Financing the Development, Construction, and Operation of the Project and Related Activities

MCC shall, within the MOU, undertake the planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of the project subject to the necessary approvals by the Government of Sri Lanka for the Project Proposal and, within the time tables to be agreed. The Parties shall fully, co-operate through, including but not limited to mechanisms identified in this MOU, to achieve the objectives as set out in Article 1 of this MOU.

Article 3
Project Parameters

- (i) The planning, designing financing the development, construction and operation of approximately 46 Km of Stage 3 of Northern Expressway from Ambepussa to Kandy and the associated property development by MCC shall initially entail the preparation of various feasibility reports on the viability (from both engineering and commercial perspectives) for construction and the associated property development, as appropriate, and subsequently, submission of unsolicited Project Proposal (consisting of Financial and Technical proposals) to the Ministry for the planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of the approximately 46 Km of Stage 3 of Northern Expressway from Ambepussa to Kandy and the associated property development as appropriate.
- (ii) MCC shall within three (03) months from the date of receiving the documents specified in Article 9 (III) of this MOU, with the assistance of the Ministry, conclude the preparation of the feasibility reports on the viability of the Project and other feasibility reports for the associated property development shall be concluded within the timetables to be agreed.
- (iii) MCC shall within Six (06) months from the date of receiving the documents specified in Article 9 (III) of this MOU, submit a Proposal, (consisting of Financial and Technical proposals) to the Ministry for the construction of approximately 46 Km of Stage 3 of Northern Expressway from Ambepussa to Kandy to be considered for the award of Contract for the Planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of the said section of Northern Expressway.
- (iv) The Proposals for the associated property development shall be submitted by MCC within the time tables to be agreed with the Ministry.

Article 4
Cost of Feasibility Study and Submission of Documents

MCC shall bear the entire costs associated with Feasibility Study including any investigation, preparation and submission of all documents stated in this MOU. Ministry shall not be responsible or liable for those costs, regardless of the conduct or outcome of any process stated in this MOU.

Article 5
Institutional Arrangements

The Project shall be implemented in consultation and with the necessary approvals of the Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping and other relevant Government Authorities.

Article 6
Allocation of Land

Construction shall take place on land earmarked, without any encumbrances, and provided for these purposes by the Government of Sri Lanka.

The associated property development, where required, shall take place on land earmarked and provided in compliance with laws and regulations of Democratic Socialist Republic Sri Lanka for these purposes and leased to MCC on mutually agreed terms and period.

Implementation Modalities

The Implementation Modalities shall be discussed and agreed between the parties and thereafter such agreed implementation Modalities shall be enshrined in the Financial and Technical Proposal to be submitted by MCC to the Ministry for the planning, designing, financing development, construction and operation of the Project.

Article 8

Technical Norms and Standards

Design parameters, technical norms, standards and specifications for the planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation and the associated property development shall be finalized by mutual consultation between the Parties, as appropriate. MCC shall take all reasonable endeavors to prepare their Project Proposal in accordance with the technical norms and standards to be mutually agreed.

Article 9

Responsibilities of the Ministry

In order to ensure successful implementation of the Project, Ministry shall take upon itself the following roles and responsibilities:

- (i) To identify and provide land for construction and operation of the said section of Northern Expressway without any encumbrances;
- (ii) To acquire requisite land in compliance with laws and regulations of Democratic Socialist Republic Sri Lanka for the associated property development and make available to MCC on lease basis.
- (iii) To provide to MCC the master plan for the Northern Expressway and recent feasibility study report by SMEC, which has already been developed under the Ministry, which includes the feasibility study for the section Ambepussa to Kandy (stage 3) and other master plans if any, within 30 days for the planning, designing and financing the development, construction and operation of the associated property development, together with all relevant plans, drawing and other associated documentation and data as available.
- (iv) Shall assist MCC with all available, qualified and experienced officials, who have associated with the Project and see the possibility of extending the assistance of consultants and experts who involved in the project.
- (v) To arrange assistance required for all necessary clearances from provincial, district and designated local authorities in respect of preparation of a feasibility reports by MCC;
- (vi) To provide requisite short-term and long-term stay visas under appropriate categories for staff of MCC and their Associates/Consultants involved in the preparation and submission of documentation works relevant to the Project;
- (vii) To endeavor to exempt from import duties, customs, taxes, levies and other applicable charges of Government of Sri Lanka, Provincial Governments and local bodies all equipment, machinery and tools required for the preparation of the feasibility reports and the related

of any such equipment, machinery, tools, construction material and other material on completion of the documentation works relevant to the Project;

- (viii) To provide adequate support in the conduct of the feasibility studies, and where the proposal submitted by MCC is accepted by the Ministry for the planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of the said section of Northern Expressway and the associated property development, the Ministry to endeavor, with the assistance of Ministry of Investment Promotions and the BOI, to consider the Project, as a Strategic Investment Project/s within the meaning Strategic Development Projects Act, No. 14 of 2008; and provide any other policies
- (ix) If the Proposal submitted by MCC to plan, design, finance the development of, the construction and operation of the said section of Northern Expressway and the associated property development is accepted by the Ministry and approved by the Government of Sri Lanka, to then endeavor to finalize the award of the Contract for the planning, designing, financing the development, construction and operation of the said section of Northern Expressway and the associated property development, within six (6) months of having received the Proposal ; and
- (x) Not to enter into any agreements, memorandum of understanding, framework agreement of otherwise, with any other third party for the construction and /or operation of the said section of Northern Expressway and the associated property development within the validity of this MOU.

Article 10

Period of Validity

This MOU shall come into force on the date of signing of this MOU and shall be valid either for a period of Eighteen (18) months (or as extended by mutual consent) or until the formal agreement is entered in to between the parties, whichever occurs first.

Article 11

Confidentiality

This MOU shall be treated as a confidential document by the Parties hereto. No information whatsoever directly or indirectly in respect of this MOU arrangement or terms hereof information gathered by MCC during the preparation of the documentation, shall be disclosed by MCC to any third party other than financing institution(s) involve in the project and parties responsible for project implementation without prior written approval of the other party unless MCC reasonably believes that it is necessary to provide such information to any other party, within the scope of this MOU, with the prior written approval of the Ministry. These provisions shall not apply to disclosures required by law, rules or for performance of the obligations under this MOU, in which event the party so called upon shall disclose to the other, the nature of inquiry and the information sought to be given.

Article 12

Non-Disclosure

The parties hereby undertake that they will not at any time after entering into this MOU divulge any information it gathers in relation to the affairs and/or business under this MOU or method of carrying on business by other Party.

Article 13

Dispute Resolution

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of application of this MOU shall be settled through consultations between the Parties.

Article 14

Applicable Law

The Law of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka shall be the applicable law.

Article 15

Notice of Amendment

This MOU may be amended and supplemented at any time as mutually agreed to by the parties.

Article 16

Notice of termination

This MOU shall enter into upon signature and shall continue to remain in force until either party notifies the other by giving one (1) months' prior written notice of intention to terminate this memorandum if the conditions of this MOU are breached by the other party. Both Parties are obliged to fulfill their role and responsibilities as envisaged under MOU and extend necessary services during the period of such notice.

Article 17

Counterpart Originals

This MOU may be executed in counterpart each of which shall be deemed to be an Original, and of which shall constitute the one and of the same Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHERE OF the undersigned representatives of the parties being duly authorized to do so, have signed this MOU.

R W R Pemasiri
Secretary

Ministry of Highway, Ports and Shipping

Wang Zhou
General Manager

Metallurgical Corporation of China Ltd
Sri Lanka Branch

Signature of the witness

Name: Luo Shu

Signature of the witness

Name: W. A. S. Waerasinghe

AGREEMENT

This Agreement is made and entered into on this 17 day of November 2014.

BY AND BETWEEN

Road Development Authority of Ministry of Highways, Ports and Shipping duly established in terms of the **Road Development Authority Act No. 73 of 1981** as amended and having its office at "Sethsiripaya", Battaramulla, Sri Lanka (hereinafter called and referred as "the Employer" which term shall include the said **Road Development Authority**, its successors and assigns) of the First Part.

AND

M/s China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) of People's Republic of China of No. 10, Barnes Place, Colombo 07. (hereinafter called "the Contractor" which terms shall include the said Contractor, its successors and assigns) of the Second Part.

WHEREAS the Employer desires that certain Works should be executed by the Contractor, viz. Contract No. **RDA/NEP/PAK-7**, Northern Expressway-Package 7 [from Pothuhera (Ch 0+000) To Rambukkana (Ch 14+0000) and 3.5km on Package 4 Including Interchanges At Pothuhera And Rambukkana] (hereinafter called and referred to as "The Works") and has accepted a Bid by the Contractor for the execution and completion of such Works and the remedying of any defects therein.

THEREFORE, The Employer and the Contractor agree as follows:

1. In this Agreement words and expressions shall have the same meanings as are respectively assigned to them in the Conditions of Contract.
2. The following documents shall be deemed to form and be read and construed as part of this Agreement, viz:
 - a.) This Contract Agreement (with power of attorney)
 - b.) The Letter of Acceptance
 - c.) Minutes of Negotiations if any
 - d.) The Form of Bid
 - e.) Appendix to Bid
 - f.) The Conditions of Particular Application (Part II)

- g.) The General Conditions (Part I)
- h.) The Addenda to Bidding documents
- i.) Technical Specifications
- j.) Drawings
- k.) Bill of Quantities (Priced)
- l.) Schedules of Supplementary information

3. In considerations of the payments to be made by the Employer to the Contractor as hereinafter mentioned, the Contractor hereby covenants with the Employer to execute and complete the Works and remedy any defects therein in conformity with all respects with the provisions of the Contract.
4. The Employer hereby covenants to pay the Contractor in consideration of the execution and completion of the Works and the remedying of defects therein the Contract Price of LKR-48,200,000,000.00(Forty Eight Billion Two Hundred Million) (Without VAT) or such other sum as may become payable under the provisions of the Contract at the times and in the manner prescribed by the Contract.
5. Government of Sri Lanka intends to obtain a loan from the EXIM Bank of China for the implementation of "The Works". In the event the Loan Agreement is not signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and the EXIM Bank of China pertaining to "The Works" on or before 180 Calendar days from the date of signing this agreement, this Contract shall automatically stand terminated and the Employer shall release the Performance Guarantee within 10 days of such termination and Employer pay any/all expenses arising from preliminary works and mobilization undertaken by the Contractor for the execution of "The Works" upon acceptance by the Employer on mutually agreed Terms and Conditions. Contractor agrees to refund any advance payment received from the Employer.
6. All bank Guarantees shall be on demand, irrevocable and unconditional. The Contractor shall provide the Bank Guarantees, in the formats annexed to this Agreement.
7. The Employer hereby covenants to pay the Contractor, in consideration of the execution and completion of "The Works" and remedying of defects therein, the contract price as agreed above for "The Works" at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Contract.
8. The Contractor agrees to enter into and take over and use part of the Site as practicable and start mobilizing from the date of signing this agreement and to proceed with the investigations, and Detail Engineering Designs and construction as agreed.




- 9. The Employer shall give Notice to Commence to the Contractor after
 - (a) Submission of the Performance Guarantee acceptable to the Employer
 - (b) Submission of the Advance Payment Guarantee acceptable to the Employer
 - (c) First instalment of the Advance Payment made to the Contractor
 - (d) Loan Agreement between Government of Sri Lanka and the EXIM Bank of China is signed for "the Works".
- 10. Nevertheless the Contractor may commence mobilization, the preliminary works, preparation and any other works agreed with the Employer during Negotiations within 21 days after signing Contract agreement and receipt of first instalment of advance payment.
- 11. This Contract Agreement shall come into full force and effect once upon both Parties sign on it.

In Witness whereof the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed the day and year aforementioned in accordance with the laws of Sri Lanka.


For and on behalf of the Employer

For and on behalf of the Contractor


 R.W.R Pemasiri
 Acting Chairman
 Road Development Authority



 Authorized Person


 Board Member
 Road Development Authority
 Witness



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 பிரதம அமைச்சரின் அலுவலகம்
 PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

අමුණුම 10 - (i)

58, ශ්‍රීමත් ආර්නස්ට් ද සිල්වා මාවත
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 58, Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha, Colombo 07.

මගේ යොමුව
 எனது குறியீடு
 My Ref.

PMO/01/ASP/2016/01(Vol II)

ඔබේ යොමුව
 உமது குறியீடு
 Your Ref.

දිනය
 திகதி
 Date } 06.06.2016

Secretary
 Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Dear Sir

Cabinet Committee on Economic Management

Given below is an extract of the Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Economic Management Meeting held on 01st June 2016 for your information and necessary follow up action.

Item No. (01/06/2016/11)

Central Expressway (Third Phase)

Pothuhera to Galagedera

On the recommendation of the CCEM, the Cabinet had approved the construction of the third phase of the central expressway vis Pothuhera to Galagedera and the elevated road section from Keleniya bridge to Ragagiriya, using Japanese funding. This funding from Japan is a new offer to help the government fast track the completion of these urgently needed two roads. The funding is also concessionary.

There is transparency as RDA could call tenders from Japanese contractors nominated by the Japanese government. The Cabinet has also appointed two separate committees to evaluate these two tenders and finalize offers. The Committees should ensure that the rates quoted are reasonable and justifiable.

The Japanese Government has nominated the following three contractors:

1. Taisei Corporation
2. Penta-Ocean Construction Co.Ltd
3. Wakachiku Construction Co.Ltd

Certified as a true copy
 L. V. S. Weerakoon
 Project Director
 Central Expressway Project Office III

කාර්යාලය
 அலுவலகம்
 Gen. Office } 2575317
 2575318

දුරකථන
 தொலைபேசி
 Fax } 2574143
 2575454
 2575310

විද්‍යුත් තැපෑල
 எ.மெயில்
 E-mail } secpm@slmet.lk

They have also nominated the following three consultants for the two projects:

1. Nippon Koei Co.Ltd
2. Oriental Consultants Co.Ltd
3. Katahira & Engineers International (Pvt) Ltd

The CCEM decided that the Cabinet appointed tender boards should call offers from the above nominated companies and select one for the central expressway and another one for the elevated highway. Similarly, consultants have to be selected.

Central Expressway (Second Phase)

Meerigama to Pothuhera and the Ambepussa link

It was explained that there are huge delays in the acquisition of land in this section. This section was assigned to the Asian Development Bank. There are nearly ten thousand plots to be acquired and large number of families to be relocated.

The ADB underwent a bad experience and lots of criticism in the acquisition process for the first section of the southern expressway Kotawa to Galle. Since then, ADB is particular that at least 50% of the acquisition process should be fully completed and families satisfactorily relocated. They will commence the process of calling for tenders only after the completion of the above process. This completion of the ADB requirement may take well over two years.

When Chinese, Japanese and local contractors undertake work, they accept small extents of roadway to commence construction and so both acquisition procedure and construction would proceed in a parallel manner, saving time.

The CCEM felt that ADB delay would ultimately delay the completion of the central expressway beyond the next five years. This was felt unacceptable. CCEM therefore decided to cancel the allocation of this work from ADB.

This terrain from Meerigama to Pothuhera is mostly flat land and easy for the construction of the expressway-unlike the mountainous terrain of the third phase.

This terrain is therefore easy for local contractors to undertake construction.

With the approval of the Cabinet, twelve local contractors were originally prequalified for the third phase. This work was not handed over to them as it was found on the completion of the feasibility studies; the necessity for several tunnels and viaducts in this mountainous terrain. The local contractors do not have much experience of tunneling.

The CCEM decided that the second phase could be allocated to the already prequalified twelve contractors on the basis of dividing the entire work of the second phase into four parcels.

These twelve prequalified contractors could form into four consortiums and negotiate with the RDA based on the engineer's estimate. The same Cabinet appointed tender board and the technical evaluation committee that prequalified these contractors could decide on and finalize the awards on the above basis, keeping the final negotiated rates to the minimum possible/acceptable level.

Handing over the work to the local contractors would help the budgetary process as the local bank loans they obtain could be in the books of the RDA and not be in the Treasury. This will help in keeping the budgetary deficits within the acceptable limits of the ceiling agreed with the IMF.

The CCEM decided that the tender board referred to above should proceed expeditiously and award the contracts as early as possible. It was also decided that the consultants for this second phase should be finalized early.

Land acquisition procedure

The CCEM decided that the UK law on land acquisition on development projects should be studied by the additional secretary (legal affairs) of the Prime Minister's Office. The UK law has an expeditious procedure to acquire lands for development projects. This procedure could be adopted with modifications to help development projects in Sri Lanka.


Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

Action by: Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Copies for information: Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers
Secretary, Ministry of Finance
Chairman, Road Development Authority
Mrs. Bimba Tillekeratne, Addl. Sec (Legal Affairs)

Note : Amendments to the minutes, if any, are to be sent by Tuesday the 07th June 2016. If not the minutes will be considered as confirmed.

Thank you

Yours sincerely



E M S B Ekanayake

Secretary to the Prime Minister

(Tel. - 0112575311/ Fax - 0112575310)

(Email - secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk)



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PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

10/06/2016
OFFICE / CEP 3

58, මුල් අත්තලා ද, පීටා පාර, කොළඹ 07.
58, මුල් ඉසෙකල් තර්ණා මාවත, කොළඹ 07.
58, Sir Emeel de Silva Mawatha, Colombo 07.

මගේ යොමුව
අයුතු යොමුව
My Ref.

PMO/01/ASP/2016/01(Vol II)

ඔබේ යොමුව
අයුතු යොමුව
Your Ref.

දිනය
08.06.2016
Date

Secretary
Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Dear Sir

862
Dattaramulla. Mr.
Handwritten notes: "copy", "Mr. Weerakoon", "Enil Proc to mltia", "As AP and set", "particular for", "need to report", "completeness", "my submission", "06/9"

Cabinet Committee on Economic Management

This has reference to my letter No: PMO/01/ASP/2016/01 (Vol I) and dated 06.06.2016 on the above matter.

Decision circulated from the above letter has been amended as given below.

Item No. (01/06/2016/11)

Central Expressway (Third Phase)

Pothuhena to Galagedera

On the recommendation of the CCEM, the Cabinet had approved the construction of the third phase of the central expressway v/s Pothuhena to Galagedera and the elevated road section from Keleniya bridge to Ragagiriya, using Japanese funding. This funding from Japan is a new offer to help the government fast track the completion of these urgently needed two roads. The funding is also concessionary.

There is transparency as RDA could call tenders from Japanese contractors nominated by the Japanese government. The Cabinet has also appointed two separate committees to evaluate these two tenders and finalize offers. The Committees should ensure that the rates quoted are reasonable and justifiable.

The Japanese Government has nominated the following three contractors:

1. Taisei Corporation
2. Penta-Ocean Construction Co.Ltd
3. Wakachiku Construction Co.Ltd

They have also nominated the following three consultants for the two projects:

1. Nippon Koei Co.Ltd
2. Oriental Consultants Co.Ltd
3. Katahira & Engineers International (Pvt) Ltd

Certified as a true copy
L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

සාමාන්‍ය කාර්යාලය
Gen. Office } 2575317
2575318

දුරකථන } 2574143
මුද්‍රණ } 2575454
ෆැක්ස් } 2575310

විද්‍යුත් තැපෑල
E-mail } secpm@slwaet.lk

The CCEM decided that the Cabinet appointed tender boards should call offers from the above nominated companies and select one for the central expressway and another one for the elevated highway. Similarly, consultants have to be selected.

Central Expressway (Second Phase)

Meerigama to Pothuhera and the Ambepussa link

It was explained that there are huge delays in the acquisition of land in this section. This section was assigned to the Asian Development Bank. There are nearly ten thousand plots to be acquired and large number of families to be relocated.

The ADB underwent a bad experience and lots of criticism in the acquisition process for the first section of the southern expressway Kotawa to Galle. Since then, ADB is particular that at least 50% of the acquisition process should be fully completed and families satisfactorily relocated. They will commence the process of calling for tenders only after the completion of the above process. This completion of the ADB requirement may take well over two years.

When Chinese, Japanese and local contractors undertake work, they accept small extents of roadway to commence construction and so both acquisition procedure and construction would proceed in a parallel manner, saving time.

The CCEM felt that ADB delay would ultimately delay the completion of the central expressway beyond the next five years. This was felt unacceptable. CCEM therefore decided to cancel the allocation of this work from ADB.

This terrain from Meerigama to Pothuhera is mostly flat land and easy for the construction of the expressway-unlike the mountainous terrain of the third phase.

This terrain is therefore easy for local contractors to undertake construction.

With the approval of the Cabinet, twelve local contractors were originally prequalified for the third phase. This work was not handed over to them as it was found on the completion of the feasibility studies, the necessity for several tunnels and viaducts in this mountainous terrain. The local contractors do not have much experience of tunneling.

The CCEM decided that the second phase could be allocated to the already prequalified twelve contractors on the basis of dividing the entire work of the second phase into suitable number of parcels to be determined later.


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L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

These twelve prequalified contractors could form into consortia and negotiate with the RDA based on the engineer's estimate. The same Cabinet appointed tender board and the technical evaluation committee that prequalified these contractors could decide on and finalize the awards on the above basis, keeping the final negotiated rates to the minimum possible/acceptable level.

Handing over the work to the local contractors would help the budgetary process as the local bank loans they obtain could be in the books of the RDA and not be in the Treasury. This will help in keeping the budgetary deficits within the acceptable limits of the ceiling agreed with the IMF.

The CCEM decided that the tender board referred to above should proceed expeditiously and award the contracts as early as possible. It was also decided that the consultants for this second phase should be finalized early.

Land acquisition procedure

The CCEM decided that the UK law on land acquisition on development projects should be studied by the additional secretary (legal affairs) of the Prime Minister's Office. The UK law has an expeditious procedure to acquire lands for development projects. This procedure could be adopted with modifications to help development projects in Sri Lanka.

Action by: Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Copies for information:

- Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers
- Secretary, Ministry of Finance
- Chairman, Road Development Authority
- Mrs. Binba Tillekeratne, Additional Secretary (Legal Affairs, Prime Minister's Office)

Thank you

Yours sincerely



E.M.S.B. Ekanayake

Secretary to the Prime Minister

(Tel. - 0112575311/ Fax - 0112575310)

(Email - secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk)

Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III



ලකය අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය
உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் நெடுஞ்சாலைகள் அமைச்சு
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION & HIGHWAYS

ඇමුණුම 11

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வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபை
ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය
மத்திய கடுகதிப்பாதை செயற்திட்டம்
CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY PROJECT

මගේ අංකය
எனது இல.
My No.

RDA/CEP/SEC3

ඔබේ අංකය
உமது இல.
Your No.

දිනය
திகதி
Date

22.06.2016

M/S Wakachiku Construction Co., Ltd,
No.250 – 3/11, 3rd Floor,
Liberty Plaza,
R.A de Mel Mawatha, Colombo 3,
Sri Lanka.

Dear Sirs,

**CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY SECTION 3 FROM POTHUHERA
(CH. 0+000KM) TO GALAGEDARA (CH. 32+500KM) VIA RAMBUKKANA.**

CONTRACT NO. RDA/CEP/SEC3

INVITATION FOR BIDS

1. The Road Development Authority (“the Employer”) of Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, Sri Lanka now invites sealed bids for Construction of Central Expressway Section 3 from Pothuhera (Ch. 0+000Km) to Galagedara(Ch. 32+500Km) via Rambukkana.
2. To obtain further information and inspect the bidding documents, eligible bidders should contact:
The Project Director,
Central Expressway Project Section 3
Wing 1,
3rd Floor, Sethsiripaya, Battaramulla,
Sri Lanka.
Telephone: 94-011-2877708
Facsimile number: Fax: 94-011-2877708
Electronic mail address: rdapdcep3@gmail.com
3. To purchase the bidding documents in (English) the bidders should;
 - (i) - Write to address above requesting for the bidding documents for the Contract No.RDA/CEP/SEC3
 - (ii) Pay a non-refundable fee of Sri Lankan Rupees (LKR) 50,000 (Including VAT) by cash or bank draft in favour of the Project Director, Central Expressway Project Section 3 in respect of the bidding documents.

The bidding documents will be issued during normal working days from 9.00 am to 3.00 pm at the address under 2 above, from **22 June 2016 to 01 August 2016.**

Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III


4. Bidders should deliver their bids:

(i) To the address below on or before the deadline: 2:00 pm on 02 August 2016.
The Chairman
Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee,
C/O The Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education and Highways,
No 216, 8th Floor, "Maganeguma Mahamedura",
Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka.

(ii) Together with a Bid Security in the amount as specified in the Bidding Documents. For the purpose of determining the equivalent amount of the required Bid Security in a freely convertible currency, the selling exchange rate published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka prevailing on the date 28 days prior to the deadline for Bid submission shall be applied.

5. Bids will be opened immediately after the deadline, in the presence of bidders' representatives who choose to attend.
6. The bidder shall bear all costs associated with the preparation and submission of its Bids, and the Employer shall not be responsible or liable for those costs, regardless of the conduct or outcome of the bidding process.

Thank you
Your faithfully,


L.V.S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Section 3


Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

පළමු අදියර, තුන්වන මහල, සෙත්සිරිපාය, බත්තරමුල්ල
Wing 1, 3rd Floor, Sethsiripaya, Battaramulla

MINUTES OF CABINET APPOINTED NEGOTIATION COMMITTEE (CANC)																				
Nature of the Procurement Committee		CANC		Name of the Procurement Entity																
MOHE&H																				
Title of Procurement		Central Expressway Project (CEP) Section 3 – from Pothuhera (Ch. 0+000 Km) to Galagedara (Ch. 32+500 Km) Via Rambukkana -Civil Work Contract.																		
Meeting No:	02	Date	10 th October 2016	Purpose/s	To obtain the Recommendation of the CANC for the cancelation of the Bidding procedure.															
PRESENT																				
Members of the CANC			Project Committee (PC)																	
1. Mr. V Sivagnanasothy (Chairman) Secretary, Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affaires			01. Mr. D. Ganeshan, ADG (Network Planning), RDA – Chairman / PC 02. Mr. V. Athukorala, Procurement Specialist (CEP3), RDA – Member/PC																	
2. Mr. D. C. Dissanayake. (Member) Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways.			Others																	
3. Mr. H. T. Kamal Pathmasiri. (Member) Secretary, Ministry of Provincial Councils & Local Government.			01. Mr. L. V.S Weerakoon, PD(CEP), RDA 03. Mr. A. B. K. S. Rangana, Eng. (CEP), RDA 04. Mr. Gamini Rathnayake, Procurement Specialist, (MOHE&H)																	
DOCUMENT CONSIDERED:																				
The CANC considered the report of the Project Committee (PC) pertaining to the evaluation of Bids of the above project.																				
OBSERVATIONS OF THE CANC:																				
The Central Expressway from Kadawatha to Dambulla with Kandy link (from Pothuhera to Galagedara) has been scheduled to implement in four sections as stated in the Table 01.																				
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 15%;">Section No</th> <th style="width: 60%;">Name of Section</th> <th style="width: 25%;">Length (Km)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Section 01</td> <td>Kadawatha – Meerigama</td> <td>37.09</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Section 02</td> <td>Meerigama – Kurunagala</td> <td>39.70</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Section 03</td> <td>Pothuhera - Galagedara</td> <td>32.50</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Section 04</td> <td>Kurunagala - Dambulla</td> <td>60.30</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>						Section No	Name of Section	Length (Km)	Section 01	Kadawatha – Meerigama	37.09	Section 02	Meerigama – Kurunagala	39.70	Section 03	Pothuhera - Galagedara	32.50	Section 04	Kurunagala - Dambulla	60.30
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Table 01																				
The Section 3 of the Expressway commences from Pothuhera and proceeds up to Galagedara via Rambukkana making a total length equal to 32.50 km. This is a fully access controlled expressway with the design speed of 100 km/hr.																				
As per letter No. PMO/01/ASP/2016/01(Vol 1) dated 20.05.2016, addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education and Highways by the Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Management (CCEM) has decided to call offers from Japanese contractors to undertake Pothuhera to Galagedara section of Central Expressway with the concessional financing from Mitsubishi bank.																				
Subsequently, on the referred recommendation of CCEM, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the construction of the Section 3 of the Central Expressway using Japanese funding and to invite bids from three following contractors nominated by the Japanese Government.																				

1. M/s. Taisei Corporation
2. M/s. Penta-Ocean Construction Co. Ltd.
3. M/s. Wakachiku Construction Co. Ltd.

The Bidding Document and Invitation for Bids prepared by the Project have been approved by the CANC at its meeting held on 17th June 2016 and accordingly, bidding documents were issued to above three contractors.

Submission of bids was concluded on 30th September 2016, at 14.0 hrs. as scheduled and M/s. Penta-Ocean Construction Co. Ltd. and M/s. Wakachiku Construction Co. Ltd. have informed in writing that, they are not in a position to submit bids.

As such, M/s. Taisei Corporation was the only bidder, who has submitted a bid. However, M/s. Taisei Corporation has not submitted a Bid Security as requested in the bidding documents.




The Project Committee has examined the bid and reported that, non-submission of the bid security is a major deviation as per the Section 7.8. (a) of the Procurement Guidelines. Therefore, the PC has considered this bid as non-responsive and decided to recommend for rejection.


The CANC accepted the recommendations of the Project Committee and decided that, the bid submitted by M/s. Taisei Corporation is non-responsive due to major deviation.

CANC DECISION:

Having considered the recommendations of the Project Committee, the CANC decided that, the bid submitted by M/s. Taisei Corporation for the "Construction of Central Expressway Section 3 from Pothuhera (Ch. 0+000 Km) to Galagedara (Ch. 32+500 Km) Via Rambukkana—Contract No Contract No. RDA/CEP/SEC3" is non-responsive and therefore, to reject the bid. The CANC also requested the Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education and Highways to inform this decision to the Cabinet of Ministers.

Signatures

Name	Capacity	Agree with the above decision/s (yes/no)	Signature
Mr. V Sivagnanasothy	Chairman	Yes	
Mr. D. C. Dissanayake	Member	Yes	
Mr. H. T. Kamal Pathmasiri	Member	Yes	



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THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN
IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
20, SRIMATH R.G. SENANAYAKE MAWATHA
COLOMBO 07, SRI LANKA.
TEL : 011 2693831 - 3
FAX : 011 2698629
http : //www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp

November 2, 2016

Mr. W.M.P.G. Wickremasinghe
Actg. Secretary
Ministry of Higher Education & Highways
"Maga Neguma Mahamedura" 8th floor
No.216, Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha
Battaramulla

Athula Mr Athula Senaviratne

Dear Mr. Wickremasinghe,


RE: Construction of Central Expressway -Section 3


I acknowledge receipt of your letter to H. E. Mr. Kenichi Suganuma, Ambassador of Japan, dated November 2, 2016 regarding the submission of fresh bids for the above project.

I also wish to clarify with regards to its fourth paragraph, that since the Embassy of Japan is not in a position to engage itself in the bidding process of the Sri Lankan Government, the Embassy will provide information mentioned in your letter to the three bidders, but we expect that your Ministry will make necessary arrangement to enable them to submit fresh bids along with compliant Bid Security/ies.

I highly appreciate your understanding in this regard.


Yours sincerely,


Certified as a true copy
L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
(Central Expressway Project Office III)


Koji Yagi

Counsellor/Deputy Head of Mission

c.c. Mr. N.R. Sooriyarachchi, Chairman, Road Development Authority



Please check & advise.



PO/CEA3

03/11/2016



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 பிரதம அமைச்சரின் அலுவலகம்
 PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

58, ශ්‍රීමත් ආර්ථනායක ද සිල්වා මාවත, කොළඹ 07.
 58, ශ්‍රීමත් ஏராளம் த சில்வர் மாவத்தை, கொழும்பு 07.
 58, Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha, Colombo 07.

මගේ යොමුව
 எனது குறியீடு
 My Ref.

PMO/01/ASP/2016/01(Vol V)

ඔබේ යොමුව
 உமது குறியீடு
 Your Ref.

CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE

දිනය
 திகதி
 Date

13.11.2016

15 NOV 2016

10180

R.D.A.

Secretary

Ministry of Highways

Dear Sir

Cabinet Committee on Economic Management

Given below is an extract of the Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Economic Management Meeting held on 9th November 2016, for your information and necessary follow up action.

Item No. (09/11/2016/19)

Central Expressway

CCEM discussed a letter received from the Japanese Ambassador regarding the third section of the central expressway which requested the inclusion of a fourth contractor from Japan to submit proposals. The CCEM felt this would improve competitiveness. It was decided to accept the proposal of the Japanese ambassador and instruct the Secretary, Ministry of Highways to extend the submission date for proposal by another week.

Action by: Secretary, Ministry of Highways

Copies for information:

- Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers
- Secretary, Ministry of National Policies & Economic Affairs
- Secretary, Ministry of Finance
- Chairman, Road Development Authority
- Director General, Department of Project Management & Monitoring

Central Expressway Project III
 2209
 18 NOV 2016
 Road Development Authority
 Wing
 Sethsiripaya
 2275

Thank you

Yours sincerely

Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
 Project Director
 Central Expressway Project Office III

E.M.S.B Ekanayake

Secretary to the Prime Minister

(Tel. - 0112575311/ Fax - 0112575310)

(Email - secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk)

AD (CCEP III)

Handwritten signature and date: 15/11/16

Mr. Athulasundaram
 Please check & forward to me

Handwritten notes and date: 18/11/16



මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය
வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபை
Road Development Authority

"මගනෙගුම මහමදුර", ඩෙන්සිල් කොට්ටකඩුව මාවත,
 කොස්වත්ත, බත්තරමුල්ල, ශ්‍රී ලංකාව.

"மகநெகும மஹாமதூர்", டென்சில் கொப்பேகடுவ மாவத்தை,
 கொஸ்வத்தை, பத்தரமுல்லை, இலங்கை.

"Maganeguma Mahamedura", Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha,
 Koswatta, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka.

මගේ අංකය
 எனது இல
 My No.

ඔබේ අංකය
 உமது இல
 Your No.

දිනය
 திகதி
 Date

අමුණුම 15

15.11.2016

M/s Fujita Corporation,

4-25-2, Sendagaya,
 Shibuya-ku,
 Tokyo 151-8570,
 Japan.

Dear Sirs,

[Signature]
 Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
 Project Director

Central Expressway Project Office III

**CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY SECTION 3 FROM POTHUHERA
 (CH. 0+000KM) TO GALAGEDARA (CH. 32+500KM) VIA RAMBUKKANA.**

CONTRACT NO. RDA/CEP/SEC3

INVITATION FOR BIDS

- The Road Development Authority ("the Employer") of Ministry of Higher Education and Highways, Sri Lanka now invites fresh sealed bids for Construction of Central Expressway Section 3 from Pothuhera (Ch. 0±000Km) to Galagedara (Ch. 32+500Km) via Rambukkana.
- To obtain further information and inspect the bidding documents, eligible bidders should contact:

The Project Director,
 Central Expressway Project Section 3
 Wing 1,
 3rd Floor, Sethsiripaya, Battaramulla,
 Sri Lanka.
 Telephone: 94-011-2877708
 Facsimile number: Fax: 94-011-2877708
 Electronic mail address: rdapdcep3@gmail.com

Received by -
 Asanka Jayaward.
 900620330 v
 Asus.

- To purchase the bidding documents (in English) the bidders should;
 - Write to address above requesting for the bidding documents for the Contract No.RDA/CEP/SEC3
 - Pay a non-refundable fee of Sri Lankan Rupees (LKR) 50,000 (Including VAT) by cash or bank draft in favour of the Project Director, Central Expressway Project Section 3 in respect of the bidding documents.

The bidding documents will be issued during normal working days from 9.00 am to 3.00 pm at the address under 2 above, till 22 November 2016.

☎phones:-
 Director General 2862767, Director General 2862795, Working Director 2887257, General Number ++94-11-2046200
 Additional Director Generals {Projects 2862485, AO&M 2864804, CD 2882194, NP 2886923 }
 Directorates {Administration 2865245, Construction 2864388, Engineering Services 2864803, EO&M 038- 2291373, ESD 2187165,
 Finance 2864799, Highway Designs 2874024, Internal Audit 2872661, Lands 2889350, Legal 2186044, Mechanical 2872273, MM
 2196, Planning 2882995, Procurement 2886863, QA&PM 2887235, R&D 2632649, Rural Bridges 2623896, Training 2869342 }

4. Bidders should deliver their bids:

- (i) To the address below on or before the deadline: 2:00 pm on 23 November 2016.
The Chairman
Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee,
C/O The Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education and Highways,
No 216, 8th Floor, "Maganeguma Mahamedura",
Denzil Kobbekaduwa Mawatha, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka.
- (ii) Together with a Bid Security in the amount as specified in the Bidding Documents. For the purpose of determining the equivalent amount of the required Bid Security in a freely convertible currency, the selling exchange rate published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka prevailing on the date 28 days prior to the deadline for Bid submission shall be applied.
5. Bids will be opened immediately after the deadline, in the presence of bidders' representatives who choose to attend.
6. The bidder shall bear all costs associated with the preparation and submission of its Bids, and the Employer shall not be responsible or liable for those costs, regardless of the conduct or outcome of the bidding process.

Thank you
Yours faithfully,


Chairman
ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

CC:-

1. Secretary, MOHE&H - f.i. please
2. Chairman/CANC - f.i. please


Certified as a true copy

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III



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உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் நெடுஞ்சாலைகள் அமைச்சு
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION & HIGHWAYS

අ.මු.ම 16

මාර්ග සංවර්ධන අධිකාරිය
வீதி அபிவிருத்தி அதிகாரசபை
ROAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ග ව්‍යාපෘතිය
மத்திய கடுகதிப்பாதை செயற்திட்டம்
CENTRAL EXPRESSWAY PROJECT

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No.	RDA/CEP/GEN	ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No.	දිනය திகதி Date	24.11.2016
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The Chairman
Road Development Authority
Maganeguma Mahamedura
Battaramulla

CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRL EXPRESSWAY SECTION 3
FROM POTHUHERA (CH. 0+000KM) TO GALAGEDARA (CH. 32+500KM) VIA
RAMBUKKANA

DETAILS OF BIDS RECEIVED

We have invited bids from the following Japanese firms as decided by the Cabinet of Ministers.

1. M/s. Taisei Corporation
2. M/s. Penta-Ocean Construction-Co. Ltd.
3. M/s. Wakachiku Construction Co. Ltd.
4. M/s. Fujita Corporation

Certified as a true copy
L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

However, only the 2 firms submitted Bids. The price of Engineer's estimate compared with Bids received are given below. The Engineer's Estimate (EE) is LKR 123.5Bn.

	Bidder's Name	Bid Price (LKR Bn)	Comparison with EE[+(above),-(below)]	
			As an amount (LKR Bn)	As a percentage (%)
1	M/s. Taisei Corporation	159.6	+36.1	+29.24%
2	M/s. Fujita Corporation	147.7	+24.2	+19.56%

As shown above, these bid prices appear to be very high compared to the Engineer's Estimate. These bids will be forwarded shortly to the Project Committee for evaluation. The expected amount of loan for Civil works and the Consultancy Service is US \$ 1Bn.

L V S Weerakoon
Project Director(CEP03)

PD (CEP 3)

As it appears that Contract Prices of both Consultancy and the civil works exceed the anticipated loan amount, a decision has been taken to obtain approval of the Cabinet to award the Contract within the limit acceptable to the Employer. Therefore, Please hold on evaluation Process until the Cabinet approval is obtained.

(Signature)

පළමු අදියර, තුන්වන මහල, සෙත්සිරිපාය, බත්තරමුල්ල
Wing 1, 3rd Floor, Sethsiripaya, Battaramulla

Eng. Nihal R. Sooriyarachchi
Chairman



උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය
உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் நெடுஞ்சாலைகள் அமைச்சு
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION & HIGHWAYS

මගේ අංකය எனது இல. My No.	MPH/HWY/PRC/2015/04/15- Volume II	ඔබේ අංකය உமது இல. Your No.	දිනය திகதி Date	03.04.2017
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The Chairman,
M/s Fujita Corporation.

Certified as a true copy
L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

Dear Sir/Madam,

Central Expressway Project (CEP) Section 03 – Civil Work Contract for Construction of Pothuhera (Ch.0+000km) to Galagedara (Ch.32+500km) Via Rambukkana

Intention to Award the Contract

This refers to the bid submitted by your Company for the above project on 23rd November 2016.

The Project Committee (PC) and the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) have evaluated your bid and **decided that you have failed to prove the following qualification criteria;**

1. Contract of similar size of nature

Participation in at least one contract that has been successfully or substantially completed within the last five (5) years and that is similar to the proposed works, where the value of the Bidder's participation exceeds US\$ 600 million. (The similarity of the Bidder's participation shall be based on the physical size, nature of works, complexity, methods, technology or other characteristics as described in Employer's Requirements.)

Although M/s Fujita Corporation has completed 14 projects, there is no single Contractor with a value of US\$ 600 million having completed within last 5 years.

2. Construction experience in key activities (May be complied with by Specialist Subcontractor/s who is a specialist enterprise engaged for highly specialized processes which cannot be provided by the main Contractor).

There are 8 key construction activities namely Excavation, Filling, Rock Blasting, Aggregate Base Course (ABC), Asphalt, Concreting, Two Lane via Ducts and Two Lane Tunnel have been identified in the bidding documents and the bidder should prove the production rates of these key items from projects completed within last 05 years.

The bidder has proved only 3 items and you have failed to prove Rock blasting, Aggregate Base Course (ABC), Asphalt Concreting, Two Lane via ducts. Further, the production rate quoted for two lane tunnel was not from a project completed within last 5 years.

900620330 V
Asam.
11/04/17

Therefore, the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) decided that your bid is non responsive.

Subsequently, the Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) has evaluated the second bid and decided to recommend to the Cabinet of Ministers to award of the above contract to M/s Taisei Corporation for a negotiated contract sum of SLR. 134,905,155,000.00 (One Hundred and Thirty Four Billion, Nine Hundred and Five Million, One Hundred and Fifty Five Thousand Rupees only) (excluding VAT).

If there are any representations to be made against this determination, you are kindly advised to make such representation / appeal in writing to the Procurement Appeal Board (PAB) at the Presidential Secretariat, with a copy to the secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways within one week from the date of receipt of this letter, along with all the materials required to support your appeal.


Such representation / appeal shall be sent to the following address marked "Representation / Appeal against the tender award - MPH/HWY/PRC/2015/04/15 - Volume III".

**e Chairman,
Procurement Appeal Board (PAB),
Presidential Secretariat,
Colombo-01.**

This intimation is issued to you under the Circular number CSA/4//PAB/01-I dated 27th February 2012 and CSA/4//PAB/01-III dated 07th October 2014 issued by the Secretary to the President. A copy of the Circular is attached herewith for your information and guidance.

Thank you

Yours faithfully,


H. C. S. Gunatilake
Addl. Secretary (Eng)
For Secretary
Ministry of Higher Education & Highways.


Certified as a true copy
L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

Copy:

01. Chairman, Procurement Appeal Board (PAB)
02. Chairman/Managing Director, M/s Taisei Corporation

For your information please



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 பிரதமர் அலுவலகம்
 PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

ඇමුණුම 18

58, ශ්‍රීමත් ආර්ථික උපදේශන මාවත, කොළඹ 07.
 58, ஸ்ரீமத ஏர்தக உதவிமை மாளிகை, கொழும்பு 07.
 58, Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha, Colombo 07.

Handwritten notes and signatures in the top right corner.

මගේ යොමුව
 எனது குறிப்பு
 My Ref.

PMO/01/ASR(CCEM)/2017/01

මාගේ යොමුව
 உமது குறிப்பு
 Your Ref.

දිනය
 திகதி
 Date

05.05.2017

Secretary

Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Dear Sir

Cabinet Committee on Economic Management



Given below is an extract of the Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Economic Management Meeting held on 03rd May 2017, for your information and necessary follow up action.

Item No. (03/05/2017/07)

Construction of Section 3 of Central Expressway from Pothuhera to Galagedara

With regard to the construction of Section 3 of Central Expressway from Pothuhera to Galagedara it was reported that the Government of Japan has informed that Fujita Corporation is a prominent civil works contractor which is technically and financially capable of constructing expressways. The CNAPC Chairman who was present explained that Fujita bid was disqualified based on the evaluation criteria and they have negotiated with the Taisei. The CCEM instructed Ministry of Highways/CNAPC to revisit evaluation criteria to see whether there had been a disadvantage to Fujita and also to reconsider bid of Fujita in view of the strong recommendation made by the Japanese Government.

Action by: Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Copies for information: Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers
 Director General, Department of Project Management & Monitoring

Thank you
 Yours sincerely

E M S B Ekanayake
 Secretary to the Prime Minister
 (Tel.- 0112575311/ Fax - 0112575310)
 (Email - secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk)

Certified as a true copy
 L. V. S. Weerakoon
 Project Director
 Central Expressway Project Office III

දුරකථන
 Telephone
 Gen. Office } 2575317
 2575318

ෆැක්ස්
 Faxes } 2574149
 2575454
 Fax } 2575310

විද්‍යුත් තැපෑල
 E-mail } secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk

Tokyo, April 12, 2017

Hon. Lakshman Kiriella
Minister of Higher Education & Highways

Dear Mr. Kiriella,

RE: Central Expressway Project - Section 3

With reference to our letter dated November 3, 2016 regarding the above, the Government of Japan is pleased to inform that Fujita Corporation, which shows interest in participating in the bidding for the Central Expressway Project - Section 3, is a prominent civil works contractor capable to construct a 32.5km long, 4 lane two way expressway.

Fujita is a construction company with much experience in handling various projects including road, airport, housing and express railways, etc. Currently, Fujita is handling development projects amounting to approximately 700 million US dollars in Japan. Together with this amount, the scale of their projects over the last three years has reached more than 1100 million US dollars.

In addition, as for their experiences in large expressway project abroad, we would like to mention that Fujita has successfully completed a highway project in Iraq to the value of 750 million US dollars in 1989.

The Government of Japan appreciates your favourable consideration to be given to Fujita along with other competent Japanese companies in this regard.

Yours sincerely,


Shigeru KIYAMA

Special Advisor to the Cabinet/
Ambassador for Economic Cooperation on
Quality Infrastructure Investment Promotion

L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

c.c. Hon. Malik Samarawickrama, Minister of Development Strategies
and International Trade
Mr. R. Paskaralingam, Snr. Advisor to the Prime Minister
Mr. N.R. Sooriyachchi, Chairman, Road Development Authority
Mr. D.C. Dissanayake, Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education &
Highways

RECEIVED
Central Expressway
189 31 MAY
Road Development
Wing 1, 3rd Floor,
Sethusiriwapa Baitaramulla.

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PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

අමුණුම 21

58, මුලින් අර්නස්ට් ඩී සිල්වා මාවත, කොළඹ 07.
58, ශ්‍රී ලන්දේ ඉර්නස්ට් ඩී සිල්වා මාවත, කොළඹ 07.
58, Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha, Colombo 07.

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எனது குறிப்பிடு
My Ref.

PMO/01/ASR(CCEM)/2017/01(Vol I)
Your Ref.

දිනය
Date

29.05.2017

Secretary

Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Dear Sir

Cabinet Committee on Economic Management

RECEIVED
Secretary
31 MAY 2017
Ministry of Highways, Road & Shipping
9th Floor, "Sethusiriwapa"
Baitaramulla

copy
Slur - RSDH
RD -
Princ. Secy to PM
DS/30

Given below is an extract of the Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Economic Management Meeting held on 24th May 2017, for your information and necessary follow up action.

Item No. (24/05/2017/01)

Central Expressway - Section III

With regard to the Central Expressway it was reported that the CANC for the Central Expressway - Section III revisited evaluation criteria to see whether there has been a disadvantage to M/s Fujita Corporation and also reconsidered the bid of M/s Fujita Corporation in view of the strong recommendation made by Japanese Government. Accordingly, the Project Committee has revisited the evaluation criteria and has reported that requirements of Contracts of similar size and construction experience of key activities have been stipulated based on the International Competitive Bidding procedure and accordingly, not intended to have any disadvantage to M/s Fujita Corporation. Further, Project Committee has reported that all pre-qualification information submitted by the Corporation with the bid has been considered at the evaluation stage. Accordingly, HE the Ambassador of Japan was requested to report this situation to Government of Japan (GOJ). The next step will be taken depending on the response of the GOJ.

Action by: Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Copies for information:

- Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers
- Mr. R. Paskaralingam, Advisor to the Ministry of National Policies & Economic Affairs
- Director General, Department of Project Management & Monitoring

Thank you

Yours sincerely


E.M.S.B. Ekanayake

Secretary to the Prime Minister

(Tel. - 0112575311/ Fax - 0112575310)

(Email - secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk)

Certified as a true copy
L. V. S. Weerakoon
Project Director
Central Expressway Project Office III

Mr. Adnanullah

Plat ahal

09/CCE3
31/05/2017

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Gen. Office } 2575317
2575318

දුරකථන } 2574143
දුරකථන } 2575454
ෆැක්ස් } 2575310

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& ඊමේල් } secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk
E-mail



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 PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

අමුණුම 22

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 58, ශ්‍රීමත් ඉරිමානුල්ල ප්‍රසාද මාවත, කොළඹ 07.
 58, Sir Ernest de Silva Mawatha, Colombo 07.

මගේ යොමුව } PMO/01/ASR(CCEM)/2017/01
 எனது குறியீடு }
 My Ref. }
 உமது குறியீடு }
 Your Ref. }

දිනය } 23.06.2017
 திகதி }
 Date }

Secretary

Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

Dear Sir

Cabinet Committee on Economic Management

Given below is an extract of the Minutes of Cabinet Committee on Economic Management Meeting held on 21st June 2017, for your information and necessary follow up action.

Item No. (21/06/2017/01)

Central Expressway – Section III, Pothuhera to Galagedara

The inordinate delay in commencement of the construction of the above section was discussed. It was instructed to expedite the forwarding of recommendations of CNAPC to Cabinet. Subsequent to the decision by the Cabinet, the formation of a consortium of joint venture could be discussed and approval of the Cabinet obtained by way of a note to Cabinet.

Action by: Secretary, Ministry of Higher Education & Highways

- Copies for information:
- Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers
 - Chairman, Road Development Authority
 - Director General, Department of Project Management & Monitoring

Thank you
 Yours sincerely

E M S B Ekanayake
 Secretary to the Prime Minister
 (Tel. - 0112575311/ Fax - 0112575310)
 (Email - secpm@pmoffice.gov.lk)

Certified as a true copy
 L. V. S. Weerakoon
 Project Director
 Central Expressway Project Office III

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அமைச்சரவை அலுவலகம்
OFFICE OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS

CABINET DECISION අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණය அமைச்சரவைத் தீர்மானம்

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අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම්. 2018 පෙබරවාරි මස 28 දින.
මුදල් හා
ජනමාධ්‍ය ලේකම්.
මහානගර හා බස්නාහිර
සං.ලේකම්.
විගණකාධිපති.

ක්‍රියා කළ යුතු : ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්.
උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශයේ ලේකම්.

මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ 3 වන කොටස (CEP III) ඉදි කිරීම සඳහා කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව පිරිනැමීම - පොතුහැර (CH. කි.මී. 0+000) සිට රඹුක්කන හරහා ගලගෙදර (CH. කි.මී. 32 + 0.500) දක්වා

(ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු ගැන ඇමතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ 2018-01-25 දිනැති සංදේශය)

2018 පෙබරවාරි මස 20 දින පැවැත්වුණු අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල රැස්වීමේදී එළඹී තීරණයක් අවශ්‍ය කටයුතු සඳහා මේ සමඟ එවා ඇත.

ඩබ්ලිව්.එම්.ඩී.ජේ.ප්‍රනාන්දු
අතිරේක ලේකම්.

අ.කළේ/එස්.අබේසිංහ
අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ ලේකම්.

(අ) න්‍යාය පත්‍රයේ විෂයයන්:

(II) අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා - ප්‍රසම්පාදනයට අදාළ කරුණු :

33. අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල පත්‍රිකා අංක 18/0184/706/008 වූ, “මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගයේ 3 වන කොටස (CEP III) ඉදි කිරීම සඳහා කොන්ත්‍රාත්තුව පිරිනැමීම - පොතුහැර (CH. කි.මී. 0+000) සිට රඹුක්කන හරහා ගලගෙදර (CH. කි.මී. 32 + 0.500) දක්වා” යන මෑලයන් ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු ඇමතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ 2018-01-25 දිනැති සංදේශය - (අමප අංක 16/1400/706/045 පිළිබඳව වූ 2016-07-20 දිනැති අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල තීරණයට අදාළව) ඉහත සඳහන් සංදේශය, පහත සඳහන් කරුණු සමඟ සලකා බලන ලදී:

* මෙම විෂය පිළිබඳවම වූ, අමප අංක 18/0184/706/008-1 ලෙස අංකගත කරන ලද, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු ඇමතිතුමා ඉදිරිපත් කළ 2018-02-19 දිනැති වැඩිදුර අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩල සටහනෙහි ඇතුළත් කරුණු;

- * මුදල් හා ජනමාධ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගේ 2018-02-13 දිනැති නිරීක්ෂණ සහ එතුමාගේ 2018-02-19 දිනැති වැඩිදුර නිරීක්ෂණ;
- * උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග ඇමතිතුමාගේ නිරීක්ෂණ;
- * 2018-01-25 දිනැති සංදේශයේ සඳහන් යෝජනා පිළිබඳව ගරු අග්‍රාමාත්‍යතුමා සහ උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග ඇමතිතුමා විසින් මෙම රැස්වීමේදී සිදු කරන ලද වැඩිදුර කරුණු පැහැදිලි කිරීම; සහ
- * මහානගර හා බස්නාහිර සංවර්ධන ඇමතිතුමා සහ අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලයේ තවත් සාමාජිකයින් කිහිපදෙනෙකු විසින් මෙම රැස්වීමේදී පළ කරන ලද අදහස් දැක්වීම්.

මේ පිළිබඳව සාකච්ඡා කිරීමෙන් අනතුරුව, මධ්‍යම අධිවේගී මාර්ගය ඉදි කිරීම කලක් තිස්සේ පැවැති දැඩි අවශ්‍යතාවක් බව අමාත්‍ය මණ්ඩලය විසින් සැලකිල්ලට ගන්නා ලදුව, උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය විසින්, මුදල් හා ජනමාධ්‍ය ඇමතිතුමාගේ 2018-02-19 දිනැති නිරීක්ෂණවල (අ), (ආ) සහ (ඇ) ඡේදවල නියම කර දක්වා ඇති කරුණුවලට අනුගතව කටයුතු කරනු ලැබීමට යටත්ව, ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු ඇමතිතුමා විසින් ඉදිරිපත් කරනු ලැබ ඇති අමප අංක 18/0184/706/008 හා 2018-01-25 දිනැති සංදේශයේ අවසන් ඡේදයෙහි සඳහන් (I) සහ (II) යෝජනා සඳහා අනුමැතිය ලබා දීමට තීරණය කරන ලදී.

ක්‍රියා කළ යුතු: ජාතික ප්‍රතිපත්ති හා ආර්ථික කටයුතු අමාත්‍යාංශය - ඉහත නිරීක්ෂණ යා කොට ඇත.
 උසස් අධ්‍යාපන හා මහාමාර්ග අමාත්‍යාංශය - අදාළ ලියවිලිවල පිටපත බැගින් යා කොට ඇත.

පිටපත්: ජනාධිපති ලේකම් - අදාළ ලියවිලිවල පිටපත බැගින් යා කොට ඇත.
 අග්‍රාමාත්‍ය ලේකම් - අදාළ ලියවිලිවල පිටපත බැගින් යා කොට ඇත.
 මුදල් හා ජනමාධ්‍ය අමාත්‍යාංශය - අදාළ ලියවිලිවල පිටපත බැගින් යා කොට ඇත.
 මහානගර හා බස්නාහිර සංවර්ධන අමාත්‍යාංශය - ගරු ඇමතිතුමාගේ අවධානයට යොමු කිරීම පිණිස - අදාළ ලියවිලිවල පිටපත බැගින් යා කොට ඇත.

(B) Agenda Items :

(II) Cabinet Papers - Procurement Related Matters

33. Cabinet Paper No.18/0184/706/008, a Memorandum dated 2018-01-25 by the Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs on "Awarding the contract for the construction of Central Expressway Section 3 (CEP III) from Pothuhera (CH. 0+000 km) to Galagedara (CH. 32+0.500 km) Via Rambukkana" - (Cabinet decision dated 2016-07-20 on CP No.16/1400/706/045 refers) the above Memorandum was considered along with the following:

- * the contents in the further Note to the Cabinet by the Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs dated 2018-02-19 numbered as CP No.18/0184/706/008-I on the same subject;
- * the observations of the Minister of Finance and Mass Media dated 2018-02-13 and his further observations dated 2018-02-19;
- * the observations of the Minister of Higher Education and Highways;
- * the further clarifications on the proposals in the Memorandum dated 2018-01-25, made by the Hon. Prime Minister and the Minister of Higher Education and Highways, at this meeting; and
- * the views expressed by the Minister of Megapolis and Western Development and several other Members of the Cabinet, at this meeting.

After discussion, Cabinet having noted that the construction of the Central Expressway is an acutely felt need, decided to grant approval to the proposals (I) and (II) in the final paragraph of the Memorandum dated 2018-01-25 on CP No. 18/0184/706/008 by the Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs, subject to Ministry of Higher Education and Highways adhering to the stipulations made in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in the observations dated 2018-02-19 by the Minister of Finance and Mass Media.

Contd.2/-

- 02 -

Action by: **My/National Policies and Economic Affairs** - above observations annexed.

My/Higher Education and Highways - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.

Copied to: **Secretary to the President** - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.

Secretary to the Prime Minister - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.

My/Finance and Mass Media - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.

My/Megapolis and Western Development - to be brought to the notice of the Hon. Minister - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.

Checked by: 1. *[Signature]*
2. *[Signature]*



මුදල් හා සමාජීය සම්ප්‍රදාය
 මහා මন্ত্রි මණ්ඩලය
 MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND MASS MEDIA

මහලේකම් කාර්යාලය, කොළඹ 01,
 ශ්‍රී ලංකාව

රජයාලය, කොළඹ 01,
 ශ්‍රී ලංකාව

The Secretariat, Colombo 01,
 Sri Lanka

කාර්යාලය - මුදල් } (+94)-11-2484500
 කාර්යාලය - අරමුදල } (+94)-11-2484600
 Office - Finance } (+94)-11-2484700
 කාර්යාලය - ජනමාධ්‍ය } (+94)-11-2513459
 කාර්යාලය - මාද්‍ය මාද්‍ය } (+94)-11-2513498
 Office - Mass Media } (+94)-11-2512324

ෆැක්ස් - මුදල් }
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 Date }

Cabinet Memorandum

Further Observations of the Minister of Finance and Mass Media

- Ministry** : National Policies and Economic Affairs
- Subject & Date** : Awarding the contract for the construction of the Central Expressway Section 3 (CEP III) from Potnuhera (CH. 0+000 km) to Galagedara (CH. 32+0.500km) Via Rambukkana
 25.01.2018
- Proposals/Requests** : Approval of the Cabinet of Ministers is sought for the following proposals;
1. Award the contract for the construction of the Central Expressway Project – Phase III to M/s Taisei Corporation of Japan, pending signing of the loan negotiated with the Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi / Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (BTMU/NEXI) for this purpose.
 2. Commence the necessary preparatory works for the immediate implementation of the project with the selected contractor using its own funds on the basis of reimbursement of relevant costs with the successful conclusion of the BTMU/NEXI facility.
- Observations** : The Cabinet of Ministers at its meeting held on 14.02.2018 has considered the Cabinet Memorandum dated 17.10.2017 on the above subject submitted by the Hon. Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs along with the observations made by me, where I did not agree with the proposals and decided to differ the same enabling me to submit further observations on the proposals. Accordingly, I have revisited my earlier observations

and considered the strategic importance of the project and agree with the early commencement of the project, subject to the following observations.

- a. The Ministry of Higher Education and Highways in consultation with the Department of External Resources (ERD) should finalize the loan within a period of three months.
- b. Payments for the preparatory works by the contractor should be made only on measure and pay basis.
- c. If the Ministry of Higher Education and Highways and the ERD fail to obtain the loan as planned, there won't be any commitment to the contractor beyond the completed works up to that date.



Mangala Samaraweera, M.P.
Minister of Finance and Mass Media

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E-mail }

OFFICE OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS

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Republic Building, Sir Baron Jayathilaka Mawatha,
Colombo 01, Sri Lanka.

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Your No. }

දිනය } 2018-02-21
திகதி }
Date }

Urgent & Confidential

Mr. D.C. Dissanayake
Secretary
Ministry of Higher Education and Highways
Fax: 2862705

25 FEB 2018
23 FEB 2018
Road Development Authority
Wing 1, 3rd Floor,
Sri Lanka
Bastaramulla.

DRAFT CABINET DECISION

Given below is an extract of Item (33) of the Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting held on 2018-02-20. These Minutes are to be confirmed at the next Cabinet Meeting.

Item (33)

Cabinet Paper No.18/0184/706/008, a Memorandum dated 2018-01-25 by the Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs on "Awarding the contract for the construction of Central Expressway Section 3 (CEP III) from Pothubera (CH. 0+000 km) to Galagedara (CH. 32+500 km) Via Rambukkana" - (Cabinet decision dated 2016-07-20 on CP No.16/1400/706/045 refers) the above Memorandum was considered along with the following:

- * the contents in the further Note to the Cabinet by the Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs dated 2018-02-19 numbered as CP No.18/0184/706/008-I on the same subject;
- * the observations of the Minister of Finance and Mass Media dated 2018-02-13 and his further observations dated 2018-02-19;
- * the observations of the Minister of Higher Education and Highways;
- * the further clarifications on the proposals in the Memorandum dated 2018-01-25, made by the Hon. Prime Minister and the Minister of Higher Education and Highways, at this meeting; and
- * the views expressed by the Minister of Megapolis and Western Development and several other Members of the Cabinet, at this meeting.

After discussion, Cabinet having noted that the construction of the Central Expressway is an acutely felt need, decided to grant approval to the proposals (I) and (II) in the final paragraph of the Memorandum dated 2018-01-25 on CP No. 18/0184/706/008 by the Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs, subject to Ministry of Higher Education and Highways adhering to the stipulations made in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in the observations dated 2018-02-19 by the Minister of Finance and Mass Media.

Contd./2-

- 02 -

Action by: **My/National Policies and Economic Affairs** - above observations annexed.
My/Higher Education and Highways - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.

Copied to: **Secretary to the President** - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.
Secretary to the Prime Minister - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.
My/Finance and Mass Media - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.
My/Megapolis and Western Development - to be brought to the notice of the Hon. Minister - copy each of the relevant documents annexed.



S. Abeysinghe
Secretary to the Cabinet of Ministers

18/0184/706/008 - 1



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Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs

"මිලෝඩ්" (පැරණි ටයිම්ස් භාණ්ඩාගාරය), පලමු මහල, මිලිටේ ඒටී, කොළඹ 01. "Milooda" (Old Times Building), 1st Floor, Ebfis/O Street, Colombo 01.

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Date } 19.02.2018

Note to the Cabinet

33

Implementation of the Central Expressway 3rd section (32Km) from Pothuhera to Galagedara

Further to my Cabinet Memorandum dated 25th January 2018, I submit the following information to the Cabinet of Ministers for their information.

The Cabinet Appointed Negotiation Committee (CANC) for the procurement of civil contractor for the construction of Central Expressway 3rd section (32Km) from Pothuhera to Galagedara has recommended the Cabinet of Ministers to award the above contract to the M/s Taise Corporation of Japan for a negotiated contract sum of SLR 134,905,155,000.00.

Having referred to the strong recommendation made by the Japanese Government regarding the competency of M/s Fujita Corporation to implement the project, at the Cabinet Committee on Economic Management meeting held on 28th June 2017 (agenda Item No 28/06/2017/23) it was decided to recommend to Cabinet that both bidders, M/s Taise Corporation and M/s Fujita Corporation can form a consortium.

The Cabinet of Ministers had approved the above CCEM decision on the meeting held on 11.07.2017, and instructed the Ministry of Highways and Higher Education to inform the arrangement by the way of Note to the Cabinet.

The above arrangement will be an internal arrangement of the both companies for the purpose of implementation of the project and the terms of financing facility and implementation schedule of the project will not be affected by this arrangement. I attach herewith a preliminary agreement between the M/s Taise Corporation and M/s Fujita Corporation intending to form the Joint Venture between the two companies.

Once the contract is awarded to M/s Taise Corporation and the BTMU loan become effective, the final version of the above agreement will be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for information.

Ranil Wickremesinghe, M. P
Minister of National Policies and Economic Affairs

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E-mail }
Website }

info@mnpdea.gov.lk
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- ii. Environmental and Social Due Diligence (ESDD) have not commenced yet.
- iii. If the Loan Agreement is not signed on or before 365 calendar days from the due date of signing the Contract Agreement, the contract shall automatically stand terminated. Further, in such a situation the employer Road Development Authority (RDA) should pay the contractor for the works already done, including the financing costs incurred, if any, using its own funds.
- iv. In addition, in my previous observations dated 17.07.2017 on the Cabinet Memorandum No. CP 17/1520/713/045-111/TBR, I have pointed out the likely obligations that could be faced by the General Treasury if the necessary funds are obtained as a loan from the Bank of Tokyo – Mitsubishi (BTMU) of Japan.

Therefore, I do not agree with the proposals to commence the project without ensuring the availability of funds to avoid creating unnecessary financial burden to the Government Budget.



Mangala Samaraweera, M.P.
Minister of Finance and Mass Media



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உயர் கல்வி மற்றும் நெடுஞ்சாலைகள் அமைச்சு
MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION & HIGHWAYS

අංකය No.	MPH/HWY/ADM/07/03	පාලන අංකය අංකය Your No.	16/1400/706/045	දිනය Date	2016.07
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Cabinet Memorandum
Observations of the Minister of Higher Education & Highways

Ministry: Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs


Title: Mandate Letter to Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. to Fund the 3rd Phase of Central Expressway and the Elevated Road from Kelani Bridge to Rajagiriya

Number and Date: CP No: 16/1400/706/045
Date: 2016-07-14

Proposals: Approval of the Cabinet of Ministers was sought for the following:

- To authorize Director General, Department of External Resources to sign the attached Mandate Letter; and
- To conduct further negotiations with the BTMU on Terms and Conditions of the proposed credit facility

Observations: I have no objection for the implementation of the above proposals.


Lakshman Kiriella
Minister of Higher Education & Highways

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CONSORTIUM AGREEMENT

This Consortium Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "Agreement") is made on 12 Sep 2017, by and between:

Taisei Corporation, a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan, having its registered office at 1-25-1, Nishi-Shinjuku, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 163-0606, Japan and having a registered branch office at 3rd Floor, No.177, Galle Road, Colombo 03, Sri Lanka.

(Hereinafter referred to as "TAISEI");

And

Fujita Corporation, a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan, having its registered office at 4-25-2, Sendagaya, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 151-8570, Japan

(Hereinafter referred to as "FUJITA");

Each hereinafter referred to individually as a "Party" and collectively as "Parties".

WHEREAS, it is defined as the **Road Development Authority (RDA), Ministry of Higher Education & Highways, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka** the "Employer" and design, construction, completion and remedying of the **Central Expressway Project Section 3** from Pothuhera (Ch.0+000 KM) to Galagedara (Ch.32+500 Km) as the "Works".

Both Parties hereby agree:


1. that both **Parties** of the Consortium shall be liable jointly and severally for the execution and remedying the defects of the **Works** in accordance with the Conditions of the Contact;
2. that after receiving the consent by the **Employer** for this consortium, action will be taken to legalize this Consortium Agreement by the **Parties** of the Consortium.

Signed for and on behalf of Taisei Corporation

Signed for and on behalf of Fujita Corporation



Hiroki Horikawa
General Manager
Taisei Corporation
Colombo Office
International Marketing and
Business Development Division



Hiroo Suganuma
General Manager
International Branch
Fujita Corporation